April Marathon: What does Trump's new Ukraine plan mean and where did it come from?

From threat to concession

The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration has presented Ukraine with its own plan for resolving the war. The plan includes a ceasefire along current frontlines, Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership, and official recognition by the US (and possibly Ukraine?) of Crimea as part of Russia. At the same time, the plan does not limit the size of the Ukrainian military and includes no guarantees that European troops will be absent from Ukrainian territory. Ukraine and its European allies are expected to respond by the end of the week at a meeting with Trump’s team representatives in London, after which the proposals will be forwarded to Moscow.

The plan appears to be a major diplomatic win for the Kremlin, which, with the help of pro-Russian envoy Steve Witkoff, a real estate specialist, as The Wall Street Journal describes him, managed not only to escape US pressure but also to raise its demands.

Previously, a proposal agreed upon by Trump and Zelensky had suggested a ceasefire as the first step toward negotiations, but it was rejected by Putin. After another outburst from the Russian leader against the negotiation process (Putin questioned whether Zelensky was a legitimate participant), Trump said on 30 March that if he did not see a willingness to compromise from the Kremlin, he would increase economic pressure on Moscow – introducing ‘secondary tariffs on all oil coming out of Russia’.

However, Russia responded by intensifying its preparations for a new spring offensive and launched strikes on civilian targets in Ukrainian cities. Around April 10, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US expected the Kremlin to show readiness to pursue talks in the near future. Axios, citing sources, reported that Russia had been given a deadline until the end of the month.

Amid these developments and Russian missile strikes, an internal debate emerged within Trump’s team, according to The Wall Street Journal. The paper reported that Marco Rubio and Keith Kellogg advocated for a tougher stance toward Moscow (evidenced by their public outrage over the Russian strike on Sumy). However, Trump leaned more toward Witkoff’s position, which emphasised acceptance of Putin’s main conditions. This was indirectly confirmed by Trump’s own statements: he initially condemned the strike on Sumy, but later described it as an unintentional Russian mistake.

Reuters also reported on the clash between Witkoff and Kellogg: after meeting with Kirill Dmitriev in Washington, Witkoff assured Trump that the most direct path toward negotiations was to agree to Putin’s demand for control over four Ukrainian regions – regions not fully occupied by Russia but already written into its constitution. Whitkoff pushed the same idea in an interview with Tucker Carlson, referring to the results of fake Russian referendums organised in the occupied areas.

However, Witkoff’s biggest success was in redirecting Trump’s strategy from one of pressuring Putin, advocated by hawks like Kellogg and Rubio, toward seriously considering Putin’s demands and then conveying them to Ukraine. Both Witkoff and Putin understood Trump’s key vulnerability: his desire for quick results, something that 'secondary tariffs', whatever exactly they might entail, could hardly guarantee.

Fighting for Trump in Holy Week

On 11 April, Witkoff traveled to Saint Petersburg for negotiations with Putin. The Kremlin described the talks as 'highly constructive', and referred to Witkoff as 'persuasive'. Witkoff himself told The Wall Street Journal (and presumably Trump) that Putin is 'fixated' on the four Ukrainian regions he has failed to fully capture. According to The Washington Post columnist David Ignace, during negotiations with Witkoff, Putin did not budge an inch from his demands, which include control over the four Ukrainian regions and guarantees of Russian military dominance, i.e. no security guarantees for Ukraine.

Witkoff and Rubio then took these 'proposals' (more accurately, demands) to Paris for a meeting with Ukrainian representatives and their European allies. The plan they brought 'contained so many concessions to Moscow on security issues that it was rejected by the Ukrainian and European representatives', writes Ignatius, citing his European sources. In this context, Marco Rubio and Donald Trump stated that if one or both parties failed to take steps toward compromise, the US would simply exit the talks.

On the eve of the Paris meeting, Kremlin-linked journalist Vitaly Zarubin released an interview with Yuri Ushakov, one of the architects of Putin's foreign policy. Ushakov spoke positively about the negotiations with Witkoff in Saint Petersburg and mentioned the possibility of a Putin–Trump meeting in Riyadh (noting that the idea had come from the American side). And on 19 April, after the meeting in Paris, he posted another fragment of the same interview, in which Ushakov lamented that although the American leadership, including the president, understands the 'root causes of the conflict', the 'anti-Russian atmosphere' is preventing progress on 'reasonable ideas' that 'Washington seems to agree with'.

The 'reasonable ideas', of course, are the Kremlin’s demands conveyed via Witkoff, and the 'anti-Russian atmosphere' refers to the reaction to those demands from the hardliners in Trump’s administration – primarily the Europeans. Three hours later, Zarubin posted footage of Putin announcing a 30-hour ceasefire, accompanied by praise for Trump’s peacemaking efforts, alongside those of Xi Jinping and other BRICS leaders.

The dream of a ‘grand bargain’

Amid this flurry of news, two previously under emphasised details stand out: first, the unexpected idea of the US withdrawing from negotiations; second, the mention of a possible meeting between Putin and Trump in Riyadh.

On 18 April, The American Conservative website published an article by its regular contributor Sumantra Maitra titled ‘Trump should just set a date for a ceasefire in Ukraine’. However, these ideas likely had been circulating in Trump-aligned circles for some time. The magazine, founded in the early 2000s by conservative opponents of neoconservatism, has recently become an active participant in shaping the agenda for Trump’s second term. In fact, it is part of the advisory board for Project 2025, a radical policy initiative for a second Trump administration. While Trump has publicly distanced himself from Project 2025, Time magazine notes that nearly two-thirds of his administration's proposals reflect its ideas.

