The apparent stabilisation in the number of political persecutions in Russia masks significant changes in their structure and organisation. Human rights databases record a more or less stable number of new individuals facing charges, yet court statistics show a continued and substantial increase in the number of people convicted under politically sensitive and repressive articles.
Although the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court has withheld a substantial proportion of data on convictions of this kind, Re: Russia has managed to reconstruct some of the statistical indicators. On this basis, we estimate that around 3,650 people were convicted under politically sensitive provisions in 2025, 1.7 times the figure for the previous year. The discrepancy between human rights and judicial statistics points both to the growing opacity of repression and to its expanding reach beyond the more visible, urban and politically engaged sections of society. A second domain of repression is emerging on the geographical and social periphery of contemporary Russia.
At the same time, human rights activists note that the FSB has definitively become both the main operator and the driving force behind repression. Accordingly, the share of cases falling under its investigative jurisdiction is growing, while the proportion involving less serious charges is declining. The repressive apparatus is increasingly concentrated around three broad and ever more elastic categories of offences: terrorism, extremism and treason. Charges relating to anti-war statements are fading from the scene, whilst retrospective campaigns targeting donors to the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and former members of Vyacheslav Maltsev's Artpodgotovka movement are becoming instruments of intimidation aimed at politically engaged urban communities. Charges of financing extremism and facilitating terrorism make it possible to prosecute people on the basis of political associations dating back many years.
However, the main factor behind the rise in convictions under repressive articles is the prosecution of Ukrainian prisoners of war on terrorism charges, alongside the steadily expanding category of cases combining terrorism charges with treason. This combination is being used extensively both against residents of occupied Ukrainian territories and in Russia's own regions. It amounts to a veritable conveyor belt which, apparently, the FSB presents to the political leadership as a campaign against potential saboteurs and accomplices of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also enables the authorities to extend the social reach of repression.
Preliminary data from human rights organisations tracking the emergence of new politically motivated cases suggest that, in numerical terms, political repression in Russia appears to have stabilised in 2025–2026. Quantitative stabilisation, however, does not in itself mean that the pressure of repression has eased. Its deterrent, or more precisely terror-inducing, effect is successfully sustained through the arbitrary conduct of investigators and courts, which demonstrate to citizens their complete powerlessness in the face of the repressive machinery; the systematic use of torture during investigations and within the penal system; and lengthy prison sentences. According to Memorial's calculations, the median length of imprisonment for political sentences has risen throughout the war, reaching 11 years in 2025. A recent review by Memorial shows that at least 22 political prisoners have been killed or have died as a result of torture, with a further 18 cases in which such an outcome is suspected.
Nevertheless, human rights databases show no increase in the number of new politically motivated prosecutions in 2026, or even in 2025, compared with the preceding period. At the same time, the number of convictions under repressive provisions of the Criminal Code, used to prosecute political opponents as well as members of groups regarded by the authorities as unreliable (such as Islamic activists), continued to rise in 2025.
If one were to attempt to determine the absolute scale of repression in Russia in 2025–2026, it would amount to around 3,000–3,500 people per year, or 2,000–2,500 if Ukrainian prisoners of war and residents of occupied Ukrainian territories are excluded. These two categories, which accounted for around a third of all prosecutions under repressive articles, constitute a separate repressive domain within the overall picture. These estimates are based on an analysis of three sources that provide an insight into the current level of political repression: the OVD-Info database of politically motivated prosecutions, the Memorial database on prosecutions involving deprivation of liberty, and Re:Russia's own calculations of convictions under 36 politicised and repressive articles of the Criminal Code (for further details on these articles as an indicator of repression and on these statistics → Re: Russia: Repression Index). These three perspectives offer different perspectives on the dynamics of the repressive machinery in today's Russia (see Table 1 for a detailed breakdown of the data from all three sets of statistics).
However, the updating of the OVD-Info database slowed significantly in 2025–2026, while updating Re: Russia's judicial statistics dataset has been hampered by the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court classifying, from this year onwards, conviction data for an entire chapter of the Criminal Code (Chapter 29, 'Crimes against the Foundations of the Constitutional Order and State Security'). The articles in this chapter cover offences including treason, espionage, extremist activity and sabotage (Articles 275–284.3). On the one hand, these offences fall under the investigative jurisdiction of the FSB, which explains why the data have been withheld. On the other, they accounted for approximately 45% of all convictions under repressive provisions in 2024–2025.
