A Fox in the Baltic: Military escalation in the Baltic region may be much closer than experts realise

Closer than assumed

The unfolding events in the Middle East, in particular the strategic impasse currently facing the US-Israeli operation against Iran (→ Re:Russia: The Fog of Victory), once again raise the question of the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare, in which a demonstrably weaker adversary in economic and military terms can impose intractable challenges on a stronger opponent, at minimum pushing it towards concessions or even leading to political defeat. This logic applies fully to a potential Russia–NATO conflict (→ Re:Russia: Waiting For War), which has evolved from a marginal topic at the end of 2023 into one of the central issues now debated by European policymakers, military officials and analytical centres.

The United Kingdom’s Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Tony Radakin does not believe that Russia will decide to attack NATO, whilst the former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba argues in an article for Foreign Affairs that Moscow could open a new front even before the war in Ukraine has concluded. This divergence of views reflects not only differing regional perspectives, but also contrasting assumptions about the objectives and nature of a possible Russian invasion.

Most analysts, when referring to a full-scale military operation, assume that the timing of a potential attack depends on the Russian army’s ability to recover after the war in Ukraine. For example, military expert Michael Kofman suggested in an interview with The Wall Street Journal that this moment would arise seven to ten years after the end of hostilities in Ukraine. Most experts, whose assessments were summarised by the Russia Matters portal, point to earlier dates: ten sources identify 2028, a further twelve 2029, and thirteen 2030, yet they likewise assume a period of post-war recovery for the Russian military.

However, the main motivation that could prompt Putin to launch a military operation against a NATO member is not so much the pursuit of territorial gains as the intention to undermine confidence in the alliance and in the mutual defence guarantees enshrined in its founding treaty, as argued, for example, by Jennifer Kavanagh and Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Atlantic Council experts Elena Davlikanova and Yevhenii Malik hold a similar view: Moscow is betting that a limited incursion would not trigger a serious NATO response, thereby becoming a step towards the alliance’s disintegration. Former NATO commander Erhard Bühler made essentially the same point in a recent interview with the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung, suggesting that a Russian incursion into one of the Baltic states, to which NATO fails to respond adequately, is entirely plausible.

In such a scenario, an operation limited in military scope would not require Russia to concentrate all available forces. At the same time, a key factor favouring an earlier attack may be the current lack of preparedness among the Baltic states and NATO’s eastern flank. Finally, an invasion may not represent a subsequent phase following the war in Ukraine, as is commonly assumed, but rather form part of the present confrontation. Moscow’s inability to achieve its objectives in Ukraine, whether by military or diplomatic means, including with the involvement of Donald Trump, may push it to exert pressure on Europe by threatening a large-scale military conflict and provoking a localised clash.

Europe’s current logic rests on the assumption that the ongoing war in Ukraine delays the moment of a possible Russian attack, which serves as a key pragmatic argument for providing Ukraine with extensive financial and military support. However, the Kremlin may seek to invert this logic by turning the threat of a large-scale military conflict in Europe into a bargaining instrument in negotiations over Ukraine. Notably, existing Western analysis does not consider such a scenario, which is precisely why, in the view of Re: Russia, it warrants closer attention. Under this scenario, the threat could materialise significantly earlier than most experts currently expect. The challenge to European and NATO unity could prove particularly acute, as the stakes would be framed as ‘merely’ securing an agreement on Ukraine on Moscow’s terms. The difficulties the United States has encountered in its operation against Iran, and the refusal of European allies to assist in the Strait of Hormuz, further increase the likelihood of an escalation scenario in the Kremlin’s relations with Europe in the near term.

