Ukrainian society has not lost its will to resist Russian aggression, but it has definitively moved past the ‘rally around the flag’ effect that characterised the early stages of the war. As a result, its view of the situation in the country, the government's actions, and Ukrainian politicians in general is becoming increasingly critical.
The greatest dissatisfaction is with the situation in law and order, specifically the fight against corruption and crime and the work of the justice system. Over the past year, public assessment of the authorities' actions in the defence sector has sharply deteriorated, likely influenced by the dismissal of Zaluzhny.
The trust ratings of almost all incumbent politicians are declining, and the public is feeling a growing frustration with the forced absence of elections. Ukrainians do not believe that the current generation of politicians is capable of effectively carrying out post-war reconstruction and are hoping for the emergence of new figures from among the military.
At the same time, President Zelensky’s approval rating, after a prolonged decline, has stabilised. Surveys show that trust in Zelensky is closely tied to hopes for continued Western support for Ukraine, which respondents believe the current president, well-regarded on the international stage, is capable of securing.
Meanwhile, a segment of society is forming in Ukraine that is convinced the West has grown tired of the war in Ukraine and is ready to ‘betray’ Ukraine by forcing it into unfavourable peace terms. Overall, around 38% of respondents currently trust Zelensky and believe in the West, while a group half that size distrusts both Zelensky and the West.
This implies that if the West were to exert real pressure on Ukraine regarding peace terms, it would deliver a devastating blow to Zelensky and potentially trigger a political crisis in the country. This crisis could further weaken Ukraine’s and the West’s negotiating positions in any future talks.
In the third year of the war, Ukrainian society has largely moved past the ‘rally around the flag’ phase, which was characteristic of the conflict’s early stages (→ Re:Russia: Extraordinary Legitimacy). This shift means that, while still significantly mobilised against Russian aggression, the public has become much more critical of the president and the government.
The mobilisation of society is reflected in the continued belief in victory and confidence that Ukraine will overcome its current challenges. According to the latest poll by the Razumkov Center, 83% of respondents stated that they believe in Ukraine's victory in the war. This figure should not be taken literally; rather, it reflects respondents’ commitment to the socially accepted 'normative' viewpoint. Nevertheless, compared to the first year and a half of the conflict, this figure has dropped by 10 percentage points. Twenty percent believe that 'victory' will come by the end of this year, while 39% think it will occur within one to two years. The size of these optimistic groups has remained unchanged since January. Additionally, 30% believe that Ukraine will resolve its current problems within the next few years, while 46% see solutions coming in the more distant future. These figures have also held steady since the beginning of the year.
However, respondents assess the current situation and the government's ability to address key issues quite critically. After some improvement in August – likely a reaction to the intervention in the Kursk region – the balance between positive and negative assessments of the overall situation (the country's direction) has turned negative again, at 33% to 48%. At the height of the 'rally around the flag' effect in February-March 2023, the ratio was 61% positive to 21% negative, in stark contrast to the pre-war numbers, when only 20% thought the country was moving in the right direction, and 66% thought otherwise.
The data on which areas respondents perceive Ukrainian authorities as least effective is quite striking. The relatively strong areas of the government, in their eyes, remain foreign policy, education, and energy supply, with an average positive balance of +13 points. According to Ukrainians, the authorities are handling these areas appropriately given the circumstances. In healthcare and defence, the balance of assessments is neutral. However, the starkly weak points of the current government, according to respondents, include combating corruption and crime, the entire justice system, as well as economic policy and the country’s recovery efforts. On average, about 70% of those surveyed view government policy in these areas as ineffective (almost 80% in the case of corruption). Over the past year and a half, the most significant deterioration in ratings has occurred in the defence sector (–34 percentage points), as well as in the economy, foreign policy, and energy supply (–24 percentage points). In the defence sector alone, the balance of assessments has dropped by 20 points in just the past year, likely partly linked to the replacement of Valerii Zaluzhni with Oleksandr Syrsky as the head of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Additionally, survey data shows that Ukrainians do not trust a significant portion of the political class; most of these politicians have a negative trust/distrust balance, and this balance continues to worsen for all of them. When asked, 'Do you see any existing political forces that could be trusted with power in the post-war period?' 54% respond negatively, while exactly half as many (27%) respond positively. Last summer, the figures were 41% against 39%.