According to Re:Russia's calculations, the total number of unique individuals implicated in new prosecutions, as recorded in the two human rights databases (OVD-Info and Memorial) was 2,162 in 2025, compared with 2,042 in 2024. Overlaps between the databases have been excluded. However, the effectiveness of OVD-Info's data in capturing the number of repressive cases in 2025 may have been affected by victims' reluctance to disclose that they were being prosecuted. Given the current level of repression, publicity is more likely to worsen the position of those targeted. We therefore believe that the actual number of cases opened last year was higher. Nevertheless, approximately 2,000 unique new cases of persecution recorded across the two databases in 2024–2025 provide an important benchmark for understanding the scale of repression and establishing its lower bound.
As for convictions under the group of 36 repressive articles identified in our analysis, official statistics record 2,120 in 2024 and almost 1,600 in the first half of 2025 alone, the latest period for which complete data have been published, compared with 893 in the first half of 2024. Conviction figures under repressive provisions in 2025 were significantly affected by the trials of Ukrainian prisoners of war, who in Russia are sentenced to prison terms under the 'terrorism' article (Article 205, Part 2), contrary to international norms and common sense. According to various estimates, at least 360–380 such sentences were handed down in 2025 (→ MIPL; First Department & Parubets Analytics; The Insider & Parubets Analytics). However, even after excluding this category, the number of convictions under repressive provisions in the first half of 2025 was approximately 35% higher than in the first half of 2024.
For those articles whose conviction data were not withheld by the Judicial Department in its full-year 2025 statistics (14 of the 36 repressive articles identified in our analysis), the number of convictions increased by at least 50% compared with the previous year, even after excluding convictions under Article 205, the 'terrorism' provision used to sentence Ukrainian prisoners of war (see Table 2). In particular, the number of people convicted for 'protest-related' offences (violations of the procedure for organising public events and mass riots, Articles 212, 212.1 and 214) rose from 73 to 245; convictions for the 'rehabilitation of Nazism' increased from 52 to 104; and those for justifying terrorism and making public calls for terrorist activity rose from 410 to 662. The total number of convictions under these provisions increased from 535 in 2024 to 1,011 in 2025. Overall, the number of people convicted under the provisions for which data remain publicly available doubled, from 1,075 to 2,065.
However, the available court statistics for 2025 do allow for a fairly accurate reconstruction of the total number of convictions under Chapter 29 of the Criminal Code and, consequently, the approximate overall number of convictions under repressive provisions in 2025. A total of 1,818 people were convicted under these articles during the year, including 818 in the first half. Of these, approximately 200–220 were probably convicted of offences involving state secrets (Article 283 and related offences), as indicated by the figures for 2024 (210 convictions) and the first half of 2025 (110 cases). Articles 278–279 are not used as principal charges and therefore do not affect our calculation of the Chapter's statistics. We consequently estimate that around 1,600 people were convicted during the year under the 22 repressive articles concealed by the Judicial Department. This puts the total number of people convicted under politically sensitive provisions in 2025 at approximately 3,650, 1.7 times the number of convictions under repressive provisions in 2024. Thus, the number of convictions continued to rise not only in the first half of 2025 compared with 2024, but also in the second half of the year when there were more than 2,000 convictions, compared with 1,594 in the first half.
An increase was observed across most 'thematic' categories of repressive articles, but two categories stand out in numerical terms: terrorism-related offences (in the publicly available statistics) and treason cases (in the concealed statistics). The number of convictions under the 'terrorist act' provision (Article 205) surged from 75 to 473, largely as a result of prosecutions of Ukrainian prisoners of war. Convictions under other terrorism-related provisions rose by a third, from 793 to 1,058.
According to investigations by Kirill Parubets, at least 478 people were convicted in 2025 under the category of 'Espionage and Treason', compared with 189 in 2024, an increase of 2.5 times (→ Parubets Analytics 2025; Parubets Analytics 2026). However, most of the defendants' personal details were withheld. In terms of the alleged conduct, 35% of cases involved the transmission of supposedly classified information, 30% involved arson and sabotage, and a further 35% concerned donations to Ukrainian organisations, correspondence with alleged representatives of Ukrainian intelligence services, and intentions to join Ukrainian armed formations. Some cases in this last category were based on entrapment by law enforcement officers. These provisions appear to play a key role in law enforcement agencies' performance reporting. As a result, prosecutions under them have effectively been turned into a conveyor belt, surrounded by a particularly thick wall of secrecy.
