Donald Trump has returned to the White House amidst an atmosphere of unprecedented excitement and diverse expectations about what his second presidential term will bring. While his first inauguration eight years ago seemed like a fluke, this time officials, corporations, and world leaders are eager to pledge their allegiance to him.
Polls show that people across the globe are pinning their hopes on Trump, while the most critical voices come from countries and regions whose security might be jeopardised by his presidency. Ironically, these include some of America’s most reliable and longstanding allies: Europe, the United Kingdom, and South Korea.
The perspective of analysts and intellectuals on Trump has also shifted significantly. He is no longer viewed as an irresponsible populist but as a transactional leader who, despite his controversial rhetoric, is more of a realist than proponents of liberal value-driven approaches. Analysts believe Trump’s primary mission is the effective containment of China, culminating in a global deal that serves the interests of both sides. Achieving this would place him alongside Ronald Reagan in the annals of history.
At the same time, analysts and some politicians argue that Trump must not lose Ukraine if he wants to negotiate with China from a position of strength. It seems this reality is now dawning on Trump’s team as well. In this context, a resolution on Ukraine is no longer seen as a peripheral episode of little significance to Trump but as a prelude to the challenging dialogue with Beijing.
However, Trump currently lacks leverage over Moscow, which believes it holds the upper hand in its conflict with Ukraine. Threats from Trump’s team – such as proposals to lower oil prices – are unconvincing and unlikely to alter the situation within the six-month timeframe Trump has promised to end the war. Changing the balance of power in the Ukrainian conflict will require more time and effective measures to support Ukraine.
Donald Trump’s long-anticipated return to the presidency is surrounded by an atmosphere of unprecedented excitement, a stark contrast to his first inauguration in 2016. Back then, the Democrats’ electoral defeat and Trump’s victory were seen as an absurd accident. Trump himself was perceived as a dubious figure who had stumbled into power, and the primary goal of the American state and establishment was to mount robust resistance against his destructive ideas and political recklessness. Today, however, American officials, corporations, and world leaders are rushing to pledge allegiance to Trump or at least display their loyalty, while he basks in the glow of triumph.
At the same time, the 'stock value' of outgoing President Joe Biden has plummeted to historic lows. According to a Gallup poll, his approval ratings as he leaves office are the worst among 21st-century presidents. Contributing factors include harsh criticism from Republican voters and lukewarm acknowledgment of his achievements from Democrats, who fault him for inconsistency – whether it be insufficient military aid to Ukraine or, conversely, his support for Israel. Missteps in public opinion management—first concealing his partial incapacity and then attempting to position Kamala Harris as his 'successor' – further tarnished his legacy, which few seem eager to defend today. The broader 'Western crisis' felt by many intellectuals at the end of 2024 has also come to be associated with the losing finale of Biden’s era.
These disappointments, in turn, pave the way for Trump-mania, which seems to have gripped much of the world. Trump’s most exotic, controversial, and seemingly unattainable promises – ending the war in Ukraine in record time, annexing Greenland and Canada to the US, imposing a 50% tariff on Chinese goods, or withdrawing from NATO – fuel the frenzy surrounding his presidency. The lack of realistic pathways to implement these ideas fosters hope among various actors that they can shape Trump’s presidency in their favour.
A large-scale survey (28,500 people across 24 countries) conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) reveals that people in many parts of the world are optimistic about Trump’s second term. Many believe he will not only benefit America but also ease tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East, and US-China relations, the ECFR report states. Predictably, Trump’s critics are concentrated in regions where his presidency could undermine security (Europe, Ukraine, South Korea). The paradox is that these countries and regions are historically America’s strongest and most consistent allies. For instance, public opinion in the United Kingdom is markedly pessimistic about Trump’s return. The report’s authors argue that Europe will struggle to establish an independent foreign policy amid the 'Trump fog', though it has the potential to do so. Many around the world view Europe as a player potentially equal in strength to the US and China, but they believe its new strategy cannot simply be a return to the old liberal order.
The general perception of Trump among analysts and think tanks has shifted significantly since his election victory. While his campaign was viewed as the work of an irresponsible populist, global media and think tanks now predominantly interpret him as a 'populist transactionalist'. This means that while Trump frames his promises in populist and controversial rhetoric, in practice he is seen as more pragmatic than advocates of liberal value-driven politics. As a result, the new president represents the hopes of both those weary of 'liberal hypocrisy' and those who believe in Trump’s mix of boldness and calculated decision-making, which they hope will help resolve or mitigate conflicts that value-driven approaches have failed to address. Analysts frequently cite Trump’s book ‘The Art of the Deal’, which outlines an ideology of aggressive negotiation tactics that seek to establish a balance of interests from a position of strength. This miraculous business technique has become the 'pill of hope' for many.
