The Last Ray of a Bygone Era: Why the US has no interest in Putin's nuclear deterrence initiatives and threats

Diplomacy of the weak: from a ‘gesture of goodwill’ to a threat

On 9 October, at the end of his visit to Tajikistan, Vladimir Putin stated, in response to a journalist's question, that if the US 'considers it unnecessary' to extend the New START Treaty, this would be 'not critical' for Russia. 'The novelty of our nuclear deterrence systems exceeds that of any other nuclear power… We are finishing the development work, and I think we will soon be able to announce new weapons,' Putin added, noting that tests of this 'superweapon' were 'proceeding successfully'.

The Russian leader often bluffs and tries to 'sell' Russia’s military potential and capabilities at a higher price than they are valued by his counterparts on the international stage. As a result, negotiations often simply break down, and Russia misses the opportunity to make use even of the advantages it does possess. The talks on strategic nuclear arms with the United States are likely to become yet another example of this pattern.

Putin made his unexpected proposal to extend New START on 22 September. The treaty expires in February 2026, yet there has been no discussion between Moscow and Washington on the matter since December 2023, when Moscow rejected the Biden administration’s offer to begin negotiations on extending the treaty 'without preconditions'. The timing of Putin’s initiative was far from accidental. On 23 September, Donald Trump was due to deliver a 'historic speech' at the UN General Assembly, which promised nothing good for the Kremlin amid the effectively frozen Ukraine talks. Putin sought to offer the US President a political 'pass', highlighting not only the negative dynamics in US–Russian relations over Ukraine but also a potentially positive one in bilateral affairs. This was in line with the strategy Moscow had adopted back in February 2022: to delineate areas of mutual interest between Moscow and Washington in bilateral and international relations, while pushing the 'Ukrainian question' to the periphery of the real negotiating agenda.

Trump, however, did not take up this offer. In his UN speech he criticised Putin for refusing to end the war, and the next day called Russia a 'paper tiger'. Meanwhile, on 22 September, White House Press Secretary Caroline Levitt noted that Putin's proposal to extend the START treaty ‘sounds pretty good,’ but added that they would wait for the President’s comment. That came only on 5 October, when Trump simply limited himself to repeating Levitt's words almost verbatim, saying it ‘sounds like a good idea’.

Such a reaction is understandable. In 2022, Russia refused to resume mutual inspections, a key element of the treaty, citing US 'hostile actions' and sanctions that prevented Russian inspectors from flying directly to the United States (see a detailed account of events from the Russian Foreign Ministry's point of view). In January 2023, the US State Department accused Russia of violating the treaty, and in February Putin announced Russia’s 'suspension' of its participation. However, Moscow did not follow the formal procedures required for such a suspension (hence US officials sometimes say Russia has not formally withdrawn), and the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would continue to adhere to the treaty’s limits (see table in the Appendix). Thus, as often happens in Putin’s Russia, the treaty is simultaneously both in force and not in force. In June 2023, the Biden administration proposed returning to negotiations on the full resumption of the treaty and its extension ‘without preconditions’. However, in December, Moscow issued a final and firm refusal.

Moreover, at the Security Council meeting on 22 September, Putin did not in fact propose restoring the treaty or beginning talks on its renewal. He stated that 'Russia is ready, after 5 February 2026, to continue for one year to observe the quantitative limits of the Treaty,' and possibly beyond, on the condition that the United States also complies with its provisions. He added that 'US plans to expand its strategic missile defence system, including preparations for the deployment of interceptors in space,' could 'nullify' efforts to maintain the status quo in the field of strategic arms. Thus, Putin both introduced a new condition for Russia’s compliance – a US halt to strategic missile defence development, which is not covered by the treaty – and failed to propose any resumption of full treaty implementation or negotiations.

In his public statement, Putin spoke of unilateral actions, that is ‘voluntary self-restraint,’ as he phrased it at the Security Council meeting, or a ‘gesture of goodwill,’ as his press secretary Dmitry Peskov later called the initiative. Thus, Moscow’s position is that restoring the monitoring and verification mechanisms stipulated in the now frozen treaty is not under discussion. These include 18 on-site inspections per year, the daily exchange of data on the status and location of nuclear forces covered by the treaty, and biannual data exchanges. At the same time, Russia is adding new conditions for compliance, linked to restrictions on the development of strategic missile defence systems, particularly the deployment of interceptor satellites.

