The Crisis Roaming Europe: A new phase of democratic backsliding is gripping developed countries with long-standing democratic traditions

Twenty years of regression

The global regression of democracy continues, according to the three most well-known democracy indices: the American non-governmental organisation Freedom House, the international research project Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), and the Economist Intelligence Unit, the analytical division of The Economist Group, which publishes the magazine of the same name.

Freedom House, the longest-running global index of freedom, has recorded a deterioration in the state of democracy for the 19th year in a row. In 2006, for the first time in a long period, the number of countries where democratic conditions worsened (59) exceeded those where they improved (56). Since then, this negative balance has persisted every year. Previously, from 1975 to 2000 (as shown in Figure 1) the world experienced the third and fourth waves of democratisation. During that time, the share of 'not free' countries fell from 45% to 25%, while the proportion of 'free' countries increased by the same margin. However, since 2006, the share of 'free' countries has reverted to levels seen in the late 1990s, and the share of 'not free' countries has regressed to levels last seen in the late 1980s.

Figure 1. Proportions of free, partly free and unfree countries, 1972-2024

The V-Dem international research project, which uses multidimensional indices (primarily based on expert surveys), has been documenting democratic decline for a full 25 years. Among the three major indices, it presents the bleakest picture: in 2024, the number of autocracies worldwide (91) exceeded the number of democracies (88) for the first time in over two decades. Last year's V-Dem report noted deteriorating political conditions in 42 countries; this year‘s report identifies similar backsliding in 45. At the same time, 19 countries in 2024 showed signs of democratisation.Finally, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (EDI) shows a steady decline in global democratic standards since the mid-2010s (the index has been published since 2006). However, its assessment of the extent of degradation is somewhat more restrained.

Each of the three projects focuses on different aspects of democracy and uses distinct typologies of political regimes. Unlike the multidimensional V-Dem, Freedom House evaluates the quality of regimes based on two main categories: political rights and civil liberties (each assessed using a set of 25 indicators). The other two indices aim to measure the quality of democratic institutions and various aspects of political culture – a methodology aligned with the so-called 'broad' definition of democracy.

If we summarise the picture across all three indices, roughly 43% of the world’s countries can be classified today as generally democratic. This includes flawed or incomplete democracies, as categorised by V-Dem and EDI, all of which are grouped as 'free' in Freedom House’s classification in terms of political and civil rights, even if their institutions fall short of high standards. Conversely, Freedom House categorises 30% of countries as 'not free,' while V-Dem classifies regimes in 20% of countries as 'closed', meaning elections are either not held or are purely ceremonial. Russia, for instance, has been classified as 'not free' since 2005 but has not yet reached the level of a fully 'closed' regime. Belarus, on the other hand, has been considered 'not free' since 1997 and, as of 2024, is categorised as a 'closed' regime. Between these two poles lies a 'grey zone' — a range of hybrid or transitional regimes that fall somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. All three democracy-monitoring initiatives agree: in 2024, the number of countries experiencing democratic backsliding was approximately double the number showing improvement.

Regime types and the balance of change, 2024

According to the V-Dem project, the democratic recession is progressing along two distinct tracks. First, liberal democracies are devolving into electoral democracies. These two regime types differ mainly in terms of legal certainty: in liberal democracies, high standards of electoral competition coexist with the rule of law; in electoral democracies, although political competition exists, the legal framework is vulnerable to distortion and corruption. The Economist Intelligence Unit captures this distinction by differentiating between 'full' and 'flawed' democracies.

According to V-Dem's assessment, four countries dropped out of the 'top tier' of liberal democracies (the UK, South Korea, Bhutan, and Suriname), while two countries – Jamaica and South Africa – joined it. Meanwhile, three nations (Indonesia, Mongolia, and Georgia) moved from flawed electoral democracies to electoral autocracies. On the EDI scale, France and South Korea lost their 'full democracy' status (defined as a score of 8 out of 10 or higher), while the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Portugal moved up into that category. Despite the positive overall balance of changes, the departure of long-established democracies from the top tier is notable.

The second track of democratic regression involves the entrenchment and intensification of authoritarian regimes. According to V-Dem, in 2019 the ratio of electoral autocracies to closed autocracies was 67 to 25. By 2024, it had shifted to 56 to 35. New entries to the 'closed regime' category last year included Gabon, Lebanon, Niger, and Belarus, all previously considered electoral autocracies. Belarus became Europe’s first closed autocracy in 25 years.

