Double Mobilisation: Russia and Ukraine need to mobilise 300,000 men each for a decisive clash by the end of the year

Both Ukraine and Russia need large-scale mobilisation on the eve of a summer military campaign. Analysts assume that Ukraine needs to mobilise at least 300,000 people to hold the front line after the fall of Avdiivka. Putin needs to mobilise roughly the same number of troops to take advantage of the window of opportunity created for him by the blocking of US aid by Republicans in Congress who are loyal to Trump, and to be in the best possible position by the time the US decides the winner in the battle for the White House (→ Re:Russia: The Putin-Trump Plan).

Delayed mobilisation

The discussion about the need for widespread mobilisation in Ukraine began in December of last year. At that time, Volodymyr Zelensky diverted responsibility for the initiative to Valery Zaluzhny, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and opposed it, soon thereafter dismissing Zaluzhny. In the midst of the conflict with the popular commander, Zelensky decided not to risk his own rating and postponed the unpopular decision. As a result, Ukraine may find itself in a situation similar to that in which the Russian army found itself by the end of the summer of 2022, when Putin's desire to avoid mobilisation led to a partial collapse of the front.

The new Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, has said that as a result of an audit of military units, the General Staff revised the estimate of 500,000 mobilised personnel significantly downwards, without giving a specific figure. However, even at this scale, mobilisation poses a serious challenge both politically and financially. According to calculations by the Ukrainian project Texty, Ukraine's total mobilisation resource is approximately 4.9 million people. However, the Ukrainian public has a contradictory attitude towards mobilisation: 54% of those surveyed agree with the statement that 'draft dodgers can be understood — no one wants to die', while only 17% disagree. Among the residents of Ukraine’s southern regions more than 70% sympathise with draft dodgers. At the same time, about 43% of those surveyed 'feel ashamed of men who evade mobilisation' (among residents of the southern regions, this figure stands at almost 50%). 

A survey conducted by the 'Rating' group in February on behalf of the International Republican Institute (IRI) shows that there remains potential support for mobilisation in society: 36% of those surveyed consider the current level of mobilisation to be insufficient in the current situation and only 18% believe that it is excessive. However, the picture looks much worse when segmented by age group: among respondents aged 18-29, the current level of mobilisation is considered excessive by about 30%, and insufficient by 20%, 30-year-olds equally perceive the level of mobilisation as excessive and insufficient, but among those over 40 the opinion that additional mobilisation is needed is beginning to prevail. Among those who are generally more likely to oppose the expansion of mobilisation (they believe that the current level is excessive), the view that Ukraine will have to put up with territorial losses is much more widespread. Among this group, only 36% believe that the country will regain its territories within the 1991 borders, while among those who support mobilisation this figure stands at 50%. In addition to the basic and natural factors (fear of death, wounds, captivity) respondents named unfair mobilisation rules (22%), poor uniforms and equipment (22%) and distrust of the government (18%) among the factors that prevent citizens from joining the army. 31% of those surveyed believe that strengthening material support for the army is the main means of increasing the attractiveness of service.

Before the second reading of the draft law on new mobilisation, scheduled for 10-11 April, the authorities are attempting to soften those provisions that could become a focus for public discontent in order to prevent a further decline in public support for Zelensky, as noted by the Stratfor Institute. Among other things, deputies have softened penalties for draft dodgers (for example, they have abandoned the idea of freezing the bank accounts of those not registered for military service), focusing on improving conditions for mobilised individuals, as well as including a provision in the bill on demobilisation upon completion of service. However, even in its current form, Stratfor believes that the bill will trigger a new wave of attempts by Ukrainian men to leave the country illegally — since February 24, 2022, according to official data, European countries have granted temporary protection to 812,000 Ukrainian men aged 18 to 64.

The most controversial aspect of the planned reforms, experts say, is the introduction of the so-called system of economic reservation (exempting) from mobilisation, which will allow certain categories of men to make a monthly financial contribution of $520 to support the armed forces instead of serving in the army. Currently, Ukraine already has 528,000 'critical' workers who are not subject to mobilisation. The Verkhovna Rada estimates that up to 2 million men may benefit from the economic exemption scheme, which will raise the defence budget from $5.2 billion to $13.1 billion a year. This scheme was planned to be included in the draft law, but due to negative public reaction, it was decided that it should be introduced by a separate legislative act or a government decree.

