In the third year of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin's influence in its traditional ‘sphere of interest’ is growing again, while the influence of Europe and the West as a whole is declining. The West is ceding ground to Moscow in the struggle for influence, even in countries that seemed previously firmly on the path to European integration, such as Georgia or Moldova.
In the former, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, is promising voters security in relations with Russia and negotiations with the Kremlin regarding the return of separatist regions,pushing the issue of European integration to the background. In the latter, President Maia Sandu is trying to maintain a pro-European coalition amid growing public scepticism about the country's prospects for EU membership.
The EU is facing both active influence operations and propaganda campaigns from Moscow, as well as the rising popularity of conservative populism in countries to the south of Russia, including long-standing EU member Bulgaria. Furthermore, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the West is being forced to act cautiously and, to some extent, turn a blind eye to the benefits that these countries gain as intermediaries in bypassing sanctions imposed on Russia.
Otherwise, the West risks pushing these regional countries further into Moscow's embrace and undermining projects aimed at creating supply routes for raw materials to Europe. One way or another, the political leverage of European integration is becoming less significant in the post-Soviet space, while the importance of Russia's ‘non-soft’ power is growing.
Perhaps the most painful blow to the West's influence in the post-Soviet republics has been Georgia's pro-Russian drift. Since 2014, Georgia has had an association agreement with the European Union, a visa-free regime with Schengen countries since 2017, and since December 2023, the status of an official candidate for EU membership. Friction between the EU and the ruling Georgian Dream party first surfaced in 2022 over the issue of judicial reform, with the party dissatisfied with European standards. However, relations began to seriously deteriorate in early 2023 when 'Georgian Dream' made its first attempt to pass a 'Putin-style' law on ‘foreign agents’.
The law was intended to simultaneously strengthen the party’s position ahead of the 2024 elections and increase its value in Moscow's eyes (→ Re: Russia: The Georgian Dream Cycle). In early 2024, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgian Dream, who had previously been accused by the European Parliament of close ties with the Kremlin and been forced to remain in the shadows of Georgian politics, openly announced his return to the political scene. After the law on foreign influence was eventually passed amidst violent clashes between protesters and police, several other repressive bills were approved by Georgian Dream lawmakers, including a Family Values Law, aligned with the Kremlin’s repressive conservative discourse, which targeted the rights of the LGBTQ+ community. As a result, in October, the European Parliament called on the European Commission to freeze all European funding for Georgia.
Despite strong public support in Georgia for EU and NATO membership (79% and 67%, respectively), Georgian Dream looks set to win the parliamentary elections next Saturday, 26 October. According to the polls, it has 34% of the vote. Several opposition parties, which had earlier signed a pro-European Action Charter, are also expected to pass the 5% threshold – Unity (19.2%), Strong Georgia (9.8%) and New Unity — Gvaramia, Melia (9.1%) — are also likely to pass the 5% threshold. Together, opposition pro-European parties could potentially secure 38% of the vote, but the Georgian opposition is highly fragmented, notes the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in a commentary. Georgian Dream has previously promised to ban all major opposition political forces in the country if it wins the election .
In the weeks leading up to the vote, a powerful new theme emerged in the Georgian Dream campaign.During the mass protests in the spring against the 'foreign agents' law, the party hinted at the possibility of returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgian control, according to the Carnegie Centre. Now, a possible agreement with Russia, which the party claims it can secure, has become the main focus of the campaign, overshadowing the opposition's pro-European integration rhetoric. However, the theme of Georgian Dream's special relationship with Russia holds deeper political meaning for Georgian society and ordinary citizens. During the campaign,the Georgian Dream also put up election posters and distributed a video that contrasted the images of destroyed Ukrainian cities with the peaceful life of modern Georgia, asking voters to ‘choose peace’ and say ‘no to war’.
In other words, Georgian Dream presents itself as the guarantor of Georgia's security in relations with Moscow, suggesting that the pro-European opposition would dismantle these guarantees, leading to confrontation with the Kremlin and unpredictable consequences. At the same time, party leaders promise to maintain the course toward European integration, claiming that the conflicts between Tbilisi, Brussels, and Washington will fade after the war in Ukraine ends. According to the Carnegie Centre, this set of contradictory priorities aligns well with the sentiments of a significant portion of Georgian society, which simultaneously wants to join the EU and NATO, avoid confrontation with Moscow, and regain Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A 2021 survey showed that, when forced to choose between the first and third priorities, three-quarters of the population would prefer restoring territorial integrity. Therefore, Georgian Dream's electoral strategy seems almost foolproof, regardless of the credibility of their promises.
