The Russia-Ukraine conflict has revealed a split between Soviet and national identities across almost the entire post-Soviet space, including Central Asia. This conclusion can be drawn from an analytical report by the Kazakh research centre PaperLab, based on surveys conducted by the Central Asia Barometer, Demoscope and PaperLab itself, as well as focus groups conducted in the summer of 2023 in the largest cities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
As in Russia, TV consumption by older respondents determines their greater engagement and (albeit one-sided) awareness of the conflict, while younger respondents receive information about it on an ad hoc basis, via social networks and online media.
However, there is a distinct variation in attention to the war at the country level. For example, in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2022, it was reported that 74% of those surveyed were following the situation in Ukraine, in Kazakhstan this was 71%, and in Uzbekistan it was only 48%. This difference is related both to the penetration level of Russian media, primarily television, and to practical involvement. In Kyrgyzstan, people often noted that their attention to the situation is connected to concern for relatives and acquaintances working in Russia. Elderly respondents more often related this to the shared Soviet past. Finally, in Kazakhstan, concerns about the country getting involved in a conflict with Russia as a result of territorial claims by Moscow appears quite pronounced.
However, by the second year of the war, attention to the war in Kazakhstan had significantly decreased. Russia's 'entanglement' in the war reduced the level of these concerns, as respondents explicitly stated in the focus groups. However, the overall assessment of the 'Russian threat' - the likelihood of a Russian attack on Kazakhstan — has increased over time from 26% in November 2022 to 39% in the spring of 2023. However, this should be seen as evidence of growing negative attitudes towards Russia in Kazakh society and a more widespread narrative of Russian 'aggressive imperialism', which before the war was obscured by the myth of good neighbourliness and a shared past.
At the start of the war, the highest level of justification for Russian aggression was observed in Uzbekistan (47%; the only survey with this formulation). In Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2022, 34% justified the Russian invasion, while in Kazakhstan, it was 30%. In Kyrgyzstan, by the second year of the war, the proportion justifying Russia’s aggression remained almost unchanged, while in Kazakhstan, it decreased to 23%, and the proportion of opponents increased from 44% to 48%.
Moreover, there is a much more pronounced age difference in the perception of the conflict in Kazakhstan: 19% of those in the youngest age groups and 38% of those in older groups consider the invasion justified, while in Kyrgyzstan it is 35% and 44%, respectively. This is due both to a more 'nationalistic' perception of political events and to the fact that Kazakh youth are much more engaged in the consumption of online political content. As indicated by focus group materials, they follow Russian opposition bloggers, and among the popular local political blogs they engage with, many are quite critical of Russia. At the same time, in Kazakhstan, support for the ‘special military operation’ is much more dependent on the consumption of Russian media content. In Kyrgyzstan, this correlation is much weaker with a higher level of approval for aggression. This may be related to the more pro-Russian position of local media compared to Kazakhstan.
Over the course of the conflict, in the three surveys, the proportion of those blaming Russia was 27% in Kazakhstan and 14% in Kyrgyzstan, and these figures remained virtually unchanged. The proportion who blame Ukraine in Kazakhstan stood at around 20% and also remained virtually unchanged, but in Kyrgyzstan it fell markedly from 36% at the beginning of the conflict to 25% in the second year of the war. In Kyrgyzstan, the language of communication did not influence the choice between Ukraine and Russia as much as it did the assessment of the role of the US and NATO. Among those who preferred to use Russian, 23% named them as responsible for the conflict, while among those who preferred to use Kyrgyz, just 14% did. In other words, domestic Russification entails greater consumption of censored Russian media content and deeper internalisation of Russian official narratives. In general, the narratives of those who are more sympathetic to Russia repeat similar Russian narratives and Russian propaganda talking points. Those with a negative attitude towards Russian aggression point out its imperial nature and emphasise Putin's personal responsibility, attributing the influence of 'Covid isolation' and age-related cognitive changes to his decision to invade.
In Uzbekistan as a whole, the general population has a much more detached view of the Russia-Ukraine war. At the same time (at least at the beginning of the war), the influence of Russian official narratives was very noticeable here. In Kyrgyzstan, the penetration of Russian media and official Russian narratives is significantly stronger than in Kazakhstan, where its influence is largely characteristic of older age groups. Moreover, these narratives are countered to a much lesser extent by the national anti-Russian narrative. In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, attitudes towards Russia have seriously deteriorated over the course of the war, alongside a dramatic increase in the influence of anti-imperial narratives, fuelled both by the national narrative of potential victimhood and the influence of Russian-language anti-war political content. But, in general, it seems that the influence of Russian narratives in the post-Soviet space is declining as the Soviet generation with its mythology of a 'common past' passes away and the role of television as a source of news and 'interpretations' diminishes.