People vs. Drones: Why are the Russian authorities increasing payments to contract soldiers and how does this affect Russians' attitude to war?

Contract race

Russian regions continue to rapidly increase the amount of one-time payments for signing a contract to fight in Ukraine. According to a report by Novaya Gazeta Europe, nine regions increased payments in June. This wave actually began as early as the end of May, with increases in regions including St Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, Karachay-Cherkessia, Khabarovsk Krai, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tatarstan, and Yaroslavl Oblast.

Karachay-Cherkessia currently offers the largest payment: in June it was increased to 1.305 million rubles (even though it had already been raised fourfold in April from 100,000 to 400,000 rubles). Thus, the total amount a new contract soldier in the republic receives is 1.5 million rubles. For reference, the base salary of a contract soldier in the war with Ukraine is now 210,000 rubles per month. Upon signing the contract, they receive a federal one-time payment of 195,000 rubles and a regional payment. They can also be supplemented by city (municipal) payments, which have become increasingly widespread since this spring: 305,000 rubles in Nizhny Novgorod and Maykop, 250,000 rubles in Krasnodar, 200,000 rubles in Kazan, 100,000 rubles in Makhachkala, and so on.

Following Karachay-Cherkessia in the list of most generous regions are St Petersburg, which also increased its payment for the second time this year to 1.3 million rubles in June (having raised it from 695,000 to 1.1 million rubles in March), the Republic of Adygea (1 million rubles), and Krasnodar Krai (1 million rubles). In total, a volunteer in Krasnodar Krai can receive up to 1.645 million rubles upon signing a contract, including 1 million rubles from the regional payment, 250,000 rubles from the Krasnodar administration, 195,000 rubles from the federal government, and an additional 200,000 rubles if they serve in the regional units. The top six regions for regional payments are rounded out by Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (805,000 rubles) and Moscow, which pays 50,000 rubles monthly, making the annual payment for a contract in the capital 600,000 rubles in addition to the federal payment of 195,000 rubles.

In April, we reported that payments had increased by 40% since the beginning of the year based on a limited sample of regions (→ Re:Russia: Counter Mobilisation). The most accurate and complete data on all regions as of the end of June was collected by the project ‘Govorit Nemoskva’. According to their data, in August 2023, regional payments were implemented in 52 regions and their average amount was 186,000 rubles. Thus, taking into account the federal payment, a recruit received an average one-time payment of 290,000 rubles (about $3,100). By mid-June 2024, the average regional payment in 77 regions increased to 290,000 rubles, and the final amount rose to 485,000 rubles (about $5,300). Therefore, payments have increased 1.7 times over the year.

The top six regions provide payments ranging from 800,000 to 1.5 million rubles ($9,000–$16,000). However, contracts can be signed in any region regardless of registration. Consequently, these top regions, in effect, draw volunteers from other regions like a vacuum. Due to this, some weaker regions bordering stronger ones do not participate in the payment competition: volunteers will go to neighbouring regions for contracts anyway. Following the top six are 16 regions with payments from 500,000 to 700,000 rubles ($5,500–$7,500) and another 23 regions with payments from 400,000 to 500,000 rubles ($4,300–$5,400).

War heroes or soldiers of fortune?

The average monthly salary in Russia, according to Rosstat, was 73,000 rubles in March 2024, while the median was 56,500 rubles. Thus, the average one-time payment is about seven times the average monthly Russian salary or about nine times the median. The monthly per capita income in Russia in the first quarter of 2024 was 45,000 rubles, and the median was 36,500 rubles. Therefore, the average one-time payment is equivalent to 11 monthly per capita incomes and 13.5 median incomes, roughly corresponding to the annual per capita income of a Russian resident.

However, these national average incomes and salaries do not reflect the real significance of the payment for residents of less affluent regions. Thus, in seven regions the lump-sum payment is 12-33 times higher than the regional average salary, and 18-64 times higher than the average per capita regional monthly income. This means that in these regions, the payment is more than what can be earned in an average job over a period of one to three years. In another 33 regions, the payment is equivalent to six months to a year's average regional salary. In terms of per capita income, the one-time payment exceeds the annual per capita income in 28 regions and falls within the range of six months to a year in another 40 regions.

The main appeal of the one-time payment is that it allows families to immediately resolve significant financial issues: make a mortgage or car loan payment, do repairs, or pay off debts. The regions with the highest signing bonuses, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic and the Republic of Adygea, are among the top ten regions in the country in terms of the share of overdue debts to banks: 6.3% and 5.7%, respectively, compared to the national average of 3.41%, according to Novaya Gazeta Europe.

