02.12.24 Analytics

The Unfulfilled Dream: How and why Georgian politics shifted from demobilisation to mobilisation


For a month, protests by the Georgian opposition seemed lackluster and unpromising. This was facilitated, first, by the fact that the opposition's claims about the elections pointed to their manipulative nature rather than outright falsification of the results.

Second, over the past year and a half, the ruling Georgian Dream party has managed to significantly alter the public agenda in the country. It has deepened internal societal divides on several fronts and mobilised more conservative segments of Georgian society to its side.

Relatively low public trust in both opposing sides – the ruling party and the opposition – contributed to societal demobilisation. This, in turn, created opportunities for successfully conducting manipulated elections.

However, a statement by Irakli Kobakhidze, the head of Georgia's government, about halting negotiations on EU accession drastically shifted the dynamics of the protest rallies. It not only revitalised the protests but also gave them a new agenda and fresh legitimacy. The police's violent response to the protests could further amplify public sympathy for the demonstrators.

The most dangerous indicator for the ruling party of the changed political dynamics has been signs of fractures within the elite and the state administration. Statements by the President of Georgia that she will not leave her post until a legitimate parliament is elected, resignations by ambassadors and Foreign Ministry officials, and collective statements from representatives of state institutions and agencies are transforming street protests into a frontal confrontation. This raises the question of whether the ruling party will be able to maintain control over the state apparatus and sufficient loyalty from law enforcement agencies.

The dynamics of the protest rallies remain unpredictable. The development of events will depend primarily on whether the protesters can sustain their momentum throughout the workweek and prepare for a new protest climax the following weekend. It will also hinge on the ruling party’s ability to organise alternative mass demonstrations in its support.

Manipulated elections and the mechanics of demobilisation

Events in Georgia are unfolding in a manner reminiscent of Ukraine's Maidan movements – specifically, aspects of both the 2004 and 2014 protests. In 2004, mass demonstrations in Kyiv were triggered by the opposition’s distrust of the officially declared election results, while in 2014, they arose from President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an EU Association Agreement under pressure from President Putin.

The current Georgian protests also began with allegations of election fraud. However, the opposition’s claims that the results were entirely illegitimate did not appear compelling enough to prompt the annulment of the vote or the collapse of the regime. This was despite support for these claims from Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, who announced on 27 October (the day after the election) that she would not recognise the results, as well as a group of parliamentarians from European countries. 

Zourabichvili’s statement did not catalyse widespread protests. The opposition attempted to reignite protests on 17 November, following the electoral commission's approval of the final protocol affirming the election results. Yet the rallies failed to gain sufficient mass appeal and noticeably lost momentum within a week. Police did not even need to use force against the demonstrators.On 28 November, the Atlantic Council published a commentary entitled ‘Why Georgia’s pro-democracy protests have failed’, a conclusion that at the time seemed entirely accurate.

This outcome – opposition failure to mobilise a robust protest campaign following the elections – was expected. First, the opposition’s credible grievances pointed more toward manipulative practices by the authorities during the election rather than outright falsification of results. In hybrid democracies, manipulation tends to be tolerated more than direct fraud. 

Second, the ruling Georgian Dream party, in power for 12 years, has significantly reshaped the public discourse in the past 18 months. It has shifted societal focus away from a foreign policy dichotomy of ‘Europe or Russia’ toward internal socio-political debates. These issues resonate increasingly with voters in post-Soviet countries, including topics like traditionalism, xenophobia, and Euroscepticism. Laws passed in Georgia despite significant protests – modeled on Russia’s discriminatory templates (such as laws targeting 'foreign agents' and LGBTQ+ 'propaganda') – illustrate this shift. As a result, Georgian Dream has successfully mobilised more conservative segments of society while convincing the median voter that its governance serves as a safeguard against the threat of Russian invasion (→ Re:Russia: The Contested Underbelly).

Scepticism about the potential for protest mobilisation also stems from the fragmented and organisationally weak opposition, which lacks prominent national leaders. The ruling Georgian Dream, which officially won 54% of the vote in the October elections, faced opposition from a dozen smaller parties that garnered between 1% and 11% of the vote (four parties collectively achieved 38%). Trust in Georgian Dream has eroded in recent years, but the decline in trust for the opposition has been even steeper. According to the Caucasus Barometer 2024, 60% of surveyed Georgians expressed distrust toward both the ruling party and the opposition. The same survey showed that trust in the President of Georgia stood at 26%, while 39% expressed distrust. For political parties, the trust/distrust ratio was even worse: 12% versus 46%.

A study by political scientist Cole Harvey from the University of Oklahoma, reveals that, despite societal divisions, political polarisation in Georgia is not as intense as it might seem – likely due to the low trust in both opposing sides. However, polarisation is notably higher among supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party than among opposition supporters. In other words, Georgian Dream supporters exhibit stronger loyalty to their party and stronger opposition to the opposition, compared to how opposition supporters (and neutral respondents) feel about the ruling party. This creates conditions of ‘demobilisation’, where the ruling party maintains an advantage despite criticism and public dissatisfaction. In such an environment, criticism fails to become a catalyst for broad and energetic protests.

