European Placebo: Discussing new European sanctions against Russia is pointless at this point
On 10 May, European leaders demanded that Vladimir Putin implement a ceasefire in Ukraine, threatening to impose additional sanctions on Russia should he refuse. Putin’s rejection of participation in the Istanbul negotiations now compels them to follow through on their threats with something concrete.
However, the EU’s sanctions policy is in deep crisis following the breakdown of coordination mechanisms with the United States during the Trump administration. Firstly, the EU is bound by the principle of consensus in its sanctions policy and by the so-called 'Orban factor', which not only hinders the expansion of pressure on Moscow but also continually threatens the renewal of existing sanctions. As a result of pressure from the Hungarian leader, the recently agreed 17th sanctions package has proven largely toothless.
Secondly, the EU effectively lacks its own mechanisms for implementing and monitoring sanctions policy, meaning that only those European sanctions which are backed by the US tend to be effective. Even so, the EU struggles to ensure compliance with restrictions among its own member states.
Tariffs could be an alternative tool. Their introduction does not require unanimous approval. This mechanism could, at the very least, return to the EU some tools of active trade and energy policy, though more likely in the long term. In the short term, tariffs on Russian gas would primarily create problems for European consumers.
In any case, no sanctions or tariffs that the EU might introduce would exert a swift or decisive influence on the course of the conflict. A far more pressing issue is the guarantee of support for Ukraine, particularly now that the previous US aid package is nearing exhaustion. Yet this is precisely the issue that European politicians have recently been careful to avoid. Discussions of new economic pressure measures, when detached from it, appear to be an example of diplomatic placebo.
The EU's sanctions impasse
Following Vladimir Putin’s defiant and provocative refusal to travel to Istanbul, European leaders have been faced with the challenge of coordinating their next steps regarding Russia. It is worth recalling that the recent diplomatic marathon began with an ultimatum from President Zelensky and four European leaders (Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron, and Donald Tusk) who demanded that Putin implement a ceasefire by 12 May. Failing that, they pledged to increase sanctions pressure on Russia.
Meanwhile, the EU’s sanctions policy is undergoing a deep crisis, ever since its coordination mechanism with Washington fell apart during Donald Trump’s presidency. The 17th package of sanctions, which the EU began preparing about a month ago and which was agreed at ambassadorial level last week, does not appear particularly convincing. According to Bloomberg, the 17th sanctions package will affect 60 individuals and entities, as well as around 150 tankers, bringing the total number of sanctioned vessels to over 300. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that 189 tankers would be targeted. According to Politico sources, European diplomats had considered tougher measures in the energy and financial sectors, but these were not even discussed due to anticipated resistance from Viktor Orbán. Hungary continues to import both pipeline gas from Russia (via the TurkStream pipeline) and oil (for which an exemption from the oil embargo was granted). Furthermore, the Hungarian bank OTP continues to operate in Russia, enabling transfers to the EU via SWIFT. Hungary’s position has thus become the primary reason behind the ineffectiveness of the 17th package.
The decision-making process, which requires unanimous approval for sanctions measures, not only prevents Europe from adopting new measures in the face of Orbán’s obstruction, but also poses a constant threat to existing sanctions, which must be renewed every six months. It should be noted, however, that Orbán’s stance is not the only issue undermining European sanctions policy. As previously discussed, the EU also lacks its own mechanisms for implementing and monitoring sanctions (→ Re Russia: The Regime Is Wavering).
In addition, European countries show a surprising inability to enforce the measures already in place, even among their own members. And this goes beyond Hungary. For example, sanctions against Russia’s so-called 'shadow fleet' appear ineffective, given that, according to a Brookings study, the bulk of the tankers replenishing it are supplied by Greek and other European shipowners. In any case, the effectiveness of blocking tankers already in use by Russia is also in question. Such measures only prove effective when backed by the United States and the threat of secondary sanctions. The EU lacks this mechanism as well: namely, the credible threat of restrictions on dollar transactions imposed by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Thus, Europe’s sanctions policies only function effectively thanks to the United States, which has the means to enforce sanctions, punish violations, and pressure Viktor Orbán into compliance. At present, the EU is incapable of conducting an independent sanctions policy. When European leaders issued their threats from Kyiv on 10 May, they expressed confidence that any increase in sanctions pressure in the event of Moscow’s refusal to accept a ceasefire would be supported by the US. However, Donald Trump has not made a single statement to that effect following Putin’s refusal to meet him in Istanbul, merely stating that he still hopes such a meeting might take place in the future.
Will tariffs save Europe?
All of this is pushing European leaders to turn to President Trump’s favoured instrument: tariffs. According to Politico sources, they will be the main topic of discussion at the 6th European Political Community Summit taking place today in Tirana. This grouping, established in 2022 on the initiative of President Macron, includes not only EU countries but also 20 other states of 'Greater Europe,' such as Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Iceland, and others.
The possibility of 'converting' sanctions into tariffs, or using the two tools simultaneously, has already been discussed and studied in detail by the European Commission back in April, according to Bloomberg sources. Unlike sanctions, tariffs require not unanimous approval but only a qualified majority, thereby resolving the 'Orbán problem.' At a ministerial meeting in Warsaw held just prior to the four leaders’ visit to Kyiv, Finland’s representative reportedly proposed introducing tariffs on all Russian imports alongside the adoption of the 17th sanctions package, according to the same agency. It is likely that this measure was what the European leaders had in mind in their ultimatum from Kyiv.
