‘The Union of the Kremlin and the Russian people’: Why the authorities have warmed up to Russian nationalists

Rehabilitation of nationalism

Russian right-wing nationalists are on the rise. Never before have they been so involved in state agendas, had such a noticeable influence on the behavior of the authorities – at least at the regional level – or received such overt patronage at the highest levels of the administrative apparatus. This unexpected renaissance, in turn, points to important processes occurring within the Russian state machinery.

Although militant anti-Westernism has been the basis of the regime's official ideology since the beginning of the war, the authorities have predominantly articulated it in terms of geopolitical confrontations, carefully substituting ethnic nationalism with state-driven and imperial nationalism. However, in 2024, the situation began to change. A striking example of the convergence of official and nationalist agendas, and a true triumph for the far-right, was the formalisation of two long-lobbied initiatives into draft laws: banning migrants from bringing their families to Russia and prohibiting the admission of foreign children who do not know Russian into schools. This was noted in a review of nationalist group activities in the second half of 2024, prepared by the Sova research centre and entitled ‘Swinging the ethno-political pendulum’. Vladimir Putin also used the theses of the nationalists in a softer form: at his final press conference pre-New Year's Eve at the end of the year, he urged people not to rely on the idea that the Russian economy could solve its problems with the help of migrant labour, and recommended that migrants respect existing laws and customs in Russia.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, nationalists became one of the first categories of political activists against whom the Kremlin employed forceful methods and open persecution. This was partly due to the perceived broad populist potential of their narratives (which ultimately did not materialise), and partly because nationalist groups were initially more oriented toward direct violence. The manifestation of nationalists in Moscow's Manezh Square in December 2010 became the first truly mass protest the Putin regime faced, which shocked it.

However, in 2024, the agendas of the Russian authorities and nationalists coincided on the issue of xenophobia. Despite a sharp labour shortage, Kremlin policy toward labour migrants has evolved significantly over the past year compared to the rather pragmatic stance authorities held in the 2010s, resulting in a broad anti-migrant campaign (→ Re:Russia: Authoritarian Dysfunction). Behind this shift is not only the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, which certainly acted as a trigger, but also by more complex processes in the Kremlin's political positioning and among various factions within Russian power. Anti-migrant narratives and policies became the main field of convergence between nationalists and the Russian authorities, but the political functionality of this convergence is much broader than it might seem at first glance.

The restructuring of the right-wing nationalist sector

In the previous July report from Sova, the centre's experts identified several political currents within the nationalist spectrum. As in the Russian public space as a whole (→ Yulia Galyamina: Five Discourses Around the war), the self-identification of different groups in this part of the political spectrum today primarily revolves around their stance on the war, and secondly, on their relationship with Putin's political regime. Three segments can be distinguished here.

The first and most powerful is the group of nationalists loyal to both the war and the regime, with whom the Russian authorities actively engage, whom they support to some extent, and from whom they partially adopt agendas. The second group consists of those loyal to the war but not entirely, or not at all, loyal to the regime. This segment partly inherits the 'Prigozhin' narrative of an existential war against the West and global Russophobia, which Russia cannot win due to the corruption and incompetence of the leadership (the Ministry of Defence or the country as a whole). However, while for the 'war correspondents' these theses are primarily applied to the conduct of the war and the front, for nationalists, they are projected onto domestic policy. For example, Ivan Otrakovsky and his Russian National Party, while paying attention to the war as interpreted by opposition 'war correspondents', see the main task as the 'demolition of the oligarchic-corrupt system', which they argue suppresses the potential of the Russian people alongside the 'West'. Finally, the nearly eradicated segment of anti-war and anti-regime nationalists was represented by the Telegram channel 'SocDem', created in 2022 and attempting to organise an anti-war action 'Enough' (after which the creators of the channel were arrested), as well as a group led by Vladimir Basmanov, founder of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, who is currently abroad, as noted by the Sova experts. This sector also includes nationalists fighting in the Russian Volunteer Corps, for whom the Russian army's invasion of Ukraine is seen as an act of the anti-Russian Kremlin oligarchy.

