Unattainable Space: What could be the focus of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and why they have not begun

Two peace camps and three existential questions

At the upcoming UN General Assembly session, Volodymyr Zelensky plans to present his 'victory plan' to outgoing President Joe Biden. Meanwhile, in unofficial conversations with Bloomberg, anonymous high-ranking sources indicate that among Ukraine's allies, there is a growing number of voices advocating for a compromise with Russia, one that should be reached through negotiations. Talks of a 'peace agreement' have been ongoing throughout the two and a half years of the conflict, though they have usually been initiated by countries from the Global South. Over the past year, the number of parties interested in participating in the 'peace process' has grown significantly: China, Brazil, the UAE, Turkey, Hungary under Viktor Orbán, Austria, Donald Trump, and now German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have their own 'peace plans', not to mention Zelensky's 'peace formula' and Putin's 'conditions'. However, while the situation on the battlefield is constantly reported by journalists and analysed by experts, the 'peace process' is shrouded in vague statements and abstract calls.

An analysis of 25 peace proposals for resolving the war, conducted by political scientist Masha Hedberg (→ Russia Matters: Comparing Pathways to Peace in Ukraine) reveals the main directions in the search for peace and provides insights into why most of these proposals are unrealistic and where a rational core might lie.

Masha Hedberg divides the existing peace plans into two groups. The key idea behind the first group can be described as ‘peace from a position of strength’. This includes Ukraine's maximalist plan and the plans of its allies who believe that Russian aggression must be fully countered. Political scientists Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard have referred to the supporters of this approach as the ‘party of justice’ (→ Re:Russia: Peace versus Justice). Vladimir Putin, who believes that the path to peace lies in satisfying Russia's demands, also falls into the 'peace from a position of strength' camp. The second group adheres to the approach of 'peace through negotiations'. This group believes that, since Ukraine cannot reclaim the territories occupied by Russia through military means, it will have to make compromises to stop the bloodshed. This group is often called the 'peace party', although that name is somewhat misleading. It is more about forced concessions and the acceptance of the status quo. It would be more accurate to call them the 'realist party', which seeks a 'peace formula' at the expense of Ukraine's concessions.

In general, the peace proposals can be situated within a framework defined by two axes: 'pragmatism vs. justice' and 'immediate vs. delayed ceasefire'. Proposals aimed at a quick end to the conflict require significant concessions from Ukraine, while those that could lead to a more just resolution require continued military action and additional resources that only the West can provide Ukraine. 

The first attempt to find a peace formula, or a ‘settlement’, occurred in the March-April 2022 negotiations, which began with an exploration of compromises (it is unclear how sincere) and ended in failure. In the absence of other examples, these negotiations can be seen as a model. Hedberg analysed five rounds of consultations between the parties to identify their real interests and the possible map of concessions. The draft documents discussed in the spring of 2022, including the so-called Istanbul communiqué, one version of which was published by the New York Times, suggest that the parties were grappling with existential questions for both Kyiv and Moscow.

The published text of the communiqué remains unclear regarding the issue of territories: it refers to a map that was not made public. The communiqué specifies that its provisions do not apply to Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as to unnamed territories marked on the map (presumably Donbas and Luhansk region). Other territories were apparently supposed to be returned to Ukrainian control. In return, Ukraine was expected to agree to the status of a 'permanently neutral' and 'non-nuclear' state, though Russia was not to obstruct its accession to the EU. In exchange for neutrality, Kyiv sought reliable security guarantees. The proposed guarantors of Ukraine's 'neutral' status included the UK, China, the US, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, and Israel (though none had officially agreed). Russia was also included among the security guarantors. Later, Russia added several other issues to the negotiation agenda, including the future size and armament of Ukraine's military, economic sanctions, the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, and more. One key point stated that in the event of an attack on Ukraine, the 'guarantors' would take measures to protect it based on the consensus of all parties, including Russia. As a result, the negotiations were halted.