Historian Niall Ferguson, in an article for Foreign Affairs, compares Donald Trump's return to the White House with Ronald Reagan's 1981 presidency and sees Reagan as a role model for Trump’s second term. Reagan adhered to the concept of 'peace through strength', Ferguson argues, starting with an uncompromising strategy before transitioning to more balanced agreements. Reagan began with a dramatic increase in US military spending and declared communist Moscow the 'evil empire of the modern world', but softened his stance toward the USSR during his second term, culminating in some of the most remarkable agreements on détente that ultimately ended the Cold War. However, Ferguson omits the fact that these agreements were made possible by the deepening economic crisis and internal political changes within the USSR, and the process itself took nearly a decade. He also overlooks that Reagan represented a distinctly values-driven approach, which later inspired American neoconservatives. Regardless, Ferguson believes that just as Reagan led the world to the end of the Cold War, Trump’s mission should be a historic deal with China, which, like Reagan’s achievements, can only be reached from a position of strength. According to Ferguson, Trump himself likely views this as the desired outcome of his presidency.
Richard Fontaine, head of the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), notes in the same magazine that despite extreme hostility and overt disagreements, US foreign policy has remained largely consistent and bipartisan throughout Trump’s first term, Biden’s presidency, and the start of Trump’s new term. 'The foreign policies of administrations – even ones as different as Biden’s and Trump’s – are like an iceberg. The visible part gleams, is jagged, and captures most of the attention. But there is also a much larger, less visible foundation that tends to remain largely unchanged', he writes.
The strategic competition with China, formulated during Trump’s first term, has remained the central axis of American foreign policy under Biden. Even the pressure tactics on Beijing – such as technological containment and revitalisation of alliances in the Pacific region – introduced by Trump, were preserved and further developed by the Biden administration. Similarly, in the Middle East, Biden sought to expand and deepen the Abraham Accords achieved under Trump. In this sense, fears that Trump will upend the foreign policy landscape and priorities appear superficial and unfounded. Fundamentally, the differences lie more in emphasis and methods of achieving goals than in defining those goals.
However, the bigger question is which objectives and 'frontlines' will ultimately matter most to Trump – his domestic battle against liberals and what he calls the 'deep state', or international conflicts and alliances. For example, Peter Schroeder of CNAS points out that some of Trump’s expected, politically motivated appointments (such as in intelligence) could significantly harm US security and weaken the country on the global stage. An equally pressing issue is whether Trump’s effectiveness will hold now that, on the one hand, he is no longer an enigma, and on the other, he takes office at a time when the West appears significantly weaker, while the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran seems far more convincing and powerful than it did eight years ago.
The widespread hopes for the transactional approach of the new president and his 'art of the deal' from a position of strength currently face the reality that Trump's known plans and those of his team lack convincing substance and are being criticised by experts. This includes proposals like increasing US oil production, new tariff policies, or promises to resolve various crises. At the same time, such bold promises have already been made, placing the new administration not in a position of strength but rather weakness, ultimately pushing it toward simulating successes rather than achieving real ones. This dynamic risks failures akin to the Afghanistan deal, largely orchestrated during Trump's first term, whose devastating consequences only became apparent after his departure from the White House (→ Re:Russia: Between Populism and Transactionalism).
The spectre of Afghanistan, however, already looms over Trump’s loudest promise – to stop the war in Ukraine – and is reportedly a significant concern for his team. According to a European official who has held multiple rounds of talks with Trump's aides, his ‘team is obsessed with looking strong, so they are reconsidering their approach to Ukraine'. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, acting head of the German Marshall Fund, suggests that this fixation on the Afghanistan case 'reflects a mindset that directly shapes Trump’s current approach to Ukraine policy'.
Another argument raised during discussions between European officials and Trump’s team is that losing in Ukraine would weaken America in the eyes of China. Among US 'Ukraine skeptics', the desire to disengage from the conflict has often been justified as a need to focus on the key strategic challenge – containing China. In this view, supporting Ukraine and risking escalation with Russia seemed like distractions or burdens on the US’s foreign policy strategy. However, a potential 'Ukraine deal' is now being seen not as a side episode but as a prelude or initial step toward complex negotiations with China. Trump cannot enter those negotiations from a position of strength if he loses Ukraine to a far weaker adversary, Vladimir Putin, compared to Xi Jinping. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told The Financial Times that ‘Trump wants to appear strong', adding that 'failure in Ukraine' would reveal he is 'not so strong after all’.
In the last two months, the discourse surrounding the presumed Ukraine deal has shifted. European officials and diplomats, who initially prepared contingency plans in case Washington withdrew its support for Kyiv, are now much more optimistic. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, after visiting Trump in Florida in early January, stated she does not foresee a divergence from Ukraine, as ‘the only way to bring Russia to the negotiating table is to create a difficult situation for it’, according to Bloomberg. Furthermore, following recent discussions with Trump, several European leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, were reportedly surprised by Trump’s 'intelligent questions' about the war, his openness to exploring different solutions, and his criticism of Putin.
