The War Has Killed Television: Russia’s inability to win in Ukraine is eroding public trust in TV propaganda

It appears that four years of war in Ukraine have effectively brought the era of television in Russian politics to an end, as demonstrated by FOM data. As in many other countries, the political influence of television in Russia began to grow in the 1960s and 1970s, when TV sets became a widespread household appliance, and reached its peak in the 1990s and 2000s. The systematic takeover in 2000–2002 of all major Russian television channels (ORT, RTR, NTV and others) was one of the key factors behind Vladimir Putin’s political consolidation. The informational monopoly subsequently established by the Kremlin over television became, without exaggeration, the midwife of Putin’s authoritarianism. The effect of television as the primary means of soft political control served as the basis for Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman’s concept of ‘informational’ autocracy.

In the 2010s, television began gradually to lose ground under pressure from the internet and social media. However, researchers noted that television continued to reach most of the less educated population and politically passive strata, sustaining their loyalty and depoliticisation. The model of propaganda based on ideological mobilisation on TV gave way to a more extensive model of influence that maintained a loyal majority. The hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, which the Kremlin waged through ‘rebels’ in the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR in 2014–2015, temporarily revived the importance of television but did not halt its decline. For example, the share of those surveyed who reported that they always kept a television switched on at home rose from 40% in 2014 to 45% in 2015, but then fell to 30% in the 2020s.

In the mid-2010s, in response to FOM’s regular question ‘From which sources do you most often get your news?’, 87% of those surveyed mentioned television, while around one third cited online news sites and a further 13% pointed to blogs and social media (the question allowed multiple responses). By 2020–2021, however, television was mentioned by 63–65% of those surveyed (–20 percentage points compared with the mid-2010s), online news sites by 42–45% (+10 pp), and blogs and social media by 21–23% (+10 pp). At that point, the combined weight of online sources and social media had already reached parity with television.

Finally, over the past four years, following the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, a further shift has taken place. On the eve of the conflict and during its first year, around 60% of those surveyed cited television as their main source of information. However, in the second half of 2023 and throughout 2024, mentions of TV in response to this question declined to 55%, while blogs and social media reached the 30% mark. By March 2026, according to the latest FOM survey, mentions of television had fallen to 47% (–13 percentage points compared with the start of the war).

Main sources of information for Russian residents, 2014–2026, % of those surveyed

This shift in attitudes towards television during the later war years is also clearly reflected in responses to another standard question: ‘Which sources of information do you trust more than others?’ In the mid-2010s, more than 55% of those named television in response to this question; by the early 2020s, this had fallen to 40–43% (–12 percentage points). This level persisted at least until the beginning of 2024, after which it began to decline rapidly, dropping to 35% in early 2025 and 31% in early 2026 (–12 percentage points), according to FOM data. Notably, since 2024, trust in TV has been falling while, at the same time, the share of those surveyed who say they do not trust any sources of information has been rising, from 21–22% in 2023 to early 2024 to 32% in early 2026. It may be inferred that this group consists of individuals who have become disillusioned with television but have not found an alternative ‘information niche’ online.

‘Which sources of information do you trust more than others?’, 2015–2026, % of those surveyed

The decline of television is also evident in the changing shares of those who watch TV daily and those who do not watch it at all. Two processes are visible here: a long-term trend of declining significance over roughly ten years, and a sharper reduction in TV consumption during the current war. In 2014–2015, 73–74% of those surveyed watched television daily, while only 6–7% reported never watching TV or not having a set at home. By the early 2020s and the first year of the war, daily viewers had already fallen to 55–57%. In the second half of 2023 and during 2024, around 50% claimed to watch television every day, and by early March 2026 this had dropped to just 44%. Conversely, the share of those who never watch television and do not have one at home rose from 14% in the early 2020s to 17–18% at the start of the war, 22–25% by late 2023–2024, and 33% in March 2026. In other words, only two out of three Russians watch television at all today, and only two out of five do so daily.

Thus, while television retains some significance as an instrument of authoritarian control, it has clearly lost its universal effectiveness. The generational breakdown is particularly striking. In March 2026, only 16% of younger respondents (aged 18–30) identified television as their main source of information, compared with 57% who cited news websites and 54% who relied on forums and social media. Television’s position strengthens with age: among those aged 46–60, 54% watch TV regularly, rising to 82% among those over 60. Notably, the decline is fastest among younger cohorts. The share of those adhering to the ‘always-on’ model of television consumption fell from 40% in 2013–2014 to 30% in 2026 (–10 percentage points), while those who watch television only for specific programmes dropped from 53% to 34% over the same period (–20 percentage points).

A similar pattern is visible in trust in sources of information. Among young people, only 13% trust television, compared with 21% in the 30–45 age group. At first glance, younger generations also appear sceptical of online news sources and social media, with trust levels of 33% and 27% respectively. However, this reflects a different dynamic: for users adept at navigating the online environment, these sources are experienced as a selective trust environment. Few trust websites or social media in general. Critical attitudes here indicate the ability to form a personalised ‘circle of trust’ across a diversity of sources. Distrust in this context is a measure of reflexive engagement with sources rather than ignorance.

Similar data from the Levada Centre shows a slightly more subdued trend and a smaller decline in television’s influence during the war. Those citing television as a main source of information fell from 85% in 2016–2018 to around 65% in 2021–2022, and 60% in 2025. Trust in television dropped from around 50% in 2021–2023 to 45% in 2024–2025.

Thus, while television played an important role in justifying the war and mobilising patriotic sentiment in 2022–2023, it appears to have lost much of its propaganda potential in 2024–2025. The prolonged conflict and the lack of a clear picture of Russian victory have had a demobilising effect. Notably, in response to the FOM question on which topics were insufficiently or excessively covered on television, the ‘special military operation’ ranked first for perceived excess (23%). Its failures and protracted nature appear to have substantially undermined trust in TV propaganda.