Europe's Strategic Autonomy. Part 1: Are Europeans ‘free riders’ in NATO? The short answer – no

An unequal alliance: the advantages and disadvantages of asymmetry

The war in Ukraine and the new US administration’s aggressive demand that Europe take responsibility for its own security came as a shock to Europeans, shaking them out of their ‘comfort of illusions’ regarding the continent’s actual security situation, writes Jack Watling, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI). Europe has found itself strategically vulnerable – not only to the Russian threat but also to Donald Trump’s decision to negotiate European security matters without Europe’s participation, violating the fundamental principles of Euro-Atlantic partnership.

Trump justifies his disregard for European interests and exclusion of Europe from negotiations and decision-making by citing what he sees as Europe’s insufficient contribution to collective security. These accusations are not new; they echo criticisms made during his first presidential term, when the term ‘free riders’ was used to suggest that Europeans were securing their safety at the expense of American taxpayers. While this perspective is now widely accepted not only in the US but also in Europe, it is far less justified than it may seem.

From the early 1950s to the early 1970s, the US accounted for over 75% of all NATO military expenditures. Between the 1970s and 1990s, this share declined somewhat, averaging 70% versus 30% for European allies. Later, NATO allies' share fell to 25%, but this was not primarily due to their reduced spending; rather, it resulted from a sharp increase in US military expenditures as America waged war against radical Islamism, invaded Afghanistan, and later Iraq.

Defence spending by the US and all other NATO members, 1953-2023, billion US dollars (constant 2022 dollars)

This arrangement was generally satisfactory for both sides until the 2000s. The fact that the US allies’ share of total defence spending was low had a flip side. In reality, the US always played the key command role in the alliance. Moreover, NATO relied on American intelligence and, to some extent, military infrastructure. In a sense, it functioned as an extension of the US military apparatus in Europe, where European members provided manpower, weapons, local infrastructure, and command structures for the European theatre.

Although never explicitly stated, NATO was neither conceived, created, nor operated as an equal partnership. According to the NATO charter, member states submit their instruments of ratification to the US government. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact was structured with the Soviet Union as its leader and patron of the military alliance.

This structure aligned with theoretical perspectives suggesting that asymmetric alliances are not only more common in international politics than symmetric ones but also considered more stable (this view, in particular, was theorised in the writings of James Morrow in the early 1990s and remains foundational in international relations theory). The ‘junior’ members of an alliance gain security at a lower cost, while the 'senior' members maintain freedom of decision-making and action beyond shared responsibilities.

In reality, US allies in NATO (Europe, Turkey, and Canada) increased their defence spending throughout the Cold War, reaching $290 billion by the late 1980s (according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI; constant 2022 dollars), increasing 2.3 times to the levels of the mid-1950s. However, after that, their spending largely stagnated despite NATO expanding to include 13 new European members between 1999 and 2017, effectively doubling its membership. In real terms, the combined defence expenditures of US allies in NATO averaged $275 billion annually in the 25 years following the Cold War – about 95% of 1990 levels. However, with more European countries joining NATO, relative military spending as a share of GDP steadily declined. While European NATO members (the 'old' allies) spent an average of 3% of GDP on defence at the end of the Cold War, this figure dropped to 2% by the mid-1990s and to 1.5% by the mid-2000s. Notably, US defence spending followed a similar trajectory, decreasing from 6% in the final phase of the Cold War to 3% on the eve of 11 September.

This twofold difference in defence spending can be explained by the fact that, unlike the US, Europe did not seek global dominance or take responsibility for maintaining military balance in other regions. At the same time, its close alliance with the world’s leading superpower disproportionately enhanced European security, while the US benefited from cementing its dominant position both in the Euro-Atlantic theatre and beyond. This situation precisely aligned with Morrow’s model.

Defence spending as a share of GDP in the US and 13 European NATO members, 1971-2023, %

Europe's new reality and strategic crossroads

However, the US perspective on NATO funding shifted significantly at the turn of the 2010s. On one hand, the US had become deeply entangled in military operations in the Middle East, with defence spending nearly doubling – from $523 billion in 1999 to $990 billion in 2010 – reaching almost 5% of GDP. At the same time, the US government and establishment recognised the urgent need to expand their presence in the Asia-Pacific region in response to China’s growing power. A strategic shift in US foreign and military policy from Europe to the Pacific was officially outlined in the 2011 Foreign Policy Strategy introduced by the Obama administration. Importantly, this was a bipartisan decision. However, alongside this shift, the US also decided not to increase but to reduce military spending to curb national debt growth. By 2016, defence spending had dropped to 3.4% of GDP, where it remains today.

This combination of priorities made it imperative to increase NATO allies' contributions to European security. At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, a directive was agreed upon requiring all member states to raise defence spending to at least 2% of GDP. However, until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, progress toward this goal was sluggish. Even today, compliance with this directive is more formal than substantive. While Poland, the US, Greece, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania allocate between 2.85% and 4% of GDP to defence, eight NATO countries spend less than 2%, and six – Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Canada – spend less than 1.5%, despite not being among the poorest members. The remaining 17 NATO countries fall within the 2–2.5% range.

At the same time, NATO allies have increased their defence spending at a significantly faster rate than America. According to NATO data published in 2024, since 2014, European NATO members and Canada have boosted their real defence expenditures by nearly 40%, reaching $430 billion, whereas US spending has risen by only 14%. As a result, the allies' share of total NATO military expenditures has grown to 36% – one of the highest levels in the alliance’s history (NATO calculates expenditures in constant 2015 dollars, leading to some discrepancies with SIPRI data). This is one of the highest levels in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty.

So the short answer to the question of whether Europe is a ‘free rider’, is ‘no’. Europe contributes to NATO as it always has, if not more. The alliance's asymmetric structure has historically justified the gap in spending, with the US maintaining dominant military command and infrastructure. While US defence spending remains 1.75 times higher than that of all other allies combined, not all of this spending directly benefits NATO’s collective defence. Key decisions – such as the invasion of Iraq and the pivot to the Pacific – were made by the US without NATO-wide consultation. Europe, for its part, has largely met the commitments set in 2014. Trump's current demands represent a new condition linked to rising US expenditures on containing China, yet he is willing to challenge or even nullify NATO treaty obligations in the process.

Moreover, meeting Trump’s demand to raise European defence spending to 3.5% of GDP – an increase of over $300 billion – would bring European and US contributions to NATO to near parity. This would fundamentally alter NATO’s structure, ending its asymmetrical nature. Accordingly, Europe’s political role in the alliance would also have to evolve.

This does not mean Europe should avoid increasing defence spending. On the contrary, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that such increases are necessary. The key question is how to channel these additional resources into European security and what political guarantees Europe can expect in return.

Currently, European NATO members and Canada collectively spend $430 billion on defence, making them the world’s second-largest military spender – half of the US defence budget and 40% higher than China’s. Yet Europe lacks a unified army, and NATO forces in Europe remain vulnerable and militarily weak without US involvement. This dependence limits Europe's ability to defend its political positions and pursue its own strategic course, as seen in the case of Ukraine.

Given the erosion of bipartisan consensus in US foreign policy, deepening disagreements with the current US administration, and growing transatlantic distrust, increasing defence spending within the existing political framework is becoming increasingly meaningless for Europe.