Vulnerability at sea: tankers and islands

Discussing scenarios for a possible clash with Russia, RAND experts Samuel Charap and Hiski Haukkala in their article ‘Europe’s Next War’ in Foreign Affairs, note that the risk is not limited to a large-scale, single-phase invasion, but also includes a gradual ‘slide into war’ resulting from Moscow’s actions in the grey zone. To date, NATO has shown restraint in responding to such provocations. However, as Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chairman of its Military Committee, stated in December, the alliance is considering options for a ‘more aggressive’ response to cyberattacks, sabotage and violations of airspace by Russia. In an environment of mutual distrust, such actions could lead to rapid escalation, Charap and Haukkala warn.

The situation in the Baltic is indeed becoming increasingly tense, particularly following the tightening of European measures against Russia’s shadow fleet. Over the past three months, Sweden has detained three Russian vessels, including two dry cargo ships and the tanker Sea Owl I, Germany has detained two tankers, and Finland one dry cargo vessel. In February 2026, former FSB director and now Putin’s presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev stated that, if such incidents continue, Russia will deploy its navy to counter them. He also accused NATO countries of seeking to cut Russia off from access to the Atlantic, of building an offensive grouping in the Baltic, and of intending to blockade the Kaliningrad region. This set of accusations effectively amounts to a ready-made justification for a pre-emptive strike.

Meanwhile, the Russian government is preparing to table a bill in the Duma that would allow Putin to use the armed forces to protect Russian citizens detained under foreign court decisions, in cases where the relevant countries lack a specific treaty with Russia. In effect, the bill would transform the detention of Russian citizens under the jurisdiction and laws of other states into a potential casus belli. Notably, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, which is generally associated with an isolationist stance, criticised the practice of vessel detentions in a recent report, warning that it could draw the United States into a conflict, something Washington should seek to avoid.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. of the Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council considers Russian aggression against NATO in the Nordic and Baltic regions to be the most likely scenario. Around 40% of Russia’s energy exports transit the Baltic Sea. At the same time, following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Moscow views the balance of power in this strategically important region as having shifted against it.

Hooker identifies three possible directions for a Russian attack in the Baltic maritime domain. The least risky option, in his view, would be the occupation of the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, where the deployment of military infrastructure is prohibited. The archipelago, located some 750 km from mainland Norway, has a population of fewer than 3,000 people, of whom around 17% are Russian citizens. Russia maintains a mining enterprise there, and in October 2025 an office of the Russian Geographical Society was also opened. Occupation of Svalbard under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens or economic interests would pose a serious test for NATO, Hooker argues. Given the archipelago’s remote location and small population, some allies might question whether it warrants entering into a war with Russia.

Another potential target for the Kremlin could be the Åland Islands, situated between Sweden and Finland. This Finnish archipelago likewise lacks military infrastructure, and could be seized by special forces, followed by the deployment of more substantial support to establish control over access to the Gulf of Bothnia and the approaches to St Petersburg. Sweden’s Gotland is another Baltic island that could become a target, according to Hooker. Its capture would likely involve forces based in Kaliningrad and the Baltic Fleet. Control over Gotland, often described as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, would allow Russia to deprive NATO of key strategic advantages in the Baltic in the event of a wider regional conflict.

‘The bear in the Baltic’: directions of a ground invasion

Beyond the seizure of islands, two principal scenarios for a land-based incursion are considered: an attack on Estonia and the creation of a land corridor to Kaliningrad through Lithuania.

In their February report on threats to NATO’s eastern flank, experts at the Belfer Center consider the most likely scenario for an invasion of Estonia to be the escalation of hybrid attacks into an outright occupation. Russia would gradually increase pressure on Estonia and Latvia by intensifying cyberattacks, drone-based provocations, acts of sabotage against transport and military infrastructure, and by conducting an information campaign centred on the ‘protection of Russian-speaking populations’, who account for around 21% of Estonia’s population. The culmination could be a limited operation in the Narva region, where ethnic Russians form a majority. Small, professional military units, disguised as ‘local militias’ or ‘self-defence forces’, would seize key buildings and infrastructure, attempting to present events as an internal conflict rather than a Russian invasion.

