Uneven Growth: While the incomes of most Russian households have risen, 20% have lost out from economic restructuring, while another 20% have seen their incomes increase by one and a half times or more
Almost two-thirds of Russian households report income growth compared to 2022, according to the results of a large-scale consumer finance survey conducted by the Central Bank. The estimated average per capita income stands at 33,800 rubles per month, while the median income is 27,900 rubles (a little over $300). The actual situation may be slightly better, as people with higher incomes tend to participate in surveys less frequently, the Central Bank notes.
Incomes have grown across all decile groups over the past two years. However, behind this average figure lie several different ‘stories’. A quarter of households saw their incomes decline, and for 20%, the drop exceeded 10%. This is the group of 'losers' in the economic restructuring brought on by the war and sanctions.
At the other end of the spectrum is the group of 'winners': 22% experienced an income increase of one and a half times or more. Around 40% saw a moderate rise in real incomes, ranging from 3% to 25%. At the same time, income growth among the 'winners' is several times greater than the losses among the 'losers,' which is why average income dynamics present a more favourable picture than a simple ‘headcount’ of those whose situation improved versus worsened.
In reality, the share of those whose real incomes declined may be somewhat higher, and the share of those whose incomes increased somewhat lower, since both low- and high-income groups face real inflation rates for their consumption baskets that exceed the official average.
The presence of such an effect is also indicated by spending data. Members of the highest-income group report that their expenses grew faster than their incomes, while in the top three income groups combined, expenditures and incomes grew at the same pace. This suggests that, in addition to high estimates of nominal income growth, these groups also tend to have high subjective perceptions of inflation.
Those whose incomes rose by more than 50% increased their spending on durable goods by nearly 60%. This seems logical: they were catching up on more 'elevated' consumption. In contrast, households with moderate income growth saw little to no increase in such spending.
The balance of optimism in subjective assessments of material well-being appears relatively high in comparative terms. 22% said their situation had improved (the 'winners'), and an equal share said it had worsened (the 'losers'). Another 57% reported no change in their material well-being. Thus, the more than 40% who, according to the Central Bank’s breakdown, experienced moderate real income growth did not give a positive assessment of their financial situation.
Three hundred dollars per person
Almost two-thirds of Russian households have seen a significant increase in income compared to 2022, according to data from a large-scale All-Russian Household Survey of Consumer Finances. The survey covers over 6,000 households and 12,000 individuals and is conducted every two years to provide a more detailed picture of the financial situation of Russian households, their differences, and their financial behaviour (the first four waves of the survey were carried out by the Ministry of Finance, while the last two, in 2022 and 2024, were conducted by the Central Bank). In all cases, the longitudinal study was implemented by the research firm 'Demoscope,' with around 90% of respondents having participated in the previous wave. Most of the respondents for the latest wave were surveyed between April and June 2024. The extensive survey data will serve as material for multiple analytical studies, but the primary results were presented by Alexei Zabotkin, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank.
What have we learned about Russian households and how their circumstances have changed over the past two years? First and foremost, most households fall within the range of a monthly per capita income between 15,000 and 35,000 rubles ($170–390 at an exchange rate of 90 rubles to the dollar). According to the study, the average per capita income in mid-2024 was 33,800 rubles. This corresponds to a total monthly income of about 100,000 rubles for a family with one child, or approximately 135,000 rubles for a family with two children. In this scenario, two working parents would each earn around 60,000–70,000 rubles. At the same time, the median per capita income is significantly lower than the average – 27,900 rubles (as the average is heavily influenced by high-income groups). In other words, in half of Russian households, income per person is below this figure (just over $300). The average per capita income in the lowest-income group is roughly equal to the minimum old-age insurance pension (12,000 rubles).
Figure 1: Change in nominal per capita income by 10 decile groups, 2022-2024
Source: Bank of Russia, median household income per person per month.
However, the Central Bank notes that the real situation may be somewhat better, as individuals with higher incomes are generally less willing to participate in such surveys. Indeed, when comparing the survey data with figures from Rosstat, which, like the Central Bank, divides Russians into income decile groups, there is virtually no discrepancy for the low-income groups. However, for the top three high-income groups, Rosstat's data shows incomes that are twice as high. The question of how much of this discrepancy is due to respondent behaviour, how much stems from accessibility issues, and how much is attributable to Rosstat itself requires separate analysis.
Figure 2: Income of decile groups according to Central Bank survey and Rosstat data, 2024, rubles
‘Losers’, ‘winners’, and the financially secure
From 2022 to 2024, nominal incomes increased across all decile groups. In absolute terms, as shown in Figure 1, incomes grew the most among the wealthiest (from 58,000 to 74,000 rubles per person per month), while in relative terms, the poorest saw slightly higher growth (33% vs. 31%). However, the difference in growth rates is not significant, meaning the income gap between poorer and richer groups is hardly narrowing. The gap between the richest and poorest groups widened from 49,000 to 62,000 rubles, although income inequality in relative terms slightly decreased – from a ratio of 6.44 to 6.17 times.
While household incomes have generally increased over the past two years, this overall growth masks several distinct 'stories,' which the study helps to uncover. For instance, a quarter of households experienced a drop in income, with nearly 20% reporting a decline of more than 10%. The uneven nature of these losses suggests that there is a clearly defined group in Russian society that has significantly 'lost out' due to the economic restructuring linked to the war and sanctions. This group includes one in five households.
That said, the situation is, in a sense, symmetrical: among those whose incomes increased, the largest and proportionally similar group are those who reported their incomes rose by one and a half times or more (22% of respondents). These households made a real leap in their financial well-being. In addition to families of combatants and those directly supporting frontline operations (which may account for about 3–5% of households, based on estimates including the killed and wounded), this group likely includes workers in many defence industry enterprises and other participants in the current 'wage race' (→ Re:Russia: A Leap Instead of Growth).