According to The Financial Times, the upcoming elections in Georgia could lead the country either toward a Belarusian scenario (harsh suppression of protests against the results of unfair elections) or a Serbian one, where not entirely free elections consistently bring victory to Aleksandar Vucic and his ruling party, yet the West maintains working relations with them. This conclusion may seem somewhat speculative and premature, but the political dynamics in the republic clearly show that the value of European integration, which is also a fairly distant prospect, is diminishing, while the appeal of ‘special relations’ with Moscow is gaining weight in the eyes of voters.
Another significant test of Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space will be the presidential elections in Moldova, on 20 October. A referendum will be held simultaneously on whether to enshrine the European course in the country’s constitution. The incumbent president, Maia Sandu, is running as the pro-European candidate who can secure Moldova’s integration into the EU. Therefore, according to Sandu and her supporters, the double vote should mobilise voters and ensure her victory. For its part, the EU began official membership talks with Moldova a few months before the election. Moldova, with a population of around 3.5 million, similar to Georgia, is highly important for the entire European bloc as a stronghold and demonstration of its influence in Southeast Europe and the former USSR.
Sandu, according to the latest polls, gs expected to receive around 36% of the vote, with her closest rival, pro-Russian former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, polling at 10%. The proposal to include a pro-European course in Moldova's constitution is supported by 63%. However, amendments to Georgia's constitution, which came into force in 2018, also enshrined the country's goal of integrating into the EU and NATO, yet this did not prevent Georgia’s drift in the opposite direction under the influence of shifting geopolitical balances.
Critics of Sandu note that she has failed to reform the judiciary and rid the country of oligarchic influence (this was her main campaign promise in 2020), as well as to improve the economic situation. The level of support for European integration is also less clear-cut. As in Georgia, the average Moldovan voter tends to support both opposing foreign policy orientations. According to the independent Moldovan online publication NewsMaker, support for EU membership, which reached nearly 75% in 2007, had fallen to 51% by 2022. Political analyst Alexei Tulbure explained this trend by citing insufficiently successful reforms, particularly in the fight against corruption, as well as ongoing political scandals that undermine trust in the government.
According to a survey conducted in 2023 by Imas, 35% of respondents in Moldova support a clearly pro-European course, 13% favour a pro-Russian direction, while 42% believe the country should seek a balance between the two. If a referendum were held on the issue, 54% would vote for joining the EU, but 41% would vote for joining the Eurasian Economic Union (→ Re: Russia: Anticipating Hybrid War). At the same time, 53% of those surveyed do not believe the country will join the EU by 2030, as promised by Sandu; just over a third believe it is possible. CEPA notes that the most sceptical about European integration are rural residents, who fear that an alliance with the EU would worsen economic inequality in the country, as well as national minorities, particularly the Gagauz, who have historically leaned toward Russia, seeing it as a counterbalance to the ethnic majority.
Thus, as in Georgia, the duality of Moldova's geopolitical orientation and the perception of EU membership as a distant and abstract goal create ample manoeuvring space for pro-Russian politicians and Moscow. For instance, in April of this year, the governor of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutu, signed an agreement during a visit to Moscow that would allow pensioners and public sector employees in this autonomous region to apply for a monthly payment equivalent to $100. The residents of Gagauzia could receive these funds on ‘Mir’ cards from ‘Promsvyazbank’ (the average pension in Moldova is $220). And at the end of 2023, a video appeared on social networks, where Maia Sandu allegedly stated that for environmental reasons she was banning the harvesting of rose hips, the main ingredient of the popular Moldovan berry tea. The video, which turned out to be fake, sparked outrage among a significant portion of the population, especially those with mixed geopolitical loyalties and concerns about the consequences of EU membership.
According to official reports from Chișinău, the Kremlin funnelled over $15 million through networks associated with exiled Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor to influence campaigns ahead of the presidential elections, and the total amount of funds invested by Moscow in this effort may reach $100 million. Maia Sandu has called Russian interference in the election ‘unprecedented’ and claimed that evidence of vote-buying involving about 13,000 voters has been documented.
While Sandu appears to be heading toward victory in the October 20 election, the name of the new president will likely only be known after the second round, scheduled for November 3. However, even a victory for the incumbent president does not guarantee the continuation of Moldova's European path. The upcoming parliamentary elections in 2025 are much more critical for the country's future, as noted by the Carnegie Centre. An expert from the Stratfor Centre's reminds us that it was the victory of Sandu’s Action and Solidarity party in the 2021 elections that allowed Moldova to make key pro-European decisions. If pro-Russian forces gain enough seats in the 2025 elections to form a majority, they could halt Chișinău's EU integration, using tactics similar to those of 'Georgian Dream.' Stratfor experts believe that a resurgence of Kremlin influence in Moldova would demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the EU’s years-long efforts and investments in the country’s European future, potentially demoralising Brussels with regards to the Eastern Partnership. Such a scenario would also harm Ukraine’s EU integration prospects.
