Digital Curtain: How and why the Chinese model of the internet is advancing in Russia and how Russians are reacting to it

Why are social networks outperforming television? Because pensioners are using them too

According to data from a Levada Centre survey conducted at the end of August, Telegram channels remain the fourth most popular source of information for Russians about events in the country and the world: 26% of those surveyed said they most often get their news from them. This is only slightly behind online media outlets (29%). One step higher in popularity are 'social networks' in general, named as the main source of information by 36%. At the top of the list remains television, cited by 60% of those surveyed.

In terms of dynamics, however, the three and a half years of war have largely been a triumph for Telegram. On the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, only 6–7% of those surveyed named it as their main source of information. By the end of 2022, this figure had jumped to 18%, and since then it has risen by almost half again. The share of those who say they trust Telegram has also increased, from 7% to 17%, while trust in television has declined slightly since the start of the war, from 50% to 44%. YouTube, on the other hand, has lost ground after last year’s blocks and slowdowns: only 8% now name it as their main source, whereas in 2024 it was approaching 15%. According to the same Levada Centre survey, the share of people visiting YouTube fell from 38% at the start of 2024 to 21% in August this year.

However, presenting the data on main sources of information as a ranking does not provide a fully accurate picture of changes in media consumption. Respondents were allowed to give several answers to the question about main sources (typically two); in addition, Telegram and YouTube were listed separately from 'social networks', even though both are themselves hybrids of social media. If we normalise mentions of each information source against the total number of answers given and combine social networks, Telegram channels and YouTube into a single category, we get a more accurate picture of how media consumption has changed over the course of the war.

‘Where do you most often get your news about the country and the world?’, 2021–2025, % of those surveyed

Immediately after the war began, the share of television increased slightly, as it was at that time the main source of breaking news and a tool for military mobilisation. However, by August 2022 television had noticeably declined, and social media (including Telegram channels) had almost caught up with it in mentions among primary sources of information. By August 2025, television accounted for 32% of all mentions of information sources, while mentions of social media in the broad sense (including Telegram and YouTube) reached 37%. This situation is entirely understandable. Television consumption is skewed towards older age groups, with three-quarters of respondents in these groups citing it as a source. Yet even they frequently list social media as a secondary source. Among younger people (under 30–35), many do not watch television at all, and it does not appear in their answers even as a second source, which is instead occupied by other social media or online publications.

Thus, on one hand, it can be said that social media have won the battle with television at the level of consumption technology. As a navigation mechanism, they better correspond to the expectations and needs of the modern individual seeking personalised settings, rather than the ideology of a limited set of 'button' channels. At the same time, social media have long ceased to be a space of opposition, as they were in the second half of the 2010s. Today, they are a battlefield of competing content streams, vying for the minds and hearts of the consumer. Among both supporters and opponents of Putin, practically equal shares of respondents – 26% and 28% respectively – cite Telegram as their main source of information, according to Levada Centre survey data.

However, it is precisely this competition and parity of content that are now seen as unacceptable by Putin’s autocracy in its current form, creating a strong sense of vulnerability among the authorities. As a result, the government is aggressively experimenting with the promotion of a 'Chinese model' of a closed internet. Over the summer, they actively tested 'whitelisting' technologies – websites that remain accessible even when general traffic is blocked or slowed down (for details on the success of their implementation, see the review by Novaya Gazeta Europe). This technology leads to the introduction of technical tools for 'permission-based' access to content. So far, however, the results of these efforts have mainly manifested in systematic shutdowns and slowdowns of overall internet traffic. According to the ‘On the Line’ project, at least 699 local and partial shutdowns were recorded across Russia in June of this year, 2,099 in July, and 2,119 in August. As a result, 71% of those surveyed told the Levada Centre survey that they had experienced internet access problems on mobile phones, and 53% said this had complicated their lives.

Cutting off the tail piece by piece: do Russians welcome the blocking of WhatsApp and Telegram calls?

The second aspect of the Russian authorities’ growing security paranoia has been the crackdown on 'foreign' messaging apps and the forced introduction of the national universal messenger MAX. Turning the latter into an almost mandatory tool for socialisation, and therefore a tool for multi-level social control by the authorities, is seen, along with the shift to a permission-based model, as the second pillar of the 'Sinicisation' of the Russian internet (→ Re:Russia: Catching Up With Hybrid Totalitarianism).

Since the start of the summer, the Kremlin has been waging a massive campaign against 'foreign' messengers. The first instrument was Federal Law No. 41-FZ, effective from 1 June 2025, which restricts the transfer of Russian users’ personal data to platforms of 'foreign' messengers. Its provisions prohibited such actions by banks, mobile operators, and state companies. A month later, the tightening of requirements was expanded under Federal Law No. 152-FZ 'On Personal Data.' These measures are intended gradually to weaken the functionality of 'foreign' messengers and thereby compel users to switch to domestic options, primarily the notorious MAX, to which Russians are being directed by all possible means – through threats, aggressive advertising, administrative resources, and mandatory pre-installation on all new smartphones and tablets. Another step in this direction was the blocking of voice and video calling functions on Telegram and WhatsApp, implemented between 11–13 August.

