Vladimir Putin, who has been scaring Russians for years with NATO expansion, has effectively become the initiator and driving force behind the radical strengthening and expansion of the alliance’s military capabilities, ultimately leading to a significant weakening of Russia’s security level.
The expansion of the alliance in the early 2000s only increased NATO's area of responsibility. The accession of Finland and Sweden turned the 'Baltic flank' of the alliance into a full-fledged element of collective security.
Putin has achieved even greater 'successes' in worsening Russia’s military situation by forcing a previously reluctant Europe to finally significantly increase its defence spending. In 2024, these expenditures will reach 2% of the GDP of NATO countries, which in nominal terms will amount to $380 billion. Russia will spend about 6% of its GDP on military needs, which in monetary terms will be 3.5 times less.
Moreover, NATO’s rearmament will widen the technological gap between the military spheres of Russia and the alliance, rendering many Russian weapons and developments much less relevant.
Over the past two years, NATO’s European forces have done significant work and are now generally ready to repel a sudden attack from Russia. They are less prepared for a prolonged war, so the alliance’s forces in Europe need to continue to build up in order to make the initial advantage overwhelming. Experts believe that such an advantage is more likely to prevent war.
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has managed to make significant progress within the framework of the 'Back to the Future' strategy adopted two years ago, according to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) entitled 'Is the North Atlantic Alliance Ready for War?'. The authors of the report summarise the two years since the landmark Madrid summit (late June 2022), at which the alliance member states committed to strengthening deterrence and defence systems. Significant progress has been made in defence spending, reform of high-readiness forces, command and control, and collective defence exercises. The alliance has also been strengthened by the accession of Sweden and Finland.
The irony of history is that Vladimir Putin, who for years had been scaring Russians about NATO expansion, has effectively become the sponsor of the radical strengthening and increase of the alliance’s military capabilities. From the standpoint of political realism, Putin has managed to significantly worsen Russia’s military situation. The key event here was the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance. Prior to this, its expansion was extensive: new members increased the alliance’s area of responsibility but did not contribute anything in terms of strengthening its military capabilities and resources. With the accession of economically strong Finland and Sweden, NATO’s 'Baltic flank' becomes a full-fledged element of collective security.
But Putin has been even more 'successful' in worsening Russia's military situation in terms of increasing the alliance's defence spending. In the absence of a looming Russian threat, public opinion and political will in many Western countries had stubbornly resisted such a demand. NATO countries pledged to raise defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2024 at the end of the 2014 Wales summit – at the time, only three members of the alliance met this requirement. The decision was a response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's invasion of Donbas. Thus, the initial strengthening of NATO's defence capabilities was also linked to Russia's actions, but remained mostly on paper.
However, a week ago, on 17 June, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that defence spending in European NATO countries and Canada has increased by 18% in 2024, and 23 of the alliance's 32 member states will allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence this year – 13 more countries compared to last year's data and five more than projected in February.
European allies have increased their military investments by about a third since 2014, totaling $380 billion, according to the CSIS report. Norway recently announced an unprecedented increase in defence spending: over the next 12 years, they are expected to double. The UK government unveiled a plan to reach 2.5% of GDP in military spending – an additional £75 billion (or $96 billion).
Thus, since the Madrid Summit in 2022, the alliance has made significant progress. However, the question remains: is the agreed figure of 2% sufficient in the long term? At last year's summit in Vilnius, the parties agreed that 2% is the minimum threshold. Some analysts expect that the minimum defence spending share of GDP for NATO member countries will be raised to 2.5%.
Virtually all of NATO's strengthening potential is naturally directed towards the Eastern European flank. Significant progress has been made in enhancing NATO’s forward defence. Since the Madrid Summit, allies have demonstrated the combat readiness of all eight NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) missions. All eight missions are integrated into NATO's command structure at the division level, and the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish EFPs plan to integrate with new national structures at the unit level. Additionally, NATO allies have strengthened existing missions in the air and at sea. However, only two EFP missions plan to increase their numbers to brigade level on a permanent basis.
