10.01 Analytics

Migration-Occupation Balance: The Kremlin motives behind limiting the inflow of migrants


The migration policy of the Russian authorities appears irrational. Amid a severe and largely artificial labour shortage, the Russian government in 2024 launched a broad anti-immigration campaign involving active participation from law enforcement agencies, legislators, and regional administrations.

Vladimir Putin’s remarks on the issue during his year-end press conference reveal new priorities in migration policy, where the right-wing conservative ideology of nation-building takes precedence over economic considerations.

As analysis by Re:Russia shows, since the onset of the war, three main trends have shaped migration flows: the beginning of a decline in arrivals and a significant outflow of migrants from CIS countries, a sustained high influx of migrants from Tajikistan, and the migration of Ukrainians from occupied territories deeper into Russia.

In 2023, the latter category was reclassified by Rosstat from external to internal migration. As a result, migration statistics became incomparable. Internal migration data confirm that 95,000 residents from Ukraine's occupied territories relocated deeper into Russia.

The anti-immigration policies of 2024 primarily targeted citizens of Tajikistan, ultimately reversing the trend with a sharp reduction in the number of migrants arriving from this country over the past year. Meanwhile, restrictions on foreign labour migrants occupying certain niches in the labour market have, in turn, increased the appeal of relocating deeper into Russia for residents of the occupied territories.

The efforts of Russian authorities resulted in approximately 200,000 fewer migrants entering the country in 2024 compared to 2022, increasing the labour market deficit by 10%. However, this policy, which prioritises immigration from Ukraine’s occupied territories, aligns more closely with the ideological priorities of the Russian government.

Military deficit and artificial restrictions

The migration policy of the Russian authorities initially appears completely irrational. Against the backdrop of a severe labour shortage in the country, they are exerting significant pressure on migrants, as if intentionally reducing the number of workers entering the country.

The acute tension in Russia’s labour market stems from an artificial labour shortage of about 3% of the total workforce (approximately 76 million people, including Crimea and Sevastopol), exacerbated by unfavourable demographics. This shortage is primarily caused by three factors: the mobilisation and deployment of around 1 million individuals, including those in support roles for the military; the emigration of about 500,000 people since the start of the war; and an increased demand for labour driven by the war economy, particularly the defence industry, which has created 600,000 additional jobs, according to the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of this sector).

Even before the war, economists identified the demographic trend of shrinking labour force cohorts and a growing share of retirees as a constraint on Russia’s economic development. The war-related labour deficit has turned the labour market into a factor of macroeconomic instability: wage competition, coupled with declining productive employment, has become inflationary (→ Re:Russia: A Leap Instead of Growth).

In this situation, migration remains essentially the only means of mitigating the problem or at least addressing the most acute bottlenecks in the labour market. A survey of government officials conducted by the ratings agency Expert RA revealed that more than 60% of regions recognise the need for an influx of labour migrants. Nearly half of the respondents noted that migration outflows are hindering economic development in their regions. Almost all respondents (94%) stated that migrants are essential in the construction sector, nearly half highlighted the retail sector, and a third identified agriculture and manufacturing as critical areas. A survey of employers conducted by the recruitment platform HeadHunter / hh.ru (as reported by Kommersant) shows that over half of companies face a shortage of foreign workers. A similar survey by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs produced comparable results.

Under such circumstances, one might expect Russian authorities to implement measures to encourage labour migration. However, they have taken the opposite approach. In 2024, police significantly increased their scrutiny of migrants. According to Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reports, 10,200 inspections were conducted between January and October 2024 – 2.5 times more than in the previous year. During this period, 149,000 decisions were made to expel foreign citizens from Russia – almost 1.5 times more than in the same period in 2023 (with deportations reportedly numbering 103,000). Additionally, border authorities were issued 208,000 recommendations to deny entry to Russia, an increase of 70,000 compared to the same period in 2023.These figures are likely exaggerated. If they are accurate, the MVD reduced the number of migrant workers in the domestic market by 240,000 in 2022 (via denial of entry and deportations) and by 300,000-350,000 in 2023. Given that the average annual migration inflow to Russia over the past decade has been around 620,000, these official figures suggest that authorities are blocking or expelling one out of every three or four migrants, which seems highly improbable. Nonetheless, the sharply increased pressure on migrants is undeniable.

