Post-War Scenarios for Russia: Is a normalisation of foreign policy possible?

Four Scenarios

In the history of Russia, as in that of other countries, changes in the political order or in political course have usually occurred under the pressure of crises triggered by economic shocks, military overextension and conflicts within the elite. One factor tends to act as the trigger, while the others amplify the overall effect.

At times, crises have led to a change in the political system itself, as in 1917 and 1991. In other cases, policy shifted without a formal change of regime, for example in 1964 or 2000. Risky actions by the Soviet leadership, for instance, led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a result of that confrontation, together with the consequences of economic policy mistakes, N.S. Khrushchev lost his position as the de facto head of state, and the Soviet Union adopted a more cautious approach in foreign policy, moving towards peaceful coexistence with the United States and the Western bloc. In the late 1980s, several crises converged. The campaign in Afghanistan became protracted and ended unsuccessfully. The Soviet economy deteriorated rapidly. At the same time, the struggle for power between M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin intensified against the backdrop of declining legitimacy of the Soviet regime. Ultimately, the authority of the Communist Party collapsed and the Soviet Union disintegrated.

By the spring of 2026, Russia has been significantly depleted by the military conflict with Ukraine, which is exerting increasing pressure on the economy. Even if a peace agreement is reached in the near future, the country may face socio-economic shocks. Controversial decisions by the Kremlin are also intensifying tensions within the ruling elite. Some of its representatives may conclude that Moscow should make use of Washington’s mediation and bring the war to an end on acceptable terms before the risks of an internal crisis spiral out of control.

The decisive factor is the resilience of the economy and the political system. At present, however, there is no clear consensus on this question. Optimists point to existing reserves, the continued operation of market mechanisms and the state’s capacity to suppress protest. They also highlight the population’s savings as a potential source for wartime borrowing and the scope for increasing the tax burden. Pessimists, by contrast, emphasise rising inflation, a declining willingness among citizens to participate in the war even under favourable financial conditions, shrinking resources available for payments to contract soldiers and the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes against critical infrastructure.

Research shows that the relationship between military success or failure and regime stability is not always straightforward. A favourable settlement may strengthen the regime, but it could also deepen divisions within the elite. Conversely, a compromise that falls short of the Kremlin’s maximalist objectives could provoke an internal crisis that Russia might otherwise postpone by continuing the war. Such a crisis, in turn, could lead either to intensified repression or to a partial or abrupt liberalisation of the regime.

Could negotiations or a peace agreement in fact become a turning point in Russian politics and lead to the ‘normalisation’ of Russia as a participant in international relations? If so, what signals and steps would be required from the current or a new ruling group? This report considers four scenarios, distinguished by the possible outcome of the war and the level of internal stability in Russia. For each scenario, we assess the authorities’ incentives to pursue such ‘normalisation’ and outline the steps the Kremlin might take under the influence of those incentives.

In almost any scenario, the scale of the crisis will depend on whether Moscow can exchange territorial and financial concessions for a relaxation of Western sanctions. The prospects for economic cooperation between Western countries and Russia under the current political regime appear limited. In practice, the discussion centres mainly on a small number of energy projects of interest to particular American companies. Trade between the United States and Russia, as well as the volume of American investment in the Russian economy, was already moderate before 2022. A full return to pre-war levels appears unlikely. The profitability of oil and gas projects in Sakhalin and Yamal will be constrained if the trend towards lower oil prices resumes, a trend interrupted in March 2026 by the war in the Middle East. In any case, the political risks associated with Western investment in such projects will remain considerable. Direct pipeline gas supplies to EU countries may partially resume after the war, but they are likely to remain limited until Moscow’s longer-term military intentions become fully clear. In particular, the resumption of gas imports to Germany through Nord Stream appears unlikely, even if the pipeline is repaired and a possible US–Russian consortium were to participate in exports.

Additional risks stem from the possible confiscation of the assets of European companies in Russia if Russian sovereign reserves held under EU jurisdiction were to be seized. Following such confiscation, it would be very difficult to envisage the return of Western investors to Russia. Even without the seizure of Western assets in Russia, Russian companies are likely to face legal claims in Europe, and possibly in other parts of the world, for a long time to come. Claims filed in European courts by the Ukrainian state, companies and private individuals will not disappear. Given the nature of the war, it is difficult to expect full ‘forgiveness’ of Russia without meaningful compensation to Ukraine, even if a formal ceasefire agreement were reached.

