Centralisation Blind Spots: Elites in Russia and China have similar perceptions of the factors of their competitiveness, justifying their choice in favour of autocracy and unification

The most important role in predicting the behaviour of a country on the international stage is played by an understanding of how its elites view its competitive advantages and, accordingly, the social conditions that can suppress or maximise these advantages. This is the conclusion of a special report by the RAND Corporation. Long-term and value-based confrontation with countries such as China and Russia require an understanding of the drivers that shape their goals and capabilities during the confrontation, while at the same time allowing for a better understanding of one's own goals and advantages. The RAND Corporation itself was founded in the immediate aftermath of World War II with the aim of mobilising the potential of the US scientific community and linking it to centres of political decision-making in the country’s long confrontation with the Soviet Union and its satellites and allies. Now, the organisation claims to be working on the most strategically important issues in the context of a new prolonged rivalry.

The way the elites of China and Russia think about their own competitive advantages determines the models of social and political organisation that they consider preferable and eventually impose on their country. The researchers, however, immediately stipulate that when analysing the views of the Soviet and Chinese elites, it is difficult to distinguish between real beliefs and those imposed by propaganda, since in both China and Russia people are not always free to express doubts. On the other hand, the competitiveness narratives promoted by the elites of these countries have been fairly stable. They were often developed long before the existing political regimes emerged and experienced political transformations, reappearing in a new guise under the current regime. Moreover, they have been reproduced by elites even in periods of greater openness in both countries or in conditions of emigration when these elites find themselves in the West.

The Chinese and Russian narratives of national competitive advantage have many similarities, according to the analysts at RAND. Recipes for national success in both countries emphasise three elements: strong centralised power, nationalism (unified national identity) and national ambition, imposed on top of national cultural values. The underlying assumption of such a recipe is that these elements will provide the country with an advantage, despite ignoring factors related to dynamism, openness, and internal competition.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese scholars have consistently emphasised the importance of the country's political institutions as the source of its strength. The notion that China has an institutional advantage over its rivals is a frequent feature of both Chinese official documents and scholarly writings by Chinese academics: it is stressed that the centralisation of power by the Communist Party allows for coordination and unity of effort in achieving its goals, which is not the case in Western countries with their political diversity and the need to accommodate competing political interests. In addition, the advantages of the Chinese model include political pragmatism, ideological discipline, national unity, traditional culture and values. The Russian formula for success looks as follows: autocracy (autocratic rule) is responsible for order, Orthodoxy (traditional religion) provides the moral and spiritual basis, and military might guarantees the preservation of this structure and the ability to follow its 'special path'.

In such an understanding of national competitive advantages, certain ‘blind spots’ exist, the analysts note. By favouring rigid centralised control, both countries miss out on the benefits that come with the values of open societies: grassroots initiatives and innovation, horizontal linkages and supportive institutions, etc. Self-interest and confidence in their own national superiority reduce Moscow's and Beijing's ability to build long-term strategic partnerships. They are driven by a utilitarian approach to the choice of allies, which makes it impossible to form any ideological, value-based, lasting ties with other countries.

At the same time, because of their unwavering belief in their superiority and unified national values, and their fetishisation of vertical control, China and Russia tend to exaggerate their strength and ability to defeat their adversaries. This increases their propensity to unleash and escalate conflicts, but in the long run increases the risk of defeat, the RAND analysts conclude.

Indeed, it is hard to ignore the fact that roughly the same notions of competitive advantage were promoted by the regimes of these countries during the second half of the 20th century and ultimately determined their uncompetitiveness. Having survived the economic crises and abandoned the mobilisation model of the economy, the new generation of leaders, who came of age during the decline of the mobilisation model (Putin and Xi Jinping are practically the same age), reproduce the same ideas about the conditions of national competitiveness, believing that they now have a more secure economic foundation.

At the same time, at least with regard to Russia, many social studies question the strength of these values of collectivism and traditionalism in Russian society (→ Re: Russia: The Wedge of Conservatism) and there has been a significant well-documented shift towards individualistic values, reinforced by consumerist patterns of recent decades. The Russian authorities are obviously trying to ignore these trends or even reverse them. However, as a result, they find themselves focused not so much on maximising competitive advantage but rather on fighting the 'internal enemy', eventually losing sight of the pragmatic perspective of centralisation.