Ukraine is fatigued with the government, incumbent politicians, and the enforced absence of elections. This stagnation is likely contributing to partial political demobilisation, but without new triggers, it is unlikely to cause a political crisis. At the same time, 47% of respondents believe that a new political force, one worthy of trust, is most likely to emerge from among the military.
At the same time, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), President Zelensky’s approval rating has stabilised at around 60% over the past six months (following a prolonged decline from its peak of 90% in May 2022). According to the Razumkov Centre, he share of those who trust Zelensky as a politician was 51% in September 2024, down from 70% at the start of the year, while the share of those who do not trust him rose from 24% to 42%.
There may not be a significant contradiction in this data. The ongoing decline in trust in Zelensky as a politician coexists with the perception of his crucial role in securing international support for Ukraine. Zelensky’s active foreign policy sustains his presidential approval ratings, while questions of 'trust' bring respondents' focus back to domestic issues, leading to lower evaluations of him.
The experts from KIIS note that those who trust Zelensky more are also likely to believe that the West wants a just peace for Ukraine. Currently, 54% share this belief, while 38% think the West is tired of the war and ready to accept an unjust peace for Ukraine simply to end the conflict. Among the first group, 69% trust Zelensky, compared to 29% who do not. In the second group – those disillusioned with the West and suspicious of a potential betrayal of Ukraine – 50% trust Zelensky, while 48% do not. Thus, two factions are emerging within Ukrainian society: one consisting of 18% who expect Western betrayal and do not trust Zelensky, and another, comprising 37%, who rely on Western support and see Zelensky as the key intermediary capable of ensuring its continuation.
This analysis leads to an important political conclusion. Should the West push Ukraine towards a truce on unfavourable terms, trust in Zelensky within the country would collapse, sparking a political crisis. Consequently, both Ukraine's and the West’s negotiating positions could deteriorate further.
According to the Razumkov Center, as of September 2024, Ukrainian respondents remained fairly uncompromising about territorial concessions, though less so than before. In 2022-2023, an average of 50% considered the liberation of all Ukrainian territory up to internationally recognised borders a necessary condition for victory, with an additional 24% demanding a significant defeat of the Russian military and a major crisis in Russia. Only 4% supported freezing the conflict along the current front line, 7% were open to reverting to pre-February 2022 borders, and 8% were willing to cede Crimea. Now, the share of those unwilling to make any territorial concessions has fallen to 56%, while the share willing to freeze the conflict has risen to 8%, and those open to returning to February 2022 borders have increased to 17%. Another 8% are willing to cede Crimea.
A more detailed KIIS survey on the conditions of peace, which we previously analysed (→ Re:Russia: Space for Compromise and The Nature of Intransigence), suggests that around half of respondents are willing to accept a 'Territories in exchange for security' scenario. In this case, the conflict would be frozen along the current front line, with Ukraine de facto acknowledging the temporary loss of territories but gaining NATO membership as a future security guarantee. However, the idea of 'security guarantees' without NATO membership does not convince most Ukrainians, as they doubt the West would honour such promises and believe that, under these conditions, Putin would attack Ukraine again.
Therefore, while the 'rally around the flag' effect is fading and disillusionment with current politicians is on the rise, Ukraine's will to resist remains strong. Yet, the space for negotiation appears quite limited, and Zelensky’s fate remains closely tied to the question of continued Western support. Importantly, while respondents express varying degrees of trust in Zelensky's team and the government regarding managing the current situation, they generally do not see them as capable of addressing the challenges of post-war recovery and reform.