A Game Without Trump Cards: The scandal in the Oval Office, its causes, and consequences

The art of playing without trump cards

One can argue endlessly about who acted inappropriately and bears responsibility for the Oval Office scandal. It is easy to find arguments to blame either Zelensky or Trump and Vance, depending on one’s perspective and empathy. However, instead of engaging in such debates, it is more useful to examine the context of the meeting from two perspectives: foreign policy and domestic politics.

In the week leading up to the scandal, Donald Trump held talks in Washington with French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Their goal was to persuade him to adopt a more pro-Ukrainian stance and work with Europe to establish at least some guarantees for Ukraine’s post-war future. There is no indication that they succeeded. Trump, in fact, initially wanted to cancel his meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, but Macron convinced him otherwise.

On the other hand, against the backdrop of unusual Russian-American negotiations in Istanbul, the week’s most significant development was the Kremlin’s hardening of its public negotiating position. First, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and then, the next day, Putin’s press secretary Peskov, reiterated that, according to the Russian constitution, certain Ukrainian territories – still not occupied by Russian forces – are considered part of Russia. Moscow made it clear that it had no intention of making concessions on this issue.

For the first time since Trump’s election, the Kremlin played this particular trump card. Essentially, Lavrov challenged the fundamental assumption of the American administration – that any agreement would be based on freezing military operations along the current front lines. He also rejected the possibility of European troops being stationed in Ukraine and stated that, for a peace settlement, Kyiv would have to adopt several pro-Russian laws. In other words, despite Trump’s continuous public softening and the concessions he has showered upon Putin, the only response he received was a further tightening of the Kremlin’s position.

So, when Trump repeatedly tells Zelensky during their Oval Office dispute that he has 'no trump cards in hand,' we must remember that Trump himself is in the same position when negotiating with Putin. He has no real leverage, except for the assumption that he can pressure Ukraine into accepting the terms of peace he secretly negotiates with the Kremlin. And it is precisely this assumption that Zelensky publicly undermines with his actions at the White House, in full view of the press.

Scandal as a political tool

Understanding the domestic political perspective of what happened is equally important. According to Gallup, Trump has the lowest approval rating in the first month after inauguration of any US president since 1953 (45%), except for Trump himself in 2017. He is approved by 93% of Republicans, 37% of independents, and only a handful of Democrats. His approval rating on Ukraine policy is even lower – 80% among Republicans and 33% among independents.

Online polls conducted by The Economist / YouGov and Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll provide a more detailed picture. Overall, Americans approve of some of Trump’s bold initiatives, and when it comes to Ukraine, they largely share the view that it cannot win on the battlefield, meaning the war should be stopped through negotiations. They support Trump’s efforts in this direction. However, nearly 60% of respondents in the Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll oppose Trump’s administration excluding Ukrainian leaders from negotiations with Russia or forcing Kyiv into territorial concessions. Additionally, 66% believe that Ukraine should receive security guarantees from the US if it makes concessions, while 63% think that if Russia succeeds in seizing Ukrainian territories, it will expand its aggression to other countries.

Although support for Ukraine has declined, and the number of those who believe Ukraine is receiving too much aid is growing, The Economist/YouGov poll shows that a majority still favours maintaining or increasing assistance: 21% support increasing aid, 29% support keeping it at current levels, while 30% believe it should be reduced (but not stopped). Even among Republicans, fewer than half (45%) hold this view, and among independents, only a third (33%).

Overall, after three years of war, Americans have become accustomed to seeing Vladimir Putin as the enemy and sympathising with Ukraine. The median American voter, including Republicans, tends to have a favourable view of Ukraine and President Zelensky and a hostile stance toward Putin. Nearly two-thirds of Americans consider Ukraine an ally (27%) or a friendly country (37%), while among Republicans, this number is 57%. Meanwhile, almost three-quarters of Americans see Russia as an enemy (44%) or an unfriendly state (29%), with 72% of Republicans sharing this view. Hostility toward Russia is one of the very few issues where there is bipartisan consensus in American public opinion. This sheds an entirely new light on the events in the Oval Office on Friday.