According to the author, Trump’s Ukraine peace plan is being undermined primarily by the Europeans, who continue to support and arm Ukraine. The second obstacle is internal: aside from Vice President J.D. Vance and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff, no one in the administration seems to share his desire to strike a 'grand bargain' with Russia and withdraw from Europe. (Named opponents include Marco Rubio, Mike Waltz, and Keith Kellogg.) The author also notes that the Russians themselves are hesitant to trust Trump, aware that his initiatives could be overturned by the next US administration. All of this makes the prospect of a 'grand bargain' appear highly unrealistic.

Therefore, the author proposes an alternative path forward. Trump 'could order his envoys to send another letter to European capitals, Kyiv, and Moscow, setting a date for a ceasefire'. After that, forces would remain in their current positions, the US would halt all military and financial aid to Ukraine, and peace negotiations could proceed at their own pace. ‘If a ceasefire holds, [Trump] can claim he achieved peace, as promised, and any future breakdown of the ceasefire will not be his fault. If the ceasefire does not materialise, he can still blame Europe and Russia for rejecting his peace initiative'.

That said, one should not accuse Trump’s team of simply borrowing ideas from The American Conservative. The article’s author is likely a staunch isolationist who does not believe in a 'grand bargain', whereas Trump and Witkoff are betting precisely on such a deal – viewing the Ukraine conflict either as a bargaining chip in that deal, or as a frustrating obstacle to it.

This brings us to another key episode of Holy Week – the mention, by Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov on 17 April, of a potential Trump–Putin meeting in Riyadh. In fact, Axios had already reported on 30 March that Trump planned to make his first foreign trip to Saudi Arabia in mid-May. The trip’s agenda was vaguely defined, with a focus on bilateral and regional issues. However, the report also noted, citing a source, that 'the Saudis' hoped the visit would occur after a Ukraine ceasefire was in place.

It appears this plan became the bait that led Trump to abandon his threats toward Putin, which he had been voicing in late March and early April, and send Witkoff to St Petersburg to clarify the Kremlin’s 'terms'. Knowing Trump’s fondness for dramatic gestures, one can easily imagine how appealing it must have seemed to him: not only to make a splash with his first international trip to Riyadh, but also to meet Putin and announce that he had effectively 'solved' the Ukraine issue, paving the way for sweeping US–Russia initiatives. Trump could not hide his excitement about this, writing that he hoped Russia and Ukraine would reach an agreement the following week, after which 'both countries will start doing big business with the thriving USA, and both will make lots of money!'

It is no coincidence that Bloomberg's sources in Moscow were already confident in early April that, despite his threats, Trump would eventually pivot to concessions.

Trump vs. Trump

In reality, this April diplomatic marathon does not bring the 'grand bargain' closer – it all but buries it. After a ceasefire in Ukraine, the lifting of sanctions, and, contrary to international norms, the 'handover' of Crimea to Russia, Trump would become a hostage of his own naïveté. He would be forced into further concessions in dealings with the Kremlin just to preserve the unilateral concessions already made. Meanwhile, the Kremlin would dangle the threat of renewed escalation in Ukraine, undermining the fragile 'peace' Trump claimed to achieve and erasing the value of the political credit he gave Russia.

Moreover, no matter how Trump tries to frame the results of his peacemaking efforts, for outside observers, and for Putin, it will be clear that Beijing currently holds far more leverage over Moscow than Trump does, and that Trump has failed to capitalise on it. Even the possible lifting of sanctions will not change this reality. Restoring trade flows between Europe and Russia to pre-war levels, and reducing Russia’s economic reliance on China, would require Europe’s initiative and timeframes likely exceeding Trump’s stay in the White House.

As for the proposals put forward by Trump to Ukraine and Europe regarding a settlement, the Kremlin’s main 'concession' appears to be Putin’s willingness to give up claims to Ukrainian territories he has not yet conquered – territories that, according to Witkoff, he is 'fixated' on. Not long ago, even suggesting such a demand would have been considered laughable. However, the fate of these terms is still far from certain. It largely depends on Europe and Ukraine. Trump’s threat to withdraw from the negotiation process if there’s no progress may sound symmetrical, but in reality, it is not. Such a 'withdrawal' would clearly imply Washington’s subsequent suspension of military and financial support for Ukraine. That outcome would suit Putin just fine, but it poses a direct threat to Ukraine and Europe. The response to this threat hinges on whether the European coalition is willing to support Ukraine even without US backing, and whether Ukraine is ready to continue resisting. It’s a harsh dilemma that both Europe and Ukraine will have to grapple with this week.

However, it’s also important to understand that even if the 'pro-Ukrainian coalition' agrees to the proposed plan, it is by no means guaranteed to retain its current form. In the next round, when real estate specialist Steve Witkoff returns to Russia, Putin will almost certainly move the goalposts for Ukrainian security further downward. He knows that Trump, in pursuit of the glory of a 'grand bargain', will not abandon the deal over such 'details'.

The surprising thing is that Trump, who has always preached the ideology of negotiating from a position of strength, applies it equally to America’s allies, like Europe or Canada, and its adversaries. But when it comes to Putin, Trump becomes a passionate believer in concessions and handshake diplomacy based on trust. The last time Trump experienced such a worldview shift was during negotiations with Kim Jong-un. And that, too, ended in complete failure.