The course of the negotiations and the draft agreement clearly highlight the existential questions at the heart of any peace formula: 1) the fate of the occupied territories, 2) Ukraine’s future ('neutral') status, and 3) security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of its neutrality. The draft agreement, as far as can be judged, proposed returning to Ukraine the territories occupied after 24 February 2022, in exchange for neutrality, but ran into the issue of security guarantees.

Peace from a position of strength/justice

The clearest example of this approach is Zelensky's ten-point peace plan, which demands the 'unconditional and non-negotiable' restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, payment of reparations, the establishment of a tribunal to investigate Russian military crimes, and security guarantees for Ukraine from leading nations. It also emphasises Ukraine’s determination to 'eventually join NATO'. In reality, much like Putin's own 'conditions', this is not so much a peace plan as it is a plan for victory, essentially a maximalist position. Clearly, under certain conditions, both Kyiv and the West might be willing to 'trade off' some of its points if Putin shows readiness to adjust his 'conditions'. However, there have been no signals from either side indicating a move in this direction.

In various proposals from analysts and think tanks, more realistic interpretations of the same position can be found. For example, the 'fight until victory' camp, which supports Ukraine, includes proposals published by Chatham House and National Interest. Their stance is that the West should not only continue supporting Ukraine but also increase its involvement in the conflict. In his article How to Convince Putin He Will Lose, published in Foreign Affairs, Dan Altman argues that 'the best way to achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible' is for Ukraine's allies to make substantial investments in arms production. Such a step would convince Putin that 'the West will outmatch Russia in arms production in the coming years' and prevent him from winning a 'war of attrition'. According to this logic, it is not enough to arm Ukraine; 'the key to ending the war is altering Moscow's expectations about how its military efforts will unfold in three, five, or even eight years'. Altman believes that long-term commitments to arms production should be taken on by Europe, thereby creating its own security architecture and reducing its dependence on the United States.

Another ‘strong’ proposal, presented in Politico by Timo Malinowski, a former member of the US Congress, suggests that Russia could be forced into peace by admitting Ukraine into NATO before the war ends. NATO membership would guarantee the security of any territory Ukraine controls at the time of joining and would deter further Russian aggression. Essentially, this plan would freeze the territorial status quo, similar to what happened with divided Germany and Korea. A condition for joining NATO would be Ukraine's agreement to not pursue the return of occupied territories through military means. Hypothetically, Ukraine could still seek to restore its 1991 borders in the future using non-military methods, as Russia would remain under sanctions pressure.

Today, these scenarios seem even less plausible than at the beginning of the conflict, notes Masha Hedberg. Russia is currently managing to adapt its economy to wartime conditions and sanctions, while the West shows even less resolve in supporting Ukraine than during the first year of the war (despite providing greater material support). This lack of resolve is evident not only among Western politicians but also, primarily, their voters. The Western allies’ plan to increase arms production is also likely to turn into a long-term project. The threat from Russia is not viewed by European voters and politicians as existential, meaning that reallocating resources in favour of the military sector will be gradual and prolonged.

In other words, a 'peace based on strength/justice' is not a very practical scenario. It runs up against the reluctance of Western allies to increase risks (such as by preemptively accepting Ukraine into NATO) or to commit more resources to aid Ukraine and adapt their own economies to new military realities. At this point, the risks of a reverse trend – such as reducing aid – are coming to the forefront, especially if Donald Trump comes to power in the US or if far-right forces in Europe gain more influence.

Trump's wild card: peace on unknown terms

Donald Trump has repeatedly said, including in a recent debate with Kamala Harris, that he would end the war immediately after winning the election. However, he has never revealed details of his plan, explaining that it will not work if it becomes public. The Washington Post quotes Trump as saying privately, 'Both sides want to save face; they want to find a way out'. According to the newspaper's reporters, who spoke with Trump’s advisers, he plans to pressure the Ukrainian authorities to abandon claims to Crimea and Donbas. However, a return to the pre-February 2022 status quo is unlikely to satisfy Putin, and what leverage Trump plans to use to achieve such a result remains unclear. Publicly, Trump and his vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance have repeatedly opposed supporting Ukraine, while privately Trump has pressured Republicans in Congress to vote against additional aid to Ukraine. Such a scenario would lead to Kyiv's defeat, making any compromise acceptable to Ukraine entirely impossible.

