The Narrative of The 1990s: Between personal experience, family memory and ideological myths

‘The country is a family’: different views of 1990s

It is commonly believed that the 1990s, which saw the era of market reforms, are remembered by the public as a painful period. Using data from a telephone survey conducted by the PROPA project in June 2024, we sought to understand how the assessment of the post-Soviet decades – the 1990s and the 2000s – is refracted through personal memories and family recollections of Russian citizens, and whether the majority of Russians indeed hold a critical view of the transition to a market economy and such radical reforms as privatisation, as well as of the decade that followed.

The 1990s do indeed have a poor reputation, but this cannot be explained solely by family experience. As expected, the majority of Russians surveyed view the 1990s as a negative period both for their family and for Russia’s history, 61% and 74% respectively (see Table 1). At the same time, more than a quarter of those surveyed (28%) still consider the decade to have been positive for their family, whereas only 17% see it as a positive period in Russia’s history overall.

Table 1. Attitudes towards the 1990s and 2000s in the context of family history and the history of the country, June 2024, % of those surveyed

At first glance, this may seem odd, as people tend to extrapolate their own experience to others and to the time period in question. In reality, however, perceptions of the general state of affairs in the country, and of any given period in the past. also depend on the information respondents receive from the media. Therefore, the simplest explanation for the more-than-ten-point gap between the assessment of family experience and that of the country as a whole lies in the gradual monopolisation of the media in Russia: having established control over television in the early 2000s, the Kremlin selected the 1990s as a target of criticism, setting them in opposition to the relative prosperity of the 'noughties'. This tendency, which began in 2003–2004, remains in place twenty years later. Hence, Russians’ view of the 1990s as a negative period for the country seems to be shaped not only by family experience but also by media narratives.

Generational differences and family narratives

The survey also showed that attitudes towards the 1990s depend on year of birth and can be transmitted within families from parents to children. Interestingly, although younger respondents on average view the 1990s more positively, the trend is not linear but rather wave-like. The share of positive perceptions of the 1990s, in terms of family experience, is highest among those surveyed aged 48–53 and 18–23 (Graph 1). In the mid-1990s, those surveyed in the first group (48–53) were in their twenties. At that time, they were graduating from school or university and were likely able to adapt more quickly to the new socio-economic realities. In effect, this age group lost less than others during the 1990s, both materially and in terms of professional experience.

Respondents in the second group (18–23) were not yet born in the 1990s, and it is reasonable to assume that they answered the question based on the accounts of older family members. Thus, there appears to be a kind of continuity between the first and second groups – the first group being, in many cases, the parents of the second.

The same applies to negative attitudes towards the decade. The 1990s are viewed as most negative for their family by respondents aged 60 and above (69–70%). In the mid-1990s, they were in their thirties or older. Many in this generation faced the collapse of the entire Soviet project and the economic upheavals of the time at the beginning or peak of their professional careers, encountering risks of unemployment, income loss, and declining social status.The difficulties experienced by their ‘parents’ probably affected their ‘children’, that is the next generation, now aged 30–40: among those surveyed aged 36–41, 64% view the 1990s negatively. In this respect, they rank second only to those aged 60 and over.

The absence of direct experience of life in that period does not prevent those surveyed from forming an opinion about their family’s experience. Respondents aged 30–35 lived through the 1990s as children, and 20% of them found it difficult to answer the question; however, in the two youngest groups the share of those who found it difficult was even lower. Thus, it seems that those who struggled to answer were expressing ambivalence rather than simply a lack of opinion.

Graph 1. Assessment of the experience of the 1990s for the respondent's family, June 2024, % of those surveyed by age group

Contrasting decades: through the lens of ‘negativity’

Respondents’ attitudes towards the noughties are far more favourable. Their assessments of the 2000s are both more positive and more consistent: 74–75% regard this period as generally positive both for their family and for the country as a whole. Meanwhile, 16–19% consider it rather negative, again both for their family and for Russia overall. The proportion of those surveyed giving a positive assessment of their family’s experience in the 2000s – three quarters – is so high that it almost reaches the dividing line between loyalists and opposition-minded respondents. Consequently, this time, when evaluating the country’s experience, we do not observe any significant 'propaganda bonus'.

What, then, accounts for such a striking contrast between the two post-Soviet decades in the experience of our respondents’ families? Simply put, fewer Russians faced serious problems in the 2000s. Indeed, when comparing respondents’ memories of the 1990s and 2000s, it is clear that negative events were far more common in the 1990s (see Graph 2). More than half reported that their families lost their savings (61%). In one in three families someone lost their job or business (34%), one in four encountered crime or extortion (26%), and one in ten suffered as a result of war (11%; we did not specify in which war or in what way they were affected).

In the 2000s, all these indicators declined, although, for example, the proportion of families in which someone lost a job remained relatively high (19%). For comparison, the Chronicles project asked a similar question: 'Have you or anyone in your family been made redundant or lost a business?' In June 2022, the share of families where someone had lost a job or business was 12%; in October 2022 and February 2023 this was 9%; and by October 2023 this stood at 7%. Nevertheless, compared with the 1990s, this problem became almost twice less prevalent in the 2000s.

The most striking difference concerns the most widespread problem of the 1990s was the loss of savings. The share of those surveyed whose families suffered in this way fell to 16% in the 2000s, compared with 61% in the 1990s. At the same time, contrary to the common association between crime and the 1990s – the decade when, as a well-known song puts it, 'people were being killed' – the progress in this regard turned out to be much more modest.

