The Vortex of a Global conflict: The war in Ukraine marked the end of the era of limited wars and continues to spread its destructive potential

From limited conflict to comprehensive war

Observing changes in the nature of wars and types of conflicts in real time can be challenging, says Mara Karlin, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who served as Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities from 2021-2023, in her article ‘The Return of Total War’ in Foreign Affairs.

In the second half of the 20th century, during the Cold War, military challenges appeared relatively static: direct clashes between the two superpowers were prevented by nuclear deterrence, while hot conflicts arose only in proxy confrontations on third-party territories and remained limited in scope. After the Cold War, Washington shifted its focus to 'humanitarian interventions' – engagements (typically as part of international coalitions) in conflicts within third countries in response to mass killings, aggression against neighboring states, ethnic cleansing, and similar crises. After the shock of September 11, 2001, attention pivoted to combating terrorist organisations, insurgents, and other non-state actors. This 'War on Terror' pushed the prospect of broad interstate conflict into the background.

Overall, this 80-year period can be called the era of limited wars. However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the new war in the Middle East mark the beginning of a new epoch, which Karlin refers to as the age of multilateral or comprehensive conflict.

The Russia-Ukraine war itself more closely resembles what military theorists of the past called total war: a conflict in which the belligerents mobilise all available resources and populations, prioritise war above all other state objectives, attack a wide range of targets, and restructure their economies to serve military needs. This 'return to the past' is occurring in the context of new technologies and globalisation, making such wars highly unpredictable in many respects.

At the same time, Russian aggression has reshaped the geopolitical landscape, drawing dozens of countries into the conflict, either directly – such as North Korean troops fighting on Russia’s side and Belarusian territory being used by the Russian army in the initial phase of the invasion – or indirectly, through military and financial aid to Ukraine from the West and support for Russia from China, North Korea, and Iran. Today, dozens of countries act as indirect participants in the Ukrainian conflict, providing economic assistance, weapons, ammunition, or equipment to one side or the other.

However, Ukraine is far from the only theater of comprehensive conflict. The new escalation in the Middle East, which began with Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, has drawn in multiple nations. In the year since, Israel and Iran have exchanged massive missile strikes without formally going to war. The US and its allies have assisted in repelling these attacks, while Israel has conducted military operations in Lebanon. Meanwhile, China and Russia are seeking ways to involve themselves in the conflict, viewing it as a pressure point for the Western coalition and a destabilising factor for the West as a whole. Thus, this conflict, too, is becoming part of a broader global confrontation.

Global proxy war

A new type of multilateral conflict mirrors a changing balance of influence in global politics. Europe, which for centuries projected its power outward, has now become a theater for the power projection of non-European nations, write Michael Kimmage and Hannah Nott in their article ‘How Ukraine Became a World War’ in Foreign Affairs. Europe, they argue, must come to terms with this new reality.

Vladimir Putin portrays the conflict in Ukraine as his proxy war against the West, but in reality, he would likely be unable to sustain the war without the support of China, North Korea, and Iran. China has become a crucial enabler for Russia, allowing it to continue the conflict despite extensive sanctions. Beijing serves as an exclusive supplier of components critical for arms production, previously unavailable to Russia. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken estimates that China now accounts for about 90% of Russia's microelectronics imports and 70% of its imports of industrial machinery. Meanwhile, Iran and North Korea have become vital suppliers of missiles, drones, and artillery shells, granting Russia advantages in these key weapon systems at various stages of the conflict. North Korea alone may be supplying up to half of the shells used by Russia in its current offensives, according to Kimmage and Notte.

China and North Korea’s involvement in the war, however, is not solely about supporting Russia in its confrontation with the West. For both nations, as well as Iran, the conflict in Ukraine serves as a projection of yet another multifaceted and multilateral struggle in the Asia-Pacific region. For Beijing and Pyongyang, participation in the Ukraine war is part of preparation for potential future conflicts where they might be direct belligerents. Chinese strategists are closely analysing the tactics and tools employed in Ukraine to prepare for potential scenarios in a conflict over Taiwan. North Korea, by sending troops to aid Russia, seeks to provide its military with valuable combat experience – something it has not acquired since the Korean War (1950-1953).

