24.10.24 Analytics

Swarm From The Future: The development of AI-powered drones could permanently deprive Russia of its advantages in armaments and manpower once thought unassailable


The use of drones in the war in Ukraine has turned a new page in military history and may, in the longer term, trigger a technological revolution in warfare akin to the innovation of the first automatic weapon, the Maxim machine gun, in the late 19th century. If Ukraine succeeds in advancing drone warfare technology, it may offset the asymmetries in manpower and weaponry that were deemed insurmountable at the outset of the conflict, which had given Russia a clear advantage in a war of attrition.

At certain stages of the conflict, Ukraine's drone superiority has already acted as an equalising factor. In particular, it significantly reduced the impact of the Russian advantage in tanks and armoured vehicles. However, the Russian army has since adapted to drone warfare, expanding its own drone army and deploying appropriate defence systems.

For now, drones cannot replace humans entirely, and drone operations require large numbers of highly trained specialists. Nevertheless, drones are displacing soldiers from the front lines, thereby reducing personnel losses. At the same time, the impact of a drone strike is still markedly lower than that of an artillery shell, and drones themselves are increasingly vulnerable to interception and electronic warfare measures.

A true revolution in warfare will occur when drone control can be built upon artificial intelligence technology. This would not only make interception far more difficult but would also enable the use of swarms consisting of hundreds or even thousands of UAVs, vastly amplifying the effectiveness of each attack.

Drone superiority is a critical element in maintaining Ukraine's capabilities in its war with Russia. According to experts, Ukraine could make a decisive leap in AI-driven drone warfare within the next one to two years.

Asymmetric advantage

The Russia-Ukraine conflict can, to a significant extent, be called the first drone war in history. Drones have enabled Ukrainian forces to partially compensate for asymmetries in weaponry and manpower at various stages of the conflict. Success in the technological competition over drone use could potentially neutralise Russia's advantages in a war of attrition – advantages that seemed insurmountable at the start of the conflict.

The widespread use of UAVs in Ukraine emerged as a response to the inability of both sides to establish air superiority, US Air Force Colonel Kristen Thompson noted in a commentary for the US Council on Foreign Relations. This situation forced both armies to increase the manoeuvrability of ground units and escalate the use of long-range weaponry, artillery, missiles, and drones. The drone era in this war began with the extensive deployment of large reconnaissance and strike drones like the Bayraktar TB2, which had already proven effective in Libya, Syria, and during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Early in the war, Bayraktar TB2 supplies became a significant deterrent to Russian aggression, comparable in impact to the provision of Javelin anti-tank missiles, experts at the Australian Army Research Centre (AARC) say. In the first weeks of the war, TB2s began operating with Ukrainian aviation, expanding strike options against ground targets. They were deployed in the operation to destroy the Moskva missile cruiser and during the battle for Snake Island in the Black Sea.

In the conflict's initial phase, widespread drone adoption gave the Ukrainian Armed Forces an asymmetric advantage. However, the Bayraktar's weaknesses – such as low speed (130 km/h) and large wingspan (12 metres) – made them vulnerable on the battlefield once the Russian army established effective air defence and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The sharp increase in losses, coupled with the high cost (around $5 million each), ultimately forced the Ukrainian military to abandon their use. The large Russian reconnaissance drone, Orlan-10, suffered a similar fate, as it proved insufficiently reliable to consistently deliver quality battlefield intelligence, as Australian experts note.

Large drones were eventually replaced by kamikaze drones, such as the Ukrainian Switchblade 600 or Russian Lancet-3, as well as improvised drones with first-person view (FPV) capabilities, according to Stacie Pettyjohn, an expert at the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS). The popularity of FPV drones in this war stems from their small size and low cost. Originally used in racing, filmmaking, and other civilian applications, these devices – worth only a few hundred dollars – have been retrofitted with explosives and are now used in attacks. According to NATO estimates, more than two-thirds of Russian tanks destroyed on the battlefield have been taken out by FPV drones.