For this reason, promises of profit for Western business in Russia after the end of the war will not be sufficient to achieve ‘normalisation’. Convincing signals of peaceful intent will be required. During the eighteen months following the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and his attempts at mediation, Moscow has provided almost no such signals. Until February 2026, the Kremlin avoided direct negotiations with Ukraine at a serious political level. Russia relied instead on closed contacts and opaque commercial arrangements. The authorities are likely to abandon this approach only under the pressure of a strong internal incentive. Such an incentive could emerge if the rhetoric of war and ‘victory’ ceases to sustain elite and societal cohesion against the backdrop of an economic crisis.

Four scenarios are outlined below. The purpose of analysing these scenarios is to identify the factors that will determine Russia’s readiness for ‘normalisation’. A scenario-based approach also makes it possible to anticipate how the West might respond to Russia’s actions if the war comes to an end.

Post-war scenarios for Russia and the potential for ‘normalisation’

Scenario 1. Russia prevails in the war and maintains internal stability

In this scenario, a significant part of Ukraine’s territory on the left bank of the Dnipro comes under Russian control. Partial recognition of the annexations by Western countries becomes possible. Ukraine is required to accept restrictions on its sovereignty, which may include renouncing NATO membership, reducing the size of its armed forces and holding elections according to an imposed timetable. Some of the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States are lifted. In several EU countries similar easing is discussed, as European governments do not wish to fall behind the United States in returning to the Russian market.

Internal stability in Russia is maintained. Domestic political control remains in the hands of the security factions, although competition for influence between the senior military leadership, relying on veterans’ organisations, and the security services cannot be ruled out. The militarised economy continues to function without major disruptions or is gradually wound down. Inflation remains within manageable limits. The rise in crime among veterans returning from the war remains under control.

The Kremlin’s foreign policy rhetoric remains confrontational. Propagandists under its control call for further pressure on Ukraine and Europe. At the same time, narratives are promoted claiming that European countries are preparing to attack Russia. Moscow may also demand a reduction of NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, at least in the Baltic states. The ideological basis of Russian foreign policy would be close to the ‘draft treaties’ proposed by Moscow to the United States and NATO in December 2021.

The US is expected to further reduce its involvement in European affairs. This approach is outlined in the US National Security Strategy of December 2025. Russia declares that it has become a ‘regional leader’ in Eastern Europe and parts of Eurasia, a position to which Washington offers little objection. Under these conditions, the risk of renewed hostilities with Ukraine increases. The risk would grow further if Ukraine experienced internal instability or if the size or effectiveness of its armed forces declined.

In the longer term, this scenario would likely lead to a prolonged period of estrangement between Russia and the West. Economic conditions in Russia would continue to deteriorate. The main constraints would remain the sanctions that stay in place and the shortage of investment. At the same time, some economic contacts with developed countries might gradually be restored.

In such a scenario, incentives for ‘normalisation’ would remain minimal. If Russia interacts with the West from a position of strength, the need to offer meaningful guarantees from the Russian side would barely arise. Such guarantees would remain unlikely even at the declaratory level. On the contrary, anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric would continue to be used as a tool of internal consolidation. Any proposal to relinquish part of the gains in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions would be rejected by conservative expansionist circles.

A transition to ‘normalisation’ in this scenario would be possible only at a later stage, as the result of a crisis and the disintegration of a regime oriented almost exclusively around the security factions, triggered by internal turmoil. Possible causes could include failures in economic policy, as well as a political crisis following a new unsuccessful aggressive operation abroad, for example an attack on a NATO country that provokes an unexpectedly forceful response. Under such conditions, a shift towards Scenario 3 would become likely.