This position on missile defence was reiterated by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on 8 October. Ryabkov had already called the initiative a ‘proposal’ to which Moscow had received 'no substantive response from the US.' Finally, while in Tajikistan, Putin, having entirely abandoned talk of 'voluntary self-restraints' and 'gestures of goodwill,' effectively accused the US of refusing to extend the treaty and moved on to issuing threats. These threats, however, are unlikely to have any real effect.

Why the START treaty is outdated: the logic of ‘dual conflict’

The New START Treaty (as it is known in English) was signed in April 2010 by Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, entered into force in February 2011 for a period of ten years, and allowed for a five-year extension by mutual presidential agreement without the need for ratification. By 2018, both sides had fulfilled their arms reduction commitments (see the table in the Appendix). Over the life of the treaty, 328 inspections were conducted, 25,449 notifications exchanged, and 19 meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission held. Today, it remains the last major arms control agreement between Russia and the US – a relic of the post–Cold War era of détente.

Meanwhile, in the second half of the 2010s, the treaty came under sharp criticism in the US as being unfavourable to Washington. Donald Trump twice avoided Putin’s proposals to extend it: once in a telephone conversation in 2017 and again during a meeting in Helsinki in 2018. The treaty would likely not have been extended at all had Trump not been replaced in the White House by Joe Biden, who, just two weeks before its expiry, initiated its extension.

Two key arguments have led much of the American establishment, as well as many European politicians and experts, to regard New START as outdated and non-functional: the emergence of China as a third potential nuclear superpower and Russia’s large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.

The treaty limits the number of strategic weapons held by Russia and the US, while China is rapidly expanding its strategic capabilities. This argument was clearly articulated during Trump’s first term, particularly in reports by The Heritage Foundation, which maintained that without China’s participation, the treaty no longer served any purpose for the US. Since then, the situation has advanced considerably, with China’s nuclear doctrine undergoing a fundamental transformation. Whereas Beijing once adhered to a policy of 'minimum deterrence,' maintaining roughly 200 warheads, over the past five years China has tripled its arsenal to around 600, experts note. In absolute numbers, China’s nuclear arsenal still trails far behind those of the US and Russia (3,700 and 4,300 warheads respectively). However, in terms of deployed warheads, China could catch up much sooner. In 2022, the US Department of Defence predicted that China would possess 1,500 warheads by 2035. Donald Trump stated in February this year that China is 'behind, but in five or six years they’ll be on par.' Moreover, China has far greater capacity to modernise its delivery systems.

Yet the issue is not only the pace at which China is gaining the status of a nuclear superpower, but also the changing geopolitical balance. The partnership between Moscow and Beijing creates risks of 'opportunistic aggression' or coordinated attacks in two theatres, note security experts Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller in a recent article in Foreign Affairs. The military, meanwhile, speak in much starker terms. Russia is becoming a satellite of China, which Beijing could force to attack Europe at the same time as launching its own attack on Taiwan. This scenario has been actively discussed among military analysts for some time and was publicly described just recently by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

New START limits the US to one warhead per each of its 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, explains Robert Peters, an expert at The Heritage Foundation. According to US nuclear doctrine, two warheads are typically required to ensure the destruction of a single target, meaning the current limits allow for only around 225 targets to be covered. This is sufficient to deter Russian aggression against the US, but entirely inadequate for deterring both China and Russia simultaneously. Once the treaty expires, the US will be able to begin addressing this problem, for example, by increasing the number of warheads per missile.

The logic of 'dual conflict' further demonstrates the unsuitability of New START as a deterrence tool for the US and its allies. All US–Soviet and US–Russian nuclear agreements, with the exception of the 1987 INF Treaty, have concerned only intercontinental systems, while ignoring regional nuclear forces. Previously, it was assumed that any nuclear conflict would rapidly escalate to the intercontinental level. Now, however, as Edelman and Miller note, the likelihood is growing that escalation could begin with a regional conflict. Beyond the limits of New START, Russia possesses an arsenal of around 2,000 nuclear warheads that could be used in a regional conflict and employs this capability to create an escalation threat towards Ukraine and NATO, as highlighted in a briefing by the European Parliament on New START. Any new agreement in which the US might have an interest would need to take such threats into account, that is, the balance of regional forces both in Europe and in the Asia–Pacific region, whereas prolonging the outdated New START framework makes little sense.

