Diffuse Media Landscape: Putin has failed to create a full-fledged media dictatorship, and will not succeed unless Trump helps him

The military-partisan media landscape: four segments

In 2024, Russia's freedom of speech index, calculated using the Reporters Without Borders methodology, was below 30 points, placing the country among the 20 most restrictive in the world. However, this ranking does not fully reflect reality. Unlike its counterparts in the Reporters Without Borders index – such as the UAE, Djibouti, Azerbaijan, Nicaragua, and Bangladesh – Russia has a robust independent media sector that has relocated abroad but remains accessible to Russian audiences. The media landscape within the country is also far more complex than it may appear from the outside and is by no means a domain of total propaganda.

In general, the Russian media space consists of four segments: 1) state-controlled media, which broadcasts officially approved and propagandistic narratives, 2) corporate media, which adheres to the rules of censorship and partly broadcast official narratives, but at the same time provide significant ‘industry-specific’ information (most often related to the Russian economy – for example, RBC, Kommersant, Forbes), 3) independent niche media inside Russia, which comply with minimal censorship requirements but otherwise strive to uphold journalistic standards and resist propaganda, and 4) uncensored media abroad which is beyond the reach of Russian law enforcement agencies but remains part of the Russian media space (→ Kseniya Luchenko: Inside and Outside Censorship).

The Kremlin has failed to transform Russia into a classic closed media dictatorship. Instead, the Russian media landscape resembles a battlefield – marked by front lines, grey zones, counteroffensives, and guerrilla resistance

The domestic front: general pressure and a focus on regional journalism

The Russian authorities are forced to fight media 'threats' on two fronts – against the external independent sector and the remaining pockets of media independence within the country. In 2024, Roskomnadzor, acting on requests from various agencies, blocked more than 130 media outlets, including about 40 independent publications and over 70 'mirror' sites of previously banned media, according to a report by the Centre for Media Rights Protection on the state of freedom of speech in Russia. Several independent outlets also lost their official media registration in 2024 due to lawsuits filed by Roskomnadzor. Among them were Polit.ru, Russia’s oldest online media outlet (operating since 1998); the regional news portal It’s My City; and the website of the newspaper Sobesednik (published since 1984). The newspaper itself was declared a 'foreign agent' and temporarily suspended its print edition.

In 2024, repression efforts were particularly focused on independent niche regional media. Two news agencies, Khakassiaand Svobodnye Novosti. FreeNews-Volga, were stripped of their official registration. The Yekaterinburg-based news website TochkaNews announced its closure after its editor-in-chief, Dmitry Fomintsev, was placed under investigation for allegedly insulting religious sentiments. Meanwhile, Komi Daily, an online publication covering life in the Komi Republic, was added to the list of terrorist organisations, effectively banning its operations.

The crackdown on these media outlets is part of the Kremlin’s broader 'crusade' against civic initiatives tied to national and regional identities. On 7 June, 2024, Russia’s Supreme Court designated the non-existent Anti-Russian Separatist Movement as an extremist organisation, labelling nearly all significant regional and national identity initiatives as its 'structural subdivisions.' In November 2024, the same court declared another non-existent group, the Forum of Free States of Post-Russia, a terrorist organisation—along with many organisations previously included in the first list. This marked a significant step toward the criminalisation of an entire sector of Russian civil society.

According to the Centre for the Protection of Media Rights, at least 45 journalists in 2024 faced criminal charges under various articles (including 16 for failure to comply with their obligations as ‘foreign agents’, 10 for alleged ‘fakes’ about the Russian army, and eight for participating in an extremist community). Courts issued 27 convictions in cases involving journalists – though 10 were sentenced in absentia, as they were abroad. Additionally, the Centre documented at least 24 raids on journalists' homes or editorial offices over the course of the year. These figures illustrate not only persistent repression but also ongoing resistance.

Between two worlds: ‘foreign agents’, ‘undesirables’, and more

The labels of ‘foreign agent’ and ‘undesirable organisation’ have become key tools of Russia’s new political censorship, increasingly adopted by other autocracies as a populist pretext for suppressing dissent. The Kremlin continues refining these mechanisms to pressure the external independent media sector and obstruct its interaction with Russia’s domestic public sphere.