This dual-track effect is clearly visible in Figure 1. Since the late 2010s, not only has the share of 'free' countries (as defined by Freedom House) decreased, but the number of 'not free' countries has also overtaken the number of 'partly free' ones. Unlike in the 1990s and 2000s, 'partly free' regimes are now more likely to slide into authoritarianism than to progress toward democracy, and softer forms of autocracy are evolving into harsher ones.

Unfree speech and the normalisation of violence

A key indicator of global democratic decline is the sharp deterioration of freedom of expression, as shown in all three democracy indices. According to V-Dem, in 2024, freedom of speech declined in 44 countries – up from 35 in 2023. Among all civil liberties tracked by Freedom House, freedom of expression has suffered the steepest decline over the past 19 years. The number of countries and territories scoring 0 out of 4 for media freedom, meaning independent media can barely function, has nearly tripled in two decades, rising from 13 to 34. In the past year alone, attacks on the media, including censorship, arrests, imprisonment of journalists, physical intimidation, and legal pressures were documented in more than 120 countries and territories.

There are several indicators that signal different stages of de-democratisation. Attacks on free expression and partial restrictions on speech typically mark the first track of democratic backsliding: the deterioration of democratic countries. The decline in media freedom is often a leading indicator, typically followed by increased pressure on civil and political organisations, erosion of electoral procedures, and the rise of political repression. A clear example of this progression is Georgia, where a law on 'foreign agents' was followed by elections the opposition considered manipulated.

The second stage – the consolidation of authoritarianism into full dictatorship – is marked by harsh repression, including against members of the judiciary. Over the last 10 years, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers have been jailed, detained, or charged on political grounds in 78 countries. In 2024, the most egregious cases were reported in Russia and Belarus. In Russia, criminal cases were initiated against lawyers who defended opposition leader Alexei Navalny and journalist Ivan Safronov. In Belarus, lawyers representing political prisoners were themselves imprisoned and charged with 'extremism.' Persecution of justice system professionals marks the point where regimes dismantle the last remaining barriers to unchecked political repression.

The autocratisation process is increasingly accompanied by a surge in violence. Wars and conflicts foster environments and norms that undermine democracy and fundamental human rights. In 2024, Freedom House reported that in 41 countries and territories, residents scored between 0 and 4 for physical safety, meaning they are effectively unprotected by law or the state. In 2005, that number stood at just 25. Non-state armed actors – militias, terrorists, criminal organisations, and mercenaries – are playing an increasingly prominent role in this violence, though states themselves often engage in extralegal violence, including beatings, torture, and excessive force against protesters.

Rising political violence was a hallmark of the 2024 'super election year,' during which more than half the world’s population went to the polls (→ Re:Russia: Ambivalent Supercycle). According to V-Dem, nearly a quarter of the 61 electoral campaigns saw spikes in violence. In Mexico, the election season resembled a mafia war: 37 candidates were murdered. In Slovakia, the prime minister was shot; in the US, a presidential candidate was also targeted. Using a broader definition of election-related violence, Freedom House notes that in over 40% of countries and territories holding national elections in 2024, candidates faced assassination attempts or attacks, polling stations were assaulted, and post-election protests were met with disproportionate force.

Elections in nine countries saw a decline in freedom and fairness during the 2024 electoral cycle. Political trajectories shifted post-election in 11 countries (20%), with seven of them moving in a negative direction. Still, as previously noted, the 2024 super election year was not a wholesale victory for autocratisation. In 11 countries, according to V-Dem, there was a surge in public mobilisation in defence of democracy – a sign of widespread societal resistance. Incumbents, that is, ruling leaders and parties, often suffered defeat. In Botswana and Sri Lanka, mass protests against unfair elections were successful; in Georgia and Venezuela, they were not. The latter case is especially telling in Georgia, which in 2003 launched the wave of colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space. In this election cycle, Georgian society was more divided, democratic ideals held less significance, and the authorities were better prepared to suppress protests.

A new phase of democratic recession

The deepening democratic backsliding in recent years has been driven by two interconnected trends in political culture, according to V-Dem: disinformation campaigns and increased societal polarisation. Disinformation campaigns have taken on a global character. Exposure to disinformation leads to echo chambers, a decline in social trust, increased polarisation, and ultimately, erosion of confidence in democratic institutions. In polarised contexts, victory for 'one’s own side' becomes more important than adherence to the shared rules of democratic competition – as seen in pivotal events such as Brexit or recent US elections.

