Choosing an Enemy: Despite the approval of the aid package for Ukraine, the debate surrounding the strategic priorities for US foreign policy is not losing steam and will only intensify

As the US presidential election approaches, anti-China rhetoric from both presidential candidates is only likely to intensify. This is expected by both the electorate and prominent voices in the political and business establishment. 

According to a poll conducted in March by Gallup, 41% of Americans name China as the main enemy of the United States, while only 26% name Russia. It is worth noting that the perception of these confrontations in 2023 was somewhat dulled compared to the previous year: at that time, 50% of Americans surveyed called China their main enemy, and 32% named Russia. However, the main takeaway from the survey is not this but that among Democrats, 48% call Russia the main enemy and only 18% name China, while among Republicans, 67% point to China in this regard, and only 10% to Russia (the same amount, 11%, name Iran). Independent respondents tend to align with the Republican view: 40% of them consider China the main enemy and only 21% Russia.

In a similar survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in April, respondents were asked to prioritise American foreign policy objectives by choosing more than one answer. In such a ranking, containing Russia and containing China turned out to be tasks of equal importance: the former was chosen by 50% of respondents and the latter by 49%. At the same time, the task of containing Russia increased slightly after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war (cited by 42% of those surveyed in 2018 and 2021), while the scale of the perceived threat from China increased markedly in Americans' eyes over several years prior to this (from 32% in 2018 to 48% in 2021), it has remained almost unchanged since the war began. Party views almost mirror each other, with 57% of Democrats noting the containment of Russia as a top priority, and only 42% mentioning China; this is 45% and 59%, respectively, among Republicans.

Democrats in the Biden administration are trying to bridge this gap in priorities by insisting that China and Russia should be seen in conjunction, since China provides much of Russia's diplomatic and economic cover. Both countries aim to disrupt the established world order and weaken US influence. According to State Department Spokesman Matthew Miller, Russia's military efforts are backed by China's vast economic resources. Viewing competition with China as a long-term challenge and priority, the Biden administration is focusing on developing alliances, including in Europe, Asia (QUAD and AUKUS), and the Global South, as well as on limiting China's access to critical US technologies and investing in sectors where it can gain an advantage in the next technological leap forward (particularly in the production of green energy components). The Biden administration is focused on developing a long-term strategy for competition with China, which also involves reducing current tensions and continuing negotiations, which are unlikely to lead to a significant change in the trajectory of escalating competition, analysts at Chatham House note. In their view, in the short term, demonstrating American containment capabilities should be focused on Russia, which, in particular, will help to strengthen the American alliance with Europe.

This strategy has been criticised both by Trump himself and by Republican hawks who see the policy of appeasement of China as harmful and dangerous. A striking example of this approach is a recent article by Matt Pottinger, former Deputy National Security Adviser to the US president, and Mike Gallagher, former Head of the US House of Representatives Committee on China, published in Foreign Affairs. They believe that it is not enough for the United States to simply compete with Beijing, rather the United States must defeat it, as China is waging a Cold War against them and pursuing a series of global initiatives aimed at disintegrating the West and establishing an anti-democratic order. Like the first Cold War, the new one cannot be won by half-measures. The current US administration is downplaying the threat posed by the PRC, and appeasement tactics are only giving China time and opportunities to better prepare for confrontation. Thus, while Beijing agrees to engage in dialogue on responsible use of artificial intelligence, it is simultaneously using it as a weapon against the U.S.

Pottinger and Gallagher compare this situation to the ‘détente’ of the 1970s. The Soviet Union continued to act against US interests around the world while Washington cut back on defence spending. The turnaround came only after the Soviet Union sponsored the Cuban landing in Africa and invaded Afghanistan. Ronald Reagan, who was elected to the White House in 1981, abandoned the policy of appeasement of the USSR, stating that ‘“détente” was a one-way street that the Soviet Union used to achieve its goals.’ Unlike his predecessors, Reagan spoke of the need to win the Cold War not in the long term, but by setting this task as an immediate goal. Washington must make a similar U-turn today with regards to China. The power of US deterrence must be demonstrated today to prevent the deaths of tens of thousands of US troops as a result of a direct Chinese attack on Taiwan. Washington should increase defence spending from 3% to 4 or 5% of GDP; an additional $20 billion a year should be spent over the next five years to build sufficient combat power in Asia. At the same time, tariffs should be raised on the entry of Chinese firms into the US market and the flow of US money and technology to Chinese companies should be stopped. Thus, they argue that Trump should become a ‘second Reagan’ aimed at undermining the new strategic rival of the United States, which is no longer Russia, but China.

Such a prospect may be appealing and resonate with Trump. Assessing his foreign policy ideology (which, however, remains hazy on many important points), analysts note that it is not entirely accurate to label it as ‘isolationist’. Trump is a global isolationist, meaning that US power is his absolute priority. It is more accurate to describe him as ‘protectionist, nationalist and transactionalist’, James Lindsay, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, believes. This means he is much more sceptical of international alliances and tends to view them purely in pragmatic terms. 

Trump's 'conciliatory' stance towards Russia demonstrates, on the one hand, his traditional (at least) non-hostile approach towards Putin. Trump's meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (who had met with Putin shortly before) once again demonstrated the ‘anti-liberal axis’ linking the three politicians. At the same time, Trump's position on the conflict in Ukraine can be interpreted as a continuation of the ideas expressed by the hawks: it makes no sense for the US to focus on this conflict and contain Russia, whose economic and military capabilities are now almost entirely dependent on China, but to focus on the main adversary (this was partly the position of analysts at RAND, who have indicated that the conflict in Ukraine shifts the focus of US foreign policy from the main confrontation to a peripheral one, → Re: Russia: Pigeons or Ostriches?) Ultimately, one of the factors in the US victory in the Cold War was the conflict between the USSR and China and a significant improvement in relations between Washington and Beijing in the 1980s. This construct must now be reproduced in inverted form.