The right-wing nationalist spectrum in Russian wartime politics

The most powerful, first segment of the spectrum, which actively interacts with the Russian authorities, is primarily represented by the network organisation 'Russian Community', the more informal community 'Northern Man', and a number of blogger and media projects (blogger Vladislav Pozdnyakov, the 'Tsargrad' TV channel, etc.). According to experts from Sova, in 2024, the number of subscribers to the main Telegram channels of this segment doubled: the 'Russian Community' channel grew almost fourfold, from 166,000 to 644,000; Pozdnyakov's channel grew from 450,000 to 688,000; 'Multinational' grew from 206,000 to 345,000. Overall, over the year, the five leading channels grew roughly twofold, from 1 to just over 2 million subscribers.

According to Re:Russia's calculations, as of the beginning of February these five resources had added another 25,000 subscribers, indicating that their growth had sharply slowed. Last year, the audience of 'Russian Community' grew steadily from the end of January to the end of September, while Pozdnyakov's saw a sharp spike after the terrorist attack at 'Crocus City Hall' and at the beginning of the invasion of the Ukrainian army into the Kursk region. While this metric is quite unreliable (as subscriber numbers can be artificially inflated), it still vastly exceeds the number of subscribers in the opposition nationalist segment (around 150,000), which at least reflects the resource capabilities of these two sectors. However, the picture changes when considering Igor Strelkov as part of the opposition nationalist segment: at its peak, in late June 2023 (during Prigozhin's rebellion), he had 890,000 subscribers, while all five of the loyal nationalist resources had 750,000. Currently, the number of subscribers to Strelkov's channel, where comments occasionally appear from him, has dropped to 410,000 (notably, the court has prevented Strelkov from administering channels on the Internet for three years).

Thus, during the second half of 2023 and into 2024, there was a significant reshaping of the nationalist spectrum, at least in terms of the Telegram audience. In mid-2023, Prigozhin's 'war correspondents', who were critical of the Russian authorities, and Strelkov, also opposing them on tactical and many ideological issues, dominated this space. However, by the second half of 2024, as a result of Kremlin pressure on the 'war correspondents' and Strelkov's arrest, the loyal nationalist segment gained prominence, now dominating the Telegram space.

National vigilantes: tactics and patrons

The main phenomenon of the past year has been the close interaction between loyal nationalists and Russian authorities and law enforcement, in which they act as either 'public support' for their actions or as a form of societal pressure on them, essentially playing the role of a megaphone for the demands of 'grassroots civil society'. Sova reports provide a detailed picture of this interaction.

Traditionally, the common agenda for both nationalists and the establishment has been the fight against the 'fifth column', Western cultural and social influence, and the LGBTQ community. However, in the past year, the practical vigilante activities (i.e., taking on the role of protecting public order and morality) of pro-government ultra-right groups have expanded significantly. They conduct raids on locations frequented by the LGBTQ community – sometimes involving law enforcement at the final stage, sometimes working together from the outset, write denunciations about popular artists and performers accused of disloyalty to the war and the regime, and demand the cancellation of their concerts. For instance, nationalists successfully lobbied for the cancellation of concerts by Gleb Samoylov from the band 'Agatha Christie', rapper Kishlak, Diana Arbenina, and others, as noted by Sova experts. However, the central theme of their activities remains the fight against migrants.

In large part, loyal ultra-right groups themselves generate anti-migrant narratives. The main 'bread and butter' for nationalist media resources are crimes and offenses committed by migrants, as well as various domestic conflicts with a nationalistic undertone, which they select from the news or ask their readers to submit. Nationalists intervene quickly in such conflicts, thereby giving them greater scale and resonance, demanding a response from law enforcement and local authorities. This focused agenda contributes to the growing popularity of their resources and the mobilisation of anti-migrant sentiment. By pushing this agenda onto law enforcement, they regularly report on their platforms about criminal cases, arrests, and deportations that occurred as a result of their interventions. In turn, they praise those officials and law enforcement officers who respond to their requests and stories, while putting pressure on those who ignore them.

