The de facto collapse of the Western coalition supporting Ukraine has been one of the key events of the past year. The coalition demonstrated its highest level of determination and unity in the first half of 2023. However, following the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the strengthening of the Russian military machine, the coalition’s strategic goals became blurred and its standing in Western public opinion weakened.
In 2024, the idea of a ‘just peace’ for Ukraine and support for its efforts to reclaim occupied territories came under attack from populist Ukraine-sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic. The return of Donald Trump to the White House signalled the collapse of the coalition.
Meanwhile, the idea of ‘peace at any cost’ is far from dominant in opinion polls in both the US and Europe, although the ‘just peace’ party has lost its former advantage. The shift in public opinion reflects both a recognition of realities – the return of the occupied Ukrainian territories does not seem likely in the foreseeable future – and the growing popularity of right-wing populists who do not view Russia’s attack on Ukraine as an existential challenge for Europe.
While the idea of a ‘quick peace’ is gaining increasing support among the public, experts and government officials express almost unanimous scepticism on the matter. Politicians lack answers to questions about how and under what terms such a peace could be achieved, as well as what the West's strategy toward Ukraine and Russia would entail afterward. Both Trump's mythical ‘plan’ and European politicians are now stalled on these very questions. At the end of 2024, clear answers remain elusive, and this reality increases the likelihood of Western failure in upcoming negotiations with Putin.
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the past year was the de facto collapse of the Western coalition supporting Ukraine.
Two years ago, during the winter of 2022/2023, such a coalition undoubtedly existed and was determined to resist Russian aggression. Meetings were held in Ramstein, Germany, involving American and European military and political leaders who discussed Ukraine's weaponry needs and plans for its supply. Financial aid plans were discussed in other forums. The shock of the Russian invasion, the courage of Ukrainian soldiers and society, and the failures of the Russian army fuelled a sense of solidarity and belief in success. Ukraine’s swift counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022 gave hope for the liberation of territories occupied in the war's early stages.
The situation began to shift in the winter of 2023/2024, when the failure of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive led to growing scepticism and fatigue among Western public opinion and politicians. The party of ‘just peace’, i.e. the party of support for Ukraine in its endeavour to liberate the occupied territories, began to lose ground to the party of ‘quick peace’, i.e. the party which favours acknowledging the situation ‘on the ground’ (→ Re Russia: Peace vs. Justice). First Donald Trump in the US and then the European right-wing populists made the issue of aid to Ukraine and ending hostilities at any cost an important element of their electoral strategy and a focal point of their criticism of incumbent governments.
However, this shift was not solely driven by electoral strategy. By this point, it had become clear that the Kremlin had overcome its initial disarray and begun building its own military machine. Successfully countering this would require far greater resources from the West than initially anticipated. Early in the war, the weakness of the Russian army had created overly optimistic expectations about the effectiveness of Western military aid provided to Ukraine. Russia’s nuclear threats also played a role, prompting Western allies to delay supplying Kyiv with more advanced weapons, which gave Moscow critical time. Today, Russia’s annual war expenditures are roughly estimated at 7-9% of its GDP, or $140–180 billion. Meanwhile, the damage inflicted on Western economies and social stability by the inflationary wave of 2021-2022 turned proportional expenditures into a politically sensitive issue for Western leaders and voters.
The six-month delay in granting the next US aid package for Ukraine in 2024, which was blocked by Republican congressmen, gave Moscow a sense of military advantage and became an important factor in destabilising the Ukrainian army and undermining the spirit of resistance in Ukrainian society. However, while Moscow’s military and political gains strengthened the belief in some parts of Europe that the conflict needed to end quickly, other parts of Europe began to see the war as an existential challenge.
At the same time, from the very beginning of the war, the US assumed the role of leader in the coalition supporting Ukraine, in which Europe played an important but secondary role. As a result, Trump's victory in the American elections accompanied by isolationist rhetoric about withdrawing from the pro-Ukraine coalition and negotiating a ‘quick peace’ with Russia, left European politicians stunned.
Public opinion in both the US and Europe has also shifted over the past year, moving from the 'just peace' pole toward the 'quick peace' pole. However, in neither the US nor Europe does the preference for a 'quick peace' dominate. Instead, it can be said that the 'just peace' coalition has lost its majority.
During the first year of the war, the ratio of supporters of aiding Ukraine until victory and reclaiming occupied territories (the 'just peace' camp) to opportunists advocating for a 'peace at any cost' was two to one in the United States, according to Gallup polling data.By the winter of 2023/2024, amidst the failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive and the start of Trump’s anti-Ukraine campaign, the advantage of the 'just peace' supporters shrank, with the ratio shifting to 55% vs. 43%. By December 2024, the proportions of the two groups had equalised (with a symbolic edge for the 'peace at any cost' supporters). Among Republicans, Trump’s rhetoric has had significant influence: the proportion of 'quick peace' supporters surged by 20 percentage points compared to March, reaching 74% of those surveyed. Among Democrats, the share of 'quick peace' supporters increased modestly, from 21% to 30%. Among independent voters, it even declined slightly – from 52% to 47% – and the balance remains effectively one to one.
Somewhat of an edge for opportunists is also evident in responses to the question of whether America is doing enough to support Ukraine: about 30% believe it is doing enough, around 30% say it is doing too little, and close to 40% think it is doing too much. Among Republicans, two-thirds share the view that US support is excessive, compared to 11% among Democrats and 35% among independents.
