Trump's Window: How the results of his first year in office have created conditions for a successful Chinese hybrid operation against Taiwan

A new look at the ‘Davidson window’

In the forecasts of risks and challenges for 2026 produced by various analytical centres, the Taiwan issue has not featured prominently, receiving less attention than in 2024 or even 2025 (see our review of this year's forecast analytics → Re:Russia: Pandora's Black Box). However, the arrest of Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia prompts a reassessment of the risk landscape and returns the so-called ‘Davidson window’ to the agenda.

In US strategic discourse, this term refers to a warning made in 2021 by then-Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Fleet Admiral Philip Davidson that China could attempt to establish control over Taiwan within the current decade and would be ready to do so within six years. In 2023, amid the war between Russia and Ukraine, the issue gained renewed prominence when then-CIA Director William Burns stated that Xi Jinping had instructed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.

The strategic approach of the US leadership to the Russia-Ukraine war was also largely determined by the logic of the ‘Davidson window’. From the outset, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was viewed in Washington through the prism of two competing hypotheses. According to the first, US involvement in confrontation with Russia over Ukraine would dissipate American resources and distract from preparing for a potential confrontation with Beijing in the South China Sea. This view, known as the ‘trap’ scenario and advocated from the beginning of the war by the influential RAND think tank (→ Re: Russia: Prolonged War or Imminent Defeat?; RAND: Avoiding a Long War), led to the conclusion that the principal US task was to avoid being drawn into a serious conflict with Russia and to seek to end the Russia–Ukraine war as quickly as possible. The second hypothesis assumed that Putin's invasion of Ukraine was a kind of rehearsal for a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan (the ‘rehearsal’ scenario) .Beijing would observe how effective the Western response proved to be in order to calculate risks and prepare for possible measures by a Western coalition. Under this logic, the United States should seek to prevent Putin from achieving his objectives in Ukraine and to impose a severe shock on the Russian economy, thereby demonstrating to Beijing that the costs of invasion are high and that such an action would weaken rather than strengthen China. This position was articulated in 2023 by the current Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while he was still a member of the Senate.

In essence, both administrations — Biden's and Trump's — have balanced between the two hypotheses. The former operated more within the logic of the ‘rehearsal’ scenario, emphasising the containment of Russia while seeking not to cross the line into escalation. The latter has leaned more towards normalising relations with Moscow and bringing the conflict to a rapid end through concessions by Ukraine in order to avoid the risks associated with the ‘trap’ scenario. As a result, however, the policies of both administrations appeared inconsistent from the outside and achieved neither objective. This, in turn, has very likely influenced strategic debate and risk assessment within the Chinese leadership.

Late Stalinism in Beijing

According to the official statement, Zhang Youxia and another Central Military Commission member, Liu Zhenli, are ‘suspected of serious violations of discipline and the law’. At a closed briefing for the Western press, the Chinese authorities reportedly stated that the accusations concern corruption and the transfer of information on China’s nuclear programme to the United States. It is highly improbable that a hereditary party functionary who was effectively the second figure in China’s military leadership after Xi Jinping was in fact ‘an American agent’. In the tradition of party autocracies, such accusations usually signal a political conflict at the highest levels and an effort to stigmatise an opponent by framing his removal as punishment for treason. By contrast, personalist autocracies more typically justify such purges with allegations of corruption. Over the past three years, purges in China’s military leadership have generally been explained precisely on corruption grounds. The present episode stands out. China’s central military newspaper stated that Zhang’s actions ‘fostered political and corruption problems that undermined the party’s absolute leadership over the military and threatened the party’s ruling foundation’ (as quoted by The Guardian).

Anonymous sources linked to the US military leadership told Reuters that the disgraced official had served as an important communication channel between Washington and Beijing and was regarded with trust by American counterparts. His removal and the charges brought against him may signal a shift in Beijing’s political line. Drew Thompson, a former senior Pentagon analyst for Asia, believes that ‘without Zhang Youxia, the risk of miscalculation within the CMC increases’, especially given that it is now effectively composed of only two figures, its chairman Xi and Zhang Shengmin, the official responsible for anti corruption efforts in the armed forces, through whose actions five other members have been removed. Retired US Air Force General David Stilwell, formerly the State Department’s senior diplomat for East Asia, told Reuters directly that without Zhang, the Chinese military leadership is more likely to feel confident in its readiness for a ‘Taiwan adventure’.