Graph 2. Negative events in the 1990s and 2000s, June 2024, % of those surveyed

It is likely that such a significant difference in the assessment of the 1990s and the 2000s is explained more by the reduction of negative experiences than by the presence of positive ones. There were indeed more positive events in respondents’ families during the noughties than in the 1990s; however, this difference proved to be less substantial (see Graph 3). For example, in the 2000s, families of 22% of those surveyed travelled abroad, compared with 14% in the 1990s. On the one hand, this represents a one-and-a-half-fold increase; on the other, the relative difference is a fairly modest 8%. Nor should we overstate the degree of satisfaction with improved material wellbeing. Although the 2000s are now stereotypically associated with rising incomes, it appears that this growth mainly increased current consumption rather than contributing to savings: only 18% of those surveyed said that their families managed to save a significant amount of money (compared with 10% in the 1990s).

Thus, according to our survey, the marked shift in attitudes towards the noughties is not so much due to a considerably greater prevalence of positive events in family life, but rather to a notable reduction in negative experiences. This generally corresponds to the well-known negativity bias, whereby people pay more attention to negative experiences than to positive ones.

Moreover, when we compare the balance of negative and positive events within the same period, we can see that job losses in the 1990s effectively 'cancelled out' new employment (34% lost their job, 35% found a new one). In the 2000s, however, people found work more often than they lost it (19% lost, 42% found). The situation is different when it comes to savings. In the 2000s, there appears to be something of a 'balance' between the loss and accumulation of funds (16% lost savings, 18% accumulated them). In the 1990s, by contrast, only 10% of families managed to save a significant sum, while 61% lost their savings.

Graph 3. Positive events in the 1990s and 2000s, June 2024, % of those surveyed

Privatisation and private property: problematising experience

Issues of privatisation and private property continue to provoke disagreement, even though the majority of respondents’ families had some experience of privatisation. Almost half of those surveyed stated that their families had privatised a flat in the 1990s (48%). One in four families privatised a plot of land (24%), and one in six, a private house (16%). Only 1% of families reported privatising a small/medium-sized or large enterprise. Meanwhile, 34% said that their families had not privatised anything in the 1990s. Privatisation was less common in the 2000s: 77% of those surveyed said that their families did not privatise anything during that period. Overall, 75% of respondents’ families had privatised something either in the 1990s or the 2000s; correspondingly, 25% reported that they had privatised nothing in either decade.

The tiny proportion of those surveyed whose families privatised any kind of enterprise in the 1990s may partly explain why most respondents agree with revising the results of 1990s privatisation and returning private enterprises to state ownership – 67% (see Table 2). This view is particularly common among those aged 55 and older (77%), although even among the youngest group (18–34 years), 49% agree that the results of privatisation should be reconsidered. Thus, the legitimacy of enterprise privatisation remains as fragile today as it was in the early 2000s.

It is also interesting that in recent decades a new pattern of critical attitudes towards privatisation has emerged. Among older respondents (35–54and 55+), those who view the 1990s negatively for their family are more likely to support revising privatisation. However, among the youngest group (18–34 years), it is the opposite: those surveyed who evaluate the 1990s positively for their family are more likely to support the revision of privatisation and the return of private enterprises to state ownership (56%), compared with 46% among those who view the decade negatively. Thus, even positive perceptions of the 1990s do not serve to justify privatisation.

It appears that the perceived illegitimacy of privatisation among most of those surveyed casts a shadow over the notion of private property as such. On the one hand, 19% of those surveyed said they would be willing to 'voluntarily surrender their property to the state without compensation.' This view is most common among those aged 55 and above (25%). Among younger respondents (18–34 years), 10% agreed, and among those aged 35–54, 18%.

On the other hand, opinions were divided on the question of whether the right to private property is essential to be a full-fledged citizen. Half of those surveyed (52%) believe that private property is not a necessary attribute of full citizenship, while slightly fewer (41%) disagree. Responses to this question correlate strongly with educational level: agreement is higher among those surveyed without higher education (60%), whereas among those with higher education, opinions are almost evenly split: 45% agree, 50% disagree, and 5% were undecided.

It would be an exaggeration to draw overly bleak conclusions: the question of what constitutes the full set of citizens’ rights is rather abstract and distant from everyday experience, and therefore may have been difficult for some of those surveyed to answer. In more pragmatic terms, three quarters of those surveyed (see Table 2) are not prepared to give up their property to the state free of charge. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the right to private property has not acquired the status of an unquestioned norm among Russians surveyed, which is apparently due to the enduringly negative attitude towards the 'great privatisation.'

Table 2. Attitudes towards private property (‘Which of the following statements do you tend to agree or disagree with?’), June 2024, % of those surveyed

In sum, respondents’ perceptions reveal a marked contrast in their attitudes towards the 1990s and the 2000s. The view of the 1990s as a negative historical experience for the country is likely to be, at least to some extent, fuelled by propaganda, as indicated by the gap between assessments of family experience in the 1990s and of the 'collective' national experience. However, overall scepticism towards the 1990s can be well explained by the prevalence of negative experiences within families – above all, the loss of savings and employment or business – which were not offset by positive events. The noughties appear to be viewed more favourably precisely because of the reduction in such negative experiences. Attitudes towards the 1990s vary in a wave-like pattern across age groups, with both the respondents’ own experiences and those of their parents likely playing a role. Negative perceptions of the 1990s have, in all likelihood, influenced the continuing contestation of privatisation, both in relation to enterprises and to the institution of private property itself. This persists despite the widespread family experience of privatisation during the 1990s, perhaps because those surveyed are increasingly reluctant to see small-scale privatisation, which granted them personal private property, and large-scale privatisation as two parts of a single process.