The School of Military Putinism: How Russian school education has changed during the war

Total ‘sovereignisation’

The 'special military operation' that began in 2022 immediately resonated in Russian schools. In the very first days after the start of hostilities, the authorities decided to communicate their official position to children. On 3 March 2022, a nationwide 'lesson' was held, in which schoolchildren were told the reasons for the 'special operation' and NATO’s role in the events. Following these politicised 'lessons', the Russian authorities also introduced some new rituals into school life. Now, each school week begins with the raising of the flag and the singing of the anthem. Now, every school week begins with the raising of the flag and the singing of the national anthem. All schools have introduced weekly 'Conversations about Important Things'; formally extracurricular but in practice mandatory class hours conducted according to state-approved scenarios. Added to this is a 'calendar plan for upbringing' that spans the entire academic year.

'A sovereign education system – we keep talking about sovereignty in various forms. This is an extremely important, absolutely fundamental matter. And we will be doing this at all levels — from schools to colleges and universities,' were the words with which Vladimir Putin launched the Year of the Teacher in 2023. This report documents how this 'sovereignisation' of schools is taking place and what it entails.

This is, first and foremost, a strengthening of centralised control and a rolling back of school autonomy, which initially took place informally but is now becoming increasingly formalised; the abandonment of programme diversity and the ideologisation of both curricula and 'upbringing' programmes, which have become a mandatory part of the educational plan and are also turning into an increasingly standardised set of activities aimed at indoctrinating pupils.

It is worth noting that this 'sovereignisation' is accompanied by high levels of pressure on dissenters. Teachers expressing anti-war views face dismissal and even criminal prosecution. The case of Moscow teacher Natalia Taranushenko, who told her Year 8 pupils that she considered Russia’s actions an act of aggression, received widespread publicity. A criminal case was opened against her for 'spreading fake information about the army', and she was forced to flee the country to avoid prison. Similarly, in the spring of 2022, Penza history teacher Irina Gen was punished after a pupil recorded her critical remarks about the war on a dictaphone. She was fined and dismissed. Repression has also targeted schoolchildren and their parents: in March 2023, a father in Tula Oblast was sentenced to a real prison term, and the girl herself was placed into social care. In many schools, a climate has emerged in which any dissent is punished and denunciations are encouraged. Teachers admit that they work ‘under the threat of denunciation,’ and headteachers directly warn them to 'be careful what they say'.

Another facet of 'sovereignisation' has been the isolation of Russian schools from the outside world. The Russian government has declared both the International Baccalaureate programme and the system of foreign language certification 'undesirable organisations' in order to cut Russian students off from the possibility of entering foreign universities. In addition, Russia has withdrawn from international studies of educational quality, such as PISA and TIMSS. These studies provided an opportunity to track changes in education and its quality. Rosobrnadzor, together with the Ministry of Education, has announced the development of similar national, i.e. 'sovereign', instruments, which, however, will deprive Russian educational institutions of the ability to compare results with other countries and will make compliance with international educational standards more difficult.

A general picture of the state of Russian schools

Between 2021 and 2024, the number of state general education institutions in Russia declined by 3.3%, from 43,420 to 42,003 schools. This reduction occurred mainly in rural areas (–4.5%). Such a decrease is in line with the long-term trend in the development of the school network that has been observed since the early 1990s.

At the same time, there has been some growth in the non-state sector: the number of private schools increased by 12.5% in urban areas (from 777 to 874) and by 6.6% in rural areas (from 91 to 97), but their overall share remains just 2.3%. In 2021, there were 154 general education institutions in Russia with a military or civil service focus. By 2024, this number had risen to 160. In addition, more than 43,000 pupils in grades 8–11 are enrolled in cadet classes, representing around 0.9% of the total in those year groups. The 'cadet' track ranks third in popularity after engineering and teacher training.

In 2024, 1.8 million children started their first year of school. This figure remains high after the peaks of 2021–2023 (1.9–2 million). This high intake is linked to a mid-2010s birth-rate spike. However, Russia is gradually emerging from this phase: the number of first-year pupils is now declining, with around 1.5 million children starting school this year. Due to the earlier surge, the total number of pupils in Russian state schools increased by 3.5% between 2021 and 2024, from 17.2 million to 17.8 million. Growth occurred mainly in urban areas (+4.8%), while rural areas saw a 1% decrease.

