The Right of the Strong and its Weaknesses: Will Trump Succeed by Imitating Beijing's and Moscow's Strategies?

The post-war order: its defenders and opponents

Discussions about the collapse of the world order established after World War II have become almost commonplace since Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the subsequent wave of his shocking statements. Not long ago, it was widely believed that the challenge to international order came from Moscow and Beijing, while the Western coalition, led by the US, was closing ranks to defend it. However, there are significant disagreements over which order has ended and what exactly needs to be defended.

For example, the new US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, stated during his Senate confirmation hearings that the 'postwar world order is not just outdated but has now become a weapon used against us' – meaning against the US Conversely, former US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder and Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) executive James Lindsay open their article in Foreign Affairs by saying, ‘Pax Americana is gone. Born with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the US-led international rules-based order died with the second inauguration of Donald J. Trump.’

Meanwhile, Foreign Policy Editor-in-Chief Ravi Agrawal argues that the post-WWII order, which governed the world for seven decades, began to crumble even before Trump’s first term. The unprecedented rise of China and growing disillusionment with free trade and globalisation (which contributed to the deindustrialisation of developed countries) pushed the US toward protectionism and a focus on national interests at the expense of its declared values and norms. This shift had already manifested in the US invasion of Iraq, and Trump is merely completing the transition initiated by neoconservatives in the early 2000s.

A century backwards and on foreign ground

There is broad agreement, however, that Trump marks a return to power-driven politics. At its core is a revival of zero-sum logic, where there are only winners and losers, Agrawal writes. For authoritarian states, this approach is familiar and understandable, whereas smaller nations and US allies – whose value Trump openly questions – are likely to suffer under the new transactional and opportunistic system.

Trump’s scepticism toward supporting Ukraine and Taiwan, his tariff threats, and his desire to reclaim the Panama Canal or acquire Greenland make it clear that he does not merely view international relations through a transactional lens – he seeks to restore a world order based on the 'right of the strong' and the division of spheres of influence, Daalder and Lindsay argue. In essence, he is advocating a return to the 19th-century world order, where great powers carved up the globe to suit their dominance, regardless of the desires of smaller nations and peoples.

Indeed, if Trump can demand Greenland, why can’t Putin demand Ukraine? In some ways, the Kremlin’s claims even seem more justified. And by calling for the return of the Panama Canal, Trump is merely echoing Putin’s rhetoric regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

Andreas Kluth, a columnist for Bloomberg and former editor-in-chief of Handelsblatt Global, makes a strikingly similar argument. In the 20th century, during the Cold War, global relations were shaped by ideological conflict. That era has ended. Today, Putin, Xi Jinping, and Trump are all guided not by ideology, but by raw interests and the 'instinct to dominate.' In essence, this is the ideology of imperialism – the same worldview that prevailed in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when great powers competed not over ideas but over colonies, territories, and access to resources.

Trump’s praise for Putin and Xi Jinping suggests that he admires – or at the very least deeply respects—strong autocratic leaders, even those actively working to undermine US influence on the global stage. He is willing to negotiate spheres of influence with them, partly by reducing US involvement in longstanding military alliances, note Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. Like Putin and Xi, Trump believes economic power should be used as leverage to extract concessions. This mirrors Putin’s past use of Russian gas to secure the loyalty of post-Soviet states or intimidate Europe. Even if Trump’s threats are mere negotiation tactics, they signal a shift away from free trade and international cooperation as primary tools of influence – toward strategies based on threats, ultimatums, and coercion.

The architects of the postwar world order believed that high tariffs fuelled destructive economic nationalism and increased the risk of direct conflicts, while cooperation and free trade helped prevent them, Daalder and Lindsay point out. Despite its intensity, the ideological confrontation of the 20th century provided a stable global framework: the Cold War never turned hot, and tensions gradually eased, culminating in an era of disarmament. In contrast, the imperialist logic of territorial and resource competition led directly to the trenches of World War I, echoes Andreas Kluth.

However, a world order based on the 'law of the strong' may ultimately prove to be a disadvantageous playing field for the United States. The projection of brute force and the art of suppression are unfamiliar terrain for Washington – but all too familiar to Moscow and Beijing, warn Daalder and Lindsay. Unlike Putin and Xi, who face few internal constraints, Trump – who won 49.8% of the vote and secured victory by just 2.3 million ballots (1.5% of the electorate) – will be checked by domestic opposition and the US system of checks and balances. In a world ruled by raw power, the advantage lies with those who exert greater control over their populations. Autocrats who maintain dominance through repression and fear will naturally hold the upper hand.

Upside-down board

US dominance in the postwar order was built not only on military and economic might but also on a system of alliances in Europe and the Pacific (Japan and South Korea). In both cases, the US provided a security umbrella while fostering economic progress and democratic institutions among its partners. By treating rivals, allies, and neighbors alike with threats and coercion, Trump risks unraveling this ecosystem of alliances, argues Louis Simon, director of the Brussels-based Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (SSDS), in a commentary on the War on the Rocks website.

The power asymmetry within these alliances, which Trump often criticises as unfair, is not a weakness but rather a crucial advantage. Research shows that asymmetric alliances tend to be more cohesive, durable, and institutionalised than symmetric ones. What starts as a 'hub-and-spokes' model (where a key partner maintains ties with loosely connected states) eventually evolves into a networked defence system, deeply embedded with economic, political, and technological interdependencies based on trust, Simon and his co-authors argue in the Journal of Strategic Studies. This intricate system has been built over decades and is far removed from the vassal-like relationships of 'strong' and 'weak' states that dominate Trump’s worldview.

His archaic approach, fixated on displays of power, could ultimately weaken US efforts to forge new partnerships with nations in the Global South. Meanwhile, Beijing is employing the very strategy the US once used – through its Belt and Road Initiative, China first offers attractive economic deals, only later introducing discussions on mutual obligations as the relationship deepens. Rather than economic isolation, the US should pursue a strategy of re-globalization – not through broad agreements that merely lower trade and investment barriers, but through targeted partnerships in key regions of the Global South, argues another Foreign Affairs article.

Returning to the 'world of power politics' with such neophyte zeal, Trump is, in reality, abandoning the advantages of the very strategies that defined US success in the post-World War II era and stepping onto the path of America's opponents. Just hours after Trump’s eccentric inauguration, an event took place that Washington, caught up in the euphoria of victory, may not have fully appreciated. Putin and Xi Jinping held a meeting in an unusual videoconference format, footage of which was circulated the same day. In fact, they sent Trump an unequivocal signal of their unity and readiness to confront each other on their own turf.

Strikingly, in his brief two-minute speech, the Chinese president declared his commitment to defending the post-World War II order – but through a distinctly 'Eurasian' interpretation. 'This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Chinese people’s victory in the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the victory in the global anti-fascist war, as well as the 80th anniversary of the United Nations,' he stated. 'Together with our Russian colleagues, we will support a UN-centred international system, uphold the victory of World War II, won with the blood and lives of millions, and defend the rights of China and Russia as UN founding nations and permanent members of the Security Council.'

This legalistic rhetoric has the potential to serve as an attractive alternative to Trump’s erratic tariff threats and territorial ambitions. At the same time, it is backed by the combined economic and nuclear power of China and Russia – against which America does not possess the kind of advantage that Trump’s rally speeches so often imply.