As a result, tensions often arise between nationalists and law enforcement or local authorities. However, in such cases, nationalists frequently receive support from larger media outlets or at the federal level. For example, on August 19, in St. Petersburg, the police detained nine members of the 'Russian Community' who were involved in a conflict between taxi drivers and were found guilty of petty hooliganism by the court. However, the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, instructed the initiation of a criminal case against the police officers who detained the nationalists on the same day. The prosecutor's office intervened to cancel the decision to initiate the case, but the Investigative Committee made two more attempts to punish them.

Bastrykin often responds promptly to media events promoted by nationalist resources and is considered part of the group that actively supports them, strengthening their positions at the regional level. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) also plays a role in legitimising pro-government nationalists, as it shares a focus on the fight for 'moral purity' and the defense of 'traditional values'. The intermediary in these relations is, apparently, Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. For example, during the procession in St Petersburg on 2 September, where nationalistic slogans were chanted, Patriarch Kirill himself spoke to the crowd, and on 4 November – the day of the de facto banned 'Russian Marches' – a nationalist procession took place in Nizhny Novgorod, led by the ruling bishop and Malofeev. In general, for controlling pro-government ultra-right groups, the Kremlin uses the ROC in a similar way to how it previously managed ultrapatriotic Cossack formations, as noted in a commentary by the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

The tail wagging the dog

The question of whether the anti-migrant campaign of 2024, in which ultra-nationalist groups play an active role, is a response to a social demand or if it is creating this demand itself is not simple. On one hand, sociologists report that by the end of spring 2024 (after the terrorist attack), the levels of xenophobia in sociological surveys were lower than in the late 2010s (→ Vladimir Zvonovsky, Alexander Khodykin: Between Moderate Xenophobia and Low Tolerance). On the other hand, in the ranking of social problems that Russians are most concerned about, the 'influx of migrants' unexpectedly rose to second place in August 2024 (with 33% of respondents citing it), jumping 12 points from August 2023 (21%) and 21 points from August 2021 (12%).

This spike likely indicates that the rise in anti-migrant sentiments is a reaction to the media campaign, in which loyal nationalists are active participants, but which was also supported at the federal level: news about the fight against illegal migration and restrictions for migrants in the labour market became an important part of the 2024 information agenda. Notably, the second most acute issue, 'the influx of migrants', shares its position with 'corruption, bribery' (also cited by 33% of respondents in August 2024). Anti-migrant sentiments and dissatisfaction with corruption as a manifestation of social injustice are two of the most traditional populist focuses of social discontent. However, behind them usually lie various value-based and political positions – with the second one more 'democratic' and the first more right-conservative. Anti-migrant hysteria, as a rule, becomes a powerful tool for absorbing the emotions of the less educated part of society, thus hindering the consolidation of the anti-corruption agenda. Dmitry Demushkin, a 'first-wave' nationalist who served two and a half years in prison, points out interview with Radio Liberty: in his opinion, unlike in the early 2010s, the anti-migrant theme at the current stage seems the safest for the authorities and serves as a safe outlet for public discontent.

Thus, the emerging power-nationalist alliance in 2024 seems to address several political trends and tasks facing the Russian authorities in the third year of the war and after the terrorist attack in 'Crocus City Hall'. First, in conjunction with repressions, it allowed the Kremlin to shift the balance of power in the 'nationalist' field: marginalising its anti-regime segment and ensuring the media promotion of the pro-regime one. Second, it allows the authorities to rely on 'public monitoring' and 'public support' of nationalists in the fight against the 'liberal sector' and the LGBTQ community. Third, it serves as a political resource for part of the bureaucratic elite that holds extreme right-nationalist views and seeks to exert pressure on pragmatists within the Russian government. Finally, the anti-migrant theme serves as a tool for the Kremlin to shift the focus of social discontent from issues of injustice and corruption to 'loss of identity', the influx of migrants, and xenophobia, while also demonstrating readiness to respond to the corresponding public demand.

However, the interaction between Russian authorities and nationalist movements, which partly resembles how the Nicholas II regime used the 'Union of the Russian People', cannot be reduced solely to operational tasks. The result of this interaction is a general shift in the public agenda of the regime, increasingly willing to sacrifice pragmatic goals in economics and governance in favour of ideological ones.