Europe at Different Speeds: Reforming European military and political institutions should begin without waiting for the agreement of all EU members, according to German experts

‘Wir erleben eine Zeitenwende’, ‘We are at a turning point’, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a few days after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A year later, the German Language Society recognised the word Zeitenwende (literally, ‘turn of time’) as ‘the word of 2022’. As a necessary response to the Zeitenwende, Scholz called for the creation of a national defence fund of €100 billion, the development of a pan-European air defence system, the establishment of a European rapid reaction force headquarters and defence ministers council, as well as the reform of European institutions to allow the EU to make more decisions by majority vote rather than consensus. However, a programme containing virtually all of the same things could be outlined today. Scholz offered no concrete map of action. As a result, the likelihood of a breakup or radical transformation of the established Western alliances – the EU and NATO – is higher today than at any time since the early years of the Cold War, writes political scientist Josef Janning in his analysis on the website of the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP). 

In subsequent speeches, Scholz backtracked, emphasising that the reform of EU structures is only possible if all members of the community agree, that is, based on consensus. However, no such consensus is in sight. As we have noted several times, pan-European polls show quite clearly that there are two Europes (→ Re:Russia: United but Divisible). One extends from the north-east to the south-west, from Norway to Spain; the other is located in the centre and south-east, from Austria to Greece and from Italy to Bulgaria. In the first, the ideas expressed by Scholz are supported not by an absolute, but by a pronounced majority. In the second, they are supported by a more or less significant minority. At the same time, the threats and challenges requiring a response have become much more tangible and immediate over time. If more than two years ago the threat of direct confrontation between Russia and the EU seemed like an abstract strategic scenario, it now appears highly likely (→ Re:Russia: Waiting for War). But even within Europe, a policy of inaction leads to increasing contradictions and polarisation rather than strengthening unity (→ Re:Russia: Rightward Tilt). 

Europe needs to clearly define its potential boundaries, that is, the area of ​​countries that could and would like to become part of it, believes Janning. Membership should also remain open to those countries that currently do not want to join (for example, the UK or Norway). In addition, it is necessary to accelerate the integration of the Western Balkans, the most important enclave in the current EU, and prepare for the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. At the same time, according to Janning, the EU needs to pursue deeper political integration, which should include a unified energy policy, a single market for military products, a single capital market, and a common tax base, gradually moving away from the mechanism of contributions from member states. It is also necessary to abandon the principle of consensus – discussion on this matter intensified in 2022 but then stalled (→ Re:Russia: Unity without Consensus). And, the EU charter should include the principle of suspending or terminating membership.

Janning proposes a ‘two speed’ strategy: the members of the ‘European core’, primarily France and Germany, focused on the integration of defence forces, should develop and create a common foreign and security policy, a common decision-making process on the defensive use of military force, a common military command, and so on. Such a defence alliance will need a common budget and joint procurement, which implies a single market for military products. As a result, all this would require a new treaty between the EU countries, which would in fact formalise a separate union within the EU. The same treaty could also regulate other issues of deeper integration. Over time, other EU states could join the defence treaty, which would eventually allow for the integration of the defence union.

However, such a plan assumes achieving a greater level of agreement between Germany and France. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Paris and Berlin have begun to reform their security and defence policies at the national level, but as a result, the differences between them are only increasing, according to a report by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). While the positions of Macron and Scholz are very close on a declarative level, on a practical level there remain many contradictions between the countries that complicate their interaction.

Macron clearly welcomed Scholz's speech in the Bundestag, in which he mentioned the Zeitenwende and generally spoke from the position of Europe's strategic sovereignty. However, it subsequently became clear that both countries partly claimed leadership in formulating a response to the Zeitenwende and undertook unilateral initiatives that partly contradicted each other. This is evident, for example, in the programme for reforming defence policy: the German version focuses on rapid buildup and rearmament, including through procurement outside the EU, while Paris' initiatives, on the contrary, place special emphasis on the deployment and development of European production, the analysts at SWP analysts note.

Coordination falters even at the organisational level. In Paris, defence and foreign policy issues are in the hands of the president and his office, and Macron's initiative has only reinforced this concentration. Whereas, in Berlin, decisions on such matters are much more developed at the ministry level.

Paralysis of action becomes a consequence of paralysis of leadership. Berlin and Paris must find a way to combine their efforts. To do so, the mandate of the actively operating Franco-German Commission for the Reform of EU Structures should be expanded: it should also work towards a common and coherent platform between the two countries, both on the key issues of European structural reform and on its defence policy.