The Spectre of NATO or The ‘Steel Porcupine’: How Ukrainian perceptions of scenarios for ending the war and security guarantees are shifting

Victory vs. negotiations: the evolution of meanings

According to a July Gallup poll, 69% of Ukrainians surveyed support the swift achievement of peace through negotiations, while only 24% favour continuing the war until victory. This picture almost mirrors the distributions of the first two years of the war, when the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians supported fighting to victory (73% in 2022 and 63% in 2023). However, it is clear that in the context of early 2022, the formulation 'Ukraine should aim to end the war quickly through negotiations' was perceived more as consent to capitulate to the aggressor, whereas in 2023, 'continuing the war until victory' was understood in the context of the Ukrainian army’s successes in autumn 2022 and hopes for a Ukrainian summer offensive in 2023. The turning point came in 2024, when, for the first time, more than half of those surveyed expressed support for 'negotiations', while those favouring continuing the war until victory became a minority (52% versus 38%).

Surveys by the Ukrainian Rating Group confirm and clarify this picture. In March 2022, immediately after Russia’s invasion, 69% of those surveyed believed Ukraine should 'seek a compromise solution in negotiations involving other countries', and only 27% opted to 'refuse all negotiations and fight until all territories are liberated'. At that time, Russia’s military advantage was still considered overwhelming. By June 2022, however, this balance had shifted to 36% versus 59% in favour of supporters of fighting to victory. By then, the low combat effectiveness of the Russian army had become evident, and Western military and economic support for Ukraine had expanded. This distribution remained until late summer 2023, when it became clear that Russia had stabilised its military effort and Ukraine’s counter-offensive had stalled. Since then, the perception that negotiations would inevitably be part of the strategy to end the war has steadily grown. In 2022, the negotiation process was conceived as direct talks with Russia, whereas in 2025, according to another Rating Group question, three-quarters of the 80% recognising the necessity of negotiations envisage them with international mediators.

Moreover, under alternative question wording and 'prompts' offered by the Rating Group, it emerges that in 2025, including in August, around 60% of those surveyed consider negotiations the primary means of ending the war (aligning with Kyiv’s official position), while roughly a third remain committed to regaining either all occupied territories, including Crimea, or at least the factual borders of February 2022. Notably, neither the intensive shelling of Ukrainian cities by Russia, the summer Russian offensive, nor Donald Trump’s attempts to push a peace deal have changed this balance over the past five months.

What scenario for the war’s outcome do you support? 2023–2025, % of those surveyed

However, as has been noted repeatedly, recognising negotiations as the primary means of ending the war does not, in the minds of Ukrainians, imply capitulation. In the Rating Group survey, when asked whether Ukraine should agree to a ceasefire, three-quarters of those surveyed (75%) chose the answer, 'Yes, but only if security guarantees are provided by the US and Europe', while only 3% opted for 'Yes, without any conditions'. Meanwhile, 19% still believe that Kyiv should under no circumstances agree to a truce.

Choosing negotiations today is by no means seen as capitulation or acceptance of Moscow’s terms. Rather, it reflects recognition that victory and the return of territories are unlikely in the foreseeable future. In a sense, the rigid alternative implied by the way this question was framed has become outdated and no longer reflects the current agenda.

Territories vs guarantees and NATO vs the ‘steel porcupine’

Ukrainian public perceptions of acceptable scenarios for ending the war and the guarantees needed for peace have also evolved. In an August Rating Group survey, respondents most frequently cited the following conditions as necessary for ending the war: financing of the Ukrainian army and arms supplies by foreign partners (52%), a commitment from allies to enter the war in the event of a renewed Russian attack on Ukraine (48%), and international patrolling of Ukrainian air and sea space (44%). Two other options – signing a multilateral treaty with international partners and stationing foreign troops on Ukrainian soil – received less support (39% and 35% respectively), apparently because respondents considered them less realistic and less reliable than the scenario of arming Ukraine itself.

However, it is particularly noteworthy that, in response to a follow-up question asking which is more important – guaranteed financing of the Ukrainian army and sufficient weapons supplies from Western partners, or the return of lost territories – 58% chose the first option, while only 31% chose the second. In another Rating Group question, 'What are we fighting Russia for?' 60% chose 'the future of our children', 44% 'freedom', 21% 'survival', and only 19% 'territories'.

Thus, two trends emerge from this data. Both the issue of returning Russian-occupied territories and the question of joining NATO are gradually becoming somewhat less relevant, due both to their perceived impracticality and to the changing international context. Only 32% of those surveyed in a Gallup survey expressed confidence that Ukraine would join NATO within the next ten years (compared with 51% in 2024 and 69% in 2023). In this context, public expectations are shifting from goals of territorial recovery and NATO membership to security guarantees and ensuring Ukraine’s military survival in the future. The ‘Steel Porcupine’ scenario, which envisions transforming Ukraine into a military power that Russia would be unable to defeat, is becoming the primary focus and simultaneously more practically realistic.

The party of war, the party of capitulation, and the swinging scales of compromise

In May this year, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) asked respondents to assess the acceptability of three potential agreements to end hostilities: the European–Ukrainian plan, the American plan, and the Russian plan (→ Re:Russia: The Dilemma of Resistance). In early August, the survey experiment was repeated. Compared with May 2025, by August the proportion of those surveyed who found each of the proposed scenarios relatively acceptable had increased. This shift clearly reflects Ukrainian fatigue with the war and its unending losses, which is driving a greater willingness to compromise.

Attitudes towards hypothetical peace plans in Ukrainian public opinion, May and August 2025, % of those surveyed

It is worth noting, first of all, that the proportion of staunch opponents of the European–Ukrainian plan, which is undoubtedly the most favourable option for Ukraine, has decreased, but still stands at 35%. This represents the most radical segment of Ukrainian society, whose view of the war aligns closely with the third of respondents in the Rating Group survey who still believe it is necessary to continue fighting until all territories are recovered, or at least until the factual borders of early 2022 are restored.

At the same time, war fatigue, which is driving a greater willingness to compromise, is reflected in the fact that the largest increase in support (+10 percentage points) is observed for the American plan, which is less favourable to Ukraine and is now backed by almost 40% of those surveyed. This scenario also shows the largest drop in the proportion of irreconcilable opponents (–12 percentage points). This outcome is particularly notable because it is entirely unrelated to Ukrainians’ trust in Trump and his peace-making improvisations. On the contrary, according to the same Gallup survey, only 16% of Ukrainians trust the US leadership, while 73% do not (in 2022, the balance was reversed, 66% trusted vs 16% distrusted, and a year ago it was 37% to 40%). It should be noted that the 'American' scenario presented to respondents does not involve ceding any territory to Russia. Nevertheless, the growing number willing to accept this option reflects a slow rise in moderately defeatist attitudes within Ukrainian society.

Finally, psychological exhaustion is also evident in the fact that the group of those willing to accept even Russian conditions for ending military operations, i.e. effectively capitulating to the Kremlin's ultimatums, has grown from 10% to 17%. Thus, the data presented suggests that Ukrainian public opinion includes a group of 'irreconcilables', comprising roughly one-third of those surveyed, who support continuing military action. At the opposite pole is a smaller, but still significant, 'capitulation' group, willing to end the war on any terms. Between these extremes are around 50% of respondents who are open to some form of compromise, either the more favourable compromise for the majority under European–Ukrainian terms, or the minority compromise in the form of 'Trump concessions'. While today only the European–Ukrainian scenario enjoys majority support, in recent months the balance has shifted slightly towards broader concessions.