In 2024, 163 organisations and individuals were added to the register of ‘foreign agents’, including 26 journalists, 20 media outlets and 11 bloggers. Although the rate of new designations slowed compared to 2023 (which saw 229 additions), the number of fines imposed on foreign agents surged by 50%, from 368 to 556, according to the Centre for the Protection of Media Rights. These fines are issued for non-compliance with the foreign agent law – though many foreign agents living abroad deliberately ignore its requirements. Even those who comply are not shielded from financial penalties: nearly 40% of fines (224) targeted journalists and bloggers, with 58 individuals fined multiple times, exposing them to potential criminal prosecution.

However, the most damaging aspect of the crackdown on foreign agents has been restrictions on their ability to earn income from public activities and donations, as well as limitations on managing their assets in Russia. In March, Putin signed a law banning advertisements on foreign agent platforms and prohibiting their promotion on third-party sites – dealing a severe financial blow to independent media and bloggers, including those operating abroad. Then, in December, the State Duma passed a law mandating that foreign agents’ earnings be deposited into special government-controlled accounts, which they can only access if their foreign agent status is revoked. Domestically, authorities are tightening control over bloggers. As of 1 November, a new Roskomnadzor registry requires social media page owners with over 10,000 subscribers to register. Failure to comply results in a ban on advertising, fundraising, and potential blocking.

The toolkit of repression against so-called undesirable organisations is expanding. Collaborating with such entities has long been criminalised, but enforcement is expanding.In 2024, Russian courts issued at least 79 administrative penalties for cooperation with an ‘undesirable organisation’, with 20 experts fined for contributing to ‘undesirable’ media, 20 journalists punished for cooperating with them, and 39 individuals fined for sharing or linking to materials from ‘undesirable’ media. The most heavily targeted outlet was Meduza, Russia’s largest independent text-based media outlet, with at least 30 fines issued for collaboration with it. For the first time, Russian authorities launched a criminal case against a media executive for organising the activities of an undesirable organisation. The case’s defendant is Kiril Martynov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

The external sphere: Russia's independent public 

Over the past three years, exiled Russian journalists, media managers, experts, and public speakers have managed to create a unique phenomenon – a Russian independent public sphere operating outside the country. While independent media serve as the structural foundation of this sector, its scope extends beyond journalism, encompassing individual bloggers, expert commentators, think tanks, human rights organisations, political activists, and proto-political structures. These latter categories, while not part of the media industry per se, significantly contribute to the production of independent content disseminated by relocated, uncensored media.

The packaging and distribution of this content remain key components of external resistance. Despite the Russian government’s annual propaganda and censorship expenditures reaching €2 billion, nearly 50 times the combined budgets of relocated Russian media, independent outlets continue reaching a significant portion of the Russian population. They have even expanded their domestic audience despite mounting repression and a general decline in attention to news content in the third year of the war, according to a JX Fund report on Russian media that has relocated abroad. According to calculations by its authors, who monitored 66 Russian media outlets abroad, their combined audience on YouTube has grown by an average of 19% (34.33 million subscribers), by 17% on Telegram (6.15 million subscribers), by 7.5% on Instagram, despite the site's ban (4.85 million), and by 4% on X (formerly Twitter, 6.84 million) since the start of the war. Additionally, viewership of independent Russian political YouTube channels has nearly tripled since the war began.

However, it is extremely difficult to reliably assess the reach and influence of this segment within Russia. In response to government-imposed technical restrictions, independent Russian media are constantly refining their censorship circumvention strategies and diversifying their platforms (e.g., WhatsApp, Pinterest). Many outlets develop custom apps, use 'magic links' that bypass blocks, or deploy shortened links leading to mirror sites that are refreshed upon blocking, the JX Fund report notes. Many media outlets make it easy to create pdf versions of their content so that it can be forwarded to people you know without fear of being blocked. However, all of this makes it extremely difficult to assess the actual distribution of content.

