The Zone of Absolute Death: Ukraine’s drone superiority could thwart a Russian offensive in 2026

The failure of the offensive and the high losses at the outset are linked to the fact that, in recent months, since late 2025, Ukrainian forces have been conducting active counteroffensive operations north of Huliaipole and towards Oleksandrivka, at the junction of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). During the counter-offensive, the Ukrainian Armed Forces liberated more than 400 square kilometres, including ‘almost the entire territory’ of the Dnipropetrovsk region, stated Oleksandr Komarenko, Head of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff (the ISW confirms the liberation of 279 square kilometres). As noted the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, in February Ukrainian forces, for the first time since the Kursk operation in August 2024, ‘regained control over a larger area of Ukrainian land than the enemy captured over the same period’.

This success was facilitated by adverse weather conditions. Under the cover of snow and fog, Ukrainian units were able to infiltrate Russian positions towards Oleksandrivka undetected and suppress Russian defences, ISW reports. Furthermore, according to Oleh Apostol, commander of Ukraine’s Airborne Assault Forces, the strike was directed at a sector where Russian forces lacked a significant concentration of personnel. The spring thaw also reduced the manoeuvrability of Russian equipment. Ukrainian advances were further aided by the disconnection of Russian forces from Starlink terminals, which degraded situational awareness and command and control, according to the Airborne Assault Forces command. Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps, believes that the loss of Starlink reduced the effectiveness of Russian drones by 20–40%. Meanwhile, military analyst Mick Ryan also highlights the strong operational design, noting that Ukrainian forces conducted mutually supporting offensive actions towards Huliaipole and Oleksandrivka, enabling advances of 10–12 km and contributing to the operation’s success.

However, the favourable territorial balance cited by Syrskyi remains largely symbolic, amounting to roughly 40 sq km in Ukraine’s favour. Russian forces have continued to advance in several directions, including near Pokrovsk and in the north of the Sumy region. According to estimates by DeepStat, which draws on data from the OSINT project DeepState, Russia captured approximately 180–190 sq km of Ukrainian territory over February and the first three weeks of March. At the end of February, as reported by ISW, Russian forces had begun artillery and drone-based battlefield preparation for a spring–summer offensive against the ‘fortress belt’ of the Kramatorsk conurbation.

Nonetheless, the current situation points to a shift in the balance of forces. Last year, Russian forces sought to apply pressure across multiple sectors at the outset of their offensive in order to stretch Ukrainian defences and thereby enable a breakthrough along the main axis of advance. This year, however, weaknesses have emerged in the distribution of Russian manpower, suggesting at least a relative shortfall in personnel for offensive operations. Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko writes, citing Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, that Russia’s monthly mobilisation rate stood at around 20,000–22,000 personnel throughout the winter. At the same time, losses exceeded this level by roughly 30%, with fatalities accounting for 60–65% of total casualties.

‘Zone of absolute death’: the operational dimension of drone warfare

Zelensky maintains that the disruption of Russia’s offensive plans has been made possible by new Ukrainian drone technologies, a view shared by most analysts and pro-war Russian bloggers. Ukrainian forces have regained the initiative in the drone war.

In particular, they have achieved significant progress in medium-range strikes at depths of 20–120 km from the front line, which are weakening Russian air defences and reducing the Russian missile threat, notes the ISW. The channel ‘Voenkor kotenok’ reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have significantly increased their use of drones, leading to an expansion of the ‘kill zone’ to a depth of 50–60 km into the Russian rear. In some sectors, Russian troops reportedly require up to three days to reach the front line, covering distances of just 15–17 km, adds the ‘Two Majors’ channel. The channel ‘Soldatskaya Pravda’ describes Russian-occupied territory extending tens of kilometres from the front line as a ‘zone of absolute death’, the extent of which continues to grow. Drawing on interviews with Ukrainian servicemen and drone manufacturers, The Telegraph reports that in some sections of the front, the ‘strike zone’ has almost tripled in size, reaching up to 150 km from the front.

In this way, Ukrainian forces have addressed a key challenge identified during last year’s campaign: not only to hold the defensive line with drones amid acute manpower shortages, but also to disrupt the movement of troops and the logistical support underpinning Russian offensive operations in the immediate rear (→ Re:Russia: Positional Deadlock). A central role in implementing this strategy is played by the Deep Strike Command Centre, established in early 2026 on the basis of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces.

As Kovalenko notes, the depletion of Russian air defence systems has been a critical factor in the success of Ukrainian strikes against rear-area targets. Based on verified data, he estimates that since the start of the invasion Russia has lost more than 580 air defence assets, including over 370 surface-to-air missile systems and more than 120 radar systems. Crimea, he argues, has become a particular trap for Russian air defences due to the inherent difficulty of defending the peninsula. According to his estimates, following sustained strikes on active systems, no more than 100 Pantsir-S1 systems remain on combat duty in Russia.

