Space for Compromise and The Nature of Intransigence: Why the majority of Ukrainians still oppose ‘peace talks’

Space for compromise...

The idea of Russia-Ukraine negotiations is gaining increasing popularity in countries that are not directly involved in the conflict, including in the West. Many of the ‘peace plans’ discussed in these countries are largely directed at their domestic audiences, addressing internal debates over supporting Ukraine while ignoring key (existential) realities of a potential settlement for Ukraine. At the same time, Russian propaganda presents Zelensky's uncompromising stance and that of some Western politicians as the main obstacle to peaceful resolution. To some extent, this narrative has also been adopted in the West. In this context, it is crucial to understand how Ukrainians themselves perceive the issue of peace negotiations and possible compromises. A series of surveys conducted in Ukraine by various sociological centres from May to August offers insight into the arguments and perceptions shaping the positions of the main groups of Ukrainian respondents.

The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) has been tracking changes in Ukrainians' attitudes toward the idea of negotiations and possible compromises to end hostilities since May 2022. At that starting point, only about 8-10% of respondents were willing to make territorial concessions, while over 80% were categorically opposed. This situation remained largely unchanged until the fall of 2023. However, after the failure of Ukraine’s summer offensive, the share of uncompromising opponents of compromise gradually decreased over the next six months, reaching 55% by May 2024, while one in three respondents acknowledged the possibility of agreeing to territorial losses to achieve peace and maintain the country’s independence. In the southern regions, less than half (46%) are against concessions, while in the west of the country, this figure is 60%.

Which of these statements about possible compromises for achieving peace with Russia do you agree with most?, 2022-2024, % of those surveyed

In June, KIIS conducted an additional survey aimed at understanding Ukrainians' attitudes not towards unilateral concessions, but towards possible compromise formulas with Russia. While certain concessions may seem unacceptable on their own, they could become acceptable in combination with compensating conditions within a ‘peace package’. Therefore, the sociologists asked respondents to assess the acceptability of various ‘packages’ that could be the subject of negotiations.

As we previously noted, the space for possible compromises is defined by a set of existentially significant issues for both sides (occupied territories, Ukraine’s status after the conflict ends, and future security guarantees) and lies between two poles: Russia's (most favourable options for it) and Ukraine's (→ Re:Russia: Unattainable Space). The first possible package of agreements (Package 1), proposed to respondents by KIIS sociologists, is close to Moscow's pole: Russia retains control over all currently occupied territories, Ukraine renounces NATO membership, but joins the European Union and receives necessary financial aid from the West for post-war reconstruction. The second package (Package 2) implies that Russia de facto retains control over all occupied territories, but Ukraine becomes a member of NATO and the EU. This is a compromise package of ‘Territories in exchange for security’. Finally, the third package (Package 3) leans toward Ukraine’s pole and envisions that Ukraine regains control over Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions (with the remaining territories staying under Moscow's control), joins NATO and the EU, and receives funding from the West for post-war reconstruction.

Perception of compromise options in potential negotiations with Russia among Ukrainian respondents, June 2024, % of those surveyed

Predictably, the ‘Moscow-backed’ Package 1 seems to be the least acceptable option for respondents: 38% of those surveyed found it barely acceptable, while 54% were categorically opposed. Package 2, ‘Territories in exchange for security’ appeared fully acceptable to 10% and barely acceptable to 37%, meaning that nearly half of those surveyed supported it, while the share of compromise opponents decreased to 38% (with a higher proportion of respondents undecided). Finally, the most favourable scenario for Ukraine, Package 3 – NATO membership and the return of some territories – received the support of 57% of respondents, with only a third strongly opposing it.

From these two surveys, it follows that there is room for compromise in Ukrainian public opinion, which gravitates toward the ‘Territories in exchange for security’ scenario.

...and the nature of intransigence

It is well known that public opinion polls are a complex tool, and their results can depend on the current information context, the wording of seemingly similar questions, and even the survey context, meaning the nature and order of neighbouring questions. Two surveys conducted in the summer by Ukraine’s Razumkov Centre present a somewhat different picture of public sentiment.

