Russian occupation policy in Ukraine is designed to create 'irreversible influence for several generations' on local residents and make their reintegration into Ukrainian life impossible, notes the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its report on the policy of forced Russification and integration of occupied territories. Russia's actions are driven by Vladimir Putin's stated goal, outlined in an article, to replace the political, social, and linguistic identity of Ukraine's inhabitants with a Russian one. People, in particular, are considered by the Kremlin as the main resource, intended to compensate for the unfavourable demographic trend in Russia itself. The total number of Ukrainians either residing in the occupied territories or relocated to Russia under various pretexts is nearly 10 million people (around 7% of Russia's pre-war population).
The strategy and comprehensive measures of forced Russification were developed in annexed Crimea and partly used in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, according to the analysts. After a sham referendum, which served as the basis for the territory's inclusion into Russia, compulsory passportisation campaigns were conducted in Crimea. Russian authorities are actively employing these techniques in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. As reported by the European Broadcasting Union's network of investigative journalists, during the flooding caused by the Nova Kakhovka dam explosion in June 2023, humanitarian aid was only provided to holders of Russian passports. Residents of occupied territories who did not accept Russian citizenship face difficulties in accessing medical assistance even in critical situations (for example, diabetic patients are unable to receive insulin). The Russian authorities also actively use subsidies, pensions, and other economic and social incentives to strengthen residents' dependence on local administrations. According to Putin's decree, after 1 July, 2024, 'foreign citizens and stateless persons' residing in these territories may be deported. In this regard, the occupation authorities have already warned about the establishment of filtration points and camps. By the end of September 2023, according to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russian passports were issued to 2.2 million people in the occupied territories.
A crucial component of the Russification strategy is repopulation — stimulating the relocation of the local population into the depths of Russia and simultaneously settling the occupied territories with Russians. This tactic was also previously used in Crimea. According to the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, since 2014, Russian authorities have resettled up to 800,000 Russian citizens in Crimea and forced around 100,000 Ukrainian citizens to leave the peninsula (according to official data, the population of Crimea decreased by 90,000 people in 2014 after annexation and had increased again by 40,000 people by 2021). The strategy of 'commercially' attracting Russian migrants was also tested in Crimea through mortgage programmes.
In October 2023, Maria Lvova-Belova, the Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, stated that since 24 February, 2022, Russia had 'accepted' over 4.8 million Ukrainians, including 700,000 children (Ukrainian authorities know of the names of about 20,000 displaced children; Re:Russia has previously reported on this). The displacement of Ukrainians often takes place under humanitarian pretexts, as was the case during the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the autumn of 2022 in the Kherson region, where about 22,000 Ukrainian citizens were deported to Russia due to the 'increased danger of mass shelling and the threat of terrorist attacks' on Russian territory.
The 'saturation' of territories with Russian citizens primarily occurs through the recruitment of personnel to government bodies, municipal services, educational and medical institutions, as well as through extensive hiring for construction work. Additionally, it should be noted that many cities, especially Mariupol, were almost completely destroyed by Russian troops during the siege. Therefore, for local residents, the key issue and, accordingly, the most important tool of forced Russification, loyalty purchases, and even forced migration is the 'housing issue', as indicated by a recent investigation by 'Novaya Gazeta Europe'.
It is impossible to receive assistance or compensation for housing restoration without obtaining Russian citizenship. The semi-coerced relocation of Ukrainian citizens from the occupied territories is also carried out through the 'housing issue'. The 'Kherson Certificate' programme offers people who have lost their normal housing due to the Russian offensive new housing in Russian territory. In Mariupol, indigenous residents are resettled to the outskirts, demolishing their semi-destroyed homes to clear the centre for new construction. The 'elite' development in the centre of Mariupol, priced at 100,000 rubles per square metre, is supported by a preferential mortgage programme at 2% interest, which is clearly aimed primarily at Russians. As reported by 'Meduza', this project is actively promoted with powerful viral advertising on the Russian-language Internet. Thus, Russian authorities aim to create a cohort of beneficiaries of the Russian occupation who will become their stronghold in the captured territories.
An important element of Russification is the education system for children and youth, which is brought in line with Russian standards, aimed at indoctrination in accordance with the concept of denying Ukrainian identity and involves replacing Ukrainian language, literature, and history lessons with Russian ones, as well as actively militarising Ukrainian schoolchildren and preparing them to fight against their compatriots, the ISW report notes.
Finally, a significant but unaddressed part of this strategy is terror, targeting manifestations of Ukrainian identity and disloyalty to the occupation regime. Journalists have documented numerous cases of abduction and torture in the occupied territories and systematised the accounts of people who have experienced occupation in Kherson, which reveals a standard scenario of detentions and 'preventive' violence. The UN Commission on the Investigation of Events in Ukraine also reported the 'widespread and systematic use of torture by Russian authorities' in Ukraine in its October 2023 report.
It should be noted that the main instrument of Russification, capable of ensuring its success, is money via significant financing of the occupied territories from the Russian budget. According to Russian regional economics specialist Natalia Zubarevich, 12% of all federal budget transfers, which is almost one in eight rubles, goes to the occupied territories. This is almost twice as much as was allocated for the integration of Crimea and Sevastopol after their occupation (7% of all budget transfers). In addition, the 'new territories' are financed through 'patronage assistance' programmes from Russian regions. However, in reality, this is most likely also money from the federal budget, which may explain the anomalous growth in housing and utilities expenses included in the regional budgets for 2024.
ISW believes that Russia's efforts to establish control over the occupied territories and assimilate the population are reversible, but the viability of this task will depend directly on the duration of the occupation period. Thus, establishing a ceasefire regime and freezing the conflict along the current front line will strengthen Russia's positions in the occupied territories and create a platform for the propaganda of the occupation and Moscow's further advancement.