Another key application of drones has been the collection of intelligence about the situation on the battlefield. The volume of information collected by UAVs is so enormous and indispensable for the warring parties that neither side now even tries to make a manoeuvre or launch an attack without the support of a drone, which supplies real-time information about the enemy's location. As a result, offensive operations in this conflict have largely lost the element of surprise, and the advantage of defence over attack has grown considerably.

Drone warfare practices

Drones have significantly transformed the nature of combat, according to Franz-Stefan Gady, an expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), who has studied frontline drone warfare practices. First, the timing of attacks has become critically important: the Ukrainian Armed Forces conduct most operations just before dawn or late in the evening, when it is more challenging for Russian drone operators to detect their approach. Typically, Ukrainian forces attack Russian positions with assault teams of about 10-16 soldiers, deploying into enemy trenches from armoured vehicles like BMPs or APCs, with support from battle tanks. Once Ukrainian soldiers secure positions within the Russian trench system, the armoured vehicles retreat to avoid becoming targets for enemy drones. The terrain has also taken on heightened importance for advancing forces: FPV drones armed with explosives are best launched from elevated positions; otherwise, they lose connection without additional relay drones. Drones are also ineffective in strong winds, heavy rain, or freezing temperatures. In theory, this gives the advancing side an advantage, though in practice, it is offset by the logistical challenges of mounting an attack in such conditions.

Although drones have reshaped the battlefield, they have not replaced humans; drone operations can even require more support personnel than traditional military operations of a similar scale, with a need for specialised training, notes military analyst Jack Watling. Nevertheless, UAVs do reduce casualties and enhance unit resilience across various missions.

In June 2022, Watling joined a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit in an operation to launch a UAV to monitor Russian positions, requiring a convoy of eight vehicles and eight men to make a long march to a vantage point on the ground, establish communications, and then hold the position for several hours. This allowed operators to conduct electronic reconnaissance and plan the drone's flight path, after which time was needed to analyse the drone's incoming images. Watling notes that this reality contrasts sharply with how drone operations are often portrayed ‘on Pentagon PowerPoint slides.’

Robotic and autonomous systems theoretically expand unit capabilities on the battlefield, Watling writes. For example, an autonomous tracked machine with a mounted machine gun and a small reconnaissance drone can suppress enemy positions more effectively and accurately than a human gunner could. However, this increased effectiveness depends on skilled personnel. Without an operator, autonomous systems make foolish mistakes, such as ‘continuing to fire at dead targets or getting stuck in simple obstacles like farm gates’, and an additional soldier must be on hand to back up the operator in case of injury

To operate robotic autonomous systems, a machine gun platoon must be able to manage a fleet of complex technical and transport vehicles. If such a system is damaged in combat, it must be repaired or evacuated, which also requires a specialised vehicle. Overall, Watling concludes, using mechanised and unmanned systems requires a comparable number of personnel to traditional units, who must possess skills that are currently rare within modern armed forces.

Moreover, even a large number of kamikaze drones cannot match the power of artillery fire, adds Stacie Pettyjohn. The basic American 155-mm artillery shell contains nearly 11 kg of explosives, while most standard FPV drones carry just over 1 kg. Even this modest military payload is difficult to deliver due to extensive use of electronic warfare (EW) by both sides, which jam radio frequencies, causing the operator to lose control of the UAV.

In Bakhmut, during the Russian army’s 2022–2023 offensive, the intensity of Russian EW systems was so high that Ukrainian drones could not cover more than 500 metres, according to AARC analysts. According to military expert Rob Lee, who has spent time on Ukrainian frontlines, notes that FPV drone attacks have an accuracy of less than 50%, and it may take 10 or more such drones to destroy a single tank.

In addition, UAV systems are vulnerable in several areas: ground launch and recovery units, control stations, communication equipment, logistics, and support systems, any of which, if neutralised, could hinder or prevent drone operation.