A similar idea is being promoted in the US by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who has proposed imposing 'crushing' tariffs of 500% on countries that purchase Russian oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and uranium. Notably, Graham has recently been in Turkey, arriving at the same time as members of Trump’s administration. His presence was seemingly intended as a signal to the Kremlin that his proposal could be given the green light. However, this threat had no apparent effect, and Trump chose not to mention it.
The format of the meeting in Tirana is well-suited for discussions about tariffs, particularly as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is present. Since 2022, Turkey has become the main hub for re-exporting Russian energy to the European market (→ Re:Russia: Dancing Around Sanctions).From February 2023 to February 2024, the volume of re-exported petroleum products amounted to 5.16 million tonnes, or €3.1 billion, according to the report ‘Kremlin Pit Stop’ by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). Moreover, following the halt of pipeline gas transit through Ukraine, the TurkStream pipeline remains the only channel for gas deliveries to Europe. According to Reuters, deliveries in the first three months of 2025 reached 4.5 billion cubic metres.
Shifting from sanctions to tariffs could indeed return to Europe some leverage in trade and energy policy at a time when coordination with the White House has become unreliable. Some economists and market participants have also suggested that this mechanism be used as part of the EU’s long-term strategy regarding Russian energy.
Just recently, the European Commission finally published a ‘road map’ for phasing out Russian energy supplies entirely by the end of 2027. However, the concrete measures are not expected to be made public until June. This delay, it seems, is also linked to the adjustment of the plan to incorporate the tariff instrument, which would not ban Russian gas outright but regulate its competitiveness (→ Re:Russia: Between The New Trump and The Old Putin). The idea is that tariffs would pressure Russia to lower prices, while encouraging European market players to diversify their sources and expand the use of alternatives. Revenue from tariffs could be used to support countries most vulnerable to price increases. Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen confirmed that Brussels will propose a mechanism that does not require unanimous approval by all member states.
Additionally, the 'roadmap' states that after 2027, Russian gas must not enter Europe in the form of re-exports, that is, disguised as gas from third countries. This provision is intended to bury the idea of reviving the Nord Stream pipelines, under which American companies would buy the infrastructure from Russia and then deliver Russian gas to Europe under the guise of it being American (→ Re:Russia: Gas Temptation). According to eight sources familiar with the matter, who recently spoke to Reuters, negotiations to realise this plan are more than active. Participants reportedly include Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, whom Putin appointed as his 'special representative for investment and economic cooperation with foreign countries,' and Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff. The existence of the talks has also been confirmed by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov and presidential aide Yuri Ushakov, who added, however, 'We’re discussing this with the Americans, but as for who else is involved, to be honest, I have no idea.' According to Der Spiegel, German authorities were also aware of the negotiations and helped ensure that the Swiss company Nord Stream 2 AG, operator of the second Nord Stream pipeline, avoided bankruptcy. This suggests that the German government does not view the American plan as unacceptable.
Placebo for European diplomacy
How tariffs will actually work, and whether they can resolve the issues of disunity and lack of political will within the EU, remains unknown. At any rate, tariffs are primarily a tool that affects domestic consumers, and their effectiveness depends on the condition of the relevant markets, particularly their diversity and flexibility. It is evident that tariffs could help to displace Russian oil at a time when the global market is experiencing a surplus. However, the volume of Russian oil on the European market is not especially significant. In the case of gas, setting tariffs will require complex coordination. For Europe, the mechanism may appear similar to the one proposed by Donald Trump and Lindsey Graham, but it is fundamentally different. Graham envisions tariffs being imposed on imports to the United States from countries that consume Russian energy. European tariffs, by contrast, are unlikely to become an instrument of immediate and forceful pressure on Russia. They will, above all, place European consumers in the position of having to seek alternatives to Russian gas.
Such measures, in any case, are not capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The real issue that directly affects the conflict’s trajectory, Moscow’s willingness to negotiate, and Ukraine’s prospects in 2025, is the supply of weapons to Kyiv. Yet this is precisely the issue European leaders have been carefully avoiding over the past month.
At the EU summit in March, an ambitious plan by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, to deliver a coordinated military aid package worth €40 billion was not approved. She was subsequently denied approval for even an urgent €5 billion in assistance. Roughly two weeks later, at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (the 'Ramstein' format), a package worth €21 billion was eventually agreed. However, this package is not for the current or coming year, but rather for the long term, and will last to 2029. Moreover, Germany will not supply the Patriot systems Kyiv had been hoping for. Just a few days ago, additional assistance totalling €1.9 billion was approved, of which €1 billion will go to Ukrainian manufacturers.
All of this points, more than anything, to the reluctance of European leaders to guarantee Ukraine sustained support at a time when the aid previously allocated by the former US administration is expected to run out in the second half of the year (→ Re:Russia: The Price of The Moment). This would require a doubling of European spending on arms for Ukraine, from €20 billion to €40 billion, according to estimates by experts at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. To achieve this, all EU member states and the UK would need to allocate approximately 0.2% of their GDP. So far, however, the UK has provided 0.16% of its GDP in aid to Ukraine, Germany 0.13%, France 0.05%, Italy 0.04%, and Spain just 0.03%.
The discussion of tariffs and sanctions is only truly relevant if there is a guaranteed supply of arms to Ukraine. In the absence of such a guarantee, it appears more like an exercise in diplomatic placebo.