'Acceptance Cannot Be Unaccepted': Western countries must find innovative models for Ukraine's integration into the collective security system

Western NATO allies are discussing a plan to bring the Ukrainian Defence Contact Group (the 'Ramstein format') under NATO auspices, as recently reported by Politico and the Financial Times. A week earlier, this idea was put forward by security experts Ivo Daalder and Karen Donfried in an article for Foreign Affairs. This topic, whether willingly or unwillingly, will become central at today's NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. And on the eve of the meeting, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland called on their colleagues to demonstrate determination in the face of the new historical challenge posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. What will be done or not done today will determine the future in which our children will live, they write, and the plan must be developed now to reach agreements by the July NATO summit in Washington.

As it stands, the issue of supporting Ukraine and ensuring its security has found itself in limbo. As long as Ukraine is at war, its accession to NATO is impossible. However, this very circumstance encourages the Kremlin to continue the conflict and strive for the complete defeat of Ukraine to prevent its accession to the alliance even after the end of the war. For two years, the Western coalition has failed to find a way out of this deadlock as 'acceptance cannot be unaccepted'. The situation is exacerbated by Donald Trump's revisionist stance, which has undermined the bipartisan foreign policy consensus in the US. However, this revisionism has had the unexpected consequence of forcing European politicians to rethink Europe's geopolitical and military role (→ Re: Russia: Who is undermining NATO?).

In order to find a way out of the current impasse, we should first of all remember that the entire system of existing military alliances and security guarantees was created in the past as an innovative system, i.e. it crossed 'red lines', fear of which has paralysed the leaders of the West today. The system of international security created by the West in the second half of the 20th century was based on two mechanisms: US guarantees within the framework of bilateral and collective treaties, and NATO guarantees.

The leadership model of international security

Awareness of the existential threat posed by the USSR and the Soviet bloc in the face of the growing popularity of the socialist model in the Third World forced the US to assume the role of global leader when it came to organising a global security system for its allies and to reach a strong bipartisan compromise on this issue domestically. Although this bipartisan consensus appears to have been undermined today, the experience of the agreements used to create such a system remains relevant. 

As the analytical portal Lawfare highlights in its review, even non-binding agreements, which take the form of political declarations, can possess significant moral and political weight under certain conditions: a striking example of this is the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which set out the goals of the Allies in the Second World War. However, such an agreement can be abandoned by the succeeding presidential administration. More binding is the format of the Agreement on Comprehensive Integration, Security, and Prosperity, concluded by the United States and Bahrain in September 2023. It obliges Washington to undertake various measures aimed at deterring threats to Bahrain. Such an agreement does not involve congressional approval, which is its short-term advantage and long-term disadvantage.

The gold standard for international security commitments is a defence treaty like those the US has concluded since the end of World War II with Western Europe (NATO), with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), and on a bilateral basis with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. These documents, which under Article II of the US Constitution require the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, obligate Washington to come to the aid of an ally in the event of an attack. It is also possible to conclude an agreement in the form of a statute or joint resolution that would require ratification by both houses of Congress.

Although today, as Congress blocks aid to Ukraine, thereby putting its potential defeat in the war at stake, such an agreement seems unlikely, a reassessment of the threat emanating from Moscow could quickly change the situation. The Lawfare experts emphasise that, if bipartisan consensus is restored, Congress itself may be interested in developing such an agreement. Similarly, in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the US to help Taipei maintain 'sufficient self-defence capabilities' and has been a cornerstone of Washington's policy towards the island for more than 40 years. 

The US parliament could also legally enshrine one of the US military commitments to Ukraine. In 2008, Congress amended the Arms Export Control Act to allow the US to help Israel provide a 'qualitative military advantage' to deter and defeat a superior enemy. In the case of Ukraine, Lawfare writes, Congress could develop similar amendments to ensure a 'qualitative balance of deterrence' to help Kyiv deter Russian aggression.

In both cases, legally enshrined commitments to Ukraine would not only restore shaken long-term confidence in US guarantees, but also shift the balance of power on key national security issues by increasing Congress's role in concluding international agreements. They could also be a response to Republican concerns about the Biden administration's pro-Ukraine stance, which they have called a 'blank cheque' for Ukraine. While the White House currently uses emergency supplemental spending requests to disburse aid to Kyiv, a legally binding agreement would ensure transparency in allocating the appropriations, as well as require regular reporting to Congress on the progress of implementation. Congress would also be able to create a bipartisan commission to oversee the use of aid.

Half a step forward: bilateral declarations of intent

In a sense, the joint declaration on the sidelines of the NATO summit held in July 2023 in Vilnius was a step towards replicating the US experience with bilateral agreements. Its centrepiece was a commitment to provide Kyiv with 'concrete, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements' and assistance in rebuilding the country. Although the Vilnius Declaration fell short of the security guarantees Ukrainian leaders wanted from the allies, it was a major step forward in thinking about ways to ensure international security beyond the formal rules of NATO.