‘Burevestnik’ or ‘paper tiger’? The logic of limited resources

It is therefore clear that Putin’s proposal to extend New START without inspections and with additional conditions relating to missile defence had no chance of arousing interest from the Trump administration. Nor are Putin’s threats likely to cause serious concern in Washington. Since Trump’s first term, new and significant arguments have been added to the long list of reasons for rejecting New START.

Russia faces serious internal constraints, and its proposal to prolong the treaty is far from altruistic, writes Pranay Vaddi in a commentary for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Vaddi, who served between 2022 and 2025 as Special Assistant to President Biden and Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the National Security Council, argues that Russia’s capacity to expand and modernise its nuclear potential has been weakened. The war in Ukraine has drained Russia’s economic and military resources, undermining new weapons development and its strategic modernisation programme.

A year ago, a failed test of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile ended in an explosion in the silo, destroying the launcher and damaging the test site’s infrastructure and environment. The Sarmat was intended to replace the ageing RS-18 Satan missiles, developed in the 1960s by Ukraine’s Yuzhnoye design bureau. The failure of the Sarmat test means that the Satan remains a key component of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces. The lack of domestic expertise in the development of large ballistic missiles, compounded by the loss of access to Ukrainian technologies as a result of the war, is likely one reason for the Sarmat programme’s setbacks, Vaddi suggests.

Another of Russia’s hopes is the Burevestnik, which is a nuclear-powered cruise missile, widely assumed to be the weapon Putin had in mind when expressing irritation over the US silence in response to his 'gesture of goodwill.' In 2019, one of the missile’s presumed tests at Nyonoksa likely ended in disaster, causing fatalities. During Putin's recent trip to Sarov, the Kremlin deliberately, it seems, spread rumours about a closed-door discussion of new tests of the Burevestnik, which is allegedly about to be put into service. However, Putin made his first statement about successful launches of a nuclear-powered rocket back in March 2018, dating these launches to the end of 2017. In other words, they have been‘putting the finishing touches’ on it, as Putin put it, for eight years. Furthermore, the very concept of a nuclear-powered missile remains questionable: both the Soviet Union and the US terminated similar programmes at earlier stages as unviable. Even in the event of success, Russia is unlikely to produce Burevestniks in significant numbers, meaning they should be seen more as prestige weapons than as a meaningful component of the strategic balance.

In broader terms, sanctions have severely restricted Russia’s access to technologies needed to modernise its delivery systems (including microelectronics, space components, and engines) Vaddi notes. Despite official claims of progress, the timeline for renewing Russia’s delivery systems has repeatedly slipped. Meanwhile, the prolonged war in Ukraine has forced Moscow to shift its defence industry’s focus from nuclear modernisation to conventional medium-range systems, such as the Oreshnik missile. Although Russia retains an advantage over the US in nuclear material reserves and warhead production capacity, its lack of reliable delivery systems limits its ability to compete in the strategic nuclear arms race governed by New START, Vaddi concludes.

The US, by contrast, is able to increase the number of warheads on its delivery systems – to around 3,700 compared with Russia’s 2,800 – and by the end of the decade will have modernised most of these systems, widening the qualitative gap. In September 2025, the US Air Force introduced a second test model of the new B-21 Raider strategic bomber. The American strategic bomber fleet currently consists of about 141 aircraft (B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress), though only 18 B-2 Spirits possess stealth capability. The Pentagon plans to procure dozens of B-21s, increasing both the overall fleet and the number of stealth bombers capable of conducting deep strikes against complex targets, including those in China and Russia.

Thus, Russia’s nuclear modernisation potential is overstated, relying on largely outdated assumptions and data. The prolonged war in Ukraine and sanctions have significantly undermined it, experts believe. Extending New START for another year might constrain the US in expanding its strategic forces, but resource limitations will in any case force Russia to focus on a very limited number of modernisation objectives. Any new goals would mean diverting resources and failing to achieve existing ones.

Russia is, in essence, a nuclear superpower of the past and will not, in the foreseeable future, be able to compete fully in the emerging arms race between the US and China. Nevertheless, the US remains interested in maintaining dialogue with Russia on nuclear issues, and Moscow may try to exploit this interest to strengthen its bargaining position in other areas. However, Putin’s peculiar proposal to extend New START’s terms for one year should rather serve as a signal to Washington of the futility of such dialogue, and the need to redirect the strategic conversation towards Beijing.

Appendix. Key events in the history of the New START Treaty, 2010–2025