Scenario 2. Russia clearly fails to achieve its declared objectives in Ukraine, but maintains internal stability

In this scenario, virtually none of Russia’s declared objectives with regard to Ukraine are achieved. Donbas does not come fully under the control of Russian forces. No major international actor recognises the Russian annexations. Russia proves unable to impose restrictions on Ukraine’s sovereignty or on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces. Kyiv’s aspiration to join NATO and the EU remains on the agenda. Ukraine receives Western security guarantees, and the deployment of NATO units in the country cannot be ruled out. A significant share of Russia’s frozen financial reserves is directed towards compensation for the damage inflicted on Ukraine by the war.

Under these circumstances, the Russian authorities would need to suppress public discussion of the military and political failure. The most hardline supporters of the war would be compelled to fall silent under the threat of criminal prosecution or extrajudicial pressure. The Kremlin is unlikely to acknowledge the need for immediate domestic reforms. After the initial benefits from the end of the war have been exhausted, strong pressure demanding concessions in the name of ‘normalisation’ may not emerge.

The Kremlin is likely to continue to seek the lifting of the most painful financial sanctions,as well as the unfreezing of personal assets and the lifting of travel bans affecting key members of the leadership’s inner circle. Some economic sanctions imposed by the United States might be lifted in exchange for new opportunities for American energy companies in Russia. Further easing, however, would likely be blocked by Congress. The EU, by contrast, would probably expect more substantial concessions or clearer signals from Russia before beginning to lift sanctions.

In addition to exchanging occupied territories for the easing of sanctions, several signals of a change of course are possible:

— aggressive expansionist propaganda in Russian media may be curtailed and replaced by more restrained rhetoric oriented towards the status quo;

— a public statement could be issued excluding the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict around Ukraine under any circumstances;

— could be put forward to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by the war using a portion of Russia’s export revenues.

New principles of Russian foreign policy could also be announced, based on peaceful coexistence and partnership with the EU and NATO. This step would be the most significant for relations with the West, but also the most difficult for the Kremlin. Russia would need to abandon its demands towards NATO and Ukraine, and any settlement would have to be based on the norms of international law.

In this scenario, a gradual and relatively low-profile series of signals might be sufficient to achieve some easing of sanctions. This outcome would be more likely if internal stability were maintained and if Russia retained a comparatively strong position following negotiations on a ceasefire.

Scenario 3. Russia secures favourable terms for a truce but faces growing internal instability

In this scenario, the crisis may be triggered by disagreements within the ruling elite over post-war strategy in both domestic and foreign policy. While one influential faction may advocate rapprochement with the West from a position of strength following success in Ukraine, others may continue to insist on maintaining internal repression, an expansionist foreign policy course and continued self-isolation from the West, including from the United States, with which the Kremlin might nonetheless maintain ‘pragmatic’ relations. Conservative groups would also be reluctant to risk their anti-Western partnership with China.

An additional destabilising impulse could arise from a new foreign policy or military adventure (similar to the ‘radical’ development of Scenario 1). If the security factions attempt to consolidate their authority through intervention in a neighbouring country, the crisis could escalate sharply. For more moderate groups, the stakes in such a situation would be perceived as existential, given the potentially irreversible consolidation of power by the security services. The risks associated with an attempt by moderates to push the security factions aside would be significant, but could be regarded as justified.

Elite divisions could be further intensified by economic problems such as high post-war inflation, depreciation of the rouble and rising unemployment. Ill-considered economic policy could aggravate these and other difficulties. Public security may deteriorate as combatants return from the front. During the war, it was relatively easy for the authorities to impose the narrative of ‘tightening belts’ in the name of ‘victory’ on society and large business under the threat of repression. After the war, however, the Kremlin’s ability to suppress disputes over resource distribution and public discontent would weaken. The unlikely but possible departure of Vladimir Putin from the political stage shortly after the end of the war would dramatically increase the likelihood of intra-elite conflict in the struggle for power.

A swift victory by one faction over the others would be improbable under such circumstances. Security and other conservative groups could not easily be removed from power even in an unfavourable scenario. At the same time, their opponents might face the risk of physical elimination, which would make resistance in the event of a struggle for power extremely fierce. Patronage networks associated with rival factions could be mobilised within both federal and regional institutions. As a result, parts of the state apparatus might become paralysed. Decision-making could become more decentralised, with authorities in certain regions ignoring contradictory directives issued from Moscow.