Meanwhile, 43% of those surveyed told Levada Centre pollsters in March that they regularly use Telegram, only slightly less than those using VKontakte (50%). However, as a messaging service, VKontakte lags far behind: 62% use Telegram for calls and messages, whereas only 25% use the Kremlin-backed social network, according to an August Levada survey. The undisputed leader is WhatsApp, used for communication by 70% of those surveyed: around 60% in older age groups, approximately 80% in middle-aged groups, and Telegram leads among younger users with a 90% coverage.

Overall, comparable figures come from the August FOM survey. According to its data, 57% actively use WhatsApp (without specifying the purpose of use), 46% use Telegram, and 41% use VKontakte. 63% use social networks or messengers every day. 62% said they correspond with friends and acquaintances, and 37% said they exchange calls. At the same time, according to another survey conducted by the Russian Field project, 15% of those surveyed prefer to make calls via messaging apps, while another 10% make calls via mobile phones and messengers with equal frequency. A comparison of the data from these three surveys clarifies the picture: despite their wide reach, the main function of messengers remains group and individual chats, while mobile calls remain the norm (as indicated by 73% of Russian Field respondents).

Nevertheless, 63% of those surveyed told Levada Centre pollsters that in August they experienced problems with the two main messaging apps (the survey ran 19–27 August, i.e., the second week after the start of voice call blocks in Telegram and WhatsApp). Fifty per cent said this had complicated their lives. In the FOM survey, 15% considered the blocking of calls a 'serious loss,' 23% a minor inconvenience, and 26% did not notice it at all (the question was asked only of regular messenger users; the distribution of answers is the proportion of the total sample of 1,500 respondents). Therefore, claims by some commentators and media that voice call blocks directly disrupted the everyday life of most Russians should be regarded as an exaggeration.

In all three surveys – Levada Centre, FOM, and Russian Field – pollsters asked about respondents’ attitudes toward the block. The spontaneously emerging experiment demonstrates how response distribution depends on the framing of the question itself (see formulations and distributions in the table below).

The least successful question appears to be the Levada Centre’s, which references the official propaganda justification for the block ('fighting fraudsters and terrorists'). Such a caveat inevitably shifts responses in favour of government measures. Accordingly, 49% of Levada respondents supported the restrictive measure, while 41% opposed it. The Russian Field survey began precisely during the days of the block, and the wording of the question, by contrast, masks the political subtext, asking respondents to evaluate the issue in terms of 'monopolism' and 'lack of alternatives.' Moreover, the question refers to messenger blocks in general, not specifically to voice communication functions, which as we have seen, is far from the same thing from the perspective of Russian users’ interests. The distribution obtained in this case demonstrates overwhelming opposition to the authorities’ decision: 70% against and only about 15% in favour.

Finally, the FOM question appears to be the most neutral in its wording, but a problem arises in the way the data are presented. According to the FOM report, 49% of the total sample did not support the measure, 15% supported it, and 16% were unsure. However, the question was asked only of the 'internet user audience' (80% of the sample, 1,200 people), while the distribution was calculated against the full sample, which still totals 80%. Consequently, we do not know the views of the remaining 20% of those surveyed. Considering only those actually surveyed, slightly more than 60% opposed the decision, around 20% supported it, and 20% were undecided. Even if all those who were not asked the question (20% of those surveyed) had supported the authorities’ measure (which is highly unlikely) the overall level of support would have been only 35%. The most plausible projection suggests that support for the measure is slightly below 30%, with the proportion of opponents approaching 65%. In this scenario, the FOM and Russian Field data show much closer alignment, indicating that the vast majority of Russians, in the immediate aftermath, did not approve of the blocks. Moreover, the share of those opposed is substantially larger than the share of those directly affected, i.e. the active users of voice calls in messaging apps.

Distribution of responses regarding the blocking of voice calls in WhatsApp and Telegram messengers in three surveys, August 2025, % of those surveyed

It is curious that against the backdrop of a massive propaganda campaign highlighting the dangers of the internet (terrorists, fraudsters, the theft of Russian citizens’ data, and foreign surveillance via messaging apps) support for introducing online censorship has slightly declined compared with April 2022, according to the same Levada Centre survey. At that time, 57% of those surveyed supported censorship, whereas in August 2025 the figure had fallen to 52%. On the other hand, the FOM survey found that 59% of those surveyed reported being contacted by fraudsters via mobile phone, while only 14% received such calls through messaging apps or social networks. This distribution contrasts even more sharply with the findings of the survey by the Central Bank, which indicated that 46% of cases involved phone and SMS fraud, and only 16% involved messengers.

A comparison of the data from the three surveys leads to several conclusions. The restriction of voice call functions in 'foreign' messaging apps directly affects a smaller proportion of Russians than is commonly assumed. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of respondents do not support limiting messenger functions, even though the restrictions do not affect them personally. However, a significant segment of Russian society is highly susceptible to framing, and over time propaganda may succeed in cultivating a more favourable attitude toward blocks and coercive restrictions. Finally, at this stage, a full ban on the two most popular messaging apps could provoke a much more consolidated and, above all, emotional reaction. This is why the Russian authorities intend to 'cut off the tail piece by piece,' as group communication, they hope, gradually migrates to the MAX messenger. For now, according to the Levada Centre, only 6% of those surveyed have used it for calls and messaging.