Autumn Diplomatic Offensive: The weakness of the Ukrainian front and the political crisis have created optimal conditions for putting pressure on Ukraine
The fog of negotiations surrounding the new 'peace plan' persists and is unlikely to lift in the coming days. Amid the multitude of details, leaks and contradictory signals, it is worth identifying three key drivers of the political-diplomatic intrigue.
First, President Trump continues to balance between two groups within his administration that are pushing markedly different approaches to a Russian–Ukrainian settlement. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff acts as the frontman for the group promoting a 'grand bargain' with Russia, one that envisages concessions to the Kremlin at Ukraine’s expense. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and another presidential envoy, Keith Kellogg, adhere to a more traditional Republican strategy of 'containing' Russia.
The 'peace plan', which largely reflects the Kremlin’s interests, was an unexpected intervention by the first group. At the same time, the negotiations in Geneva appear to move in the opposite direction, which is a return to the containment concept that better serves the interests of Ukraine and Europe. However, Trump is likely to keep both options open, hoping in this way to force Moscow into making concessions.
Despite its pro-Kremlin character, the 'peace plan' contains an important innovation: it envisages ceding to Russia territory in Donetsk Oblast not yet occupied, while also mentioning 'US guarantees'. This vaguely resembles the formula of 'territory in exchange for security guarantees', which could, in principle, be acceptable to Ukrainian society. However, the document contains no definition of 'security guarantees', and the nature of the 'US guarantees' is described in the vaguest possible terms. A key part of the intrigue is whether these negotiations will manage to give that formula real substance.
But the main trigger behind the emergence of the new 'peace plan' has been the shift in the balance of power both on the battlefield and inside Ukraine. Limited but significant Russian gains, the fragility of the Ukrainian front due to manpower shortages, the severe damage inflicted on Ukraine’s energy system, and, finally, a corruption scandal now developing into a political crisis have created the most favourable circumstances for pressuring Ukraine into making concessions. Ultimately, the question does not lie in the number of points in the draft agreement, but in whether Ukraine can, under these conditions, find a point of leverage and the will to resist.
Trump's peacemaking wings
Donald Trump’s cavalry-style peace initiative has once again sown confusion among Ukraine’s allies and supporters. In April this year, Trump was full of expectation that an agreement would soon be signed following Steve Witkoff’s semi-secret visits to Moscow. However, the plan prepared in Washington, involving partial and quite substantial concessions to the Kremlin, was rejected. A few months later, the suddenly announced summit in Anchorage, complete with ceremonial red carpets hinting at a possible breakthrough, turned out to be nothing more than the result of a mishearing or misunderstanding by Witkoff of what he had been told in the Kremlin. The current 28-point 'peace plan' has become yet another focal point of the American president’s hopes, and yet another shock for Europe’s allies of Ukraine.
The chaotic dynamics of the 'peace process' stem from the existence within Trump’s White House of two competing wings. One consists of Envoy Witkoff and, to an extent, Vice President J. D. Vance; the other of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and fellow special envoy Keith Kellogg.
The ‘development’ group (Witkoff and President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner) has, from the start of the new presidency, been advocating a 'grand bargain' with Vladimir Putin. Under such a deal, Trump sacrifices Ukraine, viewed as a country of little interest or importance to him or to America, brings Russia back into the global economy, and thereby 'detaches' it from China, while Kushner and Witkoff manage the process of reintegrating Russia into global economic flows, especially in the area of restoring gas trade.
The other group (Rubio and Kellogg) tends to take more traditionally Republican positions, emphasising the need to 'contain' Russia, to use a 'carrot-and-stick' approach, and to reform relations with European allies with the aim of strengthening them (under American leadership), not undermining or dismantling them.
Immediately after Axios published the 28-point 'peace plan', Rubio rang senators in the bipartisan foreign policy group and told them that the document was not a product of the American administration but merely a Russian 'wish list' (as reported by CNN and Politico). Later, though, Rubio wrote on his Twitter account that the plan had been developed by the US. The content of the document, however, clearly supports the first version, which has consequently taken hold. Nevertheless, Trump not only backed the plan, but demanded its implementation before Thanksgiving, threatening Volodymyr Zelensky with a harsh winter and a complete halt to US support. His remarks about Ukraine’s 'ingratitude' were a déjà vu of earlier Oval Office exchanges.
