Peace in Exchange for Territory? So far, only a third of Russians surveyed are willing to return occupied territories to Ukraine in order to end the war

Peace in exchange for territory: a view from Russia

The proportion of Russians surveyed ready to support Putin’s decision to end the war with Ukraine as early as this week has reached a new record high of 80%, 53% of whom said they would 'definitely support' such a move, according to data from the September poll by the Levada Centre (as usual, conducted in the last week of the month).In May 2023, support for this scenario stood at 62%; from September 2023 to October 2024, it averaged 70%; and by February 2025 it had risen to 75%, with 45% expressing definite support. Only 13% would oppose such a decision. This is down from 20% a year earlier.

However, this wording of the question was presented to only half of the respondents; the other half were given a clarification: 'to end the military conflict with Ukraine and return the annexed territories to Ukraine.' This scenario was supported by 33% and opposed by 58%, 41% of whom 'definitely opposed' it. The Levada Centre has conducted this survey experiment six times since May 2023 and has consistently obtained similar results: on average, 31% of those surveyed support returning the occupied territories to Ukraine to end the war, with only one dip below 30%, in February 2025. The opposing camp (around 60%) and its 'core' of firm opponents (42%) have remained equally stable. Among the youngest surveyed (aged 18–24), over half (53%) are ready to return the territories, while 39% are not; but in the next age group (25–39), the ratio is exactly the reverse. It is worth noting that the question does not specify whether the territories in question were seized since February 2022 or since 2014.

The overwhelming majority of those favouring an immediate peace (80%) consist of 33% willing to give up the occupied territories for peace, and 47% who are not. In another part of the survey, respondents were asked whether it was now necessary to begin peace negotiations or continue military action (this wording did not mention Putin and reflected the respondent’s own view). In the latest survey, 62% said peace talks should begin; since spring 2024 this group has consistently averaged 64%, while 30% hold the opposite opinion. Among supporters of peace negotiations, opinions are almost evenly split: 43% are ready to return territories for peace, while 48% are not. Thus, four main groups can be identified in Russian society in terms of attitudes to the war and possible outcomes for its end, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Main groups of attitudes towards the war in Russian society, September 2025, % of those surveyed

The percentage of those willing to return territories in exchange for peace appears fairly high, considering the extreme political sensitivity of this issue (such an answer in Russia could be interpreted as a criminal offence) and the likely sample bias towards loyal respondents. This factor must be taken into account when analysing any survey data in the current repressive climate of opinion. As already noted, there has so far been no change in the balance between those willing and unwilling to return territories. However, it cannot be ruled out that as the costs of the war increase, this balance may begin to shift (the share of 'soft' supporters of returning the territories stands at 15%, while 'soft' opponents make up 18%). In any case, it is clear that the goal of seizing new territories – the parts of the Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions still under Kyiv’s control, on which Putin has focused for a third consecutive year – does not seem of any particular significance to the vast majority of Russians.

However, Russians do not believe that Putin will abandon his idée fixe. According to the latest Levada poll, since February, the proportion of those fearing the announcement of a general mobilisation has increased significantly, by one and a half times, from 34% to 51%. This is still lower than in 2023 (57–59%) and, even more so, at the end of 2022 (65%). This sharp jump seems to reflect both the collapse of illusions about the possibility of ending the war quickly with Trump’s help, and the growing awareness of an unfavourable situation on the front line, as well as the rumours spreading across the country as a result. At the same time, the share of those who consider a new wave of mobilisation necessary has fallen to a minimum of 11%; for comparison, in August 2024 it stood at 19%.

The war feels closer

Data from a telephone survey conducted by the ExtremeScan project in late August–early September (kindly provided to Re:Russia by the researchers) also show that Russians’ optimism about the prospects of ending the so-called 'special military operation', as it has been called in Kremlin parlance for almost four years, has sharply declined. 'In March 2022, more than half of the population (56%) believed that the ‘special operation’ would end very soon, within six months. This figure began to fall in the summer of 2022 and subsequently remained at around 21–23%. Donald Trump’s involvement in peace initiatives at the beginning of 2025 led to a rise in the share of ‘optimists’, from 21% to 43% at the peak of his activity in February. By March, the figure had dropped to 29%, and by September, according to our data, had returned to its pre-Trump level of 24%,' explains ExtremeScan director Elena Koneva.

At the same time, the data do not show any dramatic disillusionment with Trump among Russians. In March, 43% of those surveyed were convinced that Trump was 'on Russia’s side'; in the most recent survey, this figure was 32%. This suggests that the official media mainstream has not yet started to 'go after' Trump.

The pro-peace camp identified by the ExtremeScan survey is similar in size to that found by the Levada Centre: 66% support an immediate end to military action, 17% do not, and a further 17% give no clear answer. The wording of the question did not specify that the 'ending' would take place by Putin’s decision, so the results should be compared with the Levada Centre’s question about continuing the war or moving to peace negotiations. 57% agree with a scenario in which the border is fixed along the current line of confrontation, while 19% disagree. Meanwhile, 45% of those surveyed say Russia has largely achieved the goals of the 'special operation', 13% believe it has rather failed to do so, 15% either do not know what those goals are or find it difficult to assess the degree of their achievement, and 27% rate the operation’s success as 'three out of five'. In other words, 45% of responses can be considered loyal, and around 40% less so.

Most respondents believe that the ‘special military operation’ has brought Russia ‘more harm’ (42%), and only 20% believe that it has done ‘more good’. These figures are generally consistent with similar data from Levada Centre surveys (see Table 2). As we can see, a turning point came in 2024: perceptions of the 'benefit' of the operation began to shrink, while views of its 'harm' expanded. In the ExtremeScan survey, as usual, a higher proportion of those surveyed avoided answering than in the Levada Centre’s data (a result of differing interviewing strategies), but the share mentioning the 'benefits' of the operation was minimal.

However, recognising the 'harm' caused by the operation should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. Some of those surveyed consider the war with Ukraine to be a 'necessary evil'. In September 2025, the war’s harm was felt most acutely among younger people (aged 18–29, 51%) and those whose material circumstances had worsened (57%). The latter figure indicates that as Russia’s economy gradually slides into crisis, attitudes towards the war’s outcomes are likely to become increasingly negative.

Table 2. Distribution of responses to the question of whether Russia's ‘special military operation’ has done more good or more harm, 2023–2025, % of those surveyed

At the same time, the costs of the 'special military operation' have recently become increasingly tangible for Russians. It is now far less accurate than before to say that Russia lives as though there were no war. According to data from an ExtremeScan survey, 79% of those surveyed have noticed periodic mobile internet outages, while 42% mention 'shelling or drone attacks' among the most memorable recent incidents in their city or region.

As for fuel shortages, on average only 5% across Russia reported problems with petrol, although these figures date from early September. However, as we noted in our review (→ Re:Russia: Petrol Punch), there is a very strong regional disparity here. While in Moscow, the Northwest and the Urals the problem is hardly felt, 27% of those surveyed in the Far Eastern Federal District mentioned it, as did about 20% in the Volga and Southern districts. These are rather serious figures, even if a month old, and in our view they point to a more acute situation than suggested by our measurements of search query dynamics.