The most surprising aspect of what happened in the White House is not the incident itself, but the fact that it unfolded in front of the press. However, even as the scandal escalated, Trump expressed satisfaction that American voters would witness the scene. Immediately afterward, his administration and its allied media worked to frame the conflict as an example of Zelensky’s deep ingratitude after receiving massive US aid – an insult to America in the heart and symbol of its power, the Oval Office.

All of this, according to the administration, should reshape public opinion, convincing the average American that Trump is not becoming Putin’s puppet, but rather that the arrogant and ungrateful Zelensky is to blame for the breakdown in relations and the administration’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine. This is a prime example of Trump’s mastery in reframing political debates. A policy discussion (whether Putin’s promises to Trump are sufficient to ensure Ukraine’s security) is transformed into a personal scandal ('You insulted me – get out'), shifting the debate from rational argumentation to emotional solidarity. Trump likely assumes, perhaps correctly, that the average American, especially Republican-leaning, will react more strongly to the framing of 'he insulted us right in our White House' than to Zelensky’s rational arguments about why Putin’s word is insufficient for Ukraine’s security.

Zelensky likely understood this dynamic as well. Immediately after the White House incident, he went on Fox News, Trump’s favoured Republican channel, for an extensive interview. Following his meetings with Macron and Starmer, Zelensky likely realised that he would not be able to change Trump and Vance’s position. His only remaining asset was the American public’s dissent, including that of a significant number of Republicans, against Trump’s pro-Russian policy shift.

Replaying the cards

Throughout Sunday, Trump’s team launched an intense media campaign centred around two key messages: Zelensky could still return to the negotiating table if he issued a public apology, otherwise, Ukraine would need a new president.

However, there should be no illusions here: replacing Zelensky with another Ukrainian president approved by Moscow is one of Putin’s ultimatums. Ironically, the Oval Office scandal has likely pushed the American administration and the Kremlin further away from achieving that goal, at least for now. In Ukraine, Zelensky has regained his image as a hero, while the warm reception he received from European leaders and King Charles in London neutralised any perception of the White House incident as a diplomatic failure for Ukraine’s leader.

Of course, Zelensky should apologise. But only if it leads to a meaningful shift in Trump’s team’s stance on Ukraine’s interests. Apologising just to return to the same position he was in last Friday makes no sense. Besides, it’s no longer even possible.

The European summit with Zelensky in London effectively served as a joint declaration that Europe and Ukraine are developing a unified stance for negotiations – negotiations to which they were not invited. At this moment, that is a powerful card to play. Until Zelensky returns to the negotiating table with Trump’s team, it remains unclear what exactly Trump will negotiate with Putin. As previously noted, Trump’s primary leverage in those talks is his ability to force Europe and Ukraine into accepting the settlement terms he separately arranges with Putin. But now, Zelensky can return to discussions with Trump, not in the powerless role that Vance and Trump attempted to impose on him in the Oval Office, but as a representative of a unified European position.

In a sense, Zelensky has done exactly what he did at the beginning of the war. Had he not resisted Putin’s aggression, Ukraine would never have received the Western support it ultimately secured. Similarly, had he swallowed the humiliation in the Oval Office and accepted the imposed position of complete helplessness, European leaders would not have had the opportunity to put forward their own unified conditions to Trump, thereby inserting themselves into his separate negotiations with Putin. Zelensky took the same approach with the first version of the now-abandoned minerals agreement. After refusing to sign it, Trump’s team lashed out at him with insults, only to return a few days later with a new version. While this new deal may not have been particularly significant, at least it was not a humiliating capitulation for Ukraine (→ Re:Russia: Shackles, Chimera, or Marshall Plan?).

Of course, in theory, Trump could spend the coming months waging a political war against Europe and dismantling Ukraine in Putin’s interests. However, doing so would mean permanently abandoning his image as a master negotiator and peacemaker. It would also require convincing the American public that the bombing of Ukrainian cities is a just punishment for Zelensky’s refusal to wear a suit jacket. And that choice is far less straightforward than many assume, or than Trump’s administration would like to portray it.