Another 43% experienced moderate income growth, in the range of 3% to 25%. According to Rosstat, real disposable incomes in Q2 2024 were 13.9% higher than in the same period in 2022.
Figure 3: Distribution of households by group based on changes in real per capita income in 2024 compared to 2022
It should be noted, however, that the official inflation figures used by the Central Bank to calculate real incomes may not fully reflect reality in this case. For the poorest households, actual inflation is higher than the average – a fact widely acknowledged by economists. However, under the specific conditions of sanctions, inflation is likely also significantly higher than average for the wealthiest households due to the so-called ‘smartphone effect’. Due to the withdrawal of Western brands, Rosstat has replaced their goods in the consumer basket with cheaper Asian alternatives. But wealthier consumers, aiming to maintain their standard of consumption by continuing to purchase familiar brands, face much steeper price increases than those reflected in Rosstat’s official inflation figures – figures that are lowered due to this 'quality inflation' effect. As a result, the official inflation metric is essentially only relevant to middle-income groups whose consumption basket is closest to Rosstat’s average. In reality, this sector-specific inflation likely means that fewer households experienced real income growth, and more saw declines, than the Central Bank’s data suggests.
This assumption is indirectly confirmed by another survey result. Among all income groups, only one, the top decile, reported an average increase in expenses that significantly outpaced the rise in income: expenditures grew by 20%, while incomes rose by 14%. More broadly, across the entire upper-income spectrum (deciles 7–10), median income growth did not exceed expenditure growth. In other words, these households’ subjective assessment of their income growth corresponds to a higher subjective perception of inflation than the official rate. This leads, in turn, to a lower perceived improvement in personal well-being over the period.
Among the 'winners' – households whose real incomes grew by more than 50% – total expenditures rose by 43%, and spending on durable goods jumped by 57%. This makes sense: a 'leap in income' was accompanied by catching up in terms of acquiring long-lasting consumer goods. In contrast, for households with moderate income growth, spending on durable goods barely changed. With income growth in the range of 3–25%, average spending on such items increased by less than 3%. This restraint appears to have been driven by the restructuring of product availability, a tendency to save, and a lower subjective assessment of real income growth.
Assets, liabilities and subjective well-being
The share of households with savings has increased slightly across all income groups over the past two years – from 73% to 75.5%. Meanwhile, the average amount of investment in all types of assets rose from 115,000 to 145,000 rubles (a 26% increase), and the median amount rose from 20,000 to 30,000 rubles (a 50% increase). This indicates that, in relative terms, asset growth was faster among poorer groups. However,in the middle-income group (with a median income of 23,000 rubles per family member per month), financial assets grew by 70%. At the same time, in the top two income groups, growth was only around 20%.
Across all income groups, demand for credit has declined over the past two years, especially among those whose income levels remained unchanged. For these households, borrowing is not a necessity, and limited financial resources make them more sensitive to rising interest rates. Mortgage demand also fell across all groups – except for the 'winners’. The overall share of families with loans dropped from 23% in 2022 to 20% in 2024. At the same time, the financial burden on borrowers increased significantly: the average household debt rose by 43%, reaching 788,000 rubles. However, this figure is skewed by mortgage loans. The median household debt increased from 140,000 to 200,000 rubles, and for consumer loans and microloans – the most common types of borrowing among middle- and lower-income households – it rose from 134,000 to 170,000 rubles, or 27%.
When presenting the results, Central Bank Deputy Chairman Alexey Zabotkin expressed concern that respondents might extrapolate the 2022–2024 income growth trend into the future, leading them to take more financial risks through borrowing and spending, even though income growth is expected to slow down. The more cautious behaviour Zabotkin advocates would involve prioritising saving over spending, aligning better with the Central Bank's main goal of reducing inflation. However, the survey data indicates that the main incentive to spend rather than save is high inflation expectations, i.e. citizens' lack of faith in the Central Bank’s ability to achieve its goal.
In general, the picture of real income dynamics in the Central Bank’s calculations looks as follows. In addition to two almost equal groups of 'winners' and 'losers' (about 20% each), roughly 30% of households either saw no change in income or only minor fluctuations, while another 30% experienced noticeable but moderate growth. At the same time, income growth among the 'winners' is several times greater than the losses of the 'losers.' This results in a significantly positive overall balance in average income dynamics, but presents a much more modest picture when calculated per capita. Meanwhile, the group with moderate income growth also expresses a fairly restrained assessment of their material circumstances. In response to a direct question about how their household’s material situation has changed, the balance of optimism was zero: 22% of respondents said it had worsened, 22% said it had improved, and 56% said it had not changed. This suggests that the group of respondents with moderate income growth (in the 3–25% real increase range, according to the Central Bank) subjectively views their material well-being as unchanged.
Overall, the zero balance of optimism appears relatively high from a comparative perspective. It is only slightly below the best result of the past 12 years, recorded in the prosperous year of 2013 (Figure 4), due to the larger group of 'losers.' In contrast, in 2022, the balance of assessments regarding changes in material well-being matched that of the crisis year 2015, when a sharp drop in oil prices led to a noticeable GDP contraction, a currency devaluation, and a 4.4% decline in incomes compared to 2013. It is worth noting that in 2013 – when subjective well-being was at its peak – real disposable incomes had grown by 8.8% compared to 2011, according to Rosstat, rather than the 13.9% recorded for Q2 2024 versus Q2 2022. Thus, it can be said that subjective assessments of improved well-being in the survey are lower than might be expected based on official statistical data.