While NATO conducts consultations on whether such a situation constitutes an attack on a member state, Hooker notes, pro-Russian forces could establish proxy governing bodies, which would then request incorporation into the Russian Federation, following a pattern seen in Donbas and Crimea. If NATO were to favour a diplomatic response over the use of force, this would in effect undermine the operation of Article 5 of the alliance’s collective defence charter.

Kavanagh and Shapiro (whose analysis is titled ‘The Bear in the Baltics’) also consider a scenario involving a full-scale Russian invasion of Estonia. In this case, Russian forces, built around the 76th Air Assault Division and the 6th Combined Arms Army, would, after seizing Narva, advance towards Tallinn and Tartu in order to cut off reinforcement routes from Latvia. The Estonian authorities would immediately initiate consultations under Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO treaty. However, while these consultations are ongoing, only the forces already stationed in Estonia would be able to engage in combat: one active brigade, one reserve brigade without tanks or fighter aircraft, several coastal patrol vessels, and a UK-led NATO battlegroup based in Tapa.

An invasion of Lithuania aimed at establishing a land corridor to Kaliningrad could yield Russia the greatest strategic advantages. Kaliningrad is Russia’s only ice-free port in the west and the base of the Baltic Fleet. Preparations for, and the launch of, such an operation could be disguised as military exercises, as in the Ukrainian scenario of 2022, and carried out by formations of the 1st Tank Army. As Hooker writes, the operation could involve a rapid advance by two divisions from Belarus through Vilnius and Kaunas into Kaliningrad, effectively severing the Baltic states from the rest of Europe.

To counter this threat, Lithuania fields two regular brigades and one reserve brigade, though none are equipped with tanks or fighter aircraft. A German-led NATO battlegroup is also stationed in the country, with plans to expand it to brigade level by 2027. Poland, which possesses one of the strongest armed forces in Europe, would most likely provide reinforcement. By contrast, key NATO allies such as Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are not currently capable of deploying even a single division to Lithuania in under 60 days.

According to Bloomberg estimates, a war between Russia and NATO triggered by an invasion of the Baltic states would cost the global economy 1.3% of GDP in the first year alone, approximately $1.5 trillion, comparable to the economic impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Even if NATO were slow to invoke Article 5, neighbouring allies would likely come to the assistance of the Baltic states and engage Russian forces. In response, Russia would begin striking European military bases and critical infrastructure, including targets in major cities. The Baltic economies could lose around 43% of GDP in the first year of war, while the EU as a whole would lose around 1.2%, in addition to a sharp increase in public debt driven by higher defence spending.

Defence strategies

Experience from past conflicts suggests that aggressors typically decide to launch invasions in the expectation of a rapid victory, writes US Army Major Robert Rose. NATO’s primary task, therefore, is to convince Putin that such a scenario is not achievable. A key step in this direction is the construction, launched in 2024 by the Baltic states, of a unified Baltic Defence Line. This system consists of a chain of fortifications extending 15–20 km from the Russian border, including hundreds of bunkers, obstacle belts such as minefields and anti-tank barriers, counter-drone systems, and concealed firing positions.

With an estimated budget of €300 million, the line is due for completion in 2028, after which any invasion would become significantly more difficult for Russia, Rose argues. Although the Baltic states share an extensive border with Russia, much of it runs through impassable terrain, including Lake Peipus and marshlands. In practical terms, the defence effort focuses on obstructing Russian advances along major road and rail corridors. Once the Baltic Defence Line is completed, this task could be carried out by two brigades in Estonia, three in Latvia and four in Lithuania. As Tarmo Kundla, Head of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces, notes, no defence is impenetrable, but the cost imposed on an attacker would be far higher, and the preparations required for a breakthrough far more visible.