According to a survey commissioned by the publication Zerkalo Nedeli in July this year, 44% of Ukrainians stated that the time for peace negotiations with Russia had already arrived, while 35% disagreed, and the remaining 21% were undecided. An even greater division of opinion was observed on whether Zelensky’s decree banning negotiations with Russia should be repealed: 37% still support the decree, 32% believe it should be repealed, and 31% were undecided. However, when it came to the conditions of peace, those surveyed demonstrated relative intransigence: only 9% were willing to accept the current front line as the basis for a ceasefire, 26% were willing to accept peace based on the pre-invasion borders of February 2022, and 51% insisted that all territories must be returned as a condition for peace. Furthermore, nearly 50% expressed confidence that if an agreement freezing the current situation – the cessation of hostilities along the present front line – were signed, it would lead to civil conflict within Ukraine.

In another question, respondents were asked what they would personally be willing to concede in hypothetical negotiations with Russia. It turned out that 8% were willing to give up territories, 14% were willing to sacrifice Ukraine’s pro-Western trajectory, 17% were unsure, and 60% were unwilling to concede anything. Public opinion overwhelmingly rejects the possibility of officially recognizing the loss of territories (84%). The position is less categorical regarding the recognition of Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned status: 58% are against it, while 22% are open to such a concession, and 20% remain uncertain.

In an August poll by the Razumkov Centre, about 50% of those surveyed said that negotiations with Russia were either entirely impossible or only possible after the liberation of all territories, 20% believed that only prisoner exchange negotiations were possible, and only 20% agreed to negotiations without any preconditions. The poll was conducted from 8-15 August, during Ukraine's offensive in the Kursk region.

In another formulation of the question regarding negotiations with Russia, 32% of respondents agreed that Ukraine has suffered such heavy losses that it cannot afford to continue losing people and must begin negotiations to end hostilities. In contrast, 45% supported the statement that Ukraine has endured such significant losses that it cannot accept a peace agreement that does not align with its interests. When asked whether Ukraine could withstand a prolonged military confrontation with Russia, 54% answered positively, while 28% disagreed. Additionally, 21% believed that Ukraine should continue military resistance even if Western aid were to stop (expectations regarding Western support were quite realistic: 40% agreed that the West would not support Ukraine in the war indefinitely, while an equal number held the opposite view),

When answering detailed questions about the conditions for ending the conflict, only 9% of respondents considered the official recognition of occupied territories as a condition for ending the war (a similar result to the July poll), 21% were willing to give up NATO membership, and 17% were willing to forgo EU membership. In a more complex and balanced question, ‘Would you support a peace agreement that guarantees lasting peace and protection for Ukraine from the Russian threat, even if part of the territory remains under Russian control?’ 25% responded positively, 14% were unsure, and 61% said ‘no’. This option of ‘Peace in exchange for territories’ resembles Package 2 from the KIIS survey (‘Territories in exchange for security’), but without mentioning NATO.

To understand the last distribution of answers, it is important to consider responses to two other questions from the same survey. 60% of those surveyed are confident that regardless of the conditions under which a ceasefire agreement is reached, Russia will attack Ukraine again in the future. When asked whether Western guarantees would protect Ukraine, 62% gave a definitively positive answer, while around 40% expressed doubt or disbelief. This highlights how sensitive the issue of security guarantees is for Ukrainian respondents and the level of trust in these guarantees. The reasons for this sensitivity are not difficult to understand. In the previously analysed KIIS survey, 36% of those opposed to territorial concessions believe that Russia's real goal in the war is genocide and the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation, while 32% think the goal is the destruction of Ukrainian identity and the forced assimilation (Russification) of all Ukrainians. Even among those willing to make concessions, about half share this view.

Thus, over the past year, the proportion of Ukrainians who believe that negotiations are necessary and that concessions to end the war are inevitable has noticeably increased, making up about a quarter to a third of those surveyed. In reality, this number may be even higher, as in both Russia and Ukraine, wartime survey samples may have biases: people who do not share mainstream or official positions may be more likely to refuse to participate in polls. However, based on the survey data, the majority still oppose concessions, with a significant portion holding this position quite firmly. A year ago, the dominant argument among opponents of negotiations was the belief in the possibility of regaining territories through military means. Today, a different argument has become key: Ukraine sees no point in entering negotiations or making concessions without reliable security guarantees, because in that scenario, another Russian attack is expected, aiming at the erasure of Ukrainian identity and total Russification.