The position of the senior military leadership could become decisive. If the end of the war were perceived by the military as a defeat or concession, they would almost certainly align with the security factions. Competing factions might attempt to appeal to public opinion, but the mobilisation of significant numbers of Russians around political slogans appears unlikely in a context of widespread social atomisation and demoralisation.

In a situation of turmoil, rival factions might seek external backing. Conservative security factions could request support from China. Beijing, however, would probably pursue a cautious approach and refrain from openly supporting either side. Even if China were prepared to act discreetly, it is unclear what decisive resources it could provide to a particular group.

More substantial support could potentially come from the West, especially from the European Union, which had been an important economic partner for Russia before the war. Despite years of anti-European propaganda by the Kremlin, EU countries are still perceived by millions of relatively affluent Russians as attractive destinations for travel, business and access to education, medical care and other services. A declaration promising the removal of visa restrictions or the restoration of air connections between Russia and Europe in the event of victory by a particular faction could resonate with a critical mass of Russian bureaucrats whose decisions would influence the fate of the political regime during a period of instability.

In such circumstances, it becomes likely that the EU and the US will be approached for support. This could be done either publicly or through closed channels. The hardline factions might offer guarantees regarding the safety of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Moderate groups, for their part, might promise steps towards the ‘normalisation’ of Russian domestic and foreign policy, including relatively free elections, a revision of the foundations of foreign policy and other reforms.

At the onset of an internal political crisis in this scenario, Russia’s international position would still be relatively strong. As a result, initial attempts to engage the West would likely be based on limited concessions. The principal leverage would be the West’s fear of chaos in a nuclear-armed state. Risks associated with the loss of control over nuclear warheads, especially non-strategic ones, would be viewed as critical. Western concerns might also extend to other types of weapons of mass destruction. If an internal crisis in Russia were to occur in 2026, the starting point could be the settlement plans discussed in late 2025 and early 2026.

The Russian leadership will have several options for possible concessions. The faction that emerges victorious from the internal struggle might offer the West a freeze of the conflict along the current line of contact and the return to Ukraine of small portions of territory in exchange for partial lifting of US and EU sanctions. The Kremlin might also agree to the use of all frozen sovereign assets to compensate Ukraine. Such concessions could be linked to the political and economic support from the United States and Europe that the new authorities would require to remain in power.

The cost of tacit support for moderate factions in Russia could prove relatively modest while offering significant potential benefits. At the same time, the EU and the United States would probably hesitate to make timely public gestures capable of influencing the struggle for power, given the strong taboo in the West against facilitating regime change in Russia or even openly discussing such steps. No open backing for any particular faction would be offered, and negotiations and support would most likely take place through closed channels.

As in Scenario 2, the outcome could ultimately be the victory of conservative security forces. However, it is also possible that power could consolidate in the hands of a moderately reformist faction composed of senior figures from the previous regime and enjoying conditional Western support. In such a case, a gradual course towards ‘normalisation’ would become more likely. At the same time, strong Western pressure demanding major concessions might not arise so long as internal stability in Russia is preserved within a rigid authoritarian framework. The Kremlin would have a stronger incentive to pursue deeper reforms and ‘normalisation’ if a peace settlement with Ukraine clearly failed to meet the original military and political objectives and if Russia simultaneously entered a severe internal crisis.

Scenario 4. Military failure and internal crisis

This scenario would unfold if a deepening internal crisis forced Russia to end the war without achieving its declared objectives, or if the cessation of the war itself triggered a process of internal destabilisation. A prolonged and unsuccessful war is almost always accompanied by rising domestic instability, often making it unavoidable to abandon the original objectives and reconsider the foreign policy assumptions that led the country into a strategic dead end.

The struggle for power in this case will be more intense than in Scenario 3. The Kremlin would find it difficult to justify the evident costs of the war. Some members of the ruling coalition might see advantages in escalating the conflict within the elite and shift towards criticising the war and demanding that those responsible for launching it be held accountable. Conservative security groups would likely respond by intensifying repression. Tensions within the elite would increase, and the political cost of defeat in an internal struggle would rise to the highest level for coalition members deemed ‘disloyal’.

