Europe increasingly views the security and strengthening of Ukraine as an organic part of its own defence system

Shifting from empty to meaningful

At the end of last week, the European coalition supporting Ukraine held two important meetings. The 'coalition of the willing' in Brussels discussed plans for support both before and after a possible ceasefire agreement. Meanwhile, at Friday's meeting of the Defence Contact Group, formerly known as 'Ramstein,' the focus shifted to specific plans for upcoming military supplies. However, leadership in this format has now shifted to the UK and Germany. The 12 February meeting was the first where the US Secretary of Defence did not chair, with the role being taken over by his British counterpart. At the 11 April meeting, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth did not attend in person, but joined via video link.

The resumption of 'Ramstein without the US' is itself a significant and symbolic event. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said at the concluding press conference that peace in Ukraine is not imminent and that Russia must understand that Ukraine will continue to fight with effective support from Europe.

The most important outcome of the meetings was the agreement on a €21 billion military support package for Ukraine. This amount is half of the package that EU Commissioner for International Affairs and Security, Kaja Kallas, had tried to negotiate at the EU summit on March 20. At that time, the plan was met with objections, in particular from France and Italy. Reports about the new plan suggest that three-quarters of the funds will be provided by the UK and Germany (€5.3 billion and €11 billion respectively), over an extended period.

However, what remains crucial today is not just the decision to allocate funds, but the definition of Europe’s overall strategy for supporting Ukraine under various scenarios, depending on the continued involvement of the US in its support. Although Trump’s negotiation strategy with Russia is at a complete standstill, and no optimistic statements were made after the special envoy Whitcoff’s meeting with Putin, continued US military assistance to Ukraine should now be seen as a possibility, but not the default scenario. This is indicated, in particular, by the tense, according to Reuters, negotiations between the US and Ukraine regarding a new economic agreement (replacing the unsigned deal from late February), the text of which was obtained by the Financial Times and which the newspaper's sources in Kyiv call a robbery. Ukraine’s disagreement with this 'colonisation plan' will give Trump a new lever to cut military support to Ukraine, even in the absence of progress in the negotiation process.

European politicians are maneuvering to develop plans for independent support of Ukraine, without highlighting or exacerbating divisions with the US on one side, and internal EU disagreements on the other. Currently, there are two main projects under discussion: the creation of international European peacekeeping forces in the event of a ceasefire agreement, and the 'Steel Porcupine Strategy,' which has become part of the European Commission’s report on ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ released in March.

The idea of deploying European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine has always seemed controversial, if not stillborn. First and foremost, the status and mandate of these forces remain unclear – are they peacekeepers overseeing a ceasefire, separation forces, or deterrent forces? The lack of clarity on this issue is pointed out by several countries participating in the discussion. A second problem is Russia’s stance, which has already made clear (as previously stated) that it does not recognise the 'peacekeeping' nature of the mission and will consider the participating countries as parties to the conflict. This raises the question of what would happen if these forces are attacked by Russian forces or become involved in military confrontation with them.

In any case, the report by experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) examines three potential formats for a 'European mission,' each corresponding to a different potential 'function.' According to their assessments, based on the resources available to European countries, they could deploy a contingent of about 10,000 personnel to Ukraine, supported by limited air and naval assets. However, with such a small force, it would play a symbolic role and be unable to fulfill deterrent functions in the event of a new Russian invasion.

A medium-sized contingent of up to 25,000 personnel, with more intensive air and naval support, could provide a more substantial deterrent. European countries still have enough resources to deploy such a force; however, the critical issue in this scenario is strategic support from the US. Additionally, deploying a medium-sized force would require significantly more time. For full deterrence against Russia, a land force should consist of 60,000 to 100,000 soldiers, supported by substantial air and naval assets, but European countries do not have the necessary resources for such an operation.

As reported by the British Telegraph, London, in cooperation with France, is considering the deployment of a limited contingent to Ukraine for a five-year period. The primary mission of this force would be to train and rebuild the Ukrainian army. The 'security support forces,' led by Paris and London, would also include a limited naval and air contingent to protect Ukraine in the skies and at sea.

