A Not-So-Harmonious Choir of Loyalists: Why and on what issue Russians disagree with Putin

The topic of public opinion surveys in today’s Russia has to a large extent slipped out of the focus of the media, and even of analysts and experts. The exceptional stability of key indicators, such as the level of support for the authorities, assessments of the state of affairs in the country, or approval of military actions in Ukraine, creates the impression that the data are irrelevant. If a thermometer constantly shows the same temperature, it means either the thermometer is broken or the patient is dead.

Polls only occasionally respond to events that disrupt the worldview constructed by official discourse – mobilisation, Prigozhin’s mutiny, the incursion of Ukrainian troops into the Kursk region – but even in these cases, the 'disturbance' is fully calmed within a month or two. Overall, the question of how meaningful polls are and how they function under conditions of strict censorship and a repressive environment is periodically discussed by specialists and the public.

Vladimir Putin's approval rating, according to FOM

Source: FOM website

‘Loyalty’ to the official discourse remains the principal characteristic of the public opinion landscape that can be seen in the poll data. It is quite likely that this loyalty is overstated, as disloyal respondents are more inclined to refuse participation in polls (→ Re:Russia: Pro-War Spring). At the same time, a comparison of answer distributions across different questions among those who agree to take part in interviews, including indirect questions that are not perceived by respondents as a ‘loyalty test’, reveals gaps and inconsistencies in their understanding of events and in their attitudes towards the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Successful but endless

The latest survey by the Russian Field project, conducted between 19 and 27 June using telephone interviews (CATI), records several shifts and paradoxes in attitudes towards the war. Compared with February 2025, the share of those who believe that military operations are developing successfully for the Russian army has risen from 61% to 67%; however, the share of those who consider them unsuccessful has remained unchanged since February, at 23%. Around a quarter of respondents maintain a persistently sceptical attitude towards the actions and capabilities of the Russian military. A similar picture was observed last year: at the early stage of the offensive, the share of those who regarded the army’s actions as successful rose (from 56% in February 2024 to 69% in June), but by November the indicator had rolled back. For now, however, reports from the Ministry of Defence about the capture of new Ukrainian villages ‘work’, although, as the survey shows, they resonate far more with consumers of traditional media content, people over 60, and those without higher education – among YouTube audiences, the ratio of ‘success’ to ‘lack of success’ stands at 50 to 40%.

Yet the perception of most respondents regarding the success of the Russian offensive appears in a different light when considered alongside answers to the next question: only 24% of respondents believe that the ‘military operation’ will end this year, while 67% doubt it. It is likely that those who consider the Russian army’s actions unsuccessful hold the latter view, but this means that around 40% of respondents call the offensive successful yet do not believe that these successes will lead Russia to ‘victory’. Here, trust in the official line appears limited or divided. This picture gains additional nuance from the fact that, in February, 49% believed the war would end within the year, i.e. twice as many. To some extent, this may be explained by the optimism of the ‘New Year effect’ or the ‘Trump factor’, as he promised to end the war in a single day. Nevertheless, hopes for the war’s end appear only weakly connected, in respondents’ minds, with the success of Russian troops.

In the latest survey, the share of those who believe that Russia should now move to peace talks rather than continue military operations has grown slightly (by 5 percentage points) to 50%. However, over the long term, Russian Field surveys since autumn 2023 show that the share of supporters of peace negotiations hovers around this level, while around 40% believe that the fighting should continue. This picture differs somewhat from the data of the Levada Centre (conducted using face-to-face interviews): since the start of 2025, its polls indicate that around 60% of respondents support peace talks, while around 30% favour continuing military action.

At first glance, the wording of the questions asked by Russian Field and the Levada Centre differs only minimally: ‘Should Russia continue military action in Ukraine or move towards peace talks?’ (Russian Field), ‘Should military action continue or should peace talks begin?’ (Levada Centre). However, the first wording introduces a certain mobilisation undertone, appealing to state necessity and long-term national interests (continue, even if one might wish to stop), whereas the second appeals more directly to the respondent’s own opinion and sounds less prescriptive. This shift in modality may account for the difference in distribution.

Partial demobilisation

This interpretation is supported by the balance of answers to the next question: 82% of respondents would support a decision by Vladimir Putin to halt the ‘military operation’ and sign a peace agreement, and only 12% would oppose it. In other words, if Putin decided to sign an agreement, the perceived ‘necessity to continue’ the war would vanish. As a result, the group of those who genuinely believe it necessary to achieve a complete victory over Ukraine comprises only 12%, while around 30% of ‘loyalists’ are prepared to see the war as a state necessity for as long as Putin does.