A number of analysts, however, believe that the large-scale purge of the military leadership, which began with a reshuffle of PLA generals in 2023 to 2024 and later extended to the CMC, pushes back the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan, as this would first require restoring stability to the armed forces' command structure (such opinions are cited, in particular, by The Wall Street Journal). The opposite position is set out in detail by Matthew Johnson of the Jamestown Foundation, in an article titled ‘Late Stalinism in Beijing’. Johnson examines the situation from an institutional perspective. Xi’s military reforms and the purge of the CMC have in effect eliminated it as a collective political body overseeing the armed forces, turning it into an instrument of Xi’s personal authority. ‘Military command now begins and ends with Xi personally’, and the purge reflects his ‘internal conviction’ that political loyalty and command coherence are prerequisites, whether for faster action or for more deliberate encirclement’. As a result, ‘the timeline for a Taiwan operation remains fundamentally unchanged’, while tolerance for expert views opposing risky political decisions has diminished. Tristan Tang, a leading expert at the Secure Taiwan Associate (STA) takes a similar view. Zhang and Liu were removed because they considered Xi's directive to be ready to attack Taiwan in 2027 as more of a political slogan than an operational directive, and, in a sense, sabotaged it. Although the PLA is not yet ready to seize the island, the new generation of military leaders replacing those dismissed in recent years is fully loyal to Xi’s line and prepared to pursue a more assertive strategy towards Taiwan.

Xi Jinping's window

In an article published last week in Foreign Affairs, ‘The Perfect Storm for Taiwan in 2026?’, Yun Sun, director of the China programme at the Stimson Center, outlines several reasons why an attack on Taiwan or a serious escalation could occur as early as this year. Xi Jinping’s third term at the head of China ends in 2027. At the next Party Congress, it will be decided whether he retains full power for another term or begins transferring authority to a successor. By that point, Xi must demonstrate both complete control over the upper echelons of power and compelling arguments for extending his rule. The temptation to achieve a ‘historic breakthrough’ before then is considerable.

Yun Sun argues that the most important factor creating a window of opportunity for Xi is President Trump, who has demonstrated limited interest in defending Taiwan. A similar view was previously expressed by Carnegie Centre expert Tong Zhao: ‘Trump’s early second-term actions have strengthened Beijing’s conviction that the United States is accelerating its own decline, bringing a new era of parity ever closer’. At the same time, the risk may grow towards the end of Trump’s presidency, as Beijing assumes that his successor would be more inclined to support Taipei. Yun Sun, however, narrows this ‘window’. Trump’s political position is weakening and is likely to become more fragile after the autumn congressional elections, which could make his foreign policy less opportunistic. ‘The window of opportunity is therefore limited: China may never again face a moment when Washington is so reluctant to become involved in Taiwan’s affairs’, she concludes. Trump’s vacillation towards China has also fuelled suspicions that he may be internally prepared for a far reaching bargain with Beijing, exchanging economic advantages for reduced support for Taiwan, similar to what he effectively proposed to Putin over Ukraine. The scenario for such a deal has been discussed in Foreign Affairs by Jude Blanchette, director of the RAND China programme. An escalation around Taiwan would raise the stakes and strengthen China’s position in any such negotiation.

Regardless of how Trump might choose to act, or not act, in the face of a potential conflict, it is evident that in a single year of his presidency he has done as much as possible to complicate the task of US military and political deterrence vis à vis China. In his efforts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine and to press Kyiv into territorial concessions, Trump has effectively normalised the right of major powers to revise the status quo and alter borders by force. His operation in Venezuela and his absurd suggestions of occupying Greenland point in the same direction. China, which has always and unequivocally regarded Taiwan as its own territory, thus gains additional arguments to justify possible coercive action. Moves by Beijing to restore what it considers its internationally recognised sovereignty over Taiwan would appear far more legitimate than Trump’s extravagant claims about US sovereignty across the Western hemisphere. Researchers at the Lowy Institute note that nearly three quarters of the world’s countries, that is 142 states, support Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China, while only 11 UN member states, mostly small island countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, recognise the island’s independence.