In an article titled Trump's Plan for Ukraine in The Wall Street Journal, Mike Pompeo, former US Secretary of State during the last two years of Trump's presidency, proposes, among other things, tightening sanctions against Russia, attempting to push it out of the global energy market, and reclassifying aid to Ukraine under a lend-lease program. Neither Trump nor his representatives have publicly responded to these proposals. Most likely, Pompeo's plan is an attempt to reconcile Trump's positions with other Republicans who are not ready to ‘surrender’ Ukraine to the Kremlin.

Theoretically, one can assume that Trump means to present both sides with a dual threat: reducing aid to Ukraine (if it does not agree to his compromise formula) or increasing aid (if Russia does not agree). However, Trump's actual peace formula remains unknown. Ukraine is more vulnerable to such an ultimatum than Russia, meaning that for Trump to succeed, he would likely need to shift his compromise closer to Russia’s interests.

‘Peace through negotiations’, or the ‘pacification’ formula

According to Hedberg, most of the 'compromise' proposals resemble diplomatic gestures more than substantial plans that consider the interests of both sides. They all consistently call for Russia and Ukraine to resume direct negotiations as soon as possible. 'Dialogue and negotiations are the only viable solution to the Ukrainian crisis', reads point 4 of China’s plan, first revealed in February 2023. Nearly identical phrases can be found in the joint proposal by China and Brazil, the framework plan of Indonesia’s defence minister, and the African Peace Initiative. The main tactic of such diplomacy is to reinterpret what the 'peace party of strength/justice' considers unilateral Russian aggression as a 'crisis', implying shared responsibility between both sides.

When moving from declarations to details, these ‘negotiation-based’ peace initiatives reveal differences on four key issues. First, how to handle the territories currently controlled by Russia, including Crimea. Second, whether Ukraine should adopt a permanent and official neutrality. Third, whether to simply freeze the conflict or to pursue a comprehensive peace agreement. And lastly, the question of the security architecture that could guarantee peace for Ukraine in the future.

In the report The Diplomatic Path to a Secure Ukraine, George Beebe and Anatol Lieven propose a dual approach to ending the conflict: while continuing to provide Ukraine with as much defensive aid as it needs, the US should also make diplomatic efforts to involve Russia in the peace process. As the authors write, ‘assistance should not be a means of securing victory, but a lever in negotiations’. In their view, Ukraine will need to agree to neutrality and limits on its military forces, in exchange for security guarantees from a group of countries. Russia, in turn, would renounce any further territorial ambitions and agree to ‘limitations on the number of Russian troops and missiles deployed in Kaliningrad, Belarus, and Russian regions bordering Ukraine’. This plan largely mirrors the Istanbul communiqué project but assumes that Ukraine will have to accept the occupation of territories seized by Russia.

This perspective is shared by Richard Haass, honorary president of the US Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and his colleague Charles Kupchan, who note that the West ‘will continue to use sanctions and diplomatic pressure to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but through negotiations, not on the battlefield’. Meanwhile, for instance, Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institution suggests that in exchange for Ukraine’s neutrality, Moscow would withdraw troops from Ukrainian territories, including Donbas, though Crimea would remain under Russian control, with its status possibly revisited in the future.

There is also no consensus among the various 'negotiation-based' plans regarding the security architecture and guarantees for Ukraine. Most proposals call for expanding the role of existing organisations (NATO, the EU, or the UN) or security guarantees from a 'group of countries'. A more original idea comes from Michael O’Hanlon and his colleague Lisa Howard, who propose creating a new security organisation that would include both European and Asian states – the Atlantic-Asian Security Community (AASC). Founding members could include the US, several major European powers, and countries bordering Russia or Ukraine. In the near and medium term, the organisation’s goal would be to deter Russia through military missions, including training the Ukrainian army and monitoring activities. In the long run, however, the AASC could evolve into a global security institution, distinct from NATO, and eventually even include Russia.

