The Fog of Victory: The tactical success of the US and Israel in the Iran war does not guarantee strategic success

War of attrition in the air

Despite the impressive results of the first few days, the outcome of the Israeli and US operation in Iran remains far from certain, as is its duration. A CNN headline captures the current situation succinctly as ‘tactical success, strategic uncertainty’.

The US operation deployed two carrier strike groups, led by the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford, each carrying 60-90 combat aircraft and helicopters. The total American deployment, including around 40,000 personnel permanently stationed across eight bases in the Middle East, may reach 70,000–80,000. This is much more than during the twelve-day war in June 2025, The Financial Times notes, but significantly less than in 2003, when Washington prepared for the Iraq operation, deploying five carrier strike groups and around 170,000 personnel. These comparisons highlight the main difference between the current war and previous ones: the strategy assumes success without a large-scale ground operation. However, if the ‘crushing wave of strikes’ does not work, Trump has still not ruled out sending ground troops, though the amassed forces may prove insufficient for such an operation.

The balance of forces and results in the air campaign are far from clear-cut. The conflict’s dynamics indicate that Iran has learnt lessons from the twelve-day war and is seeking to impose a war of attrition in the air on the US, according to experts at The Financial Times. Tehran is conducting a more measured campaign, employing missiles and drones to wear down Israel’s air defences (a technique refined by Russia in its strikes on Ukraine), while carrying out intensive attacks on US allies in the Gulf and targeting both civilian infrastructure and American military bases. Iran has launched 25 waves of missile and drone strikes against targets in Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq. Analysts believe this is far from the end: as in last year’s war, Iran appears to be using its least advanced missiles initially, aiming to deplete American and Israeli interceptors while reserving more capable systems for later stages to maximise their effect.

According to Joel Rayburn, an expert on the Iraq war and US special envoy to Syria from 2018 to 2021, after last year’s war with Israel, Tehran had around 95 medium-range missile launchers, but it has likely increased the total to 200–260. The most significant threat comes from Iran’s arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles, capable of striking US bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, as well as targets in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has probably stockpiled thousands of such missiles and maintains around 100 launchers. Once the US and Israel locate and neutralise these 300–360 launchers and suppress Iran’s air defences, Washington will be able to strike remaining targets, including fixed nuclear sites. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) believes that roughly 300 launchers have already been destroyed, reducing the intensity of Iranian attacks on Israel by 70%.

The most alarming development was a closed-door briefing by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine to members of Congress on the evening of 3 March. Hegseth acknowledged that air defences cannot cope with the large number of Shahed drones, which fly at low altitudes and at low speeds (the content of the briefing was reported by CNN). Members of Congress present at the briefing expressed serious concern about the evolving situation.

Moreover, according to Politico, Caine had already raised concerns in January about whether the US possessed sufficient surface-to-air missile systems. Six current and former US officials and members of Congress interviewed by the publication noted that prolonged Iranian strikes could deplete American air defences, leaving tens of thousands of US personnel in the region vulnerable. According to estimates by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), during the twelve-day war, the US expended around 20% of its SM-3 interceptor stock and between 20% and 50% of THAAD interceptors.

The US is also facing a shortage of sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM), heavily used by the Pentagon over the past year against Iran, the Houthis, and in operations in Nigeria, notes The Wall Street Journal. At the same time, the publication's sources suggest that this stock will be critical in a potential conflict with China. Meanwhile, another participant in the war with Iran, Israel, has encountered shortages of Arrow 3 anti-missile interceptors and air-launched ballistic missiles. Despite Trump's bravado and repeated assertions in recent days that the American arsenal is inexhaustible, his meeting with major American arms manufacturers scheduled for 6 March indicates that the situation is far from rosy.

In general, it can be said that at the tactical level, the American-Israeli coalition is facing problems that are already familiar from the experience of the Russia-Ukraine war. The key issue is the asymmetry between offensive and defensive systems. Producing missiles and drones for combined attacks is far cheaper and easier than producing air defence interceptors. As a result, once defensive stocks are depleted, Iranian missile breakthroughs, even if they cause less damage than Iran itself suffers from coalition strikes, could nevertheless exceed the threshold of acceptable losses from the perspective of the US, Israel, and their populations. Hegseth acknowledged that the risk of higher-than-expected casualties among American servicemen is significant.

The fog of victory: ground operation, negotiations or regime change

Donald Trump has outlined four main objectives of the operation in Iran: the destruction of Iran’s missile capabilities and missile production facilities, preventing Tehran from developing a nuclear bomb, the defeat of the country’s navy, and depriving Tehran of the ability to sponsor its proxy organisations abroad. However, the means of achieving these objectives remain unclear.