The Biden administration restricted China’s access to advanced technologies while at the same time seeking to avoid the sharp edges of a trade war, signalling that China could continue to benefit from trade with the United States so long as it refrained from using force against Taiwan, and simultaneously strengthening alliances in both Europe and the Indo Pacific. Trump has effectively dismantled this diplomatic strategy.

The escalation ladder: from quarantine to RORO invasion

Yun Sun is not alone in suggesting that a conflict could begin in 2026. Authors of a RAND report published in November 2025, ‘Economic Deterrence in a China Contingency’, work from an assessment that there is a ‘high probability’ that China could initiate a confrontation ‘within the next three to six months’. At the same time, current American debate around the ‘Davidson window’ is dominated by the view that the Chinese armed forces are not yet ready for a forcible seizure of Taiwan and that some form of blockade of the island is more likely. Over the past several years, virtually all leading think tanks, including CSIS, RAND, RUSI, Atlantic Council, Council on Foreign Relations, IISS and Carnegie Endowment, have outlined variations of how such a scenario might unfold.

The basic logic is that, from Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan is a lawful part of China and there is no immediate need to occupy the island in order to assert this. At the initial stage, it would be sufficient to restore control over the border and territorial waters. In 2021, Beijing adopted new coast guard and maritime traffic safety laws granting Chinese naval forces broad powers of regulation and enforcement in waters under its jurisdiction, including the right to detain and use force against foreign vessels. These provisions extend not only to Taiwan’s territorial waters but also to areas of the Taiwan Strait. To begin escalation, it would be enough for the Chinese leadership simply to decide to implement these norms in practice.

The scenarios describe different types and stages of blockade. In a ‘quarantine’ scenario, Chinese authorities would begin inspecting vessels and gradually move towards a system in which entry to Taiwan’s ports requires authorisation from Beijing (the scenario is described, in particular, in reports by CSIS and RAND). Most cargo would still reach its destination, but only with Chinese approval. In a ‘partial blockade’, Chinese forces would actively prevent vessels without such approval from entering, expanding their control. In a ‘forceful blockade’, Chinese naval forces would use coercion to isolate the island and strike Taiwanese ports, airports and related infrastructure.

The defining feature of the blockade scenario is that it begins with measures well below the formal threshold of war. A quarantine can be presented to the world as a lawful assertion of sovereignty, allowing China’s leadership to manage escalation step by step while observing the reaction of the United States and the wider international community.

Since 2022, following the visit to Taipei by Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, China has conducted seven rounds of military exercises around Taiwan. The first, in August 2022, were demonstrative in nature and aimed at intimidation. Subsequent exercises, however, increasingly rehearsed actions associated with enforcing a blockade of the island. Two rounds of the Joint Sword exercises directly simulated such a blockade. The commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Samuel Paparo, remarked that these were no longer exercises but rehearsals. It is worth recalling that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 also began with ‘exercises’, the second iteration of which served as direct preparation for the assault.

A notable feature of the Chinese drills has been the integration of naval forces, coast guard units and civilian vessels within a single operational framework, as analysts observe, including experts from CSIS China Power writing in Foreign Affairs). Of particular concern to Taipei and Washington is the rehearsed use of China’s vast fleet of commercial roll on roll off ferries to transport troops and equipment to the island, a possibility explicitly provided for under China’s National Defence Transportation Law). The use of civilian vessels creates a self deterrence dilemma for Taiwan in conditions of uncertainty over whether a given ferry is carrying civilian or military cargo. At the same time, military analysts note that it creates the risk of strikes on civilian shipping, which Beijing could exploit to raise the stakes in the confrontation.

The fruits of opportunism: a scenario of soft capture and US retreat

An escalation scenario beginning with a ‘quarantine’ would confront the United States less with the need for an immediate military response than with the challenge of assembling a political and sanctions coalition. Yet doing so would be difficult for Washington today. In a single year of his presidency, Donald Trump has done much to ensure that not only countries of the Global South but even close NATO allies would be inclined to avoid such a step, particularly after his confrontations with them. Having undermined its status as a guarantor of international order, the United States has also weakened, in the eyes of much of the Global South, the legitimacy of its potential intervention in a Taiwan crisis, while China can present its actions as the defence of lawful sovereignty, a principle Trump has systematically disregarded elsewhere.