Over the past four years, there has been no reduction in the proportion of pupils attending school in a second shift: in 2024, 15.8% of pupils were still taught in this way. This figure varies significantly across regions. The highest levels are in Irkutsk Oblast (22.5%), the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) (22.4%) and Sverdlovsk Oblast (22.1%), while the lowest is in Penza Oblast (4.7%). The problem is particularly acute in cities, where 17.2% of pupils attend second-shift classes. Second-shift schooling is a sign of insufficient facilities.

In recent decades, the pace of school construction has failed to keep up with the deterioration of Soviet-era buildings, leaving the issue of major repairs acute. In 2023, 28.5% of all state schools in Russia required repairs. The situation regarding drainage, running water and heating is moderately adequate — only 6–7% of schools lack these utilities (3% in cities, 10–11% in rural areas). From 2021 to 2023, the proportion of schools without running water fell from 8.1% to 6.9%, without sewage from 8.9% to 7.5%, and without central heating from 7.4% to 6.4%. In remote and northern regions the situation is much worse: for example, in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) more than half of educational institutions lack internal water supply and toilet facilities altogether.

The proportion of unsafe (condemned) schools fell from 0.79% to 0.72%. At the same time, the share of schools in need of major repairs increased from 25.6% to 28.5%. This remains the main infrastructural problem of the Russian school system. Nevertheless, the majority of teachers interviewed for this study rated the condition of buildings and the general upkeep of schools as satisfactory, though they frequently mentioned outdated equipment: computers, projectors, printers and interactive whiteboards that are in need of renewal.

The number of teaching staff fell by 19,000 (–1.8%) — from 1,066,000 to 1,047,000 — which, against the backdrop of rising pupil numbers, increased the burden on teachers. By 2024, the pupil–teacher ratio rose from 16.1 to 16.9. The average number of teaching posts per employed teacher increased from 1.43 to 1.53 between 2021 and 2024. Meanwhile, the proportion of vacant posts has remained almost unchanged at around 2.8%.

The material condition of Russian schools today can be considered satisfactory, though far from fully adequate. The situation, however, depends greatly on the economic standing of the region.

Informal mechanism of centralisation

In 2022, the existing balance between federal, regional and municipal authorities began to break down. The system of school administration in recent years has been moving towards greater centralisation.

At the federal level, the hierarchy of educational management is headed by the Ministry of Education. It formulates state education policy and approves educational standards (FGOS). However, de jure, the ministry does not directly manage regional and municipal schools. Below it in the hierarchy are the regional ministries of education, which oversee the implementation of educational policy within the federal subjects: they appoint the heads of municipal education departments, develop regional programmes and manage subordinate schools (gymnasiums, lyceums and boarding schools). At the municipal level, local authorities directly manage schools, including the appointment and dismissal of headteachers. In practice, the overwhelming majority of schools are subordinate to municipalities.

According to Part 1 of Article 278 of the Labour Code of the Russian Federation, the founding body has the right to terminate a school headteacher’s employment contract at any time without giving reasons. This creates wide scope for control, including beyond formal job duties. For example, in 2024, the headteacher of a school in the village of Zamzor, Irkutsk Oblast, Tatiana Shandaleva, was dismissed after district head elections in which the government-backed candidate received poor results at the polling station located in the school.

Despite the formal separation of powers in the school system, in practice it functions as a single vertical of governance: headteachers report to municipalities, which in turn report to regional authorities, while the regions follow federal policy. Despite the formal absence of direct management, the Ministry exerts significant influence on their activities through mandatory standards, programmes, methodological guidelines and directives. For example, in a letter dated 8 June 2023, the Ministry emphasised the improvement of the patriotic education system, which reflects the centralised approach to shaping upbringing policy.

Standardisation and ideologisation: how the school curriculum is changing

Since 2022, school education in Russia has undergone large-scale changes. The main innovation has been the introduction of the Unified Federal Basic Educational Programmes (FOOP), established by Law No. 371-FZ adopted on 24 September 2022. This law put an end to the principle of curricular diversity, allowing the state to exercise full control over the content of teaching. As Olga Kazakova, Chair of the Duma’s Committee on Education, stated, 'variability, exemplarity, uncertainty' — all of this causes 'great harm' when studying 'subjects that shape values.' Officially, however, the FOOP is positioned as a step towards facilitating the transfer of students from school to school.