Thus, the judicial statistics clearly indicate an increase in the scale of repression. The divergence between trends in the human rights organisations' data and those reflected in conviction statistics is attributable to changes in the socio-demographic profile of those targeted. The centre of gravity of repression has shifted away from the capitals, where prosecutions for extremism and anti-war statements were concentrated, towards the geographical periphery and occupied territories, where cases involving treason and terrorism are now driving the increase (as evidenced by the geographical distribution of the courts handing down sentences, as compiled by Parubets). As we suggested in our previous review, repression has, in a sense, 'gone mainstream'. The Baymak case and Prigozhin's mutiny revealed to the authorities a potential threat concentrated in social strata which they had not previously regarded in this light.
The latest assessments of trends in repression in 2026, based on human rights databases, are presented in Memorial's recently published 'Barometer of Repression' report. According to Memorial's experts, the total number of new cases of persecution recorded in the first three quarters of 2026 was 2,030, compared with 2,160 over the same period in 2025. Excluding Ukrainian prisoners of war (330 people) and residents of occupied territories (307), human rights defenders recorded 1,393 new cases of persecution, compared with 1,339 over the same three quarters of 2025. It should be borne in mind, however, that the data are collected manually and added to the databases with a delay. The figures for the first three quarters of 2026 are therefore likely to increase over time, and the year-on-year rise may ultimately prove somewhat greater than the current 4%.
According to Memorial's analysts, one of the main trends in 2026 has been a structural shift in the relative importance of different categories of persecution. On the one hand, there has been a sharp decline in prosecutions under the traditional 'intelligentsia-oriented' provisions concerning the discrediting of the armed forces and the dissemination of knowingly false information about them ('fake news'), as well as under other less serious provisions targeting public statements and expressions of political allegiance (vandalism, the rehabilitation of Nazism, extremist symbols and so on). The number of people targeted under this group of provisions fell from 220 in the first three quarters of 2025 to 120 over the same period this year. At the same time, the number of people prosecuted under extremism-related provisions increased by 132, primarily as a result of a rise in convictions under Article 282.3, 'Financing Extremist Activity' (+90 people). This increase is the result of a retrospective campaign, launched in 2025, against people who donated to the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) in 2020–2021.
In April 2026, Mediazona reported that it had information on 225 cases of this type. Memorial recorded 244 cases over the course of the first three quarters of last year and over the same period this year. The popularity of this form of repression among the Russian authorities and security services is readily explained. First, such prosecutions require minimal effort on the part of those carrying them out: surviving bank transaction records provide direct evidence of the relevant transfers. Second, the campaign targets a social group that is particularly critical of the regime and the war it has launched, making it an effective instrument of intimidation. Finally, it indirectly discredits the FBK leadership by suggesting that it allowed donors' data to leak, while also undermining the very idea of financially supporting political initiatives.
Another retrospective campaign of repression in 2026 targets former members of the Artpodgotovka movement. Over the six quarters of 2025 and 2026, Memorial's experts recorded 64 such cases, two-thirds of them in 2026. Here, too, the relative ease of identifying potential defendants is combined with the possibility of bringing serious charges, namely 'facilitating terrorist activity'. More broadly, these retrospective campaigns indicate that repression is no longer reactive. It is no longer simply a response to the behaviour of particular communities, but is instead geared towards maintaining specific levels of pressure on them and sustaining a background climate of fear among the relevant social groups. The performance targets for repression exceed the number of people who openly demonstrate their disloyalty in one way or another.
Finally, Memorial's analysts identify the growing concentration of repression under the FSB's authority as the principal institutional trend in the current pattern of repression. This is reflected in the steadily increasing share of prosecutions involving offences under the investigative jurisdiction of the security service, alongside a decline in the share of cases handled by other law enforcement agencies. According to Memorial's report, at least one FSB-investigated offence featured in 67% of politically motivated criminal cases in the first three quarters of 2026. This institutional perspective also helps explain the growing number of charges brought against each defendant: additional charges are needed to bring defendants firmly within the FSB's sphere of responsibility. As a result, the potential of the repressive apparatus is increasingly concentrated within the framework of 'extremism, terrorism, and treason'. This is where the FSB is 'making its money' from repression and apparently securing a continuous increase in its performance indicators, funding and powers. 'The proposition that the FSB is the principal operator of political repression should be supplemented by the observation that the FSB is not merely an operator, but also a catalyst, driving repression to ever higher levels', the experts conclude.