Furthermore, having effectively lost the trade war with China that he announced at the beginning of the year, Trump has demonstrated the limits of US sanctions leverage. After this outcome, Beijing may regard any future American sanctions as manageable. Without a broad coalition, their impact would be weaker still. Modelling results cited in the aforementioned RAND report suggest that under comprehensive multilateral sanctions involving the United States, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Canada and South Korea, China’s GDP could decline by more than 2.5% annually. By contrast, unilateral sanctions would impose noticeable costs on the sanctioning countries themselves, with US GDP potentially falling by up to 0.5%. The report emphasises that EU participation would be particularly important for the effectiveness of any sanctions regime.

For most countries, and especially for Europe, a rupture of economic ties with China would represent a serious blow to their own economies. European leaders would find it difficult to persuade their electorates of the need for such sacrifices in support of Trump’s America, particularly if China’s actions remained well below the formal threshold of war. Europe would therefore be inclined to prioritise minimising its own losses, especially in the context of its continuing confrontation with Moscow and the need to support Ukraine. Washington, accustomed to a language of threats and pressure in relations with allies, risks finding itself isolated in its sanctions efforts.

At the same time, a quarantine or blockade would rapidly inflict significant damage on Taiwan’s economy, with global repercussions due to the island’s exceptional role in semiconductor production, accounting for more than 60% of global supply. China’s economy, by contrast, is now far more diversified, and the effect of sanctions on it would, at least initially, be slower to materialise.

A number of indicators suggest that China has been preparing for life under Western sanctions for several years. According to Lewis Libby of the Hudson Institute, by 2023, Beijing had increased its strategic oil reserves to levels sufficient to cover 100-120 days of imports. In 2025, China was reportedly stockpiling about 1 million barrels per day, according to the US Energy Information Association (with normal consumption of roughly 16 million barrels per day), Reuters reports that China aims to expand its strategic oil reserve by a further 500 mn barrels, and that these surplus purchases are currently supporting global oil prices. China has also significantly strengthened energy ties with Russia, the Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Angola and Brazil. Beijing has reduced its holdings of US Treasury bonds in its reserves from $1.3 trillion in 2013 to $765 billion in 2025, while the share of gold in its reserves has grown from 1.95 tonnes in 2022 to 2.29 tonnes in 2025, with further purchases ongoing.

One of the principal restraining factors for China may be the island's ‘silicon shield,’ writes Stimson Center expert Richard Cronin, referring to Beijing’s dependence on Taiwanese semiconductor and chip supplies. Since 2015, China’s ‘Made in China’ initiative has sought to expand domestic chip production, but results remain modest. However, the experience of sanctions against Russia suggests that such gaps can be partially bridged through re-exports. More broadly, expectations of the effectiveness of sanctions against large economies have declined. Russia’s four years of life under sanctions have significantly expanded the infrastructure for operating outside the Western financial system (→ Kristine Baghdasaryan: Reliable Inferiority).

The limited effectiveness of sanctions, the lack of broad international support, the prospect of economic strangulation of Taiwan and the desire to avoid a large scale conflict with China, or even with a coalition of nuclear powers including China, Russia and North Korea, could push the United States towards concessions, at least accepting a partial erosion of Taiwan’s de facto independence. Such a retreat is particularly easy to imagine while Donald Trump remains in the White House, as he would be likely to present it as an economically advantageous ‘deal’ for America.

For Moscow, an escalation around Taiwan would be broadly advantageous, especially if by that point it had reached an agreement with Trump over Ukraine that resulted in a relaxation of sanctions on Russia. Tensions in the South China Sea would help sustain China’s excess oil purchases, while part of China’s unsold exports could be redirected to Russia. At the same time, instability in Europe and a US focus on the Pacific would allow the Kremlin to maintain high levels of tension with Europe and Kyiv, or even to conduct hybrid and air operations against Ukraine under the pretext of alleged violations of any agreements reached.