At the same time, Trump’s surprisingly swift agreement to revise the plan with Ukraine’s participation and under Rubio’s oversight suggested that the status quo was gradually being restored. In recent months, it has been the 'Republican' group that has largely shaped the administration’s policy on the Russia–Ukraine track.
Following the meetings in Geneva, Rubio expressed his complete satisfaction with the results. Ukraine's European allies (German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz) also expressed their satisfaction. In particular, fantasies about the use of frozen Russian assets under US control were removed from the plan, Bloomberg reports. According to RBC-Ukraine, obligations concerning limits on the size of Ukraine’s army were dropped, while some principled issues, including territorial matters and enshrining Ukraine’s commitment not to join NATO, were postponed until a personal meeting between Zelensky and Trump, which may take place this week.
However, it should be borne in mind that the more satisfaction Europe and Ukraine express with the revised version, the less likely it is to satisfy Moscow and Vladimir Putin. In this sense, the 'grand bargain' camp still has cards to play. One can assume that Trump will keep both options – 'containment' and 'concessions' – in order to exert pressure on the Kremlin.
Guarantees in exchange for territory: what is new in the new plan and what is old?
Although the initial 28-point plan looked blatantly pro-Kremlin, it is impossible not to note the new content that it contained and that has remained in the discussions of recent days.
Kyiv’s 'red lines' are the official recognition (including by other countries) of territories occupied by Russia, any restrictions on Ukraine’s defence capabilities, and limits on Ukraine’s future alliances, said the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ruslan Stefanchuk, at the Crimean Platform summit in Sweden. Notably, however, the transfer to Russia of Ukrainian territory not yet seized, which was the sticking point in all previous attempts at compromise with Moscow, was not mentioned as a 'red line'. Nor has Zelensky stated that such a provision is unacceptable. Point 21 of the Dmitriev–Witkoff plan envisages the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the remaining territory of Donbas under their control, while maintaining the existing lines of separation elsewhere. In other words, it envisages a partial concession to the Kremlin’s territorial claims.
On the other hand, for the first time the new plan explicitly mentions 'US guarantees' as a component of the settlement. In other words, it contains, at least formally, the formula 'territory in exchange for security guarantees', which, according to opinion polling, is potentially acceptable to Ukrainians at the current stage of the war (→ Re:Russia: The Spectre of NATO orThe ‘Steel Porcupine’).
At the same time, the phrase 'security guarantees' does not appear, and the meaning of 'US guarantees' in the Dmitriev–Witkoff document is left as vague as possible. These 'guarantees' are proclaimed but not defined, and are more a promise than a commitment. The sentence stating, 'If Russia invades Ukrainian territory, then, in addition to a coordinated military response, all global sanctions against it will be restored' is itself constructed so illogically that it betrays an effort to preserve maximum ambiguity on the key issue of military assistance.
It should be noted that the very concept of ‘security guarantees’ has been significantly devalued over the three and a half years of war (→ Re:Russia: Risks or Money). Whereas at the start of the conflict NATO membership was seen as an almost absolute guarantee thanks to Article 5 of the Alliance’s charter, today this is not quite the case. Even countries long inside NATO are uncertain that the United States would come to their defence in the event of an attack by a nuclear power such as Russia. Over the past year, it is Trump himself who has done most to erode confidence in the idea of 'US guarantees', repeatedly implying in various situations that Washington’s previous agreements and commitments mean little to him and can be revised or ignored according to his personal understanding of 'America’s interests'. The Dmitriev–Witkoff 'peace plan' fully reflects this Caesarist principle: the enforcement of the proposed agreement would be overseen by a Peace Council known only to be headed not by the 'President of the United States', but by Donald Trump personally.