The risk of the regime’s collapse under such a scenario will be at its highest. If conservatives were unable to suppress their rivals quickly and significant authority passed to reform-minded groups, the political cost of rejecting Putin’s legacy would decline. In this context, the incentives for new authorities to make concessions in the interest of domestic ‘normalisation’ would grow stronger. Distancing themselves from the previous order would be viewed as a means of political survival. This would apply to the condemnation of the war, of repression and of the distortions in the economy caused by wartime mobilisation. The effect would be stronger if the new groups seeking power did not include figures from Putin’s immediate circle. The consequences of the war would be clear to the majority of the population, making the search for those personally responsible for launching and prolonging it almost inevitable. Possible approaches would include the public designation of individuals from the leadership of the former regime as responsible, or at minimum their exclusion from the new ruling coalition. Either course would accelerate political change.

Supporters of continued military aggression would not disappear entirely, but their freedom of action would most likely be limited. This would result from the breakdown of chains of command and the disruption of mechanisms used to punish insufficient loyalty, encouraging opportunistic behaviour within the middle levels of the bureaucracy. In such an environment, a bureaucratic consensus in favour of sidelining key pro-war figures would appear plausible. Power could pass to a coalition of pragmatists or reformers. This coalition might include individuals linked to the previous system, though not those who held its most senior positions, as well as new political figures.

Two stages of foreign policy normalisation

In this scenario,proposals from pragmatic forces to the West would be the most far-reaching of those considered in the four scenarios. In substance they would come closest to what would be required for genuine ‘normalisation’, although even this might not be sufficient. For Western governments, the principal obstacle would remain trust in the new Russian authorities, meaning that statements alone would not be enough. Clear declarations would be required, followed by commitments whose implementation could be verified. At the same time, the Russian leadership would be able to condition the fulfilment of its commitments on agreed concessions from Western counterparts.

Stage 1. Signals of changed intentions

At the first stage, a swift confirmation of intentions would be required. This process would carry a political cost for Moscow, but without it even a minimal level of trust could not be restored. The strongest signal would be the composition of the new ruling coalition and the source of its legitimacy. From the perspective of Western governments, which would seek to avoid serious destabilisation within Russia, the preferable outcome would be a coalition combining reform-minded representatives of the state apparatus, for example officials from the second and third tiers who did not bear direct responsibility for launching the war, together with representatives of the opposition. Before moving towards full-scale engagement, Western governments would almost certainly require Russia to hold free elections within months rather than years. A substantial renewal of the executive branch would be interpreted as evidence of a break with the previous order. During this process of renewal, the Russian government could in turn seek public commitments from Western states regarding the lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia.

Private contacts between Moscow and Western capitals can take place under any political regime in Russia. However, such contacts carry no binding obligations. When politically convenient, either side can deny them, making it unlikely that trust can be rebuilt through communication via closed channels. Promises made in private are easily revoked and come at little cost. For this reason, a shift towards ‘normalisation’ will require public declarations of intent and of plans for implementing those intentions.

The return of foreign business and investment to Russia will be difficult in the initial phase, as a mere change in the composition of the ruling coalition will not provide business with sufficient confidence in the stability of the new government and its course. This is evident from the example of Venezuela, where American energy companies are in no hurry to return even after the removal of the odious figure of Nicolás Maduro.nvestors need assurance that previous practices of self-isolation, arbitrary law enforcement and expropriation of foreign-owned assets will not recur. Such guarantees cannot be provided without clear legal and institutional measures intelligible to foreigners.

The first set of measures should address nuclear risks. A clear and unambiguous public statement must be made renouncing nuclear coercion as a tool to support territorial acquisitions, regardless of the justifications offered. The new Russian government will require credible guarantees for the control of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads, as well as the clearly identified stockpiles of other weapons of mass destruction under Russia’s control. Public confirmation of loyalty from senior commanders and officials responsible for nuclear forces will be required in a form understandable both domestically and internationally.