The ‘peace scenario’ matrix and its bottlenecks

If we attempt to summarise the key proposals on the three existential questions, for each one we are dealing with a spectrum of options ranging from a solution that maximally satisfies Kyiv to one that maximally satisfies the Kremlin. In the table below, these are condensed into three positions, marking the poles and an intermediate solution.

It is clear that any compromise formula must be a combination of options from different columns. The table offers an idea of the spectrum of theoretically possible solutions. For instance, scenario 1: RRussia retains control over the occupied territories (A3), but a 'reduced' Ukraine joins NATO (B1), and the Western coalition guarantees this compromise (C1). As a NATO member, Ukraine renounces its intentions to reclaim the occupied territories by military means, following the model of West Germany. NATO guarantees would apply only to Ukrainian territory not controlled by Russian forces. Or, scenario 2: Russia withdraws from the territories captured after February 24, 2022 (A2), and Ukraine agrees to strict neutrality (B3), with either a Western coalition or a compromise group of countries serving as the guarantor (C1 or C2). Or, scenario 3: Russia retains control over the occupied territories (A3), and Ukraine agrees to strict neutrality (B3). The guarantor could either be the Western coalition, which guarantees military protection of Ukraine's neutrality (with a limited army) in case of an attack (C1), or a compromise coalition of countries, where the guarantees would be considerably weaker (C2).

In each compromise scenario, the sum of the numerical values (points) indicates its closeness to the 'Ukraine pole' (the optimum being three points) or to the 'Russia pole' (the optimum being nine points). Anything below six points leans in favour of Ukraine; anything above that favours Russia. Thus, the first scenario totals five points, the second – six or seven points, and the third – seven or eight points.

However, when transitioning from theoretically possible compromise solutions to practically achievable ones, two fundamental issues arise in any ‘negotiated peace’ plan. The first issue is the incentives for both sides to compromise, and the second is the guarantees of enforcement.

The problem of guarantees for Ukraine is particularly critical. In 1994, Ukraine received weak guarantees of territorial integrity from the US, the UK, and Russia in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons. Twenty years later, these guarantees were violated by Russia for the first time, and then again eight years later. The other guarantors were unable to prevent this, and Russia actively leveraged its nuclear status to apply pressure. Therefore, the issue is not just about who will guarantee Ukraine's potential 'neutrality' and disarmament, but also the nature of those guarantees. Today, there are no countries, including members of the Western coalition, willing to provide Ukraine with a 'shield' against potential Russian aggression. None of the guarantor countries mentioned in the 'peace plans' have agreed to this. Moreover, countries that have received similar 'full' guarantees from the US are now doubting their reliability in the event of conflict with a nuclear power. South Korea, for example, faces these doubts today. (→ Re:Russia: Defending the South).

The second, equally serious issue is the problem of incentives for compromise. Such incentives usually come in the form of threats that each side faces in the absence of an agreement. The Russian side relies on the threat that it will continue to advance, capturing new territories and destroying Ukraine's infrastructure, while Western support for Ukraine will not increase but instead likely decrease. This scenario would lead to far worse consequences for Ukrainian sovereignty than the limitations outlined in a compromise of 'actual loss of occupied territories plus neutrality'. The West, on the other hand, relies on the threat of continuing military aid to Ukraine and expanding its military capabilities (including by allowing Ukraine to strike Russian territory with precision missiles). This would require another year of military confrontation, which would gradually build up severe economic and social consequences within Russia.

At present, the first (Russian) threat appears more substantial. Breakthroughs by Ukraine's armed forces in the Kursk region and the increasingly successful Ukrainian drone attacks expose Russia's vulnerabilities. However, the overall potential for mutual harm still tilts in Russia's favour, while Western willingness to continue supporting Ukraine is declining. This calculation seems to be the basis for Vladimir Putin's current stance, which is why he is not inclined to consider peace options other than those listed in column 3 of our table – on the ‘Russia pole’.