The function and status of such a mission remain unclear, as do the risks and potential consequences if they were to become targets of a Russian attack. Perhaps the only meaningful aspect of this discussion today is that the very idea of a European military presence in Ukraine is now subject to practical, albeit impractical, debate. Exactly one year ago, French President Macron first urged European countries to consider the possibility of European forces being present on Ukrainian territory, noting that just a year ago, sending European and American tanks and planes to Ukraine seemed impossible. In this sense, the discussion about a limited European military mission in Ukraine can be viewed as a step toward legitimising the prospect of its inclusion within the perimeter of the European security system.

In this context, it is noteworthy that Trump’s special envoy for negotiations with Russia, Keith Kellogg, unexpectedly supported the idea of a European mission in an interview with The Sunday Times this weekend. Appointed to this position and immediately removed from negotiations by Trump at Russia's request, Kellogg holds a tougher stance on the Kremlin than pro-Putin Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. It was only in recent days, amidst growing frustration over Putin's intransigence, that Kellogg reappeared in the public sphere after a long absence.

In the interview, Kellogg speaks about a scenario in which Ukraine is divided into zones: part of the territory remains under Russian control, western Ukraine is controlled by European coalition forces, and areas east of the Dnieper are held by Ukrainian forces. Previously, the Trump administration had rejected the possibility of supporting any European peacekeeping mission. Kellogg’s statement does not signify a shift in this position, but it does elevate the status of the European mission scenario and gives it a new place in discussions about various potential futures for Ukraine. The statement should also be viewed in the context of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's idea of extending Article 5 of the NATO charter to Ukraine without formal membership in the alliance. Thus, the discussion about Ukraine's security guarantees outside the framework of formal NATO membership continues.

Military-industrial alliance

The second track of European-Ukrainian integration appears more realistic and promising. Unlike the previous one, it can be implemented without regard to Russia's and the US's positions. This is about integrating Ukraine’s military-industrial complex with that of Europe. The 'Steel Porcupine' strategy, as already mentioned, has become part of the EU's rearmament program and involves equipping Ukraine to the point where it is ready to repel a new Russian invasion. In the 'European Readiness' report, this task is seen as part of a pan-European security strategy. However, unlike the first stage of the war, today the focus is not just on supplying weapons to Ukraine, though such supplies will remain a key element of the European strategy in the near term.

During the Soviet era, significant defence capacities were stationed in Ukraine, but over the decades following the collapse of the USSR, these capabilities significantly deteriorated. However, elements of this infrastructure and engineering schools have been retained to a certain extent. And although, at the time of the Russian invasion, Ukraine did not have an industrial mobilisation plan, this legacy allowed it to implement one relatively quickly, write RUSI experts Jack Watling and Oleksandr Danylyuk. In 2023, Kyiv was able to triple its weapons production, and in the following year, it tripled it again, reaching $10 billion in arms production in 2024, notes The Economist. An important achievement for Ukraine’s defence industry was the creation of 152mm artillery shells and, later, 155mm shells compatible with NATO standards. By October 2024, according to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, one out of every two munitions used in the combat zone was produced in Ukraine.

Kyiv has made the most progress during the three years of war in the development of missile and drone technologies. Ukraine developed the P360 Neptune anti-ship missile (later successfully adapted for ground attacks with a range of 400 km), as well as the Long-Neptune missile with a claimed range of 1,000 km. Another achievement of Ukraine’s defence industry is the Peklo drone missile system, an inexpensive hybrid alternative to Western cruise missiles with a range of up to 700 km and a speed of up to 700 km/h.

However, the real breakthrough Ukraine has made is in drone warfare, electronic warfare, and combat management through integrated systems. It is these breakthroughs that allow Ukraine today to counter the Russian army, which has superior defence capabilities and manpower. In fact, Ukraine has outpaced Western armed forces in these areas, and the West must urgently adopt Ukraine’s experience, which enables combat with far fewer resources against expensive weapons and numerically superior forces. This, in particular, is the subject of a recent article by former Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi on Defence One.