In Europe, the overall level of support for Ukraine remains high and has only slightly decreased – by 3-4 percentage points – according to the October data of the regular EU-wide Eurobarometer survey, which is conducted in all EU countries. A total of 58% of those surveyed agree that the EU should fund the procurement and delivery of weapons to Ukraine, which is just 2 percentage points less than in April-May. Similarly, 68% of EU citizens support providing financial assistance to Ukraine, down slightly from 70%. However, this survey does not include questions about preferred scenarios for ending the war.
At the same time, a poll conducted in early December by the British firm YouGov in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom revealed a noticeable decline in the willingness to support Ukraine until Russian forces are expelled from its territory ( The Guardian reported the poll data). Support for this scenario remains strongest in Sweden (50%), Denmark (40%), and the UK (36%). Over the past year, however, this position has declined by 7 percentage points in Sweden, 11 in Denmark, and 14 in the UK. Concurrently, the share of those surveyed favouring a 'quick' peace over a 'just' peace rose to 24% in Sweden, 34% in Denmark, and 32% in the UK. In Germany, according to YouGov, the proportion of those advocating continued fighting until victory fell to 28% (from 40% a year ago), while the share of 'quick peace' supporters rose to 45%. Similar results were recorded in France (43% supporting 'quick peace' vs. 23% for 'just peace') and Spain (46% vs. 25%, respectively). In Italy, conciliatory attitudes are even more pronounced, with 55% favouring 'quick peace' compared to only 15% for 'just peace.'
Comparable results emerged from the ARD-Deutschlandtrend survey conducted in December on behalf of the leading German media corporation ARD. 53% of those surveyed agree that Ukraine will have to accept the loss of some territories to achieve peace – an increase of 9 percentage points since July. Supporters of populist parties overwhelmingly share this view: 82% of those surveyed aligned with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and 77% of those supporting the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance agree. The same poll indicates that AfD is supported by 19% of Germans, while Wagenknecht’s party garners 5%. Among voters for mainstream parties, however, the factions supporting 'just peace' and 'quick peace' are nearly evenly divided. The inevitability of concessions is acknowledged by 47% of Social Democratic Party (SPD) supporters and 50% of both Green Party and CDU/CSU supporters, who collectively represent 61% of German voters.
The proportion of those surveyed who believe that Germany’s military aid to Ukraine is excessive stands at 39%, while 36% think the current level is adequate, and only 18% argue it should be increased. These figures have remained largely unchanged since the summer of 2023. Among voters for the AfD and Sarah Wagenknecht’s Union, around 80% consider the current level of support excessive. Among mainstream parties, fewer than 20% see the aid as excessive, while slightly over 20% believe it is insufficient. The Green Party is the most pro-Ukraine, with 32% considering support insufficient and only 12% seeing it as excessive. In general, 49% of those surveyed believe that Ukraine should become a part of NATO 'in the distant future,' while 40% are opposed. Among supporters of mainstream parties, about 65% favour this idea, compared to only around 20% among populist party supporters.
In Germany and the US, the patterns of public opinion towards Ukraine are quite similar. There is a consolidation of Ukraine sceptics among populist party supporters and some demobilisation among centrists, leading to a balance between Ukraine supporters and sceptics.
Public deadlock is evident in responses to two additional questions in the German survey. While 65% of those surveyed are concerned that Russia may attack another European country, 61% fear Germany could be directly drawn into a war with Russia. The first perspective reflects a drift toward viewing the conflict as existential for Europe, while the second reveals a desire to distance Germany from the conflict for its own safety. This contradiction remains central and unresolved for Europe in 2024, highlighting the continent’s dilemma between greater involvement and strategic disengagement (→ Re:Russia: Putin’s Schrödinger's Cat). Consequently, neither a strategy of more robust support for Ukraine nor one of distancing from the conflict appears fully viable to German voters today.
Meanwhile, an overwhelming number of experts in both Germany and the US (including Republican experts) continue to view the war in Ukraine as an existential conflict for the West and argue for sustained support for Ukraine. This perspective is reflected in a report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) report, based on a survey of leading foreign policy experts and opinion leaders (Republican, Democratic, and independent) conducted between August and October 2024. Participants included congressional and government staff, think tank analysts, academics, business representatives, media personnel, NGO staff, and leaders of local religious communities. These findings were compared with public opinion data from a CCGA public opinion survey, conducted in June.
Experts are generally far more resolute in favouring continued support for Ukraine than the public. For instance, 92% of Republican experts support strengthening economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia, compared to 66% of Republican voters. Among Democratic experts and voters, the figures are 93% versus 77%, and among independents, 79% versus 63%.
The most notable divergence in views between experts and voters exists among Republicans. While 73% of Republican experts favour continued economic aid to Ukraine, only 45% of voters agree. Similarly, 85% of Republican experts support continued military aid, compared to just 45% of voters. Among Democrats, 97% of experts back economic aid compared to 72% of voters, and 94% support military aid compared to 71%. For independents, the figures are 81% and 57% for economic aid and 76% and 54% for military aid.
The only issue on which voters felt slightly more strongly about supporting Ukraine concerned the possibility of deploying American soldiers. Among Republicans, 23% of voters and 17% of experts would support this idea. Among Democrats, the figures are 36% of voters and 17% of experts, and among independents, 26% of voters and 25% of experts.
This divergence between public sentiment and expert opinion underscores a key problem facing both American and European politicians today. While the popularity of a 'quick peace' deal has grown in the West, politicians have no clear answers on how such a peace could be achieved, under what terms, or what the West’s strategy toward Ukraine and Russia would entail afterward. These unresolved questions are stalling both Trump’s 'mythical plan' and European leaders’ approaches, increasing the likelihood of Western failure in any upcoming negotiations with Putin.