In Memorial's database of politically motivated repression involving restrictions on personal liberty, 770 new cases were added over the first three quarters of 2026, compared with 1,534 for the whole of the previous year. At least 40% of these cases involve terrorism-related provisions, while more than a quarter include charges of treason or espionage (Articles 275, 275.1, 276 and 276.1). However, as with the 2025 data, this picture reflects the structure of repression rather than fully capturing its scale. Although official judicial statistics for the first half of 2026 have still not been published, Kirill Parubets has independently compiled some of these statistics. His findings identify 1,145 convictions under terrorism-related provisions during this period, involving 1,234 people. According to his data, the corresponding figures for the first half of 2025 were 725 convictions and 892 people convicted, meaning that the number of prosecutions increased by approximately one and a half times (according to court statistics, 651 people were convicted under the principal terrorism provision during this period, whereas Parubets' figures include all convictions in which the relevant provision appears as either a principal or an additional charge).
Between March and June 2026, the number of convictions levelled off at a high plateau, averaging 225 per month in cases involving one or another terrorism-related provision. More than half (54%) of those convicted were charged under Article 205.2, 'Public Calls for Terrorist Activity'. As in 2025, more than 85% of convictions were handed down by four district military courts: the Southern, 2nd Western, Central and 2nd Eastern District Military Courts. Among the publicly available convictions in 2026, 39% involved Ukrainian nationals, compared with 30% of those convicted of terrorism whose identities were known in 2025. In other words, much of the numerical increase is attributable to this group, which includes both prisoners of war and civilians from occupied territories accused of collaborating with or supporting Ukraine.
Finally, according to data compiled by Parubets, 487 people were convicted under articles relating to treason and espionage during the first three quarters of 2026. The monthly average of defendants convicted under these provisions rose from 33 in the first quarter to 53 in the second and 62 in the third. If this pace continues, the total number of convictions under these provisions could reach approximately 670 by the end of the year. This is highly likely, given that, according to Parubets, a further 242 similar cases are currently before the courts. The only question is how many of them the courts will manage to finalise before the end of the year. Moreover, in the second quarter, the number of new treason cases exceeded the number concluded (202 against 160). Only in the third quarter did the number of convictions match the number of newly initiated cases (190).
The treason conveyor belt operates along the same lines as in 2025, but on a larger scale. First, the same group of southern and military courts continues to play the dominant role in this campaign of repression, with Ukrainian nationals and residents of occupied territories accounting for a substantial proportion of those convicted. Second, a significant number of cases combine charges of treason with one or another terrorism-related offence. It is noteworthy that the number of convictions involving terrorism-related provisions in the first half of 2026 and the number involving treason over the first three quarters show roughly the same rate of growth, approximately 40% year on year. The specific charge of 'terrorist act' (Article 205) appears in the indictments of 427 defendants, most of whom are probably prisoners of war. However, the most 'popular' provision remains, as in the previous year, Article 205.2, covering 'public calls for terrorist activity and justification of terrorism'. It features in the cases of 862 defendants. Apparently, people are being prosecuted for expressing sympathy for Ukraine or making statements about the Russian occupation, while the addition of a treason charge gives such cases the appearance of matters of national security. In other words, these cases form a single segment of repression which, in essence, amounts to a campaign of terror against residents of occupied territories.
Thus, several key trends in Russia's repressive policy in 2026 can be identified. First, the FSB is becoming the principal operator of repression, effectively the lead agency determining the structure and objectives of repressive policy. One consequence is the concentration of charges within the framework of 'extremism, terrorism and treason', which presents them not merely as a response to dissent but as matters of existential national security. In this respect, the agency's institutional profile is increasingly drifting towards the image of the NKVD. Second, we are witnessing the emergence of two distinct domains of repression: repression targeting politically engaged urban communities, against which a sustained campaign of preventive terror is being conducted; and, in parallel, campaigns of occupation terror in territories of Ukraine seized by Russian forces. This type of repressive policy is clearly not confined to occupied territories, as the statistics demonstrate. It is also spreading across Russia's periphery, where the FSB is actively hunting for 'Ukrainian saboteurs' and prosecuting them behind a veil of total secrecy. In any case, this second domain is directed not at potentially oppositional, urban and modernised social groups, but at ordinary Russians, the wider population. It is in this second domain that the machinery of repression is currently expanding its reach.
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