In 2024, V-Dem experts recorded disinformation-fueled polarisation campaigns in 31 countries, 21 of which experienced a strengthening of authoritarian tendencies as a result (notably in Georgia, El Salvador, Hungary, and Serbia). More than half of the countries affected by this disinformation–polarisation nexus were democracies, with a third of them liberal democracies. In other words, such campaigns are impacting even countries with mature democratic institutions, triggering measurable democratic decline.

As mentioned above, a key feature of this new phase of democratic recession is the deterioration of democracy in countries once seen as its strongholds and models. In addition to France and South Korea, which lost their 'full democracy' status on the EDI index, the US, Belgium, and Italy had already fallen out of that category earlier. According to Freedom House, the last time the US received the highest score (1) for rights and freedoms was in 2016; it declined to 1.5 by 2020 and has remained at 2 since 2021. According to V-Dem, countries no longer classified as liberal democracies include Austria, Canada, Portugal, Greece, South Korea, and the United Kingdom

In the 2000s and 2010s, it was widely accepted that the stagnation, and eventual regression, of democracy globally stemmed from countries that had emerged from the so-called fourth wave of democratisation (post-Soviet, post-socialist, and many African nations) failing to capitalise on their opportunities and backsliding. However, from the second half of the 2010s onward, a clearer trend emerged: democratic quality was also declining in countries once seen as model transitions (like Hungary and Poland), as well as among the 'old democracies,' whose economic, political, and social success had once made the democratic model globally attractive.

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s latest report focuses extensively on this aspect of the democratic recession, that is the erosion of democracy in developed countries. Much of the debate on this topic revolves around the threat posed by populism and radical parties. However, only rarely is the issue discussed in terms of the erosion of the representative system itself. Meanwhile, as a number of studies, including a major report by a team of Cambridge 2020 researchers and a large Pew Research Centre survey in 2024, show that growing dissatisfaction with democracy is common both in semi-democratic and transitional countries and in long-established democracies. In fact, the most dramatic declines are now being observed in the latter group: in the 2020s, the share of citizens dissatisfied with how democracy works in 12 economically advanced countries rose from 53% to 64% over the past three years.

Figure 2. Dynamics of satisfaction with democracy in 12 advanced economies, 2017-2024, %

Satisfaction with democracy has declined particularly sharply in France, Canada, South Korea, and South Africa. The majority of respondents believe that elected leaders and parties do not represent them and are disconnected from the electorate. This sense of alienation is most acutely felt by voters with clearly defined ideological positions, both on the left and the right, and to a lesser extent by those with centrist leanings. This, in turn, forms fertile ground for polarisation. Another study found that nearly half of EU citizens consider the political system in their country to be fully or partially dysfunctional (→ Re:Russia: The Crisis of Democracy).

According to the EIU report, party systems in many democratic countries took shape in their current form roughly 75 years ago. Since then, they have become more professionalised and increasingly dependent on the state, from which they partially receive funding. Meanwhile, the old class-based political divide – with left-wing parties representing workers and right-wing parties representing business – has largely lost relevance and has been distorted. Within the parties themselves, technocrats and experts have gained significant influence, acting as a kind of filter that blocks popular demands from reaching party platforms. Advancement within party hierarchies is increasingly determined not by grassroots support, but by a small circle of party elites and big business, which provides candidates with media backing. The report notes that both US presidential contenders in 2024 bypassed much of the standard nomination process traditionally required to become their party’s official candidate.

The erosion of representative systems results in a dual effect. On one hand, a segment of voters – often the most educated, socially responsible, and centrist-minded – recognises the dysfunction and withdraws from political participation. On the other hand, another segment, which is often less educated and less rational, but more prone to actively projecting their discontent, becomes the base for radical parties and the spread of conspiracy theories. These theories provide a framework to rationalise their dissatisfaction with technocratic governance and the oligarchisation of democratic processes.

This analysis leads to several sobering conclusions. The crisis of democracy is not limited to the periphery, i.e. to countries with weak or non-existent democratic traditions, but has also overtaken the 'democratic core' of the world. The crisis has deep roots, and as such will likely require a restructuring of party systems, mechanisms of representation, and possibly a generational change among political leaders. Such profound shifts rarely occur gradually or smoothly, making it likely that sharp political crises and shocks lie ahead – even in advanced democracies with long-standing democratic traditions.