This revised outlook on a 'deal with Putin' as preparation for negotiations with China has already led to a partial reassessment within Trump’s team, including adjustments to the timeline for securing peace. And Trump's special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, welcomed Biden’s decision to allow the use of long-range weapons for strikes on Russian territory and the continued supply of US weapons to Ukraine, stating that these measures would provide leverage for the new president over Moscow. Kellogg also set a personal and professional goal to 'end the war within 100 days' and 'figure out how to achieve this in the near future to ensure a sustainable and lasting solution'. Trump himself has acknowledged that a more realistic timeline for ending the war would be six months.
However, as historian Niall Ferguson notes in his article, there were three years between President Richard Nixon's 1969 Vietnam peace initiative and the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese General Le Duc Tho for their peace agreement. Similarly, negotiations that led to the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace agreement spanned over five years. The current situation is further complicated by Moscow's apparent confidence that the situation is evolving in its favour. Trump lacks sufficient leverage to compel the Kremlin to negotiate.
As a result, he is forced to make concessions. Thus, on 7 January, Trump said that he understands Putin's concern about Ukraine's possible accession to NATO, whose neglect he claimed had led to the war. By doing so, Trump signaled a concession to one of the Kremlin’s key demands—beyond de facto recognition of Russia’s occupation of 20% of Ukraine’s territory—that Ukraine remains neutral. Only after Trump’s statement did Putin's spokesman confirm the Russian leader’s willingness to meet with Trump.
Currently, Moscow’s stance on a potential deal appears to be hardening. As the Financial Times notes, citing officials familiar with Putin’s views, his primary goal in negotiations would be agreements ensuring that Ukraine never joins NATO and that the alliance reduces its activity in Eastern Europe. Bloomberg reports that Moscow is insisting Ukraine drastically cut ties with NATO and limit its military capabilities: NATO countries could supply arms to Kyiv, but these must not be used against Russia or to liberate occupied territories. Putin is effectively leveraging the confusion within Trump’s team to push for maximalist demands reminiscent of those that led to the breakdown of talks in Istanbul in spring 2022.
While the outgoing Biden administration continues to pressure Moscow, the Trump team’s threats against the Kremlin focus mainly on promises to intensify pressure on Russian oil revenues or reduce global oil prices. However, energy market experts are deeply skeptical about the feasibility of these threats. Sergei Vakulenko, Senior Researcher for Russia and Eurasia at the Carnegie Berlin Centre, wrote about this for Re:Russia (→ Sergei Vakulenko: Talk, baby, talk), and experts from the Institute of International Finance (IIF) also wrote about the this in a recent review. America’s deregulatory measures aimed at boosting production would take significant time to yield results, and new projects would only be viable if oil prices remain at $60–$65 per barrel or higher.
Even if Trump were able to reduce Russia’s energy revenues, it would not immediately cripple the Russian economy or its ability to wage war. Today, Russia’s economy is more insulated from global markets, and the short-term impact of declining oil revenues would be limited (for example, Russia is less vulnerable to massive capital flight, which exacerbates the impact of falling prices in an open economy). Additionally, oil revenues now account for about a third of Russia’s budget, compared to 40% in the mid-2010s. While reduced oil prices would undoubtedly weaken the regime and its war effort, this effect would take at least a year or two to manifest.
The paradox of the current situation is that Moscow’s position is not as stable as it tries to portray. Although the Russian army holds the initiative on the battlefield, its gains are limited. Major population centres in northern Donbas remained unconquered during the 2024 campaign, while Russian losses have been enormous. According to the UK Ministry of Defence, Russia lost 430,000 troops (killed and wounded) in 2024, surpassing total losses from the first two years of the war. Compared to 2023, losses increased by nearly 70%, averaging 1,300 per day from May to December. Compensating for these losses requires increasing payments to new recruits, and replenishing military equipment has become an increasingly difficult challenge (→ Re: Russia: Armada Sunset). At the same time, Russia's economy is showing signs of an unfavourable turning point (→ Re:Russia: The End of Euphoria and Manual Control).
In a column for The Economist, Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen suggests that time is working against Putin at the moment. Sanctions complicate logistics and increase energy export costs, rising import costs and labour shortages lead to high inflation. At the same time, without access to international capital markets, Russia is being forced to finance its military spending by borrowing, effectively printing money. Valtonen proposes increasing economic pressure on Russia and reducing opportunities for sanctions evasion, including the use of a shadow fleet, and to continue to support Ukraine militarily and economically.
The core issue facing Trump’s team in its Ukraine-Russia plans is that it lacks the resources to exert effective pressure on Putin within a six-month timeframe. Creating favourable conditions for negotiations would require either an immediate credible threat (such as admitting Ukraine to NATO) or long-term efforts to shift the balance of power against Moscow. This would necessitate developing and implementing sustained programs of military and economic assistance to Ukraine. It is the development and adoption of new aid packages that John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Centre, and a number of other experts, among others, advise Trump to tackle first. TThe new administration is now dealing with the consequences of Trump’s prior strategy of weakening support for Ukraine over the past year. The advantage that Russia has gained, while not as decisive as Moscow presents it, leaves Trump’s team with fewer levers of influence over the Kremlin (→ Re:Russia: Psychological Attack).