Steps towards arms control must also be proposed.This could include negotiating a new bilateral nuclear arms treaty between Russia and the United States (a trilateral agreement with China appears unlikely given China’s reluctance). Such a treaty could involve the reinstatement of limits on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Trump administration would almost certainly regard a nuclear arms agreement as a key priority for US–Russia relations following the end of the Russia–Ukraine war. The concept of limiting intermediate-range missiles would likely be welcomed enthusiastically in Europe, with support also assured from India and China.

The second set of urgent measures should concern Ukraine. A formal reassessment of policy towards Ukraine will be unavoidable, including the recognition of the serious mistakes of previous authorities. Alongside this rhetorical shift, negotiations with Ukraine on compensation and the return of occupied territories should begin. The return of territory would be a gradual process, with international monitoring to ensure the security of the local population.

Within Russia, explaining the abrupt change in course regarding the West and Ukraine will require a sustained information campaign. A rapid and positive response from the West to Russia’s policy shift will be essential to reinforce the government’s claims that such change is the only viable path for Russia to emerge from its economic crisis

A third set of measures should focus on Russia’s return to European security institutions.It would be prudent for Moscow to apply for readmission to the Council of Europe and propose a structured dialogue with the European Union and NATO. Russia would also have an interest in revitalising the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) through the resumption of talks on adapting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to post-war conditions. Such negotiations could provide mutual assurances regarding the non-aggressive posture of conventional forces in Europe, backed by time-tested limits, confidence-building measures and transparency.

Russia could offer its European neighbours practical cooperation on security issues and in other areas, for example maritime security. As a reciprocal measure, the lifting of sanctions on Russian oil exports could be discussed. An additional argument for sanctions relief could be Moscow’s commitment to channel compensation to Ukraine directly from Russian export revenues, which in this scenario would exceed the level achievable under discounted sales imposed by sanctions.

Stage 2. Delivering on promises

Public declarations of intent by the Russian authorities would allow significant progress towards ‘normalisation’, but further advancement would be possible only through the actual implementation of these commitments.

Codifying political statements in Russian doctrinal documents on foreign policy and security would play a positive role. Relations with the West would not necessarily need to become the main doctrinal priority for Russia. What would be important is an official renunciation of revisionism toward the international order, the cessation of revanchist and threatening rhetoric toward neighbouring states, and a declaration prioritising economic cooperation with key partners capable of providing Russia with capital and technology. Without doctrinal updates, even important practical measures would be seen as reversible, making ‘normalisation’ superficial and short-lived.

The most important practical step towards deeper ‘normalisation’ could be the negotiation and implementation of an agreement for the phased return of occupied Ukrainian territories under international supervision, for example over one to two years. A mechanism for compensation funded by frozen Russian reserves would also be required. Moscow could reasonably insist on international oversight of the use of these funds, enhancing the perceived restorative effect of the compensation.

Negotiations on nuclear arms control would need to go beyond symbolic gestures. Strategic talks should include non-strategic nuclear forces and measures for robust verification of compliance. The key outcome of a revised conventional forces agreement in Europe should be the demilitarisation of the Russia–NATO contact zone, including more detailed and refined flank restrictions. In European capitals, such a package would likely be received positively, especially in the context of reassessed defence plans due to the US’s evolving approach to its alliance commitments. If Washington were unwilling to reinstate the ban on deploying land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, Moscow’s corresponding proposal would likely find strong support across most European capitals.

Initiating dialogue with the Council of Europe on Russia’s return to the organisation will likely require a number of difficult political steps, including:

— the release of political prisoners, a public assessment of the war and the new leadership taking responsibility for it (immediately);

— competitive parliamentary and presidential elections under international supervision (approximately within a year of the formation of a ‘caretaker’ government);

— the launch of a compensation mechanism for Ukraine (following negotiations over several months).

These measures would be significant not only as a moral and legal gesture but also as indicators of Russia’s willingness to accept constraints that would make a return to armed conflict with its neighbours more difficult. Without such a willingness, trust in Russia on the international stage cannot be restored.

High-level engagement with the EU could begin soon after the end of the war. European leaders would have a strong incentive to test the intentions of the new authorities. Bilateral contacts with key European countries would likely resume immediately after the formation of a new government, with the central agenda focusing on sanctions, energy, compensation, and security guarantees.

