Once in exile, opposition members lose the ability to participate directly in the political life of their country and lose part of their influence; at the same time, they gain the opportunity to speak safely, access to the media, and contacts with the governments of the host countries. The task of the opposition in exile is to maximise these advantages and minimise the losses of 'alienation' to achieve a mode of 'influential exile', which becomes audible both on the international stage and domestically.
Against the backdrop of the colossal scandal currently tearing apart the Russian opposition, a comprehensive overview of the activities of the opposition diaspora, presented by the Russian Analytical Digest, notes, on one hand, its quite high activity, resulting in numerous projects and initiatives, and on the other hand, the low cumulative effect of its activities, caused by ideological divisions and endless disputes. Interviews conducted by researchers indicate that there is an articulated demand for unity and solidarity within the relocated diaspora. The second overwhelming factor is the disbelief of a significant part of the diaspora in the political future of Russia. All of this leads to the opposition itself feeling ineffective and underestimating its potential.
At the same time, its ‘zone of success’ can be considered the new public sphere of the Russian emigration created up to this point, uniting both media projects and various bloggers – public speakers. This public sphere is essentially the connecting element that ensures a common agenda for the Russian opposition, not only for its relocated part but also for those who remain within the country. However, despite having significant authority and a strong voice, this new public sphere forms more of a general identity than common goals and cannot fully replace politicians and political structures that set a program for collective action and coalition solidarity for citizens.
Once in exile, opposition members are forced to make an extremely difficult trade-off. Lacking the opportunity to participate directly in the political life of their country, they lose part of their influence in the society they wish to politically represent. At the same time, they, on one hand, gain freedom of speech, assembly, and access to media – things that were denied to them at home and are still denied to their colleagues who remain there – and, on the other hand, can gain influence over the host country’s policy regarding their home country and the diaspora. Describing this trade-off in the article 'Activism in Exile', focused on Russian eco-activists, political scientists Laura Henley and Elizabeth Plantan define it as the loss of a 'horizontal voice' (influence on fellow citizens) and the acquisition of a 'vertical voice' (influence on politicians). If the latter is achieved, exile can provide activists and opposition members with new opportunities. Henley and Plantan refer to this as 'exile with new opportunities', or 'empowered exile'. Whether the relocation of the Russian opposition has become 'exile with new opportunities' is the main question of the article by political scientist Ekaterina Vorobieva titled 'Influential Exile or Inhibited Action?'
Although in quantitative terms, the majority of the Russians who have relocated during the war are concentrated in countries to the south of Russia (→ Re:Russia: Three Relocated Groups in Five Countries), the activist, political, and media segments of this diaspora are primarily located in Europe. Two issues of the Russian Analytical Digest (Issue 1 and Issue 2), prepared by Vorobieva, are dedicated to analysing the current state and activities of this part of the Russian opposition community. On one hand, the Russian emigration from the 'military' wave is very active. According to some studies and surveys, at least 20% of Russian emigrants abroad participated in protests and volunteer actions after their departure. Relocated Russians have generated numerous anti-war initiatives, public organisations, and media projects. On the other hand, Vorobieva summarises, published studies and reviews on this topic show that the Russian diaspora does not perceive its exile as ‘influential’.
Among the problems that hinder the activities of relocated Russians, as they note in surveys and in-depth interviews, are a lack of funding, anti-Russian sentiments in host countries, low visibility in the media, extremely uneven representation in the political communities of host countries, and the absence of a unified lobbying mechanism to protect the interests of Russians within the European Union. In the Baltic states and Poland, for example, Russians are seen as a potential security threat, which negatively impacts their ability to establish political connections. In contrast, the authorities in Germany have created a system of ‘humanitarian’ visas for Russians and are willing to engage with the Russian diaspora. However, calls for a more coordinated EU policy regarding new, politically active Russian emigrants have not yet yielded significant results.
Nevertheless, this typical set of immigrant problems does not convincingly explain what prevents the Russian opposition abroad from achieving the status of ‘influential exile’, nor does it answer the question of whether it will be able to do so in the future by finally resolving the pressing issues of relocation.
Political scientists Mikhail Turchenko and Margarita Zavadskaya, confirming that Russians have managed to create a whole ecosystem of organisations and initiatives abroad in various fields, propose a more detailed typology of this activity. They categorise opposition strategies by types of activities (lobbying, media, education, electoral and non-electoral politics) and by target audiences (Russians in Russia, Russians in emigration, the society of the host country, Ukrainian society, international organisations). Most initiatives are, of course, focused on Russians – both within Russia and in emigration. This is where one of the important divides lies.
On one end of the spectrum of political initiatives are projects associated with Alexei Navalny and some others, which tend to emphasise their Russian origins and do not wish to draw a line between those who stayed and those who left. On the other end is the 'Free Russia' forum, 'which is a diaspora-oriented project that not only advocates for the rights of this population group but also promotes emigration from Russia', the authors note. These disagreements often take the form of irreconcilable disputes. Despite a common anti-war stance, political organisations and activists struggle to achieve mutual understanding, form a positive agenda, and create alliances that would amplify the Russian opposition's voice.