Unlike the FGOS (Federal State Educational Standards), which set general frameworks, the FOOP prescribes exactly what pupils should study and when. This is not about educational objectives but about specific content: works, topics, facts, and concepts. Teachers are required to follow this programme strictly, especially in 'ideologically significant' subjects: history, literature, social studies, life safety (OBZh), geography and Russian language.

At the same time, the FOOP is quite detailed. For example, in the primary school curriculum, significant space is devoted to the dozens of languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, as well as 'mandatory' activities such as celebrating World Theatre Day. In secondary school, a 'new' history appears, starting with the events of 2014, while in upper school the ideological emphasis grows. Thus, the history syllabus for grades 10–11 includes: 'The 2014 coup in Ukraine and Russia’s position. The reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia and its international consequences… The Special Military Operation (2022)… Sanctions against Russia and their consequences.' Among the learning outcomes are the ability to 'resist attempts to falsify Russian history' and to search for information with consideration for 'information security.'

The standardisation of content has also affected school textbooks. The state now controls not only their commissioning, but also the teams of authors. The aim is for each subject to have just one standard and one advanced textbook nationwide

The subject Life Safety has been renamed ‘Fundamentals of Security and Defence of the Motherland.’ It now includes training in small arms, army regulations, the 'Attention Everyone!' civil defence signal and digital security. History has become a subject for 'values-based' education: the word 'Church' is now capitalised, and references to Alexander II’s reforms as a step towards a rule-of-law state have been removed. Topics such as political terrorism and the foreign policy of Nicholas II have also been excluded.

The Federal State Educational Standards have also been updated: the number of classroom hours in primary school increased from 3,190 to 3,345, and in lower secondary from 5,549 to 5,848. In addition, the course 'Fundamentals of the Spiritual and Moral Culture of the Peoples of Russia' (the previous version of 'Fundamentals of Religious and Secular Ethics') was removed. References to a 'multicultural society' were deleted from Years 10–11, while mentions of 'traditional values' were added across the board.

Extracurricular activities: ‘Conversations about Important Things’ and their status

The 'Conversations about Important Things' were first mentioned in a Ministry of Education letter dated 17 June 2022 (No. 03-871 'On the organisation of the classes ‘Conversations about Important Things’'). They were described as part of extracurricular activity: weekly educational sessions of a patriotic, moral and environmental character. It was envisaged that the materials for these sessions would be centrally developed and distributed to schools and colleges. At that time, the letter contained no direct legal basis for making them compulsory.

In the next letter, dated 27 June, two formulations were used: on the one hand, it spoke of the 'need to plan' the 'Conversations,' and on the other, 'recommended their inclusion' in the programme. In this document, they were referred to as 'class hours.' In subsequent documents they were variously called 'classes' (No. 03-1505 'On the implementation of the extracurricular activity ‘Conversations about Important Things’' of 11 October 2022) or 'project' (No. 03-239 'On the implementation of the project ‘Conversations about Important Things’' of 14 February 2023).

By law, a school must independently develop its educational programme, including the extracurricular component. Since 2022, in addition to complying with the FGOS, schools have been required to observe the federal educational programme, which is a more specific document. However, the 'Conversations' are not included in these programmes, meaning they are not part of the mandatory list of educational activities. Formally, the federal authorities cannot impose particular sessions on schools. This is even less possible for regions and municipalities, which have no authority to determine educational content at all. Nevertheless, within a centralised hierarchy, the Ministry exerts pressure on schools via regional and municipal bodies, which in turn exert pressure on headteachers, who are dependent on their founders. It is this system that makes the 'Conversations about Important Things' effectively compulsory, despite the lack of legal or regulatory basis. Some private schools, however, do not hold such classes.

The most consistent position of the Ministry of Education of Russia is to classify the 'Conversations' as extracurricular activities. However, under the FGOS, a pupil must have the option to choose extracurricular subjects. This means that the 'Conversations about Important Things' cannot be imposed as the sole option.

These legal inconsistencies could potentially be the subject of litigation, but no court cases on this matter are known. There are only known cases where parents were threatened with administrative liability for refusing to allow their children to attend the 'Conversations' (Zavodoukovsky District Court of Tyumen Oblast, 18 April 2024, Case No. 2-474/2024; Bykovsky District Court of Volgograd Oblast, 22 April 2024, Case No. 2a-132/2024; Shchigrovsky District Court of Kursk Oblast, 4 June 2024, Case No. 12-11/2024).

By law, every school is obliged to organise extracurricular activities, including clubs and sections. Although clubs belong to the category of additional education rather than extracurricular activities, in practice they are often included in the extracurricular plan. The maximum permitted extracurricular load is 10 academic hours per week. In practice, schools often report extracurricular activities through clubs and events organised by other bodies at parents’ request.

According to a survey conducted as part of this study, pupils’ participation in such activities has become almost universal. Around 90% of parents, regardless of region, state that their children attend mandatory extracurricular school sessions. One-third of respondents say their children now spend more time at compulsory extracurricular events than before. This is particularly evident in grades 7-11: in these age groups, the share of parents choosing the response 'significantly more' is notably higher.

Education as a programme of indoctrination

Formally, the term ‘education’ was redefined and expanded by amendments to the federal law on education (No. 273-FZ) adopted in December 2023. Here, education is defined as 'an activity aimed at the development of the individual, the fostering in pupils of diligence, a responsible attitude towards work and its outcomes, the creation of conditions for pupils’ self-determination and socialisation based on sociocultural and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the accepted rules and norms of behaviour in Russian society in the interests of the individual, the family, society and the state; the formation in pupils of a sense of patriotism, civic responsibility, respect for the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland and the feats of the Heroes of the Fatherland, respect for law and order, for working people and the older generation, mutual respect, and a careful attitude towards the cultural heritage and traditions of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation.' Moreover, the concept of 'spiritual and moral values' in the original text of the law was simultaneously and universally replaced with 'traditional Russian spiritual and moral values'.

However, these innovations were largely declarative. A far more tangible step was the adoption in 2024 of Federal Law No. 371-FZ, which incorporated as mandatory elements of educational programmes a 'federal programme of upbringing' and a 'federal calendar plan for upbringing activities'. The subsequent 'upbringing' programme for secondary schools defines its priority as 'the development of a highly moral individual who shares traditional Russian spiritual values… capable of realising their potential in contemporary society, ready for peaceful creation and the defence of the Motherland'. Pupils are expected to become individuals who 'know and respect Russia’s achievements in science, the arts, sport, technology, military exploits and labour achievements, as well as the heroes and defenders of the Fatherland, past and present.'

The federal calendar plan for upbringing activities includes 42 commemorative dates, even those falling in July and August, when lessons are typically not held. It sets out the topics of events and the organisations responsible for their delivery or for developing example plans (see Appendix at the end of the text). These calendar plans establish ideological control over the nature of 'upbringing work'. (It should be noted that, although the new academic year has already begun, the Ministry of Education has not yet approved the calendar plan for upbringing activities for the 2025/2026 school year.)

These changes have, in effect, legalised ideological indoctrination as a part of the educational process.

The reaction of the teachers: two understandings of ‘school’

It is worth noting that some teachers, in the interviews conducted, welcomed the strengthening of the school’s upbringing function. They believe that fostering patriotism and moral guidance in schools is necessary, and that the previous lack of such aims made them question their choice of profession: 'It is wonderful that patriotic education has become compulsory. When a generation grew up whose only dream was to leave Russia after graduating from an elite school, [I would think]: what are we working for, what are we preparing the best for?' (Sverdlovsk Region, male, 50). At the same time, the forms of upbringing themselves raise questions, but complaints are more often about the compulsory nature and bureaucracy rather than the essence of the process: 'Some events, because of the workload of teachers and organisers, have become mere tick-box exercises, photo reports and news items, and the impact is weak.' (Rostov Region, male, 37).

Some teachers with anti-war views, on the other hand, report an internal conflict caused by 'Conversations about Important Things' and patriotic campaigns: ‘When 'Conversations about Important Things' began, I said that I would not conduct them for ideological reasons’ (Sverdlovsk Region, female, 28). In interviews, teachers also sometimes complain that extracurricular activities distract both pupils and staff from the core educational process and overload them: 'There’s nothing wrong with talking about patriotism, planting trees, or taking part in an event. But there is so much of it that we simply don’t have the time to deliver our regular lessons.' (Rostov Region, male, 50).