According to calculations by ‘Ukrainska Pravda’, over the course of a year, from 19 March 2025 to 9 March 2026, Ukrainian forces carried out at least 365 successful strikes against Russian targets at depths of 50–250 km from the front line, nearly half of which (172) targeted air defence systems. The intensity of these strikes has been increasing, with one third occurring in January, February and early March. The primary strike assets have included the FP-2 strike drone, introduced in September 2025, as well as the Ukrainian equivalent of the ‘Shahed’, the ‘Rubaka’ kamikaze drone. According to the ISW, in recent weeks the Ukrainian Armed Forces have also successfully struck a significant number of Russian multiple launch rocket systems in the areas of Sloviansk and Kostiantynivka, reducing Russia’s ability to conduct artillery preparation ahead of ground operations in these sectors.

The race for innovation and the implementation of technology

Ukrainian drone superiority on the battlefield has been underpinned by a technical advantage over Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, as acknowledged by pro-war Russian commentators. The Telegram channel ‘Zapisky Veterana’ writes that Ukrainian drones have begun ‘widely using new, non-standard frequencies, from 7 GHz and above’, to which Russian EW systems do not respond. The channel ‘Reporter Filatov’ similarly confirms that there is ‘nothing to counter drones operating at frequencies of 9,000–10,000 MHz’. ‘Filolog v Zasade’ acknowledges that Russian EW systems have ‘stagnated since the first half of last year’ and that the new generation of Ukrainian drones ‘does not respond to them at all’. If the situation does not change, the channel warns, ‘a repeat of autumn 2022’ may follow, referring to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region.

In addition to the shift to higher operating frequencies, a key technological innovation has been the use of frequency hopping, which protects drones from jamming and signal spoofing by dynamically switching between frequencies not occupied by enemy interference. Ukrainian efforts to implement this technology were carried out in cooperation with specialists from the leading US military drone manufacturer Skydio. The company began supplying Ukraine with its X2 drones, originally developed for the US military, as early as 2022, but these initially proved ill-suited to real combat conditions. The drone’s radio operated within a limited range close to mobile communication frequencies, making it vulnerable to Russian EW suppression. This represented a ‘serious blow’ for Skydio, as it called into question both the company’s reputation and that of US systems more broadly, says Mark Valentine, president of Skydio. The company subsequently deployed engineers and experts to Ukraine on a regular basis and later established a permanent presence there. As a result, the X2 platform was upgraded: its radio became multi-band and incorporated frequency-hopping technology; in addition, the drone was equipped with computer vision-based obstacle avoidance and was able to operate without reliance on GPS, which is vulnerable to jamming and spoofing.

The Russian army lacks EW assets capable of countering drones operating on non-standard frequencies, as acknowledged by the Russian portal ‘Voennaya Khronika’. The Russian EW system has historically been built around large vehicle-based systems, claims Samuel Bendett, an expert at the Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA). These systems are highly vulnerable, as each EW complex effectively becomes a powerful emitter, making it an easy target. Moreover, research and development cycles in Russia’s defence industry have traditionally been lengthy, with a focus on ‘expensive and complex platforms’ concentrated in the hands of a small number of major defence firms, Bendett argues.

More broadly, Russia’s approach to EW reflects a Soviet-style centralised model characterised by opacity, institutional inertia and corruption, notes Kateryna Bondar, an expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). EW management within the Russian military remains largely at the divisional and brigade level, limiting flexibility. Only recently has Russia begun to deploy ‘trench-level EW’, consisting of small-scale systems at platoon and company level designed to counter FPV drones, with development increasingly shifting to a more decentralised, improvised defence sector. However, poor coordination between units has led to persistent ‘drone fratricide’, whereby Russian EW systems inadvertently disable their own UAVs, Bendett notes.

By contrast, Ukraine has achieved a paradigm shift in the production and deployment of unmanned systems. Its drone innovation ecosystem includes hundreds of domestic manufacturers supplying the armed forces with more than 400 UAV models, including long-range systems such as the Liutyi and Bober, with ranges of up to 3,000 km, as well as the adapted agricultural drone ‘Baba Yaga’, which has become an effective platform for night strikes on Russian positions. Ukraine has also decentralised its military procurement system: nearly 700 units have been granted authority over their own budgets and can procure drones directly from manufacturers via a digital defence marketplace, bypassing bureaucratic procedures. The state has also ceased to act as a commissioner of R&D: private companies develop prototypes at their own expense, while the government procures ready-made solutions at market prices. The effectiveness of this system has been further enhanced by successful digitalisation, Bondar writes: platforms such as Army+ and Brave1 enable frontline soldiers to provide direct feedback to engineers, reducing the technology update cycle from six months to six weeks, while the Delta situational awareness system integrates data from across the battlespace into a unified digital map.

Thus, the reported disruption of the Russian offensive in mid-March reflects a broader, unfavourable shift in the balance of forces for Russia at the outset of the new campaign. This shift is driven by two factors acting in the same direction: a sharp increase in the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drone forces and a reduction in the inflow of personnel into Russian troops. Unless the situation changes with respect to these factors, or at least one of them, the offensive is unlikely to materialise.