Over the course of three years of war, Kyiv has built its own drone manufacturing industry, and according to the country's Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, 996% of drones used in 2024 were produced in Ukraine. According to RUSI, drones account for two-thirds of Russia’s combat losses. In 2025, the country’s defence industry plans to produce up to 4 million small FPV kamikaze drones, as well as up to 30,000 long-range strike drones and up to 3,000 long-range missile drones and cruise missiles. The cost of producing a kamikaze drone in Ukraine is estimated at about $500, which is several times cheaper than in the West. For instance, the 'Drone Coalition' initiative, consisting of the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Sweden, involves supplying Ukraine with 30,000 FPV drones at a price of €1,800 per unit.

Former German Ministry of Defence official Nico Lange told The Economist that the electronic warfare systems developed in Ukraine surpass both Russian and Western systems. One of the most recent successes of Ukraine's defence industry is the Lima system, which disables the guidance systems of Russian guided bombs.

Thus, Ukraine is no longer just a recipient of Western aid. While Kyiv is deeply interested in supporting the European military industry in the production of ammunition and military equipment, this industry, in turn, is interested in the technologies developed by Ukraine and its future military-industrial potential.

Some NATO countries are already supporting Ukraine through a new model of cooperation that will serve as a prototype for integrating Ukraine’s and Europe’s military-industrial potential. The so-called ‘Danish model’ involves the purchase of Ukrainian weapons by European countries, which are then transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This scheme was initially used for the production of Ukrainian 155mm 'Bohdan' 2S22 self-propelled howitzers, allowing its production to be scaled to about 16 units per month, or nearly 200 units per year, at a cost of around €2.3 million per unit. This makes the 'Bohdan' the cheapest modern long-range self-propelled howitzer produced in Europe (three times cheaper than the French Caesar and Slovak Zuzana-2, and eight times cheaper than the German Panzerhaubitze 2000). In terms of annual production volumes, it surpasses the French counterpart by twice, the Slovak by four times, and the German by dozens of times. At current prices, the 'Bohdan' is even competitive with the Russian 'Msta-S,' which, despite similar costs, is produced annually in half the quantity.

Leading Western defence companies, including KNDS and Rheinmetall, have started building maintenance and weapons production facilities in Ukraine. French company Thales has established a joint venture with Ukraine's Ukroboronprom to develop and produce air defence and radar systems, while German Diehl Defence plans to start producing IRIS-T air defence systems in Ukraine.

The advantages of weapon manufacturing in Ukraine will remain for the coming years due to the lower level of wages and prices for many investment goods. According to Bruegel experts, in 2022, Ukraine’s wage levels were only higher than those of Moldova, Mexico, and Turkey, while in comparison with Bulgaria, its wage levels were more than twice as low, and with Germany, almost 15 times lower.

As a result, Ukraine could become one of the most important partners for the EU in the process of European rearmament. In the event of the cessation of active combat, the production capacities created there could be used for the rapid and cost-effective expansion of Europe’s defence capabilities. Currently, more than 800 private and state-owned enterprises are working in Ukraine’s defence sector, employing 300,000 skilled workers, notes The Economist. In 2025, Ukraine’s defence production capacity is expected to reach around $15 billion, and with sufficient investment, the sector could produce military products worth about $35 billion per year. Thus, on the one hand, Ukraine will remain one of the largest weapons producers in Europe, and on the other, its military supplies to Europe could become one of the important tools for the post-war recovery of the Ukrainian economy.

In any case, the European-Ukrainian military alliance is taking shape, although its contours are still vague. At the very least, the situation today is fundamentally different from what we saw in the second half of 2024, when the goals and future strategies for European support of Ukraine lost specificity and purpose (→ Re: Russia: Putin’s Schrodinger's Cat). Trump’s willingness to question the reliability of the Euro-Atlantic alliance exposed Europe’s vulnerability in terms of security, and it was this new sense of vulnerability that forced Europe – or at least parts of it – to recognise the Russian threat and, accordingly, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict as existential.