The Vilnius Declaration served as the basis for bilateral agreements concluded with Ukraine by Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, and France for a period of ten years. However, according to a review by the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Free University of Brussels, these agreements promise to assist Ukraine in restoring territorial integrity but do not commit allies to defend it in case of attack. They only pledge to consult with Ukraine within 24 hours to determine 'appropriate next steps' (wording from the agreement with Germany) or 'measures necessary to counter or deter aggression' (from the agreement with Britain).

All the agreements mention the importance of Ukraine's transition to NATO standards, but the accession process itself is described vaguely: the Danish agreement states that 'Ukraine belongs to the Euro-Atlantic family and will become a member of NATO,' while the French agreement asserts that 'Ukraine's future membership in NATO will contribute to peace and stability in Europe,' and the German version lacks such formulations altogether. These discrepancies signal a lack of unity in understanding the next steps and that the 'red lines' outlined in NATO's rules remain a fundamental problem.

At the same time, these agreements are a significant step toward a more complex and, in a sense, innovative security architecture. In the agreements, the allies pledge full support for Kyiv, with each country emphasising a different aspect of military cooperation: Germany emphasises leadership in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD),Denmark highlights the role of leading the international coalition of air forces, France emphasises the leading role in artillery and air defence coalitions, and Britain pledges its contribution to the development of Ukraine's navy. France and Britain separately promise to assist with the development of long-range artillery and air combat systems. However, Western defence companies are in no hurry to open production facilities in Ukraine due to the ongoing hostilities and systemic problems within the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. As a result, the issue of how these intentions will be implemented remains essentially unresolved.

Ukraine and NATO: innovative solutions and red lines

Currently, there is no consensus within the alliance regarding Ukraine's integration strategy. Some countries, including Poland, France and the Baltic States, believe that the alliance should extend a formal invitation to Ukraine to join as early as the July summit. Other NATO members, including the United States and Germany, are more cautious and are not ready for such a step. Outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who could well become NATO's next secretary general, is also in the latter camp. At the Munich Security Conference, Rutte made it clear that, as long as the war rages, Ukraine cannot become a member of the alliance. This is logical, because the decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO must be a consensus decision. In this sense, the dispute over its invitation to the alliance is a dispute more about political gestures than about practical steps. The condition of ending the current conflict will remain a 'red line' even if an invitation is extended.

In this situation, bringing the Contact Group under NATO auspices appears to be an innovative and promising idea. On the one hand, it will kickstart a systematic process of Ukraine's integration into NATO, while allowing it to avoid the rigid commitments associated with formal membership, which would otherwise pose insurmountable obstacles.

However, NATO will need to reconsider the rule that restricts the possibility of joining the alliance in the midst of an ongoing conflict. At the upcoming summit, NATO countries need to determine what would constitute a satisfactory end to hostilities, write Ivo Daalder and Karen Donfried in the aforementioned article for Foreign Affairs. A peace agreement cannot be expected under the current circumstances, nor can a full-fledged victory for Ukraine. The most realistic prospect in the foreseeable future is the freezing of the conflict through a ceasefire or a long-term ceasefire agreement. At the same time, Kyiv should in no way recognise the loss of its territories.

NATO's historical experience knows how to resolve such conflicts. Moreover, the alliance in its current form could not have emerged if 'red lines' were seen where some of its members draw them today. Precedents for providing security guarantees to a country with contested borders exist and are apparent to all, the authors of the article underscore. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan, signed in 1960, obliges Washington to defend only the 'territories under Japanese administration', excluding the northern territories seized by the USSR. Finally, West Germany's accession to NATO in 1955 also implied the extension of Article 5 to West Germany only, and before becoming a member of the alliance, West Germany had to agree 'never to resort to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or to change the present borders of the Federal Republic of Germany'. 

This could serve as a model for Ukraine's future accession to the alliance. After Ukraine joins NATO, the alliance's commitments to collective defence under Article 5 will apply only to territories under Kyiv's control, note Ivo Daalder and Karen Donfried. Additionally, NATO may make a reservation stating that Article 5 will not apply in case Ukraine initiates a resumption of hostilities.

Gradual integration and incentives for reform

The model of integration without formal accession, implied by transferring the Contact Group under NATO auspices, is an important step in addressing another equally important task — compelling Kyiv to undertake the necessary reforms to join the alliance. Today, in the absence of the clear prospect of NATO accession, the incentive for such reforms is insufficient. Ukraine's reform policy will be heavily influenced by domestic challenges. By establishing an institutional framework for integration and outlining Ukraine's future prospects in NATO, the Alliance will create conditions for coordinating reforms and monitoring their progress.

First and foremost, it is necessary to clarify which reforms Ukraine should implement. First, it must carry out democratic and anti-corruption reforms and, second, security reforms. In this regard, NATO countries should commit to working together to help Kyiv complete these reforms within a year, write the authors of the article in Foreign Affairs. In turn, NATO should take on the coordination of military assistance provided by the coalition, which includes more than 50 countries, and help Ukraine build a modern army. This will determine the mutual interest of the parties in fulfilling their commitments and make them more stringent.

There is a way to integrate Ukraine and gradually provide it with enhanced security guarantees. However, in order to implement this, it is above all necessary to demonstrate to Russia that it cannot achieve a final victory in this war. This requires an urgent plan to provide Kyiv with co-ordinated military and financial assistance within the Contact Group.