‘Shame will be severe, weakness will be exposed’: Can the West provide an effective peacekeeping mission in Ukraine?

Donald Trump’s refusal to even discuss Ukraine’s accession to NATO was a concession to President Putin and significantly narrowed the Western coalition’s options for securing Ukraine’s safety in negotiations with Moscow. A ceasefire will only serve as a temporary pause in the war unless certain factors effectively limit the Kremlin’s aggression, most analysts and commentators believe. Security guarantees are also crucial for another reason: without them, private foreign investment in Ukraine’s economy is unlikely to be significant or long-term. This would perpetuate the weakness of Ukraine’s economy and state, making the country’s accession to the EU unrealistic in the foreseeable future

With NATO membership off the table, a peacekeeping contingent remains virtually the only discussed scenario – one that President Trump himself insists on. But how realistic is it? Is Europe ready for it, and what conditions are necessary for its implementation?

The first round of discussions on peacekeepers took place in early December 2024. According to Le Monde, Emmanuel Macron held talks in Warsaw with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk following his meeting with Trump and Zelensky in Paris. After the negotiations, Tusk stated that Poland was 'not currently planning any such actions.' German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also said in early December that there was nothing to discuss until hostilities ended. However, both Germany’s foreign and defence ministers acknowledged that discussions were underway, with the latter emphasising that they were taking place in strict confidentiality. In mid-January, The Telegraph reported that British Prime Minister Keir Starmer had also discussed the issue with the French president. However, according to sources, Starmer has yet to fully endorse Macron’s initiative, and during his visit to Kyiv, he limited himself to rather vague statements that neither rejected nor clarified the proposal. Finally, the Financial Times reported that Starmer and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte would discuss the idea of deploying peacekeepers and possible details of the plan in an informal meeting on Monday 3 February.

Yet, even if European allies agree to establish a mission, that alone means little. Key questions remain: the mission’s mandate, its size and armament, its composition and command structure, and the response plan in case of ceasefire violations. Without clear answers, the mission risks becoming little more than a temporary political cover for Ukraine’s continued vulnerability.

At the Davos Forum, Zelensky stated that a peacekeeping contingent of at least 200,000 troops is necessary – and even more if any agreements with the Kremlin impose limits on Ukraine’s military size. However, these estimates clash with Western capabilities. Currently, France, the main proponent of the peacekeeping idea, has just over 200,000 troops, while the UK and Germany each have about 180,000. Deploying peacekeepers to Ukraine would, in effect, require sending the equivalent of one of these entire armies. A more realistic figure, according to Western military planners, is between 40,000 and 50,000 troops – an estimate aligned with the views of Ukrainian officials interviewed by the Financial Times, who believe such a force could feasibly cover the 1,000-km front line.

The 40,000-troop estimate is also supported by military experts such as Elie Tenenbaum in Le Monde and Camille Grand, a former senior NATO official now with the European Council on Foreign Relations. According to Grand, peacekeeping forces should be formed within a special coalition led by the UK, France, and the Netherlands, with the participation of the Baltic and Nordic countries. He emphasises that NATO’s role should be deliberately minimised to reduce the risk of escalation with Russia.

At the same time, military analyst Alexander Golts argues that given Ukraine’s vast territory and the length of the front line, ensuring security would require closer to 150,000–180,000 troops. Preparing for a peacekeeping operation in Ukraine will be Europe’s first test of its ability to defend itself, Golts says. Such an operation would require massive changes in European military organisation. While it would be easier to achieve within NATO – given the logistical, air, and intelligence support from the US – if Washington insists on staying out, the question of forming a de facto European army will inevitably arise. This would involve unified military command structures within the EU and UK, as well as mechanisms for reinforcing and supporting the deployed contingent in case of crisis.

Most analysts, however, doubt that a fully operational European army could be created anytime soon. As a result, they stress the necessity of NATO and US involvement in the peacekeeping mission’s architecture. The US must participate at least by providing security guarantees in case the mission’s legitimacy is challenged by Russia, argues Justyna Gotkowska, deputy director of the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). If operating under NATO is not an option, the US should at least offer strategic assistance and ensure some troop presence on the ground. Additionally, since the mission would divert a significant number of European troops, Washington may need to reorganise its 35,000-strong force currently stationed in Germany and redeploy units closer to NATO’s eastern borders.

However, the most realistic perspective on a peacekeeping mission acknowledges the necessity of a US military presence – not only as a deterrent but also based on past peacekeeping experience, such as in South Korea. A group of security experts (mostly from the RAND corporation) argue that a weak mission would fail to resolve the crisis and could itself become a trigger for further conflict. In 1995, for example, poorly equipped Dutch peacekeepers failed to prevent the Srebrenica massacre. To serve as an effective deterrent, the mission must include a substantial force – preferably with American participation – and a strong reserve of heavy equipment positioned near Ukraine’s borders, ready to be deployed in case of escalation.

William Hague, former British foreign secretary in David Cameron's government, has expressed similar thoughts in The Times. He argues that a realistic deterrence plan might resemble the Korean scenario of 1953: a cessation of hostilities along an agreed line and the deployment of a sufficient contingent along it (that said, Hague reminds us thatKorean cease-fire negotiations dragged on for a full two years). The success of that mission ultimately rested on the unwavering US commitment to defending South Korea and maintaining that stance for decades. At present, European countries lack the capacity to contain a war on their own continent without substantial US support. Their armies are too small and too poorly equipped to serve as an effective deterrent. In this context, any attempt to form a European-led peacekeeping mission would only expose Europe’s weakness and inability to defend itself. 'The disgrace will be severe, the weakness will be revealed,' the former minister writes. Ultimately, failure would await not just Europe, but the United States as well.

Beyond the logistical and financial challenges Europe would face in organising such a mission, it would also have to contend with two additional constraints: the Kremlin’s stance – Moscow would push for an inherently weak mission – and European public opinion, which remains divided on the issue. Currently, 40% of Americans support deploying US peacekeepers to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire (35% oppose, 25% are undecided), according to a January YouGov poll. Among British respondents, 58% approve of sending UK troops as peacekeepers (21% oppose, 21% undecided). In Germany, 56% support the idea of sending peacekeepers in principle (19% oppose, 25% undecided), but only 23% would like to see German soldiers in their ranks (with 33% opposed).

As before, European attitudes toward the issue are shaped by two conflicting impulses: on one hand, the desire to secure Ukraine’s sovereignty, ensure its survival, and contain Russian aggression; on the other, the urge to find a way to end the war without a total loss of face, thereby reducing tensions with Russia. Any attempt at a compromise between these two approaches risks becoming mere posturing – leading to even greater reputational and political damage for the West as a whole.