According to estimates by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the mobilisation of 500,000 servicemen in 2024 would cost the budget $20.8 billion. Consequently, the conscription of 300,000 people would cost approximately $12.5 billion. These additional expenses could pose a serious challenge for the Ukrainian budget: the Ukrainian budget, with revenues of $46 billion, has expenditures of $87 billion, half of which is already allocated to defence, the Financial Times notes. Mobilisation threatens to increase Ukraine's budget deficit by a quarter, in a situation where financial assistance from the US, IMF, EU, and World Bank can only be used for non-military expenses.

Eight months and 300,000 for a breakthrough

According to many analysts, by 2025, Europe will be much better prepared to provide military assistance to Ukraine even without US involvement. Therefore, it makes sense for the Kremlin to rush to achieve its goals before the end of this year. Moreover, the advantage gained in recent months has prompted Vladimir Putin to expand his ambitions. According to many experts, in addition to the 'complete liberation' of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, he is once again aiming, if not for a complete victory, then for the capture of most of Kharkiv oblast, and possibly also Mykolaiv and Odesa (→ Re:Russia: Window of Defeat). According to President Zelensky, Ukraine expects Russia to try to mobilise an additional 300,000 troops by 1 June. 

Meanwhile, the Russian authorities are supporting the influx of 'volunteers' by increasing regional payments to those who sign contracts (in addition to the federal payment of 195,000 rubles). In recent weeks, Russian authorities have claimed a record influx, citing a patriotic surge after the terrorist attack at Crocus City. However, it is difficult to assess the impact of the attack, as the current influx is apparently primarily due to a sharp increase in payments. If we look at the 15 regions for which data is available as of early April, these payments vary widely from 200,000 to 1 million rubles, and have recently increased by about 40%, from 340,000 to 470,000 rubles on average (see table below). Meanwhile, to fulfil the Kremlin's plan for new contract workers, the regions are not only increasing payments from their budgets, but also coercing companies in their regions to participate.

On the whole, Russia's political and economic system is much better prepared for war thanks to the availability of both financial resources and coercive measures, writes economist Boris Grozovsky on the Kennan Institute blog. However, even in this situation, sources for replenishing the Russian army in 2024 are limited. The pace of recruitment is insufficient to achieve the planned summer breakthrough.

Since the decision to mobilise in 2022 was extremely unpopular and even shocking to society, the Kremlin will try to compensate for the deficit in other ways, military analyst Pavel Luzin argues in a commentary for the Centre for European Policy Analysis. For example, existing legislation allows conscripts to be sent to the battlefield after four months of military service, and the previously approved expansion of the Southern Military District to include occupied territories makes it possible to transfer conscripts to any part of the district without attracting public attention. However, such a decision would violate Putin's earlier promise not to send conscripts to Ukraine. It is most likely that in order to achieve the goals of the mobilisation campaign, army officials will increase pressure on conscripts to switch to contract service, Luzin writes. 

The persistence of the Kremlin's campaign to blame Ukraine for the terrorist attack in Crocus City indicates that they are banking on patriotic mobilisation. The lack of time and the prospect of solidifying gains by the end of the year with a temporary agreement or ceasefire supported by Trump may push Putin to go all-in and announce the mobilisation, albeit somewhat disguised. However, it is worth bearing in mind that, in order to get at least some capable formations, it is necessary to have a temporary lag of two to four months, as demonstrated by the experience of the first wave of mobilisation. In other words, in order to deploy these formations in the midst of the summer campaign, mobilisation should be announced no later than the second half of April or the first half of May.

However, the expansion of military objectives on the wave of expected success may play a cruel joke on the Kremlin. As analysts have repeatedly noted, a peculiarity of this war is that offensive campaigns come at too high a cost and ultimately undermine the strength of the attacking side. The paradox is that mobilisation is unlikely to give either side a decisive advantage, many experts believe. Nevertheless, both mobilisations in one form or another appear almost inevitable today.

The increase in regional supplements in addition to the federal payment of 195,000 roubles, thousand roubles

	At the beginning of the year	February-March	From 1 April
Saint Petersburg		695	1000
Rostov region		500	700
Rostov region			1000 (named battalion)
Moscow region	205
Moscow region			605 (named battalion)
Krasnodar region	200	500	1000
Irkutsk region		200	400
Nizhny Novgorod region			500
Astrakhan region	150	250	500
Smolensk region		200	255
Yaroslavl region		210	310
Tatarstan		305	400
Bryansk region	200	400
Chelyabinsk region	75	225
Novosibirsk region	100	205
FSIN (prisoners)		400	450

Source: data from the project "We Can Explain", the portal "Red Line" and the Conflict Intelligence Team project (the source of information on payments to prisoners is politician Ilya Yashin).