Yet the question of security guarantees for Ukraine remains a stumbling block not only for the United States but for the entire Western coalition. A group of pro-Ukrainian European countries, following their discussions, concluded that they cannot provide Ukraine with a military contingent capable of withstanding the threat of attack. Indeed, such a contingent would itself require security guarantees. As a result, the most realistic plan at present is essentially the 'Steel Porcupine' strategy of arming Ukraine to the point at which a Russian attack would be prohibitively costly in the face of an assured retaliatory strike. This scenario is feasible if Ukraine has a sufficient arsenal of long-range missiles and, eventually, the capacity to produce them itself (→ Re:Russia: From Stings to Deterrence). In this sense, collective commitments by Europe and the United States to creating a 'steel porcupine' could serve as a form of palliative guarantee.
Meanwhile, over the past year the issue of security guarantees has undergone yet another paradoxical transformation. Europe’s interest in Ukraine as a military ally has sharply increased in the face of the growing threat of a Russian attack. Ukraine is no longer an inconvenient eastern neighbour persistently knocking at NATO’s door. Europe itself is now significantly interested in Ukraine’s human and industrial resources, its large army, and its combat experience. In this perspective, the concept of 'security guarantees' acquires a new, reciprocal meaning. But for these opportunities to be realised, Europe must assume additional risk and financial commitments.
In any case, President Trump now appears to view territorial concessions in Donbas as the main lever capable of shifting the 'peace process' from its deadlock. And the key task for Kyiv and its European allies is to give the notion of 'US guarantees' the fullest possible substance as compensation for this concession, while expanding Ukraine’s military capabilities.
Zelensky's winter: where did the ‘peace plan’ come from?
The sudden emergence of the Dmitriev–Witkoff plan and Trump’s support for it cannot, however, be explained solely by the inconsistency of the American president or his oscillation between two competing groups within his entourage. Both factors are to a large extent the result of a marked deterioration in Ukraine’s situation and a shift in the balance of power over the past month.
At the close of his 2024–25 military campaign, Vladimir Putin delivered, as expected, a final blow intended to demonstrate his advantage in a war of attrition. The force and impact of this strike proved especially significant not so much in the ground offensive, the main thrust of which, as predicted, came at the very end of autumn (→ Re:Russia: On The Eve of a ‘Decisive Breakthrough’). After all, neither Pokrovsk nor Kupiansk has yet been fully captured by Russian forces, meaning that the likelihood of further Russian advances before year-end is not particularly high. Nevertheless, the systemic weakening of the Ukrainian front is no longer in doubt and threatens to develop into a 'snowball effect'.
No less serious a challenge has been the bombing of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, which was prepared and carried out with the mistakes of recent years in mind and which poses a threat of a new phase of economic and social destabilisation in the country (→ Re:Russia: Missile imbalance). Finally, the corruption scandal that escalated towards the end of autumn has sharply weakened Zelensky’s political position. And Europe’s allies have still not agreed on a mechanism for using frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine. This accumulation of bad news has created the most favourable conditions in three years for pressuring Ukraine into making significant concessions. In this sense, the Dmitriev–Witkoff 'peace plan' is a kind of extension of Russia’s autumn military offensive, that is an attempt to cash in on its dividends.
The reactions of both Putin and Trump to the revised peace plan will be determined not so much by what it contains as by their assessment of whether Ukraine can cope with the three critical challenges it now faces: surviving what is likely to be the harshest winter of the war, ensuring a minimally sufficient supply of manpower for the front, and overcoming the political crisis triggered by the corruption scandal surrounding Energoatom, which is possibly the most important challenge of all.
The key trigger for the corruption scandal growing into a political crisis lies not merely in the revelations themselves, but in the active obstruction of the investigation by the presidential administration. In other words, the issue concerns not only corruption but also the monopolisation of power by the presidential office under martial law. This, in turn, undermines the consensus within Ukrainian society regarding Zelensky’s unelected continuation in office. And it is unlikely that he will be able to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the political class without a significant overhaul of his system of governance and the creation of a coalition government involving his opponents.