The contours and rhetoric of a new anti-immigration policy

It can be said that we are witnessing a broad anti-immigration campaign actively supported by law enforcement agencies, legislators, and regional administrations. For example, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, known for his enthusiasm for reactionary measures, boasted that under his leadership, the parliament passed 13 anti-migrant laws last year. Meanwhile, regions have been racing to impose restrictions on migrant employment. Nearly half of the respondents in an Expert RA survey confirmed the existence of such restrictions in their regions, a finding corroborated by an analysis of legal databases. The leaders in the number of economic activities restricted for migrants include Krasnodar Krai (over 80 broad sub-industries), Sevastopol (over 70), Crimea (over 30), and Yakutia (around 30). Overall, in at least half of the regions with restrictions, full or partial bans are in place on employing labour migrants in passenger transportation, retail trade, and food production. Nationwide, migrants are prohibited from working in pharmacies and non-stationary retail facilities. In 2025, these restrictions will expand further: the allowable share of foreign workers will be reduced in 21 regions, according to a recently published government decree.

Key anti-migrant initiatives of the Russian parliament in 2024:

  • the duration of temporary stays in Russia for foreigners without residence permits was reduced to 90 days per year (previously limited to 90 days within 180 days);

  • from 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) will have the authority to deport foreign citizens for certain administrative violations;

  • the data of foreigners who are subject to deportation will be contained in a special register of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

  • to combat illegal migration, as of March 5, 2025, police will be allowed to freely enter premises where migrants might reside and request information and documents from government agencies, banks, and mobile operators, including those containing commercial, banking, tax, or other legally protected secrets;

  • Russian language and history exams for migrants are now only allowed to be conducted by state institutions included in a special list;

  • children of migrants will not be admitted to schools without knowledge of the Russian language;

  • foreigners married to Russian citizens will be able to obtain a temporary residence permit under a simplified procedure only if they have been married for at least three years;

  • penalties for organising illegal migration have been significantly increased.

While the Putin-era Russian authorities have never been particularly tolerant or forward-thinking in migration policy – and have periodically launched short-term anti-migrant campaigns for political purposes – the general approach to labour migrants in the 2000s and 2010s was characterised by an understanding of their necessity and inevitability, given weak demographics and a shrinking, aging workforce. Against this backdrop, the anti-migrant campaign of 2024 could partly appear as a clumsy law enforcement reaction to the failure to prevent a terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, and partly as an initiative by regional administrations eager to align with the pro-war patriotic hysteria, in which labour-related xenophobia is becoming a component (→ Re: Russia: Authoritarian Dysfunction).

However, during his New Year's Eve press conference, Putin effectively endorsed measures to restrict labour migration, even while acknowledging its necessity. Responding to a question about the 'migration problem' and labour shortages, he remarked that Europe's situation with migrants is even worse and delved into discussions about the need to improve labour productivity and increase the share of high-tech sectors in the economy (to reduce dependency on migrants). He also stated that migrants must obligatorily speak Russian and 'respect' the 'people among whom they live' and expressed a preference for attracting 'highly qualified workers, including those who share our traditional values'. In addition, Putin unexpectedly brought up Ukrainians, asserting that as many Ukrainians reside in Russia as in Ukraine itself – considering the occupied ('new') territories. This response made it clear that political themes and the goals of 'nation-building' dominate economic arguments in the Kremlin's migration policies.

As analysis by Re:Russia suggests, this statement is directly tied to the contours of the real migration policy being implemented by Russian authorities.

Occupation and migration statistics: understanding migration flows

According to Rosstat data on international migration, Russia experienced a noticeable and steady increase in the number of migrants (defined as those entering for long-term work or residence) between 2013 and 2015. From 2014 to 2018, approximately 600,000 people arrived annually. Due to a change in migration accounting rules in 2011, comparisons with earlier periods are meaningless. Another adjustment occurred in 2019, resulting in a rise in the number of registered migrants to 700,000 for that year. In 2020-2021, and partially in 2022, migration inflows and outflows were distorted by COVID-related regulations. While total entry and exit numbers for these three years are relevant, their distribution across individual years is distorted (a detailed analysis of this distortion can be found in the newsletter of the A.G. Vishnevsky Institute for Demography ‘Demoscope’).