Leading regions in terms of the ratio of a lump-sum payment for signing a military contract to the average salary and average per capita monthly income

Ratio of lump-sum payment for signing a military contract to average salary and average monthly income in Russian regions

In brief, a contract soldier going to war receives a monthly salary almost three times higher than the national average and a one-time payment equal to six months to a year of average income in their region. This is undoubtedly a very competitive offer, especially considering that in the peripheral regions of Russia, from where most ‘volunteer’ contract soldiers come, this ratio is even more impressive.

This new situation has significant implications for the perception of the war by the Russian population as a whole. According to observations by Russian sociologists, the discussion of whether to sign a contract and the purchases made by the families of those who have signed such contracts are constantly discussed topics in low-income, low-employment provincial Russian towns (→ Re:Russia: Parallel Cheremushkin). As a result, the social frameworks for understanding the war have changed. A year ago, official narratives stimulated patriotic mobilisation by referring to patterns of the Great Patriotic War, urging people to fulfil their duty to the Motherland and voluntarily support the front from the home front. Today, those who have gone to war are seen by their peers more as ‘soldiers of fortune’ who have taken on a dangerous but well-paid job. Accordingly, the attitude towards casualties and injuries has also changed, now seen not so much as sacrifices for public service but as known risks of this venture. Consequently, the perception of those fighting is more reminiscent of the attitude towards soldiers of European powers during the colonial wars.

Humans and drones

In early April, the Ministry of Defence announced that it had already recruited more than 100,000 new contract soldiers since the beginning of the year. The statement was partly propaganda, and it is likely that the real figure is lower. However, according to the Financial Times, in early 2024, British military intelligence also estimated the increase in contract soldiers at 30-40,000 people per month. Not everyone agrees with these estimates, but if we take their lower limit as a base, about 180,000 people could have been recruited in the first half of 2024. The Ministry of Defence's goal, according to experts, is 300,000, which will allow it to create a critical manpower advantage at the front, avoiding a new wave of mobilisation. 

The urgent increase in payment amounts since the beginning of the year, especially in May-June, indicates that recruitment rates were falling under previous conditions, and the Ministry of Defence could not reach its target trajectory. However, the current increase in payments and contract rates are not unsustainable costs for the Russian economy and state finances. Given that the size of payments has gradually increased over the past few months, the total expenditure on one-time payments since the beginning of the year can be estimated at approximately $800-850 million, and the financial maintenance of newly recruited contract soldiers (based on 180,000 people) at about $1.4 billion for six months.

While the terms of a military contract, as shown above, are financially quite competitive (a salary almost three times higher than the average, and a payment ranging from half a year to a year's average earnings), the important question remains the degree of risk of loss of life and health, which also affects its competitiveness.

According to the BBC and Mediazone project,which tracks Russian manpower losses, confirmed losses from the start of the war to January 2024 amounted to almost 40,000 people, but the real losses are likely twice as high. This ratio is indicated by both examinations of military cemeteries and the approximate number of opened inheritance cases. Thus, approximately 40,000 Russian servicemen have been killed in each year of the war. If the Ministry of Defence recruits 300,000 contract servicemen within a year, with at least 300,000 military personnel already in the combat zone, and the overall rate of casualties remains the same, the dead will account for about 7% of the total Russian military contingent.

This is a high level. However, with the intense offensive the Russian army is trying to conduct, the current casualty figures are likely to be higher than the average over the two years of the war. This is also indicated by some frontline reports: This is indicated by some front-line reports: the Russian army not only suffers high losses due to attempts to attack enemy positions but also faces a sharp increase in the number of drones available to the Ukrainian army, which creates significant asymmetry in losses between the sides (Novaya Gazeta Europe provides a vivid account of the conditions of the Russian offensive). According to British military intelligence, Russian losses in May may have exceeded 1200 per day.

If this trend continues and Ukraine is able to compensate for the disparity in manpower through 'unmanned military forces' and the likelihood of death for new Russian contractors increases substantially, the competitiveness of contracts will diminish and the new contract model will come to a standstill. However, for now, the Russian authorities see the current summer offensive as a ‘window of opportunity’ to increase their manpower advantage, created both by delays in the delivery of Western military aid to Ukraine (→ Re:Russia: Window of Defeat) and by the competitive contracting model they have found, and thus they are continuing the 'contract race’.