Even the fulfilment of the primary task, neutralising Iran’s nuclear potential, may prove unattainable without a ground operation, according to experts. Although strikes carried out for this purpose during the twelve-day war inflicted significant damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they did not halt the programme entirely. As Bloomberg noted after analysing satellite imagery, key Iranian nuclear facilities such as the research complex in Isfahan and the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz continued to function and were even further reinforced in preparation for a possible US attack. Several tunnel entrances near the nuclear complex in Isfahan were covered with earth to prevent collapse in the event of air strikes.

According to Middle East security expert Nima Gerami, at the start of the new conflict Iran still possessed at least 440 kg of enriched uranium, enough to produce up to ten nuclear warheads. Iran has also retained the human capital necessary to continue its nuclear programme.

Most likely, the US will attempt through an intensive campaign to force a compromise with the Iranian authorities or to bring about regime change in favour of a more compliant leadership. However, for authoritarian rulers, concessions may appear a worse option than continuing a hopeless resistance. In 1991 Saddam Hussein acknowledged that the Iraqi army could not match the military resources of the US-led coalition, write Middle East experts Tanya Goudsouzian and Ibrahim al-Marashi in War on the Rocks. Nevertheless, he chose to continue fighting, calculating that even limited American casualties and war fatigue within US society might allow him to achieve a more favourable outcome.

Atlantic Council Middle East expert C. Anthony Pfaff identifies two possible scenarios for the continuation of the conflict with Iran: a prolonged asymmetric war or de-escalation similar to what has occurred in previous crises. The likelihood of a protracted war is lower because neither side would ultimately be able to force sufficient concessions from the other. As a result, it is more likely that at some point the US and Iran will move towards de-escalation. For now, however, the parties remain on opposite trajectories. Israel and the US are expanding the scale of their strikes, while the Iranian authorities are widening their geographical scope, targeting civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states. As we noted previously, a key element of Tehran’s strategy is to destabilise energy supplies, which would impose significant political costs on Donald Trump and push him back towards negotiations (→ Re:Russia: Temporary Beneficiary).

The desire to avoid a large-scale ground operation has led the US–Israeli coalition to rely on the prospect of collapse and regime change. Trump’s calls on the Kurdish minority to intensify armed resistance are directed towards this goal. However, many experts remain sceptical about such a scenario. Although the regime has been severely weakened by the demonstration of its military vulnerability and the exposure of its leaders, the conditions for a coordinated overthrow are not present. Such an outcome would require substantial material assistance, coordination with the Iranian political opposition, and carefully developed plans for the post-regime period. Yet there is little indication that the Trump administration possesses such detailed scenarios, writes Kelly Shannon of the Institute for Near East Policy at George Washington University. Similarly, former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro shares this view in a survey of experts by the Atlantic Council.

Middle East expert Dokhi Fassihian notes that even a successful military operation in Iran may fail to produce the political changes Washington seeks.The country's political system is a complex combination of unelected authority with features of a religious dictatorship and functioning institutions of electoral democracy, and is deeply embedded in a network of social interests and relationships. For a successful regime change, there needs to be mass desertion from the Iranian army, according to Michael Eisenstadt, director of the military studies programme at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). This appears unlikely so long as discipline and cohesion are maintained within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its leadership, effectively a military junta that has often demonstrated even more radical political views than the clerical establishment. The coalition has been carrying out targeted strikes against IRGC headquarters and infrastructure, experts note, but whether this will be sufficient to disrupt its functioning remains uncertain. Jonathan Panikoff, former deputy national intelligence officer for the Middle East, also believes that the regime is likely to transform into a military junta if the IRGC structures remain intact. In the current circumstances, a new supreme religious leader would be unlikely to consolidate power quickly, whereas the IRGC’s military forces and security apparatus represent the main pillar of the regime. 

A Nima Gerami is convinced that even regime change would most likely fail to halt Iran’s nuclear programme. The programme was initiated under the Iranian shah in the 1970s with US support, and a change in political leadership would not eliminate Iran’s nuclear material stockpiles, technical capabilities, or the strategic conditions that make the programme attractive to Tehran.

However, even a military junta may not find it easy to retain power in the midst of economic collapse, points out Hagar Chemali, a former adviser to the US National Security Council, in an Atlantic Council survey. The Iranian economy was close to such a state even before the bombing began, and economic collapse would have critical consequences for the regime, despite its high level of repression.

At the same time, a protracted conflict, the survival of the regime combined with a return to negotiations that Trump might be forced to accept in the face of the prospect of a lengthy ground war, or any other uncertain outcome would all be seen as the failure of a second military operation intended to resolve the ‘Iranian problem’ once and for all and as evidence of the Iranian regime's ability to resist for a long time. For the implications of an inconclusive war and the survival of the regime for Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations, see our article Where The Tracks Cross.