Graph 1. International migration and net migration growth, 2012-2023, number of people

A breakdown of incoming migrants into key components largely explains the dynamics of migration flows to Russia over the past 12 years. We have identified four main flows, which accounted for 92-95% of all migrants arriving in Russia during this period. These are citizens of Ukraine (20% of all arrivals in 2022), citizens of Tajikistan (26%), citizens of all other CIS countries (45%) and citizens of five non-CIS countries (Vietnam, Georgia, Egypt, India and China – who collectively contributed 5%). The first three groups were the primary drivers of migration inflows.

From 2012 to 2014, Russia experienced a period of oil abundance, leading to a strong ruble and, consequently, a highly attractive market for migrants from CIS countries. This trend resulted in increased inflows (Graph 2). However, in 2015, a sharp reversal occurred due to the drop in oil prices, ruble devaluation, and an economic crisis. At the same time, 2014-2015 saw a significant increase in the flow of migrants from Ukraine, directly linked to the war in eastern Ukraine instigated by Russian proxy forces. The number of Ukrainians entering Russia rose from 50,000 in 2012-2013 to 200,000 in 2015. From 2016 to 2022, this figure stabilised at around 150,000 annually.

Graph 2. Main immigration flows to Russia, 2012-2023, number of people

In 2021, migration flows rebounded sharply following the COVID-19 pause. However, from 2022 onward, after the onset of the ‘big’ war, the number of migrants from CIS countries (excluding Tajikistan) began to decline. By 2023, this figure had dropped by 25% compared to 2021 levels. At the same time, migration from Tajikistan surged in the early 2020s, rising by 50% in 2022 compared to 2021 and doubling compared to 2019 levels. Tajik migrants, whose numbers reached 187,000, were the primary factor in the record-high migrant influx to Russia in 2022. However, in 2023, the total migrant flow decreased sharply – down by 23% compared to 2022 (a drop of 170,000 people). This included an 8% decline in arrivals from Tajikistan (15,000 people) and an 18% drop from other CIS countries (58,000 people). The most significant decline, however, came from Ukrainian migrants, whose numbers fell threefold – from 149,000 in 2022 to 51,000 in 2023 (a decrease of 98,000).

The sharp decline in Ukrainian migrants can largely be attributed to changes in accounting rules. Starting in 2023, individuals arriving from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories were classified by Rosstat not as international migrants but as internal migrants. In reality, the number of people moving to Russia from occupied Ukrainian territories in 2023 likely remained unchanged. In the estimates of internal migration, Rosstat does not explicitly include figures for territories occupied in 2022 (formally incorporated into Russia). However, internal migration statistics for other regions indicate 1,758,000 departures to other regions and 1,852,000 arrivals from other regions in 2023. Compared to 2022, when these numbers were balanced at approximately 1,821,000, this suggests an 'arrival' of 94,000 internal migrants in Russian regions (within internationally recognised borders plus Crimea and Sevastopol).

In other words, while 149,000 Ukrainian migrants arrived in Russia in 2022, in 2023, 94,000 of those arriving from occupied territories were counted as internal migrants, leaving only 50,900 Ukrainian arrivals recorded as international migration. Thus, the total number of migrants entering Russia in 2023 (within internationally recognised borders plus Crimea and Sevastopol) declined by 76,000, rather than the 170,000 suggested by international migration statistics.

In the first half of 2024, external migration to Russia continued to decrease. Between January and June 2024, 225,000 people arrived for permanent residence or long-term stays, a 20% drop compared to 282,000 during the same period in 2023 (Demoskop analysis). Migration from Tajikistan fell sharply by 28% (64,000 arrivals compared to 88,000 in early 2023). Arrivals from other CIS countries also dropped – from approximately 140,000 to 117,000 during the same period. At the same time, assuming the ratio of first-half to full-year migration remained constant, the total influx from CIS countries and Ukraine (excluding occupied territories) in 2024 may decline by 120,000-130,000 compared to 2023 and by 200,000 compared to 2022. This includes a reduction of around 45,000 arrivals from Tajikistan, a similar decline from other CIS countries, and a drop of 25,000 arrivals from Ukrainian-controlled territories.