Another factor that could deter Russia from launching an invasion is the risk of permanently losing the Kaliningrad region. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Alexus Grynkevich, asserts that the alliance has considered all possible scenarios concerning Kaliningrad and understands how to respond. Valdis Kuzmins of the Latvian National Defence Academy likewise believes that Kaliningrad is more a vulnerability for Russia than a threat. Targets in the region could be rapidly neutralised using capabilities available to the Baltic states, including HIMARS systems and anti-ship missiles. The region’s greatest weakness, however, lies in its energy dependence: it lacks major gas storage facilities and relies on supplies delivered via Lithuania and through an LNG terminal. In the event of hostilities, pipeline flows could be cut and the terminal destroyed.

The pre-deployment of a US Army armoured brigade in Poland could reduce the likelihood of a conflict between Russia and NATO, according to Seth Jones and Seamus Daniels of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Such a move would not only reassure countries in the region but also signal to Moscow that it should refrain from confrontation. Even the current presence of US forces in Poland, around 14,000 personnel, and in the Baltic states, approximately 1,700 in total, already acts as a deterrent, agree experts from the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). However, any expansion of the US military presence in the region is likely to meet resistance from isolationist voices, who view it as a pathway to US involvement in a conflict that should be avoided, reflecting the logic outlined in the Quincy Institute report.

Asymmetric threat from the air

However, ground defence plans largely overlook what may be Russia’s primary instrument of pressure, namely not territorial advance but the creation of a sustained threat from the air. Most experts agree that Russia’s missile and drone capabilities will constitute the central challenge. Developments around Iran further illustrate both the scale and effectiveness of such threats, as well as the lack of adequate countermeasures.

During the war in Ukraine, Russia has deployed more than 25 unique models of missiles and drones, write Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan of CSIS. Interception rates for Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Kinzhal hypersonic systems have not exceeded 10–20%. The only effective air defence against these systems remains the costly and scarce US Patriot systems, while the European SAMP/T system is only now being tested against ballistic threats, as recently noted by Volodymyr Zelensky. Furthermore, the widespread use of Shahed-type drones in combined strike packages, which account for roughly two thirds of all Russian launches against targets in Ukraine, significantly complicates interception efforts. Europe’s air defence network lacks sufficient density to counter such threats. NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) system, developed since the 2010s, was primarily designed with Iranian threats in mind, while air defence on the eastern flank remains fragmented. Germany’s 2022 European Sky Shield initiative, which has been joined by 21 countries, is progressing only slowly.

To mitigate the Russian drone threat, Europe is advancing initiatives such as Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Wall, both identified as ‘particularly urgent’ in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. The Drone Wall, scheduled to begin operation in early 2026 and to reach full functionality by the end of 2027, is intended to detect, track and neutralise hostile UAVs, while also enabling precision counterstrikes. Eastern Flank Watch focuses on strengthening borders against hybrid and conventional threats, including the development of air defence, electronic warfare, surveillance and maritime security capabilities.

However, there is no consensus among EU countries regarding these initiatives, according to a European Parliament briefing note. Frontline states such as Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland regard them as urgent necessities, whereas countries further from Russia’s borders, including France, Germany, Italy and Greece, have expressed reservations due to their technical complexity and high cost. Estimates suggest that between €2 billion and €4 billion could be spent on the Drone Wall between 2026 and 2028. European countries are also discussing the creation of a drone alliance with Ukraine. Joint production of UAV systems could begin in 2026, while joint counter-drone exercises involving the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, Italy and Ukraine are planned for 2026–2027. By 2027, annual drone production under this initiative is expected to exceed 100,000 units.

Within one and a half to two years, NATO’s Baltic flank will be significantly strengthened and close to being capable of repelling a potential Russian attack. However, until then, European infrastructure and cities will remain highly vulnerable to Russian missile and drone strikes, which will constrain the ability of European allies to support states subjected to aggression. This is precisely what makes the coming eighteen months particularly dangerous for the Baltic countries. Dmytro Kuleba expresses a similar view in the article cited above, identifying a potentially hostile Trump administration in the White House and the current unpreparedness of NATO’s eastern flank to counter hybrid threats as key factors that could enable such an attack.