However, the strengthening or at least the maintenance of Moscow's influence in its traditional spheres should not be viewed solely as a result of its covert operations. A telling example in this regard is Bulgaria, where in August of this year, the parliament passed a law banning so-called LGBT+ propaganda in schools, which is quite similar to the Russian equivalent. The law was proposed by the pro-Russian far-right party Revival and supported by the ruling GERB party. As in the case of Georgia, this demonstrates that Moscow-promoted anti-Western conservative populism mobilises certain segments of the population, and is not merely a tool of behind-the-scenes political bargaining.
Notably, in response to the law's adoption, the EU limited itself to expressing ‘deep concern’. This emboldened the Revival party, which is now calling for the adoption of a law similar to the Russian 'foreign agents' law, as highlighted by CEPA in its commentary titled ‘The Creeping Putinisation of Bulgaria’. In the upcoming parliamentary elections on 27 October, Revival is poised to take second place behind GERB, overtaking the pro-European Democratic Bulgaria (current polls show them with 15.6% versus 15.1% for the Democrats).
The EU's cautious response reflects European officials' uncertainty and recognition of their limited ability to counter growing conservative populism on one hand and Russian influence operations on the other. Similarly, in its relations with Georgia, the EU seeks to avoid too sharp a conflict to keep the ‘door open’ for the country and not push it further into Russia’s orbit.
The EU must exercise similar caution with other post-Soviet countries that are balancing between Russia and the West. According to the European Consortium for Policy Research, Brussels tolerates the fact that Caucasus and Central Asian countries are helping Russia circumvent sanctions, in part because it wants to retain (rather than lose) influence in this strategically important region. In January, the European Investment Bank signed memorandums of understanding with the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as with Kazakhstan’s Development Bank, totaling €1.47 billion, aimed at developing the ‘Middle Corridor’, which is intended to connect Southeast Asia with Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
In other words, the West is also forced to balance principles with interests in the region. And the countries in the region, in turn, seek to maximise the benefits of being courted by both sides. For example, since the invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan has provided Russia access to key trade routes, including the North-South International Transport Corridor, which links Russia with Iran, facilitating Moscow's efforts to bypass Western sanctions. In August this year, following a visit by Vladimir Putin to Baku, Azerbaijan officially applied for BRICS membership, and earlier sought observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same time, Azerbaijan aims to participate beneficially in the construction of the Middle Corridor.
Kazakhstan, for which the EU is the largest trading and investment partner (about 40% of the country's foreign trade and 45% of its investments since 2004), produces 19 key raw materials, including beryllium, tantalum, titanium, ammonium metavanadate, copper, and phosphorus—all of which are on the EU’s list of critical raw materials. In February, Kazakhstan offered European investors management opportunities for the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, as well as 22 airports. Kazakhstan also plays a crucial role in Europe’s climate plans: it aims to increase green hydrogen production to 11 million tonnes per year by 2032 to meet growing EU demand (by 2030, the EU plans to import 10 million tonnes of green hydrogen annually).
At the same time, Astana remains a key venue for multilateral meetings between Asian leaders and President Putin (since the start of the war, Putin has visited three times). In his speeches, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev advocates an approach to resolving the conflict in Ukraine that aligns with China’s stance. This is a significant shift from Tokayev’s position at the beginning of the conflict when he used public appearances to cautiously distance himself from Russia.
In retrospect, there are two distinct periods in Russia's relations with countries within its sphere of influence. During the first year of the war, as Russia’s army faced setbacks and the West rallied to support Ukraine, Russia’s influence quickly waned. Russia appeared to be the losing side, too weakened to simultaneously threaten other neighbours or conduct influence campaigns aimed at destabilising them internally. However, Russia subsequently partially restored its military capabilities, while Western resolve to support Ukraine began to wane. Against this backdrop, Russia resumed an active and sometimes aggressive policy within its traditional sphere of influence, while the belief among these countries in the West’s, particularly Europe’s, ability to deter Russia has significantly diminished. This has opened the door to pragmatic populism, where the goal of securing relations with Russia by pursuing a more conciliatory approach takes precedence over the traditional and long-term objective of European integration.