Contestation dynamics: triggers of change and consequences

This balance of power was confirmed during the first month of protests following the elections. However, a sudden shift occurred in late November, when, on the 28th, Georgian Dream Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would suspend negotiations for EU membership until 2028 and freeze all joint programs with the EU. The reason for this statement likely stemmed from two factors: first, the European Parliament resolution adopted on 26 November, which, in addition to rejecting the election results and calling for repeat elections under international monitoring, also proposed EU sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili, Kobakhidze, and other Georgian Dream officials. And second, the ruling party’s assessment of the protest potential as low, based on the lackluster demonstrations during the first month.

Regardless, Kobakhidze’s statement upended the situation, triggering a new wave of protests that were significantly larger and more organised. These protests intensified over the following days and led to clashes between demonstrators and police. This shift illustrates a well-known phenomenon within ‘contentious politics’: protest movements often develop non-linearly, with their dynamics drastically changing due to shifts in their agenda or the use of excessive force by authorities – even when initial protest numbers are relatively small.

In this case, Kobakhidze’s announcement fundamentally altered the protest narrative. First, it broke the ‘partisan deadlock’, whereby median voters distrusted both Georgian Dream and the opposition equally. And second,while election manipulation might have marginally benefitted Georgian Dream, using this advantage to enact a radical policy shift – such as halting EU integration – had far greater consequences: it would be one thing if manipulation led to some improvement in the result of the ‘Dream’, and another if this advantage were used to radically change the course of the country.

Surveys indicate that around 70% of Georgian citizens support EU integration and view Russia as the primary adversary and threat to Georgia (→ Re:Russia: The Homophobes’ Dream. This sentiment aligns with Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which enshrines EU integration as a national goal. Kobakhidze’s statement granted the protests new legitimacy; as President Salome Zourabichvili stated, the protesters were now defending the constitution, not just contesting election results.

Similar to Ukraine’s 2013 Euromaidan, the protests in Georgia have grown quickly beyond party politics, gaining a spontaneous and grassroots character. Their intensification prompted heavy-handed police responses, including the use of special forces, water cannons, tear gas, and targeted detentions in residential areas – echoing tactics seen in Belarus. This escalation is likely to serve as a new trigger, potentially drawing in broader segments of society, including those who may not fully support the protesters' goals.

At the same time, one of the most alarming signs for Georgian Dream is the growing division within Georgia’s political elite and bureaucracy. A key moment was Salome Zourabichvili's statement that she would not vacate the presidency until a legitimate parliament was elected. This creates the potential for dual power in the country. The statement’s impact was amplified by a wave of voluntary resignations, including ambassadors, a deputy foreign minister, and collective declarations of dissent from officials of the Georgian Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry, Constitutional Court, Tbilisi City Hall, Education Ministry and a number of major Georgian commercial companies. In addition, there have been reports of school protests and strikes in Tbilisi schools.

These developments suggest that Georgian Dream risks losing control over the state apparatus. While the authorities currently have enough resources to manage street protests in Tbilisi, it is unclear if they can contain protest sentiments spreading within the corporate and government sectors. Moreover, although special forces and police in Tbilisi may remain loyal to the authorities, the unity of Georgia’s broader law enforcement and security forces is far from guaranteed.

The dynamics of the protest rallies remain largely unpredictable. The future course of events in Georgia will depend on whether the opposition can sustain momentum during the workweek, building toward a new climax of demonstrations over the weekend, and on how sharply Georgian society reacts to the violence used by law enforcement. Additionally, it is expected that Georgian Dream will attempt to organise counter-demonstrations in its support, potentially provoking clashes between protesters on both sides. This strategy could allow security forces to position themselves not as defenders of the ruling party and its leaders, but as protectors of civil peace in the country. In any case, if just a week ago it appeared that Georgian Dream had successfully manipulated the elections and neutralised opposing political forces, the situation has now taken an unexpected turn.

The unfolding events present Bidzina Ivanishvili and the leadership of Georgian Dream with a difficult dilemma. Previously, the combination of manipulated elections and weak protests suggested a scenario where the EU might eventually accept the new status quo in Georgia. However, the need to use force to suppress protests now raises the prospect of European sanctions and branding Georgian authorities as adversaries of the EU. Such developments could leave the Georgian government excessively dependent on Moscow, a prospect fraught with dangers as significant as European sanctions themselves.

This dilemma extends to Georgian society as a whole: even amid growing skepticism about European integration, is the country prepared to face the fate of Belarus? Until now, Ivanishvili’s political capital was rooted in his ability to balance between advancing EU integration (Georgia was granted candidate status just a year ago) and appeasing the Kremlin without fully aligning with either side. In the current situation, however, this political balancing act appears significantly devalued. This shifting dynamic creates an opening for the opposition, making their success in the ongoing confrontation a genuine possibility.