The inability to coordinate activities is the main criticism from the ‘military’ wave of emigrants directed at the opposition leaders, Turchenko and Zavadskaya conclude in another article (‘Russian Wartime Migrants: Matching Political Demand and Supply’), summarising 390 interviews with those who have relocated, conducted in six countries. ‘The interviews demonstrate deep disappointment in the Russian opposition due to the ineffectiveness of its leaders, as well as a lack of faith in a positive political future for Russia’, the authors write. The opposition is perceived as ineffective and focused on internal conflicts rather than on creating a united front against the Putin regime. The striking lack of solidarity is contrasted by respondents with examples of opposition diasporas in other countries, such as Turkey and Belarus, where the opposition has managed to maintain unity despite differences in views.
Migrants often criticise opposition leaders for their lack of a coordinated response to the needs of the new emigration. Deprived of political representation at home, many of those surveyed expect the opposition to assume the role of representatives of those who have relocated in the authorities of the host countries. A similar request is found in other studies. According to a survey conducted by the ‘Diploma of Freedom’ project among recently emigrated and soon-to-emigrate Russians, representatives of this group need help with adaptation: assistance with language learning, legal consultations on immigration and labour issues, job search assistance, and so on.
Despite a commitment to democratic ideals, the internal structure and practices of emigration movements can reproduce authoritarian models. Sociologist Pavel Kronov from the Public Sociology Laboratory examined the organisational structure of one of the Russian anti-war NGOs operating in a European capital. The leadership of this organisation is concentrated in the hands of a team that is not accountable to the community but controls resources and makes decisions, prioritising efficiency and results over democratic procedures. Attempts at democratisation encounter resistance, justified by a desire to maintain a 'working' status quo. This creates tension between democratic rhetoric and the reality of hierarchical control, reflecting the political culture of the activists themselves, which has been shaped by conditions of autocracy and corporate structures, Kronov argues.
Sociologist Karolina Nugumanova, a doctoral student at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, highlights the 'reverse gender gap' in Russian political activism – a situation where women are more involved in the activities of organisations than men but remain less visible. This phenomenon, along with the informal hierarchical nature of management, can be linked to practices and stereotypes carried over from Russia: men often occupy leadership positions and participate in public strategic discussions, while women are more engaged in solving everyday operational tasks.
The proportion of women in volunteer and political projects has significantly increased: women are more likely than men to participate in helping refugees, digital volunteering, and protest actions abroad. Nugumanova points to the OutRush study conducted in the emigrant community in September 2022, which showed that 55% of women and 48% of men experienced guilt related to the war, while 78% of women and 65% of men agreed on the necessity of compensating for the damage caused by Russia in Ukraine. The work that women have taken on requires continuous effort, involves risks and high responsibility, but receives less recognition in the eyes of the community. Nugumanova believes this reflects both the challenges of activism in emigration and the widespread perceptions of gender roles in Russia.
Many of Turchenko and Zavadskaya's informants equate political activity with media engagement, seeing the opposition in 'YouTubers', bloggers, and 'educators'. In this case, the perception of the opposition is more positive, as the interviewees believe that media personalities in emigration do not seek political power and are less inclined to confrontational approaches than political groups. As a result, they appear to be more consensus-oriented figures than opposition leaders (except for the assassinated Alexei Navalny). A successful example of consolidated, solidarity-driven efforts mentioned by many respondents was the media marathon ‘You Are Not Alone’, organised by several media platforms to support political prisoners. Nearly all significant opposition figures and media personalities participated in the marathon, both as speakers and in fundraising efforts.
The paradox of the new Russian opposition diaspora is that the public sphere it has created, which includes both media projects and individual blogs, as well as human rights initiatives, appears quite convincing, consolidates the diaspora itself, and is significantly 'heard' in Russia. This is particularly important because the current Russian emigration is happening for the first time in the new conditions of information dominance by the internet and social media. The spaces 'inside' and 'outside' are not as fatally divided and isolated from each other as in previous episodes of political emigration.
As we recently noted, the segment of independent Russian news and political broadcasting on YouTube includes around 130 channels with a total of about 110 million subscribers. According to monitoring by YouScore, the six largest projects had between one and two million views per day at the beginning of this autumn. The overlap in their audiences is undoubtedly very high; however, the core audience of the Russian ‘oppositional’ YouTube can be estimated at approximately 10 million people, with another 10 million belonging to its periphery (→ Re:Russia: Stopping the Stream).
TV channel ‘Dozhd’ |
2092 |
Khodorkovsky LIVE |
1997 |
Michael Nacke |
1558 |
NEXTA Live |
1530 |
Popular politics |
1451 |
DW in Russian |
1082 |
Anton Hardin |
871 |
Maxim Katz |
857 |
Radio Liberty |
772 |
I Gryanul Grem |
742 |
Current Time |
699 |
The Breakfast Show |
606 |
ВОТ ТАК |
599 |
To be continued |
486 |
РRadio Liberty. News |
453 |
It is this new public sphere that largely forms the infrastructure of the Russian opposition, ensuring both the unity of the opposition diaspora itself and its connection with ideological supporters located in Russia. Opinion leaders among political bloggers, 'educators', and journalists shape the identity of this community by providing material for internal debates and interpretations of current events. At the same time, despite having significant authority and a strong voice, the media and public figures cannot fully replace politicians and political institutions that should articulate common political strategies and an 'action program'. As a result, the vibrant and largely successful activities of the opposition diaspora appear ineffective – and insufficient to achieve the status of 'influential exile'.