As the now former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida remarked, ‘Ukraine today can become East Asia tomorrow’. At least four regional states – Japan, North and South Korea, and China – see the Russo-Ukrainian war as directly relevant to their own security, writes RAND analyst Jeffrey Hornung in a review of ‘Ukraine as a Proxy War of Asian Powers’. While North Korea and China support Russia, Japan and South Korea are cautiously aligned with the opposite side. Though they do not supply weapons to Ukraine directly, they provide material and financial aid to Kyiv and indirect military support by transferring arms to the United States to replace those sent to Ukraine. Additionally, South Korea has significantly increased arms exports to Poland, helping replenish its stockpiles depleted by early wartime transfers to Ukraine and bolstering the Polish military against potential Russian aggression. On an ideological level, Beijing and Pyongyang endorse Russia's narrative of a post-Western world order. In contrast, Seoul and Tokyo advocate for preserving the status quo, signaling their resolve to resist attempts to alter it through their actions.

Expansion of the ‘conflict continuum’ and the return of the nuclear threat

Until recently, military experts largely agreed on how future conflicts would evolve: wars were expected to be brief, characterised by the extensive use of advanced weaponry, drones, and AI, with an increased emphasis on space and cyberspace, while the role of nuclear threats was anticipated to decline.

Only part of this prediction has been validated. While drones are widely used – and their applications are being refined in real time – the Russia-Ukraine conflict simultaneously exhibits traits of traditional wars, where the availability of manpower, tanks, and artillery shells plays a critical role. At the same time, it challenges the previous architecture of nuclear deterrence, as evidenced by changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. These changes deliberately blur the criteria for using nuclear weapons and introduce additional uncertainty. For instance, the 'critical threat to Russia’s territorial integrity' is listed as a justification, but its 'new' borders are recognised only by Syria and North Korea.

Moreover, the dynamics of nuclear deterrence, developed in the context of bipolar threats, are now complicated by their multipolar nature. China, which claims Taiwan as its territory, is diversifying and enhancing its nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, North Korea, technically still at war with South Korea, continues to expand its nuclear program, while Seoul increasingly relies on US security guarantees that appear less dependable.

This shift is transforming what military theorists call the 'conflict continuum', notes Mara Karlin. Previously, this continuum was distinctly divided into three levels: the terrorism of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis occupied the lower spectrum; conventional armies at war in Ukraine represented the middle; and the nuclear threats from Russia and China’s growing arsenal dominated the upper tier. Today, however, these three levels are intertwined and interact with one another.

In the limited wars post-9/11, terrorist groups and militias often dominated, facing regular army contingents. Now, these two 'demographic layers' are tightly interwoven. In the Middle East, regular armies increasingly fight not only against non-state actors but also alongside them. In Ukraine, the Russian regular army has conducted operations with private mercenaries from the Wagner Group, while the so-called Russian Volunteer Corps has launched actions against Russia from Ukrainian territory. Meanwhile, nuclear-armed Russia wages a conventional war against Ukraine, periodically hinting at the potential use of nuclear weapons. Constant discussions about 'red lines', unilaterally declared by nations and frequently crossed, are eroding the distinction between conventional and nuclear war.

Finally, unlike the Cold War era, key players in this new epoch no longer form stable, cohesive blocs with unified positions. Instead, they independently determine their level of involvement in each ally’s conflicts. This trend is reversing the traditional alignment of military blocs, particularly NATO. Even full NATO members are increasingly uncertain about receiving comprehensive support in the event of an attack. Within NATO, groups are emerging with fundamentally different understandings of the threats they face. This trend accelerated during Donald Trump’s presidency and could deepen if he returns to office. Trump has already signaled his intent to limit US involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. In the long term, this also suggests that Europe may reduce its participation in a likely conflict over Taiwan, where US involvement is expected to be significant.

This blurring of bloc commitments creates high uncertainty in predicting which forces would be involved in any given potential conflict, increasing the likelihood of such conflicts arising. While World War III has not yet begun, there is a sense that everything is nearly in place for it. The balance of power and set of factors that previously served as a convincing barrier against such developments are now largely dismantled – or are crumbling before our eyes.