However, according to a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the number of combat battalions equipped with main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and self-propelled artillery pieces in European armies has remained unchanged or decreased between 2014 and 2023. This could negatively impact the potential for ground operations. Any major combat operation in Europe would rely on US forces to compensate for the shortage of European land, sea, and air forces. Thus, NATO's European infrastructure remains largely dependent on US support.
Can the missions – even those the size of brigades – deter the threat, given the imbalance of forces on the ground in favour of Russia? To address this potential issue, NATO has reformed its NATO Response Force, dividing existing forces into three categories based on deployment capabilities: more than 100,000 soldiers ready for deployment within 10 days, about 200,000 within 30 days, and within 180 days, the new Allied Response Force will be able to deploy a group of at least 500,000 personnel. In other words, 500,000 NATO troops are in a state of heightened readiness, with the number of battle groups in the eastern part of the North Atlantic Alliance doubled. This, according to Stoltenberg, significantly exceeds the goal set at the Madrid Summit in 2022.
NATO's combined capabilities — even if the US is excluded from the equation — far exceed those of Russia, CSIS notes. Annual NATO expenditures, reaching 2% of GDP on average for alliance countries, will total $380 billion in 2024. Meanwhile, Russian defence spending in dollar terms will be about $110 billion, or about 6% of GDP (actual spending is likely somewhat higher, but this does not fundamentally change the picture). In other words, by allocating three times the GDP share, Russia achieves 3.5 times less investment in defence.
However, in reality, the situation is much worse. Russia's defence spending does not strengthen its defensive potential but is squandered on the war with Ukraine. According to CSIS estimates, the number of operational battle tanks has decreased by 41% since 2022, and personnel numbers have dropped by nearly 20%, despite partial mobilisation. Moreover, unlike NATO countries, Russia will not be able to seriously modernise its weaponry in the foreseeable future due to sanctions. The technological gap will consequently increase by another one or two levels, rendering many of today's Russian weapons and developments obsolete.
But even with all this – is NATO ready for a real war? The authors of the CSIS report conclude that the answer to this question depends on what kind of war it turns out to be. In general, NATO forces are ready (or on the way to being ready) to repel aggression, but if such a conflict becomes prolonged, much will depend not solely on military indicators but on the state and mood of society, according to CSIS experts. A prolonged conflict is always a contest of resilience, industrial potential, supply chains, logistics, resources, and public ‘will to fight’.
The Russian authoritarian regime will initially have the advantage because it can more quickly restrict civilian consumption in favour of increased military spending. Therefore, NATO's initial advantage must be overwhelming to reduce the likelihood of transitioning to a prolonged conflict or making it as painful as possible for Russia. To ensure superiority in a prolonged conflict, allies still need to spend more, boost industrial potential, and eliminate critical gaps in the defence system. Overwhelming superiority is what can highly likely prevent war.
In the autumn, NATO will undergo changes: Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, whom the media calls one of Putin's main opponents in Europe, will replace Jens Stoltenberg as the organisation's Secretary General. Under his leadership, the Netherlands announced the allocation of €5.6 billion in aid to Ukraine, including €4.3 billion euros for arms supplies. These figures place the state 7th and 5th respectively among Ukraine's allies. 'Even if we imagine for one moment that Putin can succeed in Ukraine... it won't end there, he will continue. History has taught us this lesson,' Rutte said in January 2023, referring to the lessons of the 'Munich Agreement' with Hitler in 1938.
Having failed in his blitzkrieg and shifted to a war of attrition, Putin has managed to achieve the nearly impossible – to turn the unwieldy machinery of European politics and the North Atlantic Alliance towards new levels of military capability. Even if the influence of the far-right limits the scope of support for Ukraine and blocks the most radical EU reforms, it will not reverse the ideology of rearmament and the buildup of military potential in Europe and NATO. Putin has succeeded in scaring Europe and drawing it into an arms race, the pace of which Russia cannot possibly match.