President Trump is conducting separate negotiations with the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine, disregarding Europe's position and pressuring Kyiv, as he believes US assistance is critically important for Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia. The aid package allocated by the previous US administration will run out by mid-year – another factor that Putin and Trump could use to push Ukraine into unfavorable agreements.
Europe can reclaim its seat at the negotiating table and strengthen Ukraine’s position if it manages to replace American aid with its own resources. But is this feasible? Some experts believe that, in general, it is.
Compared to the early stages of the war, Europe has already significantly expanded the capabilities of its defence industry and has also fundamentally rethought its approach to the conflict in Ukraine. Today, containing Putin in Ukraine is increasingly seen as part of an existential challenge to European security as a whole.
There are several areas where Europe currently cannot fully replace the United States: intelligence, high-tech command-and-control systems, as well as rocket artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems. Europe could partially compensate for these gaps by purchasing such weapons from the US, South Korea, or Israel and by increasing supplies of simpler weaponry.
Experts also consider it entirely possible for Europe to take on the full financial burden of foreign aid to Ukraine. The combined expenditures of Europe (the EU and the UK) would need to increase but would amount to only 0.21% of the region’s total GDP based on purchasing power parity.
If costs are distributed proportionally, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Baltic states would not need to increase their contributions – they are already allocating more than 0.2% of GDP. The main burden would fall on the region’s largest economies: Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain, whose spending, in relative terms, lags behind the European average. Ultimately, it is these nations that will determine whether Europe can regain its international agency and secure better conditions for Ukraine, which is expected to become part of the EU in the future.
President Trump is engaged in separate negotiations with the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine, ignoring Europe's position and putting pressure on Kyiv. Trump operates under the assumption that US aid is critically important for Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia. This dependency has two dimensions: Ukraine's reliance on current supplies and intelligence provided by the US, and its future dependence once the final $61 billion aid package, approved under Joe Biden, is exhausted. This depletion is expected sometime in the middle of the year (→ Re:Russia: Safety Margin). No substantive discussions about a new aid package are taking place in the US, and it seems unlikely that Trump would take the initiative. His campaign promises include ending the war through a peace deal and relieving American taxpayers of further expenditures on Ukraine. This factor largely shapes the Kremlin’s negotiation strategy – delaying talks until Ukraine finds itself without US support.
To regain influence in ceasefire negotiations and bolster Kyiv’s position as a future EU member, Europe must be capable of sustaining Ukraine’s resistance against the Kremlin without US involvement. But is this feasible? Although US supplies currently dominate in some key categories – particularly in rocket systems and ammunition – fully replacing American aid is difficult but not impossible, according to a report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. While US support was indispensable at the outset of the war, European defence industries have since ramped up production of critical weaponry such as howitzers, air defence systems, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles.
A fundamental shift from the early war period is that European manufacturers were initially unwilling to invest in expanding and modernising arms production solely for Ukraine. Today, however, such investments are part of Europe’s broader rearmament strategy, making defence industry expansion a long-term commitment rather than a one-off effort. AAs a result, European military production has significantly increased. In 2022, only 11% of European aid to Ukraine came from newly manufactured arms rather than stockpiles. This share rose to 39% in 2023 and 59% in 2024, according to The Economist. Capital investments in European defence production have surged by 64% since 2021, reaching $5.5 billion, a figure that is likely even higher in reality. Meanwhile, the backlog of outstanding orders at Europe's ten largest defence companies has grown from $222 billion in 2021 to $362 billion in 2024. These firms have also expanded their workforce by nearly 25%.
The most striking progress has been in ammunition production, as ramping up shell manufacturing is simpler than increasing heavy equipment output. This year, Europe’s production of 155mm artillery shells (a key munition) is expected to reach 1 million units, surpassing the US's 600,000. Just two years ago, Europe produced only 300,000. Germany’s Rheinmetall has increased production tenfold since 2022, with a projected output of 700,000 shells in 2024 and 1.1 million by 2027. If the US does not expand its production, Rheinmetall alone will be manufacturing twice as many shells as all Pentagon contractors combined. Yet, some European arms manufacturers are still not operating at full capacity.
Despite progress, American dominance remains absolute in certain weapon categories. The highest level of dependency on the US is seen in rocket artillery, particularly multiple-launch rocket systems. According to the Kiel Institute, HIMARS accounts for 98% of the total value and 86% of the total quantity in volume terms. Another category where US dominance persists is long-range air defence, particularly the Patriot system, which represents 80% of total aid in value and 70% in quantity. Additionally, most 152/155mm howitzer ammunition still comes from the US. However, in other categories, Europe’s dependency on American supplies is considerably lower.