Between economics and ideology

President Putin's mention of Ukrainians when answering questions about labour migration was not coincidental. Russian authorities have primarily targeted labour migrants from CIS countries, especially Central Asia, with Tajikistan being a specific focus. Migration from Tajikistan had surged in the early 2020s, including during 2022, even as arrivals from other CIS countries began to decline amid the war. By 2024, the anti-migrant campaign had achieved its goal: Russian authorities successfully curtailed the flow of migrants from Tajikistan.

Russian authorities have exerted pressure on migrants, particularly from Central Asia, by banning them from certain labour market niches. These restrictions have simultaneously created favourable conditions for the relocation of residents from occupied and frontline areas of Ukraine deeper into Russia. This strategy appears to aim at their 'Russification' and incorporation into a conservative, nationalistic model of state-building. Of course, while the Russian labour market could accommodate both Central Asian and Ukrainian migrants, President Putin's ideological stance on migration prioritises political objectives over economic pragmatism. This ideological lens has led to policies that restrict labour migration from Central Asia, even at the cost of exacerbating labour shortages.

Migration statistics highlight the volume of temporary labour migrants. Most of these migrants come to Russia for work and then leave, only to return again later. The difference between incoming and outgoing migrants forms net migration, indicating the share of migrants who gradually settle in the country (settled migration). For the labour market, the flow of incoming labour migrants is of primary importance. In 2024, approximately 200,000 jobs were left unfilled due to reduced migration, increasing the artificial 'war-driven' labour shortage by about 10%. If migration inflows had remained at 2022 levels, this shortage could have been proportionally reduced.

In turn, net migration is essential for maintaining the balance of the overall population. For countries with a negative natural population growth, it compensates for the natural decline. According to Rosstat's 'low' demographic forecast, as previously reported, the annual natural population decline in Russia will amount to approximately 850,000 people over the next 20 years (→ Re: Russia: Depopulation and occupation). However, with a projected net migration of 150,000 people annually, the population decline could be reduced to 700,000 per year. In a more optimistic ‘high’ scenario, net migration should reach 220,000 people annually.

Here too, Russian authorities appear to be guided more by ideological and political considerations than economic and demographic ones. Measures aimed at limiting settled migration include restrictions on children attending schools without knowledge of the Russian language, a proposed ban on family migration, and efforts to send all new Russian citizens to war.

This pressure primarily targets citizens of Tajikistan. From 2012 to 2019, the average annual net migration growth was 250,000 people. Between 2020 and 2023, this figure decreased to 200,000 annually (including Ukrainians reclassified as internal migrants in 2023). Excluding Ukrainians, the net migration growth in 2023 amounted to 110,000 people (a figure cited by Rosstat for international migration flows – 109,950 people). Including Ukrainians, the figure rose to 204,000 (the exact number – 203,600 – is listed under ‘migration growth’ in Rosstat’s report on the components of population change). Almost half of the migration inflow over the past three years came from Tajikistan, averaging 88,500 annually (45% of the total inflow).

Judging by trends from the first half of the year (data for the entire year 2024 are not yet available), the total net migration growth in 2024 barely exceeded 50,000 people. However, if migration from occupied territories into Russia remained at the same level as the previous year, the inflow still aligns with Rosstat's 'low' scenario forecast – around 150,000 people annually. Migration inflow from Tajikistan, however, amounted to only 21,200 people in the first six months, compared to 47,000 during the same period in 2023. From January to September 2024, this figure reached just 37,800, down from 62,300 the previous year. By year-end, departures typically exceed arrivals, and net migration from Tajikistan in 2024 is expected to total around 45,000 people. In this scenario, migrants from occupied territories will provide the primary source of net migration growth, while the share of Tajik citizens will shrink to about one-third.

Thus, in both settled migration and temporary labour migration, Russian authorities appear intent on limiting migration inflows from Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan. They aim to partially offset this reduction by encouraging the movement of people from occupied Ukrainian territories deeper into Russia.