Conclusion

History offers few examples of major powers rapidly and consciously restoring relations with the most advanced economies after a serious rupture. In the 1990s, China managed within a few years to expand its economic ties with the West despite sanctions imposed following the Tiananmen Square events in 1989. In early 2025, economic sanctions against Syria were lifted by the EU, the United Kingdom and the United States following a regime change and the removal of Bashar al-Assad’s clan. In most other cases, reintegration was either enforced through occupation of the defeated state, as in West Germany and Japan after the Second World War, or unfolded over a long and unstable period, as with Germany after the First World War.

In three of the four scenarios considered, there are insufficient incentives for a consistent foreign policy normalisation. A more likely outcome is the permanent transformation of Russia into a semi-closed, repressive state, justifying any economically irrational measures to strengthen the ruling regime in the name of national security. Its main support would be a broad layer of ideologically motivated bureaucrats. Control would remain firmly in the hands of the security services and law enforcement agencies, with repression either intensifying or remaining at a high level. Foreign contacts for Russian citizens would be limited and controlled, and the economic consequences of the war would persist and be felt for years. There is little evidence to suggest that the Kremlin would be willing, after the end of the war, to relax restrictions on internet access, freedom of speech, independent media, or the protection of large private property.

In the official narrative, Russians will be asked to accept the ‘loss of the West’ and to view ties with the East and/or the Global South as compensation. Yet the internal logic of such a course would remain contradictory. Alternative partners would either be unable or unwilling, as in the case of China, to provide Russia with the necessary technologies and investments, or to supply premium goods and services available only in the West. It is also difficult to imagine that affluent Russian tourists would be satisfied with holidays in Hainan or Pyongyang as a substitute for access to European destinations. Similarly, the idea of the United States as a new ‘realistic partner’ for Russia after the initial phase of a ceasefire would have limited traction. Although the latest US National Security Strategy allows for the view of Russia as a ‘regional champion’ responsible for order in Eastern Europe, no practical mechanism exists to hand Moscow such a role. Even in countries that effectively supported Russia during the war in Ukraine, such as Hungary or Slovakia, legitimising Moscow as a security guarantor in Eastern Europe in place of NATO and the EU would face strong resistance.

Only within the framework of Scenario 4 do events take a different turn. In a crisis environment, a short window may open in which a change of course becomes possible at lower domestic cost. This opportunity arises if the pro-war leadership is sidelined, the security apparatus is divided or reoriented, and the ‘pragmatists’ calculate that survival requires institutional change and external stabilisation. Under crisis pressure, ‘normalisation’ may become a tool for internal consolidation. Sanctions relief, access to export markets and reduced security risks can be exchanged for sufficient concessions, which nevertheless would not endanger Russia’s existence as a state.

The issue of trust in the new course will be key. Western governments and private actors will assume a risk that Russia could revert to coercive revisionism if the new leadership is weak or divided, or if representatives of the ‘old regime’ retain influence.

Without the two-stage strategy described above, trust cannot be restored. In the first stage, steps must be taken to reduce the risk of immediate escalation and to demonstrate a break with the logic of war. In the second stage, the commitments made in the first stage must be implemented. This requires a controlled return of territory, structured use of frozen assets for compensation, the release of political prisoners, competitive elections under international supervision, arms control negotiations including non-strategic systems, and a renunciation of revisionism at the doctrinal level. Without this second stage, the first would be perceived merely as a tactic to ease sanctions temporarily before a new ‘offensive’.

The situation is further complicated by contradictions in Western policy. For example, the US National Security Strategy postulates a refusal by Washington to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. Yet representatives of American business, potentially interested in operating in Russia, understand that such engagement would only be possible after institutional changes in Russia. Property rights protection, judicial independence and accountability of the executive will be required. Under Putin, major foreign business could only rely on personal political guarantees, rather than functioning institutions. In post-war Russia, no one is likely to trust such guarantees again. Legal constraints and independent law enforcement will be necessary, requiring swift and risky domestic reforms.

Both the trajectory of Russia’s political transition and the sustainability of post-war stabilisation will depend on the Russian leadership’s ability to navigate the treacherous waters of an internal crisis.