Experts note that substituting American rocket artillery (HIMARS), air defence systems (Patriot), and their associated munitions will be particularly challenging. At present, Europe lacks full-fledged alternatives, meaning it will either have to purchase these systems from the US or replace them with South Korean and Israeli equivalents. The Korean K239 Chunmoo and Israeli PULS multiple-launch rocket systems could serve as substitutes for HIMARS. However, replacing the Patriot system is more difficult. Europe's new long-range air defence system, the SAMP/T (Eurosam), is being produced too slowly, and ramping up production would require significant investment. That said, developing European missile and air defence systems is a key component of the ReArm Europe initiative, making investment in this sector inevitable.
Another critical issue is Europe’s dependence on the US in the IT sector. In addition to Ukraine’s use of Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite communications, its digital battlefield management system, Delta, is built on software developed by the US company Palantir. Palantir, founded by Peter Thiel – Musk’s former business partner and a Trump supporter – is central to Ukraine’s military operations, notes Manoj Joshi, an expert at the Observer Research Foundation. Experts from the Kiel Institute agree that Europe cannot fully replace the US in this area. In the future, this dependence may be reduced through the deployment of IRIS, a European alternative to Starlink. However, this project remains in its early stages and is not yet a viable solution.
For now, the lack of high-tech solutions will need to be compensated with increased shipments of conventional weaponry. After all, the Russian army also lacks comparable technological capabilities. In the medium term, Europe can significantly scale up its production and supply of howitzer shells. Additionally, drone production can be rapidly expanded, as drones play a crucial role in this war (→ Re:Russia: Swarm from the Future). They have become one of Ukraine’s most important deterrents, helping to offset Russia’s numerical advantage in manpower. Both European and Ukrainian manufacturers are capable of ramping up drone production to meet the growing demand.
A scenario in which Europe shoulders Ukraine’s financial support alone is realistic, albeit challenging. Here, too, a shift in mindset has occurred, from the early-war reluctance to increase defence spending due to a lack of budgetary mechanisms, to a fundamental reevaluation of the role and scale of necessary military expenditures. Initially, containing Russia in Ukraine was not widely seen as an existential necessity for Europe’s security. However, by 2024, this topic was under serious discussion (→ Re:Russia: Putin-Schrödinger's Cat), but today the consensus is increasingly leaning toward recognising it as a vital priority.
According to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine Support Tracker project, after three years of war, the US and Europe have nearly equalled each other in total aid provided to Ukraine. On average, Ukraine has received €82 billion per year, with military aid accounting for roughly €20 billion annually.
Experts from the Kiel Institute estimate that Ukraine’s total annual foreign aid requirements amount to 0.21% of Europe’s GDP (calculated at purchasing power parity, including the EU, the UK, and Norway). Their analysis includes financial, military, and humanitarian assistance, all of which are equally important. If the financial burden is distributed proportionally to economic size, some countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Baltic states, would not need to increase their spending, as they already contribute more than 0.2% of their GDP.
Dividing European donors into three broad groups – the Big Five (Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain), EU institutions, and all other countries – the Kiel Institute found that each group has contributed roughly equal amounts, at around €15 billion each. This means that, in relative terms, the largest European economies have borne a significantly lighter financial burden. The UK has spent 0.16% of its GDP on Ukraine, Germany 0.13%, France 0.05%, Italy 0.04%, and Spain just 0.03%. Thus, the main responsibility for increasing spending falls on those countries with the financial capacity to do so. According to the report’s calculations, Germany would need to raise its annual contributions from €6 billion to at least €9 billion, the UK from €5 billion to €6.5 billion, France from €1.5 billion to €6 billion, Italy from €0.8 billion to €4.5 billion, and Spain from €0.5 billion to €3 billion. EU institutions would need to allocate an additional €20 billion per year.
The encouraging news for Ukraine is that, at least for this year and the next, a significant increase in funding could be achieved relatively painlessly. This is because European allies have already approved, but not yet allocated, aid roughly equivalent to what Ukraine has already received from them. According to Ukraine Support Tracker, this amounts to approximately €66 billion. The bulk of this sum comes from funding agreed upon last autumn, backed by revenues generated from the investment of frozen assets belonging to the Russian Central Bank.
However, there has been no progress in increasing funding so far. Just a few days ago, EU leaders at a summit in Brussels failed to approve a proposal by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, for an urgent €5 billion aid package for Ukraine. Prior to this, her more ambitious plan, which sought to secure €40 billion in aid, was also rejected. According to Reuters, that plan was primarily intended to be financed through future revenues from frozen Russian assets. According to Politico's sources, the €5 billion 'minimum plan' failed because EU leaders were displeased that Kallas publicly announced it before consulting with them. If this is the only issue, it can be rectified. However, a more troubling sign is that the initiative was blocked by the very countries that are lagging in financial contributions and need to increase them – France, Spain, and Italy. To a large extent, the question of whether Europe can return to the negotiating table and secure a more stable ceasefire scenario now depends on these countries.