Meanwhile, the group of those who would disagree with Putin’s decision to end the war immediately, i.e. the group of its most convinced supporters (the mobilisation party), continues to shrink. In mid-2022, the share of those unwilling to accept a peace decision by Putin in Russian Field surveys was 27–28%; from late 2022 to late 2023 it was 20%; in 2024–early 2025 it fell to 16%. Thus, the group of die-hard supporters of the war, who consider the complete achievement of its officially stated goals essential, has been steadily contracting (see also → Re:Russia: Three Parties and a Swing Group). This indicates a gradual weakening of mobilisation sentiment and a narrowing of the base of radical supporters of continuing the war.

Another sign of demobilisation is the significant decline in the share of Levada Centre respondents ready to justify Russia’s use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine: from 39% in November 2024 to 24% in June 2025. Interestingly, the view that the use of nuclear weapons 'definitely cannot be justified' is now expressed by twice as many respondents: 42% compared with 21% in November 2024. Such significant shifts in responses to this question (see chart) are evidently a reaction to the propagandist ‘normalisation’ of nuclear conflict in Kremlin-controlled media and the ‘online discourse’ of late last year. The data show that the Kremlin did succeed in significantly shifting the threshold of unacceptability for the use of nuclear weapons, but, for now, propaganda has ‘shelved’ this topic.

'Do you think Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in the current conflict in Ukraine can or cannot be justified?' 2023–2025, % of those surveyed

At the same time, respondents’ expectations regarding the likelihood of a direct conflict between Russia and NATO remain high, according to data from the Levada Centre. This topic was brought to the forefront by propaganda in the summer of last year, and since then, the share of those who consider such a conflict probable has remained at 57%.

Russians are against Putin, but aligned with propaganda

Turning to scenarios for ending the war, it is worth noting that 58% of Russian Field respondents support an immediate ceasefire without any preconditions, compared with 33% who do not (this figure has remained stable: 60% versus 30% in November 2024, and 56% versus 36% in February 2025). The age gap here is particularly pronounced: among younger respondents (aged 18–29) support stands at 69%, while among those aged 60+ it is only 50%. It was precisely an immediate ceasefire without preconditions, as a first step towards negotiations, that the Western coalition and the Ukrainian leadership insisted upon in April–May, but this scenario was firmly rejected by Putin. One may assume that, had his position been mentioned and explained within the structure of the question, the responses would have been more loyal. However, as the official narrative largely concealed from the public the essence of the May debate over the negotiation scenario, and since the ‘loyalists’ lack the ‘correct’ answer from Russian propaganda, it has emerged that a solid majority of Russians support the position of the Western coalition and Volodymyr Zelensky, diverging from Putin in their views on how the war should be brought to an end. More detailed questions regarding the conditions for ending the war in the Russian Field survey (as well as similar attempts at nuance in other polls) produce a blurred and uninformative picture: respondents do not fully grasp the subtleties of modalities (preferred conditions versus mandatory conditions) or the consequences of choosing one option over another.

Meanwhile, Russian propaganda has succeeded in promoting the notion that it is Russia which is seeking peace. When asked which side is currently more interested in a peace agreement, 60% of respondents name Russia, while only 24% point to Ukraine. Interestingly, as recently as February of this year (as well as in February of last year), Russians attributed a low interest in peace to both sides. Such a significant change in this distribution should also, in all likelihood, be interpreted as the effect of propaganda. This is indicated, in particular, by the fact that it was most strongly felt by older people (Figure 2), who shifted their assessments more radically (by 12 points among the youngest and by 28 points among those aged 60+). Thus, propaganda has managed not only to conceal from citizens that Putin rejected what they perceive as a reasonable scenario of an immediate ceasefire, but also to convince them that it is he who is striving to end the conflict, while Zelensky and the European countries are standing in the way. Accordingly, 73% of respondents stated that Russia had sought to conclude a peace agreement in Istanbul, while 81% said that the Ukrainian side had shown no desire for peace.

‘In your opinion, who is currently more interested in peace talks – Russia or Ukraine?’, February–July 2025, % of those surveyed, share answering ‘Russia’

The expectation that the war will end, but only with the consent of the Russian authorities, the low confidence in the ability of the Russian army to achieve victory, the continued shrinking of the camp of consistent war supporters, and the general partial demobilisation of public opinion, coupled with a tendency among those participating in interviews to give the ‘correct’ answers and the actual divergence of the majority’s views from Putin’s on the key issue of an immediate halt to hostilities. These are, perhaps, the defining features of Russian public opinion as it appears to us today, in mid-summer 2025, reflected in the polls.

A significant bloc of ‘loyalists,’ willing to shift their stance in line with the ‘propaganda line,’ is a defining characteristic of this picture. Yet the question remains open as to what extent this is a reflection of ingrained loyalty, and to what extent it represents a distortion of the very instrument of mass surveys within a repressive environment.