The economics of drone warfare

Despite their various shortcomings and limitations, drones offer an undeniable advantage: low cost, making them extremely effective tools. Maritime drones have enabled Ukraine to destroy a third of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, forcing Moscow to relocate the remaining ships from Sevastopol. The widespread use of long-range UAVs has enabled Ukraine to organise massive strikes on hundreds of military and industrial targets inside Russia. Moscow, for its part, actively uses Shahed drones in combined attacks on energy infrastructure, and by mid-2024, RUSI experts estimate that around 50% of Ukraine's energy capacities had been destroyed, including 80% of thermal power plants and roughly a third of hydroelectric plants.

It is difficult to create an effective counter-drone defence system, as the cost of destroying a drone is often much higher than its price. The cost of a Russian air defence missile, used to shoot down a Ukrainian drone costs around $1 million, similar to the estimated cost of firing the most advanced Ukrainian air defence systems. In March, the British Royal Navy intercepted a Houthi drone worth about $2000 with a Sea Ceptor missile, estimated to cost £2 million.

Low cost and high efficiency of drones are already leading Western analysts to question the rationality of US and allied military investments, which are still based on 20th-century military concepts. One of the most criticised projects is the fifth-generation American stealth fighter, the F-35A, according to military experts at War on the Rocks, is ill-suited for modern air combat where it would face inexpensive enemy drones. The Pentagon plans to purchase 1,763 of these aircraft at an estimated unit cost of $130 million, with the total life-cycle cost per plane reaching at least $460 million. Meanwhile, as noted by military expert Thomas Hammes from the American National Defence University (NDU), a single Chinese kamikaze drone like the Sunflower costs around $30,000. Similarly, the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, recently deployed by Washington to the Middle East after the Hamas attack on Israel, cost US taxpayers $13 billion. For that amount, the US could have acquired 650,000 Shahed drones, just a few dozen of which could cause significant damage to, if not sink, a carrier like this, say former US Marine Corps officer Elliot Ackerman and retired US Navy Admiral James Stavridis.

Maxim machine gun with AI

The advantage of drones on the battlefield will become decisive when they are operated by artificial intelligence (AI),write Raj Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff, authors of a book on the future of warfare, in a column for The New York Times. They compare the advent of AI-based autonomous weapons systems to the first use of the Maxim machine gun in 1893, when 700 British soldiers suppressed a Matabele uprising in South Africa against a 5,000-strong native force. This, they suggest, could neutralise Russia’s primary advantage in the Russia-Ukraine war – its manpower.

The first critical advantage of AI-controlled drones will be their invulnerability to interception, according to Reuters. Current electronic warfare (EW) technologies rely on severing the UAV’s connection to its operator; however, AI-operated drones would have no such link, as they could identify and engage targets based on pre-set programming. Additionally, unlike humans, AI could simultaneously control thousands of drones operating in coordinated swarms, which would exponentially increase their strike capability, Ackerman and Stavridis note.

Ukraine has emerged as a key player in the development and production of drones, including those leveraging AI. Over 200 startups in Ukraine are currently engaged in military drone technologies, with investments expected to reach $50 million in 2024, reports the Kyiv Institute of Economics. A primary goal for Ukrainian UAV manufacturers is to create a low-cost AI targeting system that can be deployed en masse along the entire front line, Reuters writes. Concurrently, Ukrainian startups are working to enable FPV drones to operate independently of an operator.

Stacie Pettyjohn notes that thus far, drone use on the Ukrainian battlefield has led more to evolution than revolution within the armed forces; artillery in both armies has benefited most, achieving faster and more accurate strikes on enemy positions. The use of autonomous and better-integrated drones could fundamentally transform warfare, Pettijohn says, though the timeframe for this shift remains uncertain. For now, Ukraine appears close to developing partially autonomous drones with pilot’s-eye view capabilities, but the rapid pace of AI development and battlefield innovation could enable a breakthrough within one or two years.