Some teachers who do not share the authorities’ positions find ways to circumvent them – from fictitious reports to sabotage. However, it is impossible to completely ignore the requirements of the school system, leading to a conflict between the need to 'report back' and the impossibility or unwillingness to carry out the tasks handed down 'from above':

'This voluntary–compulsory system has turned into a tick-box system. They hold an exhibition, take a photo, send it – and that’s it. Sometimes the children don’t even know they could have attended because it all boils down to ticking a box.' (Rostov Region, male, 37); 'Headteachers try to wriggle out as much as they can. They say: ‘Yes, yes, yes, definitely, next month’, and postpone it. They don’t argue openly, but neither do they comply.' (Sverdlovsk Region, female, 28).

Thus, even within a centralised model of school governance, some educators maintain their own stance and find room for manoeuvre. However, the overall trend of increasing extracurricular and ideologically tinted workloads persists, and deviating from it requires considerable effort.

Between obligation and coercion: the additional workload of ideological education

The reforms and the ideological turn in schools have led to increased workloads for teachers. Due to the rise in pupil numbers (as mentioned earlier), the average teacher workload nationwide increased from 1.43 to 1.53 posts per teacher, and in some regions, such as Irkutsk Oblast, it reached 1.68. This situation is largely due to staff shortages and low salaries, forcing teachers to take on additional hours.

In addition, ‘class leadership’ remains a longstanding issue. Formally, these duties can only be assigned by additional agreement to the employment contract, that is, on a voluntary basis. In practice, however, refusal to take on class leadership is only possible with the consent of the administration: 'Because of the staff shortage, you have to take on class supervision whether you want to or not.' (Penza Region, female, 30).

Interviews reveal that even before the 'special military operation' (SMO), teachers’ workloads were high, especially for class supervisors. The need to take on extra hours, combine roles and organise extracurricular activities became the norm amid chronic staff shortages and low pay. Teachers face increasing teaching and administrative demands, expanding lists of duties and tighter administrative control. At the same time, administrative pressure is mounting: the number of assignments carried out without official orders or compensation is growing. Low pay remains one of the most persistent concerns, with many teachers forced to take extra hours to increase their income.

Against this backdrop, the new requirements for extracurricular and upbringing activities during the 'SMO' years have significantly increased teachers’ extracurricular load. Before 2022, extracurricular activities were mostly traditional – competitions, excursions, themed meetings – but now new formats have been added: 'Conversations about Important Things' lessons, the 'Russia – My Horizons' project, collecting aid for the military, and writing letters to the front. Such activities are used as indicators of loyalty and are closely monitored. This also increases the burden on pupils: 'For the past two years, it’s not just noticeable — I feel like we’ve stopped teaching. We only do extracurricular activities: the ‘First Movement’, volunteering projects, ‘Ticket to the Future’, ‘Conversations about Important Things’… The children are constantly being dragged somewhere.' (Penza Region, female, 40); 'I remember the days when I really worked for the children at school. We organised events that interested them, that they needed. And now? We hold whatever we are told to hold.' (Irkutsk Region, female, 56).

In addition, in Moscow, teachers from state-funded institutions were forced to participate in election preparations. For example, they were ordered to bring acquaintances with Moscow registration to vote, under threat of losing their bonuses if they refused. In some schools, teachers were made to organise meetings with 'SMO' participants, formalise their results and publish identical reports of the meetings, emphasising the 'modesty' of the soldiers and the 'fostering of pride' among pupils.

This 'additional employment' sometimes even extends beyond the educational institution, affecting teachers’ emotional well-being. For example, in the Far East and Buryatia, teachers in 2022–2023 were involved in distributing mobilisation summonses. In the Rostov Region, teachers were intimidated for refusing to vote for 'a specific political force'.

Thus, the additional functions of 'ideological upbringing' imposed on teachers have become not only obligatory but coercive. Refusal is impossible, even if the extra work is unpaid.

Appendix. Federal calendar plan for educational work for the 2024/2025 academic year: a selection of military-patriotic and ideological events