JX Fund estimates that the independent Russian public sphere reaches approximately 6–9% of Russia’s population (9–13 million people). In our opinion, the true audience is larger. Among the consumers of such content one should distinguish between the core audience – those who consume the content regularly, and the peripheral audience that consume it sporadically and through intermediaries (→ Re:Russia: Stop the Flow). According to Re: Russia’s analysis (based on YouScore data), the core YouTube audience for independent Russian political and news content grew by 10% in 2024. During periods of heightened information demand (e.g., February-April and August 2024), YouTube traffic for this content surged by more than 1.5 times (→ Re:Russia: YouTube Window).

According to JX Fund and a separate Thomson Reuters Foundation survey on the issue, the sector was experiencing a kind of organisational stabilisation in 2024. As the JX Fund report notes, there was a significant slowdown in spending growth, from 47% in 2023 (due to the expansion of operations) to just 16% in 2024. Medium-sized outlets (10–15 employees) faced the greatest financial challenges, with budget reductions affecting their sustainability. While most increased spending still went toward editorial operations, some resources were allocated to commercial management, reducing grant dependency for select outlets. However, overall reliance on grants remained high – unsurprising given the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to obstruct media monetisation.

Overall, 2024 was the year when the sector was strengthened and finalised. Despite Russian authorities’ attempts to sever the connection between exiled media and domestic audiences, these efforts have had limited success. This is especially evident in Russia’s largest 'window' to independent content – YouTube. Russia now leads the world in VPN usage, with 36% of Russians using VPNs, according to download statistics. Every attempt to slow down YouTube has triggered a surge in VPN downloads, as revealed by investigative outlet ‘Agency’ showed. Some Russian independent bloggers and media outlets claim that the two phases of YouTube slowdown in Russia had almost no impact on their traffic, and these claims are supported by statistics (→ Re:Russia: YouTube Window).

While the influence of independent Russian media on the country’s political landscape should not be overstated, in its interaction with the segment of internal resistance, it undoubtedly hinders the ideological consolidation of the new version of Putin's regime, promotes the phenomenon of doublethink and diffuse loyalty within Russian society, and fundamentally limits the regime's ability to isolate Russian society through information.

Attacks from the rear: Big Tech and Trump

The emergence of an independent Russian public sphere abroad is a unique phenomenon, highlighting the potential of such 'exile' infrastructure in an era of global digital connectivity. Moreover, as noted in the JX Fund report, Russia’s uncensored media have become a crucial information source for international journalism, think tanks, and – most notably – the global investigative reporting ecosystem.

While the Russian authorities have yet to develop effective tools to suppress and block the influence channels of this sector within Russia, it remains fragile and vulnerable in terms of funding and infrastructure. Beyond direct actions by the Kremlin, this sector faces increasing pressure from Big Tech. The Russian government has largely succeeded in forcing tech giants such as Apple, Google, Meta, and TikTok to comply with its rules. Since these companies continue operating in Russia, they de facto implement many of the Kremlin’s restrictions on free speech while largely ignoring the appeals and protests of independent Russian media and public figures. This stance not only reduces the sector’s effectiveness but also further weakens its financial stability.

Finally, political changes in the US and a number of European countries may seriously undermine the sector's potential. For example, political changes in Lithuania may provoke a new wave of emigration of Russian media and representatives from the independent public sphere from the country, similar to that which occurred in Georgia. And, of course, Donald Trump's decision to suspend foreign aid from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for 90 days will have a huge impact on the sector.

Sabine Sile, head of the Latvian NGO Media Hub, which has helped hundreds of journalists and their family members from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to come to the country since the war began, told Re:Russia that ‘most independent media and democratic NGOs from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and other countries receive US financial support in one way or another, and Trump's decision has caused a new humanitarian crisis’. The full scale of the problem remains unclear, but most exiled media outlets and projects lack financial reserves or independent revenue streams for the reasons outlined earlier. In essence, European and American funding has countered Putin’s efforts to cut off these media from domestic sources of income. Now, however, there is a real risk that the reduction of US aid will prompt similar cuts in European support.

A severe contraction of this sector would undoubtedly strengthen Vladimir Putin’s regime, weaken internal resistance in Russia, increase the Kremlin’s ability to